Battle of Cassel (1677)

The Battle of Cassel, sometimes called the Battle of Peene, took place on 11 April, 1677, during the Franco-Dutch War, near Cassel, in modern France. A French army under the overall command of the duc de Luxembourg defeated a combined Dutch-Spanish force led by William of Orange.

Battle of Cassel
Part of Franco-Dutch War
DateApril 11, 1677
Location
Cassel, France
Result French victory
Belligerents
 France  Dutch Republic
Spain
Commanders and leaders
duc de Luxembourg
Philippe of Orléans
duc d' Humières
 William of Orange
Count Waldeck
Prince of Nassau
Strength
30,000 - 35,000 (estimated maximum) 25,000 - 30,000 (estimated maximum)
Casualties and losses
1,200 dead, 2,000-3,000 wounded 3,000 dead, 4,000-5,000 wounded [1]

Although Cassel ensured the capture of key strongpoints in modern French Flanders, the French failed to force the Dutch out of the war, which continued until the August 1678 Treaties of Nijmegen.

Background
Ypres
Valenciennes
St Omer
Cambrai
Cassel
Saint-Ghislain
Maastricht
Campaigns of 1676-1677 in Northern France and the Spanish Netherlands (modern borders shown)

In the 1667-1668 War of Devolution, France captured most of the Spanish Netherlands and Franche-Comté, but relinquished much of their gains at the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. This was made possible by the Triple Alliance of the Dutch Republic, England and Sweden; to break this up, Louis XIV paid Sweden to remain neutral, while Charles II of England agreed to an alliance against the Dutch in the 1670 Treaty of Dover.[2]

When France invaded the Dutch Republic in May 1672 at the start of the Franco-Dutch War, it initially seemed to have won an overwhelming victory. However, the Dutch position stabilised, while concern at French gains brought them support from Brandenburg-Prussia, Emperor Leopold and Spain.[3] With new fronts opening in the Rhineland and along the Pyrenees, Louis ordered his armies to withdraw from the Netherlands, although they retained the Dutch stronghold of Maastricht.[4]

The anti-French alliance was strengthened when Denmark-Norway joined in January 1674, while the Third Anglo-Dutch War ended with the February Treaty of Westminster.[5] Despite this, France re-captured Franche-Comté and made significant gains in Alsace and after 1675, the focus changed to consolidation.[6] An effective Allied response in Flanders was hampered by power struggles in Madrid, while Spanish control over the Spanish Netherlands was by now largely nominal.[7]

Peace talks began at Nijmegen in the summer of 1676 but Louis consistently sought to negotiate from strength by taking the offensive before agreeing terms. To improve their position in Flanders, the French captured Condé-sur-l'Escaut, Bouchain, Maubeuge and Bavay during 1676, and repulsed an attempt to retake Maastricht.[8] The plan for 1677 was to take Valenciennes, Cambrai and Saint-Omer, completing the French 'frontière de fer' or 'iron border;' Louis calculated that this would leave the Dutch little reason to continue fighting.[9]

Throughout the war, superior French logistics allowed them to maintain larger armies and crucially begin operations while their opponents were still in winter quarters. In late February, a month earlier than the usual start of the campaigning season, the main army of 35,000 under Luxembourg besieged Valenciennes. Another 12,000 troops were detached to take Saint Omer, led by Louis' brother Philippe of Orléans and Humières; after Valenciennes surrendered on 17 March, Luxembourg moved onto Cambrai.[10]

William of Orange had assembled 30,000 men, including 4,000 Spanish, at Roosendaal; he could not save Cambrai but was determined to fight for St Omer.[10] Delayed by lack of money and supplies, the Dutch-Spanish force reached Mont-Cassel on 9 April, near the French-held town of Cassel, about 15 kilometres west of St Omer. Leaving minimal forces to maintain the sieges of St Omer and Cambrai, the combined French armies met at Buysscheure on 10 April.[11]

The battle
French commander duc de Luxembourg, 1628-1695

The two armies were separated by the Peene Becque, a small river running through the village of Zuytpeene; while not a great obstacle, the Dutch failed to identify it and had to abandon a surprise attack on 10 April. This gave the French time to organise their lines, as well as to receive additional reinforcements; by 11th, William was outnumbered by over 5,000.[12]

Early on 11 April, the Dutch-Spanish army crossed the Peene Becque, but halted when they discovered a second arm of the river between them and the French. Luxembourg and Humières commanded a mixed force of infantry and cavalry on the left and right respectively, with the bulk of the infantry and artillery under Orléans in the centre.[13]

The Peene Becque; this apparently minor obstacle played a significant role in the battle

Without waiting for his infantry, Humières attacked as soon as his cavalry was across and was repulsed by entrenched Dutch infantry. A charge led by the Prince of Nassau threw the French back across the river, before running into heavy artillery fire; the Dutch cavalry now retreated to the far side of Mont-Cassel and played no further part in the battle.[14]

After reorganising his troops, Luxembourg made a second attack around midday. His infantry engaged the Dutch in a bloody struggle centred on some farm buildings; these were eventually taken, while a subsequent cavalry charge scattered the retreating Dutch infantry.[15]

A simultaneous attack by Humières on the right was also successful, but the French centre was over-run by infantry under Count Waldeck and the line only re-established after a charge led by Orléans himself. His flanks giving way, William disengaged about 16:00 and ordered a general retreat towards Ypres; Nassau's cavalry had by now recovered sufficiently to cover the retreat of the infantry.[16]

Cassel was a resounding French victory; Dutch lost between 7,000-8,000 killed or wounded and had to abandon their baggage. However, the French were unable to properly exploit their success; the Flanders terrain generally made pursuit difficult, while their cavalry was exhausted.[16]

Aftermath
Mont Cassel; the Dutch-Spanish army assembled here on 9 April

Cambrai capitulated on 17 April, followed by St-Omer on 20 April but forcing the Dutch to accept peace terms remained elusive. French resources were diverted by an Imperial offensive in the Rhineland, while by August, William and the Spanish governor Villahermosa had over 60,000 troops available. Luxembourg avoided battle, forcing William to besiege Charleroi instead; this was unsuccessful and the French followed up by taking Saint-Ghislain in December but it demonstrated the Dutch capacity to fight on.[17]

English public opinion was strongly anti-French and Cassel led to pressure from Parliament to intervene on behalf of the Dutch, forcing Louis to downplay this success. The Dutch were reluctant to continue the war but restoring the Spanish Netherlands as a buffer zone became even more important after the disasters of 1672, while their position was improved by William's marriage in November 1677 to Charles' niece, Mary.[18]

Cassel was the first time Orléans fought in the front-line, and the last time he commanded troops in the field. This was allegedly due to Louis' resentment of the attention and popularity he gained as a result.[19] The 1678 Treaties of Nijmegen reset France's northern border, Spain ceding Saint-Omer, Cassel, Aire, Ypres, Cambrai, Valenciennes and Maubeuge. With the exception of Ypres, returned in 1697, this fixed the frontier close to where it remains today.[20]

References
  1. Van Nimwegen 2010, p. 380.
  2. Lynn 1996, pp. 109-110.
  3. Smith 1965, p. 200.
  4. Lynn 1996, p. 117.
  5. Davenport 1917, p. 238.
  6. Young 2004, pp. 134-135.
  7. Van Nimwegen 2010, p. 499.
  8. Young 2004, p. 134.
  9. Van Nimwegen 2010, p. 498.
  10. Van Nimwegen 2010, p. 500.
  11. De Périni 1896, pp. 190-191.
  12. Van Nimwegen 2010, p. 501.
  13. De Périni 1896, p. 191.
  14. De Périni 1896, p. 192.
  15. De Périni 1896, p. 194.
  16. De Périni 1896, p. 198.
  17. Young 2004, p. 135.
  18. Van Nimwegen 2010, p. 505.
  19. Barker Nicholls 1998, p. 166.
  20. Nolan 2008, p. 128.

Sources
  • Barker Nicholls, Nancy (1998). Brother to the Sun King: Philippe, Duke of Orleans. Johns Hopkins Press. ISBN 978-0801861642.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • De Périni, Hardÿ (1896). Batailles françaises, Volume V. Ernest Flammarion, Paris.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Davenport, Frances (1917). European Treaties bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Lynn, John (1996). The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714 (Modern Wars In Perspective). Longman. ISBN 978-0582056299.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Nolan, Cathal (2008). Wars of the age of Louis XIV, 1650–1715. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 0-313-33046-8.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Smith, Rhea (1965). Spain; A Modern History. University of Michigan Press. ISBN 978-0472071500.
  • Van Nimwegen, Olaf (2010). The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions, 1588-1688. Boydell Press. ISBN 978-1843835752.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Young, William (2004). International Politics and Warfare in the Age of Louis XIV and Peter the Great. iUniverse. ISBN 978-0595813988.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)

This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.