Turkey–United States relations

Turkish–American relations

Turkey
United States
Diplomatic Mission
Turkish Embassy, Washington D.C. United States Embassy, Ankara

Turkey–United States relations[1] in the post-World War II period evolved from the Second Cairo Conference in December 1943 and Turkey's entrance into World War II on the side of the Allies in February 1945, as a result of which Turkey became a charter member of the United Nations.[1] Difficulties faced by Greece after the war in quelling a communist rebellion, along with demands by the Soviet Union for military bases in the Turkish Straits, prompted the United States to declare the Truman Doctrine in 1947. The doctrine enunciated American intentions to guarantee the security of Turkey and Greece, and resulted in significant U.S. military and economic support.[2] This support manifested in the establishment of a clandestine stay-behind army, denoted the "Counter-Guerrilla", under Operation Gladio. After participating with United Nations forces in the Korean War, Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952.[3]

Relations between the countries began to deteriorate in 2003 as Turkey refused to allow the U.S. to use Incirlik Air Base for the invasion of Iraq, a process that intensified following the failed coup d'état attempt in Turkey in July 2016 as the country′s foreign policy has gradually re-orientated towards seeking partnerships with other powers such as Russia.[4][5][6]

A 2017 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center showed 79% of Turkish had a negative view of the US, with only 18% having a positive view.[7] The same study also showed only 11% of Turkish had confidence in the current US leader, President Donald Trump,[8][9] with 82% having no confidence in the current US president.[10]

Ottoman Empire

The United States fought the Barbary Wars against the Barbary states, which were under Ottoman suzerainty.

After 1780, the United States began relations with North African countries and with the Ottoman Empire.[11]

John Hay, the American Secretary of State, asked the Jewish American ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Oscar Straus, in 1899 to approach Sultan Abdul Hamid II to request for the Sultan to write a letter to the Moro Sulu Muslims of the Sulu Sultanate in the Philippines telling them to submit to American suzerainty and American military rule, the Sultan obliged them and wrote the letter, which was sent to Sulu via Mecca; two Sulu chiefs delivered it to Sulu and it was successful since the "Sulu Mohammedans... refused to join the insurrectionists and had placed themselves under the control of our army, thereby recognizing American sovereignty."[12] The Ottoman Sultan used his position as caliph to order the Sulu Sultan not to resist and not fight the Americans when they were invaded by Americans.[13] President McKinley did not mention the Ottoman role in the pacification of the Sulu Moros in his address to the first session of the Fifty-sixth Congress in December 1899 since the agreement with the Sultan of Sulu was not submitted to the Senate until December 18.[14] Despite the sultan "pan-Islamic" ideology, he readily acceded to Straus's request to avoid hostilities between the West and Muslims.[15] The Sulu sultan was persuaded by the Ottoman Sultan.[16] John P. Finley wrote that, After due consideration of these facts, the Sultan, as Caliph caused a message to be sent to the Mohammedans of the Philippine Islands forbidding them to enter into any hostilities against the Americans, inasmuch as no interference with their religion would be allowed under American rule. As the Moros have never asked more than that, it is not surprising, that they refused all overtures made, by Aguinaldo's agents, at the time of the Filipino insurrection. President McKinley sent a personal letter of thanks to Mr. Straus for the excellent work he had done, and said, its accomplishment had saved the United States at least twenty thousand troops in the field. If the reader will pause to consider what this means in men and also the millions in money, he will appreciate this wonderful piece of diplomacy, in averting a holy war."[17][18][19] The Muslim peoples obeyed the order.[20]

The Moro Rebellion then broke out in 1904, with war raging between the Americans and Moro Muslims and atrocities committed against Moro Muslim women and children, such as the Moro Crater Massacre.

Henry Morgenthau, Sr., was the U.S. Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire during World War I until 1916. His replacement Abram Isaac Elkus, served in 1916-1917. The Ottomans severed diplomatic relations with the United States on April 20, 1917, after the United States had declared war against Germany on April 4, 1917. Normal diplomatic relations were re-established with the Ottoman Empire's successor state, Turkey, in 1927. The United States never declared war on the Ottoman Empire.[21]

Early relationship

A Turkish stamp for the 150th anniversary of American Independence, with depictions of the Turkish president İsmet İnönü, and the president of the United States Franklin D. Roosevelt
1952 U.S. Army film about Turkey

One of Turkey's most important international relationships has been with the United States since the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War. Turkey's association with the United States began in 1947 when the United States Congress designated Turkey, under the provisions of the Truman Doctrine, as the recipient of special economic and military assistance intended to help it resist threats from the Soviet Union. A mutual interest in containing Soviet expansion provided the foundation of U.S.–Turkish relations for the next four decades. As a result of Soviet threats and U.S. assistance against them, Turkey moved away from a single-party elected government towards a multi party electoral system; in fact holding the multi party elections in 1946. In 1950,President İsmet İnönü was defeated by the main opposition party led by Adnan Menderes, who was elected by popular vote. In support of overall United States Cold War strategy, Turkey contributed personnel to the United Nations forces in the Korean War (1950–53), joined NATO in 1952, became a founding member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) collective defense pact established in 1955, and endorsed the principles of the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine. In the 1950s and 1960s, Turkey generally co-operated with other United States allies in the Middle East (Iran, Israel, and Jordan) to contain the influence of those countries (Egypt, Iraq, and Syria) regarded as Soviet clients. Throughout the Cold War, Turkey was the bulwark of NATO's southeastern flank, directly bordering Warsaw Pact countries and risking nuclear war on its soil during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Since 1954, Turkey has hosted the Incirlik Air Base, an important operations base of the United States Air Force, which has played a critical role during the Cold War, the Gulf War, and the recent Iraq War.

Turkish invasion of Cyprus

After the 1974 Cypriot coup d'état, backed by the Cypriot National Guard and the Greek military junta, Turkey sent its forces to Cyprus on July 20, 1974. In doing so, Turkey claimed to protect the safety of Turkish Cypriots under the Treaty of Guarantee. As a result of the military operation, Turkish forces took control of the northern third of Cyprus and divided the island along what became known as the Green Line monitored by the United Nations.

Turkey, only 75 km away, had repeatedly claimed, for decades before the invasion and frequently afterwards, that Cyprus was of vital strategic importance to it. Ankara has defied a host of UN resolutions demanding the withdrawal of its occupation troops from the island. About 142,000 Greek Cypriots living in the north – nearly one quarter of the population of Cyprus – were forcibly expelled from the occupied northern part of the island where they constituted 80% of the population. These people are still deprived of the right to return to their homes and properties. U.S. Congress imposed an embargo on arms sales to Turkey leading to tension and mistrust between Turkey and the United States.

The arms embargo was silently removed a few years later with the contribution of the geopolitical changes in the Middle East like Iranian Revolution. Recently published documents show the increasing importance of Turkey in the eyes of the Washington. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski discussed with his staff about a possible American invasion of Iran by using Turkish bases and territory if the Soviets would decide to repeat Afghanistan scenario in Iran, although this plan did not materialize.[22]

1980s

The 1978 American semi-biographical film Midnight Express was banned in Turkey under Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, causing a strain on US-Turkish relations.

During the 1980s, relations between Turkey and the United States gradually recovered the closeness of earlier years. In March 1980 Turkey and the United States signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA), in which the United States was granted access to 26 military facilities, in return for which Turkey could buy modern military hardware and was given $450 million to start shopping.[23] Although Ankara resented continued attempts by the United States Congress to restrict military assistance to Turkey because of Cyprus and to introduce congressional resolutions condemning the Armenian Genocide, the Özal government generally perceived the administration of President George H.W. Bush as sympathetic to Turkish interests. It was in this period that the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) was established and started to build F-16 Fighting Falcon jets under licence in Turkey. Washington also demonstrated its support of Özal's market-oriented economic policies and efforts to open the Turkish economy to international trade by pushing for acceptance of an International Monetary Fund program to provide economic assistance to Turkey. Furthermore, the United States, unlike European countries, did not persistently and publicly criticize Turkey over allegations of human rights violations. Also, the United States did not pressure Özal on the Kurdish problem, another issue that seemed to preoccupy the Europeans. By 1989 the United States had recovered a generally positive image among the Turkish political elite.

After the Cold War: 1990–2000

The end of the Cold War forced Turkish leaders to reassess their country's international position. The disappearance of the Soviet threat and the perception of being excluded from Europe have created a sense of vulnerability with respect to Turkey's position in the fast-changing global political environment. Özal believed Turkey's future security depended on the continuation of a strong relationship with the United States. For that reason, he supported the United States' position during the Gulf War, although Turkey's economic ties to Iraq were extensive and their disruption hurt the country. After the war, he continued to support major United States initiatives in the region, including the creation of a no-fly zone over northern Iraq, the Arab–Israeli peace process, and expanded ties with the Central Asian members of the CIS. Özal's pro-United States policy was not accepted by all Turks. The United States' use of Turkish military installations during the bombing of Iraq in 1991 led to antiwar demonstrations in several cities, and sporadic attacks on United States facilities continued in 1992 and 1993. Nevertheless, among Turkey's political elite, a consensus had emerged by January 1995 that Turkey's security depended on remaining a strategic ally of the United States. For that reason, both the Demirel and Çiller governments undertook efforts to cultivate relations with the administrations of presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton.

War on Terror: 2000s

The Turkish Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the Wardak Province of Afghanistan is part of the U.S. led-International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Turkey has remained a close ally of the United States, supporting it in the War on Terror in the post-September 11 climate. However, the Iraq War faced strong domestic opposition in Turkey and as such, the Turkish Parliament couldn't reach the absolute majority of 276 votes needed for allowing U.S. troops to attack Iraq from Turkey, the final tally being 264 votes for and 250 against. This led to a brief period of cooling in relations, particularly following the "hood event", which was perceived as an act of hostility in Turkey.

Ankara is particularly cautious about an independent Kurdish state arising from a destabilized Iraq. Turkey has fought an insurgent war against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a Kurdish guerrilla group (recognized as a terrorist organization by both the United States and the European Union) seeking Kurdish independence, in which more than 37,000 people have lost their lives. This has led Ankara to pressure the U.S. into clamping down on guerrilla training camps in northern Iraq, though the U.S. remains reluctant due to northern Iraq's relative stability compared to the rest of the country as well as its lack of spare forces to divert away from the more contentious areas of Iraq. On October 17, 2007, the Turkish Parliament voted in favour of allowing the Turkish Armed Forces to take military action against the PKK rebels based in northern Iraq.[24] In response, U.S. President George W. Bush stated that he did not believe it's in Turkey's interests to send troops into Iraq.[25]

In late 2007, Turkey recalled its ambassador to the United States after the House Committee on Foreign Affairs passed a United States resolution on the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire. This resulted in a delay of a full House vote on Res. 106. Speaker Pelosi has pledged to bring the resolution to a full vote, but pressure from the White House and Turkey has kept her from doing so.[26]

Nevertheless, the United States and Turkey share membership in NATO, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the G-20, and continue to cooperate in important projects, such as the Joint Strike Fighter program. The United States also actively supports Turkey's membership bid to join the European Union, lobbying frequently on behalf of Ankara through its diplomatic missions in EU capital cities. In June 2008, The United States and Turkey began to cooperate on peaceful uses of nuclear energy with a pact that aims for the transfer of technology, material, reactors and components for nuclear research and nuclear power production in Turkey for an initial 15-year period followed by automatic renewals in five-year increments that provides a comprehensive framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation between the two nations under the agreed non-proliferation conditions and controls. A parallel U.S. bipartisan resolution has recently highlighted the importance for Turkish Republic's key role in providing her western (E.U. and U.S.) and regional allies Eurasian energy security.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies has recently started a one-year initiative project to evaluate and enhance the Turkish Republic - United States strategic partnership, aiming for a plan of implementation of the concluded framework at the end of this phase.

2010s

2009 U.S. presidential visit to Turkey

Barack Obama in Turkish Assembly, 6 April 2009

Relations between Turkey and the United States received a jumpstart during the Obama administration’s first term, but the two countries were nevertheless unable to reach their ambitious goals. [27] U.S. President Barack Obama made his first official visit to Turkey, stopping off in both Ankara and Istanbul, on April 6–7, 2009. There had been critics in the U.S. who claimed that Turkey should not be rewarded by an early presidential visit as its government had been systematically reorienting foreign policy onto an Islamist axis, but as former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Mark Parris has stated, “Whatever the merits of this argument, the Obama administration, by scheduling the visit, have decisively rejected it.”[28]

During his visit, Obama urged Turkey to come to terms with its past and resolve its Armenian issues. Prior to this, during the 2008 U.S. Presidential election, he had criticised the then U.S. President George W. Bush for his failure to take a stance and stating that the "Armenian genocide is not an allegation, a personal opinion, or a point of view, but rather a widely documented fact supported by an overwhelming body of historical evidence".[29] He responded positively to an announcement from sources in Ankara and Yerevan that a deal might soon be struck to reopen the border between the two states and exchange diplomatic personnel by indicating that although his own personal views on the subject remained unchanged, he may, in order to avoid derailing this diplomatic progress, refrain from using the word genocide in his upcoming April 24 speech on the question.[30]

Turkish President Gül later referred to the visit as “evidence of a vital partnership between Turkey and the US,” whilst Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu pointed out that, “You are changing the psychological atmosphere,” of what was before “seen as a military relationship,”[31] but as Obama made clear, “We are not solely strategic partners, we are also model partners,” and with this change in terminology, “The President wanted to stress the uniqueness of this relationship. This is not an ordinary relationship, it’s a prototype and unique relationship.”[32] A U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing entitled The United States and Turkey: A Model Partnership under the chairmanship of the Head of the Subcommittee on Europe Robert Wexler was convened following, “the historic visit that Obama paid to Turkey,” and concluded that, “This cooperation is vital for both of the two states in an environment in which we face serious security issues in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, the Balkans, Black Sea, Caucuses and the Middle East, besides a global financial crisis.”[33]

Following Obama’s visit Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Chief of the Turkish General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ played host to U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen in Ankara. In the course of the closed-door meeting they discussed the pledging of further Turkish support troops to Afghanistan and Pakistan where Turkish authorities have influence, the secure transport of troops and equipment from the port of İskenderun during the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, and the pro-Kurdish terrorists operating in south-eastern Turkey and northern Iraq.[34]

On April 22, 2009, shortly after Obama’s visit, Turkish and Armenian authorities formally announced a provisional roadmap for the normalisation of diplomatic ties between the two states.[35] The U.S. responded positively with a statement from the office of U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, following a phone conversation with Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan, which stated that, “The Vice President applauded President Sargsyan’s leadership, and underscored the administration’s support for both Armenia and Turkey in this process.”[36] Turkish columnists however criticised the timing of the announcement believing it to have been made to placate the U.S. President in advance of his April 24 speech, with Fikret Bila writing in the Milliyet that, “the Turkish Foreign Ministry made this statement regarding the roadmap before midnight,” as it would allow Obama to go back on his campaign promise, to refer to the incident as genocide, which the Turkish government denies profusely, by pointing out to the Armenian diaspora that, “Turkey reached a consensus with Armenia and set a roadmap,” and, “there is no need now to damage this process.”[37][38]

Continued cooperation in the War on Terror

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Washington D.C., February 13, 2012.
Incirlik Air Base hosting USAF operations

The 2009 U.S. Secretary of State’s Country Report on Terrorism confirmed that cooperation in terrorism is a key element in America’s strategic partnership with Turkey, before going on to praise Turkish contributions to stabilise Iraq and Afghanistan and highlighting the strategic importance of the İncirlik Air Base in Adana used by both U.S. and NATO forces for operations in the region.[39]

Questions have been subsequently raised, however, over the continued presence of U.S. nuclear weapons, reportedly stationed at the air base during the Cold War as part of the NATO nuclear sharing programme, after recent parliamentary debates in Belgium and Germany called for the removal of weapons stationed there under the same programme. Bilkent University Professor Mustafa Kibaroğlu speculates that if the Obama administration presses for the withdrawal of these weapons, which Turkey wishes to maintain, then Turkey-U.S. relations may be strained.[40]

The U.S. Secretary of State’s report also contained information on the PKK and other terrorist groups operating in Turkey, whom the U.S. and Turkish authorities share intelligence on, highlighting the September 12, 2006 attack on Diyarbakır and the July 27, 2008 attack on Güngören before going on to mention the ongoing Turkish investigation into the Ergenekon network and concluding that, “the details of the case were murky, however, and Ergenekon’s status as a terrorist organisation remained under debate at year’s end.”[39]

A separate report presented to U.S. President Obama by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, which had previously urged him to raise the subject of religious freedom during his 2009 presidential visit to Turkey, concluded that Turkey’s interpretation of secularism, “resulted in violations of religious freedoms for many of the country’s citizens, including members of the majority and, especially, minority religious communities.”[41]

A U.S. Democratic Party delegation group including U.S. Senators Robert Casey, Edward E. Kaufman, Frank Lautenberg and U.S. Congressman Timothy Waltz met with Turkish officials in Ankara on 30 May to confirm, “Turkey can always depend on the US, while the US can always rely on its close friendship with Turkey.”[42]


Turkey and the Iran Nuclear Deal

In April 2010, Washington stepped up its efforts to impose a new round of sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program. Key powers such as Turkey, India and China oppose the adoption of a new round of sanctions against Tehran. As a result, the U.S. Congress has delayed arms sales sought by the Turkish military.[43]

2010 leaked diplomatic documents

According to leaked diplomatic cables, Erdoğan was described by U.S. diplomats as having "little understanding of politics beyond Ankara" and as surrounding himself with an "iron ring of sycophantic (but contemptuous) advisors". He is said to be "isolated", and that his MPs and Ministers feel "fearful of Erdogan's wrath".[44] Diplomats state that "he relies on his charisma, instincts, and the filterings of advisors who pull conspiracy theories off the web or are lost in neo-Ottoman Islamist fantasies".[45][46]

The alleged cables also highlight Turkish concerns that upgrades to General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcons had "precluded Turkish access to computer systems and software modification previously allowed".[47]

Human rights and arms sales

Erdoğan with U.S. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry during the NATO Summit in Newport, 5 September 2014

In 2010, U.S. President Obama said that future arms sales would depend on Turkish policies.[48]

The Arab Spring

The U.S. under President Obama was reluctant to get deeply involved in the Arab World and was generally supportive of Turkish efforts in the region.[49]

For the Anatolian Falcon 2012 joint exercises, the United States sent the 480th Fighter Squadron to train with Turkish pilots in Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses.[50]

Syrian Civil War, and the Kurdish question

Relations between the United States and Turkey have shown signs of deterioration during the Syrian Civil War and especially over the handling over the Kurdish question.[51] The American forces in the Syrian Civil War are openly allied with the Kurdish YPG fighters and support them militarily. Turkey has considered the YPG fighters as "terrorists". Turkey overtly defied American orders of ceasing Turkey's military bombardment of the YPG fighters in their bid to take the town of Azaz in northern Syria. Signs of strain were then displayed when Barack Obama refused to have a formal meeting with Erdogan when the latter visited the United States in March 2016.[52][53][54]

Turkish Defense Minister Fikri Işık with U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis, 15 February 2017

Tensions following the 2016 coup

After the failed coup attempt in July 2016, Turkey demanded that the United States government extradite Fethullah Gülen, a cleric and Turkish national living in the U.S. state of Pennsylvania. However, the U.S. government demanded that Turkey first produce evidence that he was connected with the coup attempt. Due to perceptions that former U.S. Secretary of State and Democratic Party presidential nominee Hillary Clinton is friendly towards the Gülen movement, many Erdoğan supporters reportedly favored Republican Party presidential nominee Donald Trump in the United States' 2016 presidential election.[55]

In a speech on July 29, 2016, President Erdoğan accused U.S. Central Command chief Joseph Votel of "siding with coup plotters",[56] after Votel accused the Turkish government of arresting the Pentagon's contacts in Turkey.[57] Yeni Şafak daily, a Turkish pro-government newspaper, claimed that the former commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, now-retired U.S. Army General John F. Campbell, was the "mastermind" behind the coup attempt in Turkey.[58]

The United States suspended all non-immigrant visas from Turkey "indefinitely", due to a US consulate employee's arrest, named in Turkish state media as locally hired Metin Topuz. He was charged under allegations that he had links to Pennsylvania-based opposition cleric Fethullah Gülen. He was arrested under "terror charges" by an Istanbul court, state media Anadolu said. Topuz is the second US government employee in Turkey to be arrested in 2017. Turkey retaliated against the US with suspensions of all US visas, including tourist visas, shortly after the US State Department made their announcement.[59]

In December 2017, U.S. national security adviser General H.R. McMaster said that Turkey had joined Qatar as a prime source of funding that contributes to the spread of extremist ideology of Islamism: "We're seeing great involvement by Turkey from everywhere from western Africa to Southeast Asia," funding groups that help create the conditions that allow terrorism to flourish.[60]

On August 1, 2018, the U.S. Department of Treasury imposed sanctions on top Turkish government officials who were involved in the detention of American pastor Andrew Brunson. Brunson was charged with terrorism and espionage.[61] Daniel Glaser, the former Treasury official under President Obama, said: "It’s certainly the first time I can think of" the U.S. sanctioning a NATO ally.[62] On August 10, 2018, U.S. President Trump imposed punitive tariffs against Turkey after an impasse over Brunson's imprisonment, as well as other issues.[63] The move prompted Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that the United States was "changing a strategic NATO partner with a pastor" and that the U.S. behavior would force Turkey to look for new friends and allies.[64] The presidential spokesperson of Turkish President, İbrahim Kalın, tweeted that the U.S. is losing Turkey as a whole, the entire Turkish public is against U.S. policies.[65] In addition, the Uşak Province decided to stop running digital advertisement on United States based social media platforms like Facebook, Google, Instagram, Twitter and YouTube canceling all of the budget as a response to the U.S. sanctions on Turkey.[66] Furthermore, Turkey said that it would retaliate to the raising of steel and aluminium tariffs by the U.S. administration[67] (The U.S. had already imposed 10 percent and 25 percent additional tariffs on aluminum and steel imports respectively from all countries on March 23, 2018, but in August 13, 2018 added additional tariffs on steel imports from Turkey).[68] In addition, the Turkish President said that Turkey will boycott electronic products from the US giving iPhones as an example.[69] The Keçiören Municipality in the Ankara has decided not to issue business licenses to American brands including McDonald’s, Starbucks and Burger King.[70] In addition, Turkey decided to increase tariffs on imports of a range of US products.[71] Furthermore, in August 20, 2018 there were gunshots at the USA Embassy in the Ankara without casualties. Turkish authorities detained two men suspects.[72]

Naturalized US citizen, Serkan Golge, has also been held since July 2018 on charges of participating in terrorism and conspiring against the government as a member of the Gülen movement.

Visits

Guest Host Place of visit Date of visit
United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower Turkey President Celal Bayar Çankaya Köşkü, Ankara December 7, 1959
Turkey Prime Minister İsmet İnönü United States President Lyndon B. Johnson White House, Washington, D.C. June 22–23, 1964
Turkey Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit United States President Jimmy Carter White House, Washington, D.C. May 31, 1978
United States President George H. W. Bush Turkey President Turgut Özal Ankara and Istanbul July 20–22, 1991
Turkey Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit United States President Bill Clinton White House, Washington, D.C. September 27, 1999
United States President Bill Clinton Turkey President Süleyman Demirel Çankaya Köşkü, Ankara November 15, 1999
Turkey President Ahmet Necdet Sezer United States President Bill Clinton White House, Washington, D.C. September 4, 2000
United States President George W. Bush Turkey President Ahmet Necdet Sezer Ankara and Istanbul June 27–30, 2004
United States President Barack Obama Turkey President Abdullah Gül Ankara and Istanbul April 6–7, 2009
Turkey Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan United States President Barack Obama White House, Washington, D.C. May 16, 2013
Turkey President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan United States President Donald Trump White House, Washington, D.C. May 16, 2017

Cultural relations

Embassy of the United States in Ankara

American international schools in Turkey

Turkish schools in the United States

Around 120 Gülen charter schools operate within the United States.[73]

Public views

According to a survey conducted in the spring of 2017 and released in August, 72% of the Turks see the United States as a threat to Turkey’s security. Furthermore, the United States was perceived as a greater threat to security than Russia or China.[74]

According to The Economist, in October 2017, Turkish-American relations sank to their lowest in over 40 years.[75] Tensions have risen over such issues as the Turkish arrests of Turkish nationals employed at American consulates, the arrest of American Andrew Brunson, the belief among most Turkish citizens that America was involved in the 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt, America’s arming of the YPG in Syria, the 2017 clashes at the Turkish Ambassador's Residence in Washington, D.C. and growing Turkish-Russian security cooperation.[75]

See also

President John F. KENNEDY addressing the Turkish people on Kemal Atatürk and the Anniversary of the Republic. Recorded in October 1963.

References

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  3. ↑ "Member countries". nato.int. NATO. March 10, 2016. Retrieved August 24, 2016.
  4. ↑ U.S. Sanctions Against NATO Ally Turkey Put Ties at Crossroads Bloomberg, 3 August 2018.
  5. ↑ Turkey's ever-closer ties with Russia leave US lacking key ally on Syria The Guardian, 11 April 2018.
  6. ↑ Yegin, Mehmet. "Turkey-U.S. Relations: Towards a Multidimentional Partnership (May 2013)".
  7. ↑ http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/06/26/tarnished-american-brand/
  8. ↑ "Amid tension, Trump and Turkey's Erdogan agree to strengthen ties". Muslim Global. Retrieved 9 September 2017.
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  13. ↑ Moshe Yegar (1 January 2002). Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar. Lexington Books. pp. 397–. ISBN 978-0-7391-0356-2.
  14. ↑ Political Science Quarterly. Academy of Political Science. 1904. pp. 22–.
  15. ↑ Mustafa Akyol (18 July 2011). Islam without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty. W. W. Norton. pp. 159–. ISBN 978-0-393-07086-6.
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  18. ↑ The Journal of Race Development. Clark University. 1915. pp. 358–.
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  26. ↑ "Turkey recalls ambassador over genocide resolution". CNN.com. 2007-10-11. Archived from the original on 2007-10-12. Retrieved 2008-12-22.
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  28. ↑ Aslan, Ali H. (2009-05-02). "Parris: 'Genocide' reference would have frozen Turkey ties". Today's Zaman.
  29. ↑ "Turkey and Armenia set 'roadmap'". BBC News. 2009-04-23. Retrieved 2009-04-29.
  30. ↑ Paul Richter (2009-04-03). "Turkey, Armenia are likely to ease conflict". L.A. Times. Retrieved 2009-04-03.
  31. ↑ "Davutoğlu expects Obama message to Muslims to change 'atmosphere'". Today's Zaman. 2009-06-03.
  32. ↑ "Model partnership with US necessity rather than preference". Today's Zaman. 2009-06-04.
  33. ↑ "Wexler urges US to positively 'channel' Turkey's value". Sunday’s Zaman. 2009-05-16.
  34. ↑ "Top US commander discussed Afghanistan, Iraq in Turkey talks". Today's Zaman. 2009-05-01.
  35. ↑ "Turkey and Armenia move to ease tensions". Today's Zaman. 2009-04-25.
  36. ↑ "Turkey and Armenia expect gradual normalization in ties". Today's Zaman. 2009-04-25.
  37. ↑ Dişli, Fatma (2009-04-25). "Turkey makes last-minute move to placate Obama administration". Today's Zaman.
  38. ↑ Sami, Kohen (2009-04-25). "Road map is OK, but…". Today's Zaman.
  39. 1 2 "US says anti-terror cooperation key in partnership with Turkey". Today's Zaman. 2009-05-02.
  40. ↑ "Turkey to face pressure over US nukes on its soil". Today's Zaman. 2009-05-04. Archived from the original on 2009-05-06.
  41. ↑ "'Religious freedoms in Turkey curbed by hard-line secularism'". Today's Zaman. 2009-05-02.
  42. ↑ "Turkey can always count on America, say US senators". Today's Zaman. 2009-06-02.
  43. ↑ Despite its views on Israel and Iran, Turkey is trying to prove it's still a friend to the U.S.
  44. ↑ "Cable Viewer". Cablegate.wikileaks.org. 25 March 2005. Retrieved 1 December 2010.
  45. ↑ "Leaked cables point to vital, volatile U.S. relationship with Turkey". CNN. 30 November 2010. Retrieved 30 November 2010.
  46. ↑ "WikiLeaks US embassy cables: live updates". The Guardian. 1 December 2010. Retrieved 2 December 2010.
  47. ↑ "SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES'S MEETINGS WITH TURKISH" 16 February 2010.
  48. ↑ "US threat on Turkey arms sales." Al Jazeera, 17 August 2010.
  49. ↑ Daniel Dombey (2012-02-15). "Turkey-US harmony has its limits". Financial Times. Retrieved 2012-02-16.
  50. ↑ Knee, Daryl. "U.S. pilots plant SEAD with Turkish counterparts." USAF. March 9, 2012.
  51. ↑ "US-Turkey: The strained alliance". BBC. 29 March 2016.
  52. ↑ "Turkey-US relations are strained as Erdogan arrives in Washington". EuroNews. 30 March 2016.
  53. ↑ "US support for PKK's Syrian wing risks Turkey-US relations". Daily Sabah. 29 March 2016.
  54. ↑ "ISIS In Turkey: US Orders Diplomats, Military Dependents To Leave Over Security, Islamic State Concerns". International Business Times. 29 March 2016.
  55. ↑ "Why post-coup Turkey is suspicious of Hillary Clinton". Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy. 29 October 2016.
  56. ↑ "Turkey's Erdoğan to drop lawsuits against people who insulted him". BBC News. 29 July 2016.
  57. ↑ Lake, Eli (2016-07-28). "America's Friends Get Arrested in Turkey's Post-Coup Purges". Bloomberg View.
  58. ↑ "US Commander Campbell: The man behind the failed coup in Turkey". Yeni Safak. 25 July 2016.
  59. ↑ La Porte, Amy. "United States and Turkey mutually suspend visa services". CNN. CNN. Retrieved 2017-10-22.
  60. ↑ "US Official Accuses Turkey of Pushing Extreme Islamist Ideology". Voice of America. 13 December 2017.
  61. ↑ "US sanctions Turkey over Pastor Brunson detention". The National. 1 August 2018.
  62. ↑ "US sanctions Turkish officials over detained pastor". Politico. 1 August 2018.
  63. ↑ Trump doubles metal tariffs on Turkey as lira falls by 20%
  64. ↑ US changing strategic NATO partner with pastor, Turkish President Erdoğan says
  65. ↑ US changing strategic NATO partner with pastor, Turkish President Erdoğan says
  66. ↑ Turkish municipality strikes at social media giants as response to US
  67. ↑ Turkey to retaliate against Trump's metal tariffs
  68. ↑ Turkey vows to defend domestic steel, aluminum exporters against additional US tariffs
  69. ↑ Erdoğan says Turkey will boycott US electronic products
  70. ↑ Municipality in Turkish capital Ankara stops issuing licenses to major US food brands
  71. ↑ Turkey escalates trade dispute with US by raising tariffs
  72. ↑ Turkey detains two men over shooting at U.S. embassy in Ankara
  73. ↑ Beauchamp, Scott. "120 American Charter Schools and One Secretive Turkish Cleric". The Atlantic. Retrieved 10 December 2016.
  74. ↑ "72 percent of Turkish citizens see US as security threat". 2 August 2017. Retrieved 2 August 2017.
  75. 1 2 "Relations between Turkey and America are near breaking point". The Economist. 9 October 2017.

 This article incorporates public domain material from the Library of Congress Country Studies website http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/.

Further reading

  • Barlas, Dilek, and Şuhnaz Yilmaz. "Managing the transition from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana: Turkey’s relations with Britain and the US in a turbulent era (1929–47)." Turkish Studies (2016): 1-25.
  • Kubilay Yado Arin: The AKP's Foreign Policy, Turkey's Reorientation from the West to the East? Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Berlin, Berlin 2013. ISBN 9 783865 737199.
  • Zeyno Baran (May 11, 2005) “The State of U.S.-Turkey Relations”, United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats.
  • Harris, George Sellers, and Bilge Criss, eds. Studies in Atatürk's Turkey: the American dimension (Brill, 2009).
  • James E. Miller; Douglas E. Selvage; Laurie Van Hook, eds. (2007). "Turkey". Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972 (PDF). Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976. XXIX. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office. pp. 1036–1132. Archived from the original (PDF) on December 19, 2008.
  • Olson, Robert W., Nurhan Ince, and Nuhan Ince. "Turkish Foreign Policy from 1923-1960: Kemalism and Its Legacy, a Review and a Critique." Oriente Moderno 57.5/6 (1977): 227-241. in JSTOR
  • Sanberk, Özdem. "The Importance of Trust Building in Foreign Policy, a Case Study: The Trajectory of the Turkish-American Relations." Review of International Law and Politics 12 (2016): 13+
  • James E. Miller; Douglas E. Selvage; Laurie Van Hook, eds. (2007). "Turkey". Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972 (PDF). Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976. XXX. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office. pp. 650–855. Archived from the original (PDF) on December 13, 2008.
  • Trask, Roger R. The United States response to Turkish nationalism and reform, 1914-1939 (U of Minnesota Press, 1971).
  • Yilmaz, Şuhnaz. Turkish-American Relations, 1800-1952: Between the Stars, Stripes and the Crescent (Routledge, 2015).
  • Yilmaz, Şuhnaz. "Challenging the stereotypes: Turkish–American relations in the inter-war era." Middle Eastern Studies 42.2 (2006): 223-237.
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