Foreign policy of China

Political scientist Dmitry Shlapentokh argues that Xi Jinping and his top leadership are developing plans for global predominance based on rapidly growing economic power. The ideological framework is a specialized blend of Marxist-Leninism, coupled with China's pre-1800 historic claims to world dominance. China's trade policy and drive for access to essential natural resources, such as gas, are articulated in terms of these ideological approaches. Beijing balances both purely economic goals with geopolitical strategies regarding the United States, Russia and other powers. Balancing those two powers gives China a clear advantage, for its totalitarian government could plan for generations and could change course regardless of the wishes of the electorate or clearly defined interest groups, as is the case with the modern capitalist West.[5]

Lowell Dittmer Argues that in dealing with the goal of dominance over East Asia, Beijing has to juggle its relations with the United States, which has more military and economic power in the region because of close U.S. ties with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Australia and other countries.[6]

Regarding the Middle East, where the United States has staked out a major position, China is tentatively moving in a much smaller scale. Analysts argue that Beijing is not yet ready to become a major force in shaping regional politics.[7][8][9]

China has shown a moderate interest in the Caribbean region in recent years, but not nearly on the same scale as its interest in Asia and Africa. It has been developing ties with Cuba, the Bahamas, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, as well as Colombia. These small countries have not by 2019 noticeably changed their foreign or domestic policies because of their new economic linkages with China. Nevertheless the governments pay more attention to Beijing's views. On the other hand, China's push into the Caribbean is increasingly resented by the United States and further escalation between the two major powers is a possibility in the region.[10][11]

China considers Taiwan area administered by Republic of China, part of its inviolable sovereign territory. In China's view, Taiwan is a separatist, breakaway province that must be reunified, by force if necessary. China exerts efforts for countries recognizing the ROC to switch their recognition to the People's Republic of China (PRC).[12][13][14][15] This has forced Taiwan to go to great lengths to maintain its extant diplomatic relations, particularly with countries that recognize the Republic of China as the one "China".[16]

It has passed the controversial Anti-Secession Law authorizing the use of military force in the event of unilateral separatist activity by the Government of Taiwan,[17] as outlined in § PRC's condition on military intervention.

China has staked its territorial claims in the disputed South China Sea with the Nine-Dash Line. Its claims are disputed by other countries.[18][19] The contested area in the South China Sea includes the Paracel Islands,[note 1] the Spratly Islands,[note 2][20] and various other areas including the Pratas Islands, the Macclesfield Bank and the Scarborough Shoal. The claim encompasses the area of Chinese land reclamation known as the "Great Wall of Sand".[21][22][23]

The United States Navy has conducted freedom of navigation operations asserting its position that some waters claimed by China are international waters.[24]

On July 12, 2016, an arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ruled that China has no legal basis to claim "historic rights" within its nine-dash line in a case brought by the Philippines. The tribunal judged that there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or resources within the Nine-Dash Line.

The ruling was rejected by both Taiwan and China.[25][26] The People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) stated that they did not recognize the tribunal and insisted that the matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations with other claimants.[27] However, the tribunal did not rule on the ownership of the islands or delimit maritime boundaries.[28][29]

Scholars have been probing the Chinese motivations and long-term expectations. One approach is to compare trends in multilateral Code of Conduct negotiations between 1992 and 2016. In general, the sovereignty issue regarding contested waters is no longer a central major concern For three reasons: the inconsistency of China's official claims over time, China's increased bargaining power, and the importance of the shelved sovereignty axiom since the era of Deng Xiaoping.[30][31]

Beijing has encouraged and help finance Chinese firms to develop enormous overseas interests since 2000. More established American and European corporations have strong locks on major markets, so the Chinese companies focus on areas with high political risks, such as Myanmar. The communist government in Beijing has increasingly intervened to secure these overseas business interests. The Chinese businessmen are encouraged to cultivate social institutions in key markets. In the case of Myanmar, China is confronting a much better established position of India.[32][33][34]

• South China Sea disputes
• Belt and Road Initiative
• Maritime Silk Road
• String of Pearls (Indian Ocean)
• Political status of Taiwan
• China and the United Nations

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