Russian presidential election, 1996

Russian presidential election, 1996
16 June 1996 (first round)
3 July 1996 (second round)
Opinion polls
Turnout 69.7% Decrease 5 pp (first round)
68.8% Decrease 0.9 pp (second round)

 
Nominee Boris Yeltsin Gennady Zyuganov
Party Independent Communist Party
Home state Moscow Moscow
Popular vote 40,203,948 30,102,288
Percentage 54.4% 40.7%
  Regions in which a plurality of the second round vote was won by Boris Yeltsin
  Regions in which a plurality of the second round vote was won by Gennady Zyuganov
President before election

Boris Yeltsin
Independent

 Elected President

Boris Yeltsin
Independent

Presidential elections were held in Russia on 16 June 1996, with a second round on 3 July. The result was a victory for the incumbent President Boris Yeltsin, who ran as an independent. Yeltsin defeated Communist challenger Gennady Zyuganov in the run-off, receiving 54.4% of the vote. His inauguration ceremony took place on 9 August.

Background

Voter invitation card for the election

In 1991 Boris Yeltsin was elected to a 5-year term as President of Russia, which was still a part of the Soviet Union at the time. The next election was scheduled be held sometime in 1996.[1]

In late December 1991 Russia became a sovereign nation in wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. This meant that the scheduled election would now be the first ever presidential election to be held in a fully sovereign Russia.[2]

In a 1993 referendum question Russian voters rejected holding an early presidential election. Thus, the presidential election remained scheduled to be held in the year 1996.

Later in 1993 the Constitution of Russia was adopted. In the Constitution, future presidential terms were stipulated to last for four years, meaning that the 1996 election would elect a president to serve a 4-year term.

When incumbent president Boris Yeltsin launched his reelection campaign in early 1996, he was widely predicted to lose.[3] Public opinion of Yeltsin was at a historical low point.[3] Due to this, there was talk about Yeltsin potentially postponing or canceling the election. However, he ultimately decided against this.[4]

Shortly before the election campaign Yeltsin had faced a number of significant political hummiliations which harmed his political stature. In December 1995 the Communist Party of the Russian Federation had achieved dominance in the State Duma.[4][3] On January 9, 1996 Chechen rebels seized thousands of hostages in Dagestan and Yeltsin's response to this was viewed as a failure.[3] Additionally, Yeltsin was overseeing a terrible economy. Russian economy was still contracting and many workers had continued to be unpaid for months.[3]

By early 1996 Yeltsin's public approval was so poor that he was polling at fifth place among presidential candidates, with only 8 percent support, while Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov was in the lead with 21 percent suppprt. When Zyuganov showed up at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in February 1996, many Western leaders and the international media were eager to see him, and treated him with regards to believing that he would likely be the next president of Russia.[3] However, Yeltsin managed to reverse his fortunes, ultimately defeating Zyuganov in the second round of the election.

Candidates

Registered candidates

Candidate name, age,
political party		 Political offices Campaign Registration date
Vladimir Bryntsalov
(49)
Russian Socialist Party		 Deputy of the State Duma
(1995–2003)		 campaign 26 April 1996[5][6]
Mikhail Gorbachev
(65)
Independent		 Leader of the Soviet Union
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(1985-1991)
President of the Soviet Union
(1990–1991)
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
(1989-1990)
Chairman of the Presidum of the Supreme Soviet
(1988-1989)		 campaign 12 April 1996[5][6]
Svyatoslav Fyodorov
(69)
Party of Workers' Self-Government		 People's Deputy of the Soviet Union
(1989-1991)
Deputy of the State Duma
(1995-1999)		 campaign 19 April 1996[5][6]
Alexander Lebed
(46)
Congress of Russian Communities		 Deputy of the State Duma
(1995–1996)		 campaign 19 April 1996[5][6]
Martin Shakkum
(44)
Independent		 Leader of the Socialist People's Party campaign 22 April 1996[5][6]
Yury Vlasov
(60)
Independent		 Deputy of the State Duma
(1993–1995)		 campaign 26 April 1996[5][6]
Grigory Yavlinsky
(44)
Yabloko		 Chairman of Yabloko
(1993–2008)
Deputy of the State Duma
(1993–2003)		 campaign 19 April 1996[5][6]
Boris Yeltsin
(65)
Independent		 President of Russia
(1991–1999)		 campaign 3 April 1996[5][6]
Vladimir Zhirinovsky
(50)
Liberal Democratic Party		 Leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
(1991–present)
Deputy of the State Duma
(1993–present)		 campaign 5 April 1996[5][6]
Gennady Zyuganov
(52)
Communist Party		 First Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation
(1993–present)
Deputy of the State Duma
(1993–present)		 campaign 4 March 1996[5][6][7]

Withdrawn candidates

Candidate name, age,
political party		 Political offices Campaign Details Registration date Date of withdrawal
Aman Tuleyev
(52)
Independent		 Chairman of the Kemerovo Oblast Council of People's Deputies (campaign) He was registered as a candidate on 26 April 1996, but withdrew his candidacy on 8 June 1996 to support Gennady Zyuganov. Since Tuleyev withdrew his candidacy after the deadline, he was included in the ballots and even received 308 votes during the early voting. 26 April 1996[5][6] 8 June 1996

Campaigning

Vladimir Bryntsalov

Pharmaceutical businessman Vladimir Bryntsalov ran as the candidate of the Russian Socialist Party.

Brytsalov claimed that his leadership would eliminate the country's poverty, promising that, if he were elected, there would be, "no poor pensioners, no poor workers, no poor entrepreneurs, no poor farmers."[8]

His plan, which he dubbed "Russian socialism", was for large companies to begin paying wages comparable to companies in other industrialized nations. The plan anticipated that the employees of the companies would consequentially pay larger income taxes, spend more on consumer goods, and increase their productivity at their jobs. The feasibility of this plan was criticized, as Russian companies were considered to be unable to pay such wages.[8]

Brytsalov promoted himself with the superlative claim of being "the richest man in Russia" and flaunted his wealth.[8]

Despite being a (recently elected) deputy of the State Duma, Brytsalov did not have a voting-record. In his legislative career, he had very low attendance and extremely little participation.[9]

Brytsalov was seen as a marginal candidate, and was generally regarded as unlikely to win the election.[8]

Mikhail Gorbachev

Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev ran as an independent candidate. He ran as a self-proclaimed social democrat. His campaign was hampered both by strong public disdain towards him and a strong lack of media coverage for his candidacy.

Svyatoslav Fyodorov

Politician and renown ophthalmologist Svyatoslav Fyodorov ran as the candidate of the Party of Workers' Self-Government. He the founder and leader of the party, which was, at the time, arguably the most influential social-democratic movement in Russia.[10]

Fyodorov was considered to be on the center-left of the political spectrum.[11]

In 1994 Fyodorov had described his political objective by stating, "I want peasants to own farms, workers to own factories, physicians to own clinics, and everyone to pay a 30% tax, and the rest is theirs."[10]

Fyodorov advocated for the mass creation of joint stock companies to guarantee workers a share of profits and allow them to actively participate in management of their companies. He dubbed this concept "democratic capitalism" or "popular socialism".[10] He had advocated such a policy since as early as 1991.[12] Fyodorov advocated for economic freedom, simple and moderate taxation, stimulation of production, and a ban on exports of most raw materials.[10] Fyodorov promised that his policies would double the nation's GDP within five years.[13] Fyodorov proclaimed to draw inspiration in his politics from both Ross Perot and Deng Xiaoping.[10]

Up until early May, Fyodorov unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate the creation of a third force coalition, with negotiations largely centering on a coalition between him and fellow candidates Yavlinsky and Lebed.[14]

Alexander Lebed

General Alexander Lebed ran as the nominee of the Congress of Russian Communities, a centrist nationalist party. Lebed promoted himself as an authoritative leader that would introduce law and order, tackle corruption and allow capitalism to blossom.[15][16] While he presented an authoritarian personality, he held moderate positions.[17]

After reaching an informal agreement with Yeltsin in April (under which Lebed promised to endorse Yeltsin in the second round of the election), Lebed began to see positive news coverage, as well as a greater overall quantity of media coverage. This was done as part of an effort by Yeltsin's camp to promote Lebed in the hopes that he would syphon off votes from other nationalist candidates in the first-round.[4]

Up until early May, Lebed had entertained negotiations with Yavlinsky and Fyodorov to jointly form a third force coalition.[4]

Martin Shakkum

Martin Shakkum ran as an independent candidate. An associate of radical economist Stansilav Shatalin, Shakkum was on the right wing of the Russian political spectrum.[16] While he presented an authoritarian personality, he held moderate positions on many social issues.[17]

Aman Tuleyev

Independent candidate Aman Tuleyev (a member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation) styled himself as a "Muslim Communist".[18] The head of the Kemerovo Oblast legislature, Tuleyev was considered to be charismatic, energetic, and well as well-liked by the Communist Party's base. He turned-in his signatures the day before the deadline. He was considered to be a fallback communist candidate, in case Zyuganov's candidacy faltered.[19]

Tuleyev's rhetoric straddled between hard-line communism and social-democracy. Generally a hard-liner, he had nonetheless occasionally taken moderate stances, such as seeking tax cuts. Tuleyev's positions centered upon communism and creating a disciplined (uncorrupt) government.[19]

Tuleyev dropped out of the race on June 8 and endorsed Zyuganov.[20]

Despite the fact that Tuleyev dropped out of the race before the election, he had already been on the ballot during a portion of the early voting period.

Yury Vlasov

Politician and former Olympic weightlifter Yury Vlasov ran as an independent candidate. His politics were characterized as nationalist.[5][16] Vlasov openly espoused antisemitic rhetoric.[21] He promoted himself as patriot fighting both communism and an alleged "Zionist conspiracy" against the Russian people.[22]

Vlasov dubbed his politics as "people's patriotism".[23] His campaign platform proclaimed, "There is only one single force that is able to unite almost all and at the same time become the ideological basis of the Russian state - popular patriotism".[24]

While he had been a supporter of democratic reforms in the Soviet Union, following its collapse Vlasov had embraced authoritarian political views.[25]

Vlasov likened his politics to Gaullism. He claimed that his politics were a more effective unifying force than communist or democratic ideals.[23]

While he was nominally an independent candidate, Vlasov's campaign was supported by the People's National Party. However, by the end of the election, many in the party grew dissatisfied with Vlasov's campaign style, believing he failed to campaign aggressively enough.[26]

Despite polling at under one percent, Vlasov had stated that he anticipated capturing between six and seven percent of the vote. He swore to refuse supporting either Yeltsin or support Zyuganov in the runoff.[23]

Grigory Yavlinsky

Grigory Yavlinsky ran as the nominee of Yabloko. Yavlinsky officially accepted Yabloko's nomination on January 27.[13]

In terms of social issues, Yavlinsky occupied the political left.[27] In terms of economic issues, Yavlinksy occupied the far-right of the Russian political spectrum. His ideology most strongly appealed to Russia's population of young intellectuals.[16]

Yabloko has been a programmatic party, as opposed to a populist one. This proved to be a weakness for Yavlinsky's campaign, as he and his party opted to maintain their long-established party positions on mant issues, rather than reshaping their agenda in order to better capitalize on the political tides. This had also been the case in the preceding 1995 electoral campaign, during which Yabloko similarly had opted to focus on complex economic issues, rather than focusing on bread and butter issues.[27]

Up until early May Yavlinsky unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate the creation of a third force coalition, with negotiations largely centering on a coalition between him and fellow candidates Lebed and Fyodorov.[4]

Boris Yeltsin

Yeltsin campaigning in the Moscow-region on May 7, 1996

Incumbent Boris Yeltsin ran for reelection as an independent candidate.

While his prospects of winning were originally faltering, Yeltsin was able to resuscitate his image and pull off a successful campaign.[4]

Yeltsin's original strategy, devised by Oleg Soskovets, involved him pivoting towards the nationalist wing of Russia's politics in order to directly compete for votes with Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky.[4] However, this strategy was ultimately abandoned in favor of one devised by reformists. Yeltsin's new campaign strategy was, essentially, to convince voters that they had to choose him as the lesser of two evils. This strategy sought to recast Yeltsin as an individual single-handedly fighting to stave off communist control. The campaign framed a narrative that portrayed Yeltsin as Russia's best hope for stability.[4] The campaign worked to shift the narrative of the election into a referendum on whether voters wanted to return to their communist past (with Zyuganov), or continue with reforms (with Yeltsin).[4]

Yeltsin was able to leverage the power of his office. This included using government funds to finance campaign promises, utilizing state media organizations, and currying favortism amongst financial and media oligarchs.[4]

Two days after the conclusion of the first round, Yeltsin appointed former general Alexander Lebed , who had finished third with 14.7% of vote, to the post of Secretary of Security Council of the Russian Federation and the President's National Security Advisor.[28] Lebed in turn endorsed Yeltsin in the runoff election. Meanwhile, Yeltsin suffered from a serious heart attack and disappeared from public view. His condition was kept secret through 3 July second round election. During this period of time, Yeltsin's campaign team created a "virtual Yeltsin" shown in the media through staged interviews that never happened and pre-recorded radio addresses.[3]

Vladimir Zhirinovsky

Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky campaigned on nationalist rhetoric.

After his surprisingly strong third-place finish in the 1991 presidential election and the surprisingly strong first-place performance of the LDPR in the 1993 legislative election, Zhirinivsky had once been seen as a rising force in Russian politics, and a future contender for the presidency.[4][29][30] However, boorish and outlandish conduct by Zhirinovsky had diminished the public perception of his stature to such a degree that, by 1996, he was seen as a buffoonish figure and was no longer seen as a viable candidate.[4][30]

Gennedy Zyuganov

Communist Party of the Russian Federation-leader Gennady Zyuganov successfully advanced to the second-round of the election, where he was defeated by Yeltsin.

Coming off of a very successful Communist Party performance in the 1995 legislative election, when he launched his campaign, Zyuganov had originally been seen as the frontrunner to win the election.[4]

Conduct

Yeltsin campaign advertisements on the Preobrazhenskaya Ploshchad subway station in June 1996

In their report, the International Republican Institute stated that their election observers, "witnessed no deliberate attempts to commit electoral fraud and, indeed, in the tracking of protocols through the various levels of Russia's electoral system, observed transparency in the process." [31]

In their analysis, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs declared that, while the election failed to be "free and fair" in regards to media coverage and campaign financing, it appeared to have succeeded in being "free and fair" in regards to voting and vote-counting.[32]

Observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) reported that the first round of the election, "appeared to be generally well run, and not seriously marred by some problems which occurred in the pre-election campaign. The delegation considered the first round of the Russian Presidential elections to have been conducted in a generally free and fair manner."[33]

The OSCE also reported that, "Delegation members considered voter participation in the political campaign to be quite active compared to previous Russian elections. A relatively open flow of information concerning candidates and their platforms was made available to voters during the pre-election campaign. However, opposition candidates charged that the state controlled electronic broadcast media did not provide fair and balanced coverage, and this was also observed to be the case by delegation members. The bias appeared to be primarily in favor of the President."[33] Additionally, the OSCE reported that, "The delegation found that Polling Station Election Committees (PSECs) generally followed proper procedures and enforced the one-man-one-vote principle, although scattered instances of minor irregularities, such as family voting and voting outside of polling booths were observed."[33]

In a post-election analysis published in the journal Presidential Studies Quarterly Erik Depov asserted, "The inaccuracy of many early predictions was primarily because Yeltsin's successful re-election bid had as much to do with the dynamics of the electoral campaign as with the results of his first term in office. If the 1996 presidential campaign proved anything, it illuatrated the danger of underestimating Yeltsin's ability to meet a serious political challenge head on and prevail despite apparently insurmountable odds."[2]

During the campaign Yeltsin's opponents criticized his use of state coiffers to fund programs that would bolster his approval with voters.[34] Yeltsin had been utilizing state finances to fund programs (such as pensions) with the aim of convincing voters of his willingness to fulfill promises he which he was making on the campaign trail.[34] Yeltsin's opponents charged that, in doing this, he was essentially buying votes. However, Yeltsin's team argued that he was simply doing his job as President.[34]

During the second round campaign, Zyuganov asserted in a letter to the parliament, the Central Electoral Commission, and the media that Yeltsin was buying votes with money that should be used to pay wage and pension arrears and that he had pressured local leaders into working for his campaign. He also alleged that Yeltsin was using "tens of trillions of rubles" from the state budget for campaign purposes. Zyuganov argued that such practices would call into question the results of the voting and urged immediate measures that would insure equal conditions for the candidates.[35]

Pro-Yeltsin media bias

Yeltsin benifited from an immense media bias favoring his campaign.[4][36]

In 1991, at the time of the previous presidential election, Russia had only two major television channels. RTR had supported Yeltsin, while Russian Public TV had criticized him and provided broad coverage of the views of his opponents. In the 1996 election, however, none of Russia's major television networks were critical of Yeltsin.[36][37] Yeltsin had successfully enlisted the national television channels (ORT, RTR, NTV) and most of the written press to essentially act as agents of his campaign.[4][36]

The European Institute for Media found that Yeltsin received 53% of all media coverage of the campaign, while Zyuganov received only 18%. In their evaluation of the biases of news stories, EIM awarded each candidate 1 point for every positive story they received and subtracted a point for every negative story they received. In the first round of the election, Yeltsin scored +492 and Zyuganov scored -313. In the second round of the election, Yeltsin scored +247 and Zyuganov scored -240.[36]

Television networks marginalized all of Yeltsin's opponents aside from Zyuganov, helping to create the perception that there were only two viable candidates. This allowed Yeltsin to pose as the lesser-evil. Near the end of the election, however, the networks began also providing coverage to the candidacy of Lebed,[37] who had already agreed to support Yeltsin in the second round.[4]

Supplementing the work of the numerous public relations and media firms that were hired by the Yeltsin campaign, a number of media outlets "volunteered" their services to Yeltsin's reelection effort. For instance, Kommersant (one of the most prominent business newspapers in the country) published an anti-communist paper called Ne Dai Bog (meaning, "God forbid").[4] At ORT, a special committee was placed in charge of planning a marathon of anticommunist films and documentaries to be broadcast on the chanel ahead of the election.[4]

Led by the efforts of Mikhail Lesin, the media painted a picture of a fateful choice for Russia, between Yeltsin and a "return to totalitarianism." They even played up the threat of civil war if a Communist were elected president.[38]

One of the reasons for the media's overwhelming favoritism of Yeltsin was their fear that a Communist government would dismantle Russia's right to a free press.[36][39] Another factor contributing to the media's support of Yeltsin was that his government still owned two of the national television channels, and still provided the majority of funding to the majority of independent newspapers.[36] In addition, Yeltsin's government also was in charge of supplying licenses to media outlets. Yeltsin's government and Luzhkov, mayor of Moscow, flexed their power and reminded the owners, publishers, and editors that newspaper licenses and Moscow leases for facilities were "under review".[36] There were also instances of direct payments made for positive coverage (so-called "dollar journalism").[36]

Yeltsin had managed to enlist Russia's emerging business elite to work in his campaign, including those who ran media corporations. This included Vladimir Gusinsky, owner of Most Bank, Independent Television and NTV. NTV which had, prior to the campaign, been critical towards Yeltsin's actions in Chechnya, changed the tone of their coverage. Igor Malashenko, Gusinsky's appointed head of NTV, even joined the Yeltsin campaign and led the its media relations in a rather visible conflict-of-interest.[36] In early 1996, Gusinsky and his political rival Boris Berezovskii (chairman of the Board of ORT) decided that they would put aside their differences in order to work together to support the reelection Boris Yeltsin.[4] By mid-1996, Yeltsin had recruited a team of a handful of financial and media oligarchs to bankroll the Yeltsin campaign and guarantee favorable media coverage the president on national television and in leading newspapers.[40] In return, Yeltsin's presidential administration allowed well-connected Russian business leaders to acquire majority stakes in some of Russia's most valuable state-owned assets.[41]

Additionally, to further guarantee consistent media coverage, in February Yeltsin had fired the chairperson of the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and replaced him with Eduard Sagalaev.[42][43]

While the anti-communist pro-Yeltsin media bias certainly contributed to Yeltsin's victory, it was not the sole factor. A similar anti-communist media bias in the run-up to the 1995 parliamentary elections had failed to prevent a communist victory.[44] Additionally, Yeltsin himself had been able to win the 1991 presidential election in spite of a strongly unfavorable media bias towards him.[45]

Violations of campaign laws

Yeltsin's campaign disregarded numerous campaign regulations. Analysis has indicated that Yeltsin's campaign spent well in excess of spending limits.[4] Yeltsin also violated a law against broadcasting advertisements before March 15.[46] Yeltsin undertook many abuses of his power in order to assist his campaign effort.[47]

Fraud

While a number of instances of fraud were found, there has been no evidence that they had any material consequence on the result of the election.[47]

The Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation found that the original second-round results reported from Mordovia were falsified. A significant number of votes that had been cast for Zyuganov were recorded as "Against All Candidates". The vote totals from Mordovia were subsequently adjusted by the Central Election Commission in order to remedy this.[48][49]

The Central Election Commission also discovered fraud in Dagestan, an ethnic republic which had experienced a very improbable change in voting patterns between rounds. The vote totals were revised to remedy this.[50][51][52][53]

Another instance of fraud was discovered in Karachay-Cherkessia by the Central Election Commission. The vote totals were adjusted to remedy for this as well.[54]

Allegations of fraud

There have been a number of allegations issues claiming that there were further, and greater, instances of fraud than the aforementioned instances that had been discovered by the Central Election Commission. These include a number of allegations which assert that the election was unfair, favoring Yeltsin, as well as some allegations that go as far as to assert that the entire election was fraudulent.[55]

In addition to federal subjects in which fraud was discovered by the CEC, some results, such as those from Russia's ethnic republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, showed highly unlikely changes in voting patterns between the two rounds of voting. This has aroused suspicions of fraud.[51][52][53] However, any fraud that may have contributed to these discrepancies is unlikely to have had a material effect on the outcome of the election.[56] One hypothesis that has been given for the dramatic increase in support that Yeltsin saw in some regions was that, prior to the second round vote, administrative pressure was applied in these regions to coerce voters into supporting Yeltsin.[47][57]

Allegations have been made that, in the first round of the election, several regions of Russia committed electoral fraud in favor of Zyuganov.[58] It has also been further alleged that several of these Republics switched the direction of their fraud during the second-round, favoring Yeltsin instead.[58]

Mikhail Gorbachev has voiced a belief that the results of the election were falsified. He has stated that he believes that the results under-reported his actual share of the vote.[59]

At a meeting with opposition leaders in 2012, then-president Dmitry Medvedev was reported to have said, "There is hardly any doubt who won [that race]. It was not Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin."[55][60]

Allegations of foreign influence

Some have argued that the role of American president Bill Clinton's administration in securing an International Monetary Fund loan for Russia was an act of foreign electoral intervention.[61][62] The United States was keen on assisting Russia in their transition to a market economy, and therefore helpted to provide significant sums of financial aid to Yeltsin's government.[63]

In 2016 Dick Morris alleged that Bill Clinton was involved in assembling a trio of consultants advising Yelsin's campaign.[64] However, Morris has had a history of making both unsubstantiated and false accusations against President Clinton and his wife.[65][66][67]

Knowing that his voter base was pro-Western, Yeltsin lobbied President Clinton to speak praisefully of Russia's transition to democracy. Yeltsin believed that this would strengthen his support from voters.[68]

Yeltsin warned President Clinton of the possible ramifications of a Zyuganov victory, saying,

There is a U.S. press campaign suggesting that people should not be afraid of the communists; that they are good, honorable and kind people. I warn people not to believe this. More than half of them are fanatics; they would destroy everything. It would mean civil war. They would abolish the boundaries between the republics. They want to take back Crimea; they even make claims against Alaska...There are two paths for Russia's development. I do not need power. But when I felt the threat of communism, I decided that I had to run. We will prevent it.[69]

In their conversations President Clinton assured Yeltsin that he would give him his publicly declared personal endorsement, saying, "I've been trying to find a way to say to the Russian people 'this election will have consequences,' and we are clear about what it is we support."[69] However, President Clinton providing his endorsement was not an extraordinary act. It is not unusual for national leaders to provide their endorsements to candidates in other nations. For instance, in the 2016 US presidential election Donald Trump received endorsements from a number of then-incumbent national leaders, as did his opponent Hillary Clinton. Not only is it not unusual for a national leader to lend their endorsement to a politician abroad but, in fact, the 1996 election cycle even saw instances in which Russian politicians lent their endorsement to candidates for the US presidential election. For instance, Zhirinovsky lent (and later rescinded) his endorsement to Pat Buchanan, who was running in the primaries for the Republican nomination in the US presidential election.[70]

Opinion polls

Results

Candidate Party First round Second round
Votes % Votes %
Boris YeltsinIndependent26,665,49535.840,203,94854.4
Gennady ZyuganovCommunist Party24,211,68632.530,102,28840.7
Alexander LebedCongress of Russian Communities10,974,73614.7
Grigory YavlinskyYabloko5,550,7527.4
Vladimir ZhirinovskyLiberal Democratic Party4,311,4795.8
Svyatoslav FyodorovParty of Workers' Self-Government699,1580.9
Mikhail GorbachevIndependent386,0690.5
Martin ShakkumIndependent277,0680.4
Yury VlasovIndependent151,2820.2
Vladimir BryntsalovRussian Socialist Party123,0650.2
Aman Tuleyev[A 1]Independent3080.0
Against all1,163,9211.63,604,4624.9
Invalid/blank votes1,072,120–780,592–
Total75,587,13910074,691,290100
Registered voters/turnout108,495,02369.7108,589,05068.8
Source: Nohlen & Stöver,[71] Colton[72]
Notes
  1. ↑ Withdrew his candidacy before the election, but received 308 votes during the early voting (up to the withdrawal of the candidature), which were credited as valid.
First round
  Federal subjects in which plurality of votes were won by Boris Yeltsin
  Federal subjects in which plurality of votes were won by Gennady Zyuganov
  Yeltsin (35.8%)
  Zyuganov (32.5%)
  Lebed (14.7%)
  Yavlinsky (7.4%)
  Zhirinovsky (5.8%)
  Other candidates (2.2%)
  Against All (1.6%)
Yeltsin
 
 35.8%
Zyuganov
 
 32.5%
Lebed
 
 14.7%
Yavlinsky
 
 7.4%
Zhirinovsky
 
 5.8%
Fyodorov
 
 0.9%
Gorbachev
 
 0.5%
Shakkum
 
 0.4%
Vlasov
 
 0.2%
Bryntsalov
 
 0.2%
Tuleyev
 
 0.0%
Against All
 
 1.6%
Second round
  Federal subjects in which plurality of votes were won by Boris Yeltsin
  Federal subjects in which plurality of votes were won by Gennady Zyuganov
  Yeltsin (54.4%)
  Zyuganov (40.7%)
  Against All (4.9%)
Yeltsin
 
 54.4%
Zyuganov
 
 40.7%
Against All
 
 4.9%


First round results by federal subject

Federal subjects with a plurality of vote for Yeltsin
Federal subjects with a plurality of vote for Zyuganov
Borris
Yeltsin
Independent		 Gennady
Zyuganov
Communist		 Alexander
Lebed
KRO		 Grigory
Yavlinsky
Yabloko		 Vladimir
Zhirinovsky
LDPR		 Vladimir
Bryntsalov
RSP		 Svyatoslav
Fyodorov
PST		 Mikhail
Gorbachev
Independent		 Martin
Shakkum
Independent		 Yury
Vlasov
Independent		 Aman
Tuleyev
Independent		 Against All Total Invalid ballots Registered voters/turnout
Federal subject # % # % # % # % # % # % # % # % # % # % # % # % # # # %
Adygea 45,374 20.0% 116,701 51.5% 31,710 14.0% 11,977 5.3% 11,494 5.1% 319 0.1% 2,245 1.0% 557 0.3% 720 0.3% 342 0.2% 0 0.0% 2,380 1.1% 223,819 2,799 338,369
Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug 13,647 44.7% 10,903 35.7% 1,630 5.3% 794 2.6% 1,732 5.7% 72 0.2% 231 0.7% 340 1.1% 77 0.3% 42 0.1% 0 0.0% 384 1.3% 29,852 656 44,176
Altai Krai 300,499 21.8% 578,478 42.0% 267,212 19.4% 69,619 5.1% 101,669 7.4% 1,642 0.1% 9,439 0.7% 6,387 0.5% 4,688 0.3% 1,861 0.1% 0 0.0% 18,521 1.3% 1,360,019 18,140 1,950,248
Altai Republic 27,562 28.5% 42,204 43.6% 12,614 13.0% 3,347 3.5% 4,671 4.8% 173 0.2% 836 0.9% 967 1.0% 473 0.5% 228 0.2% 2 0.0% 1,552 1.6% 94,629 2,158 130,610
Amur Oblast 127,223 26.6% 200,186 41.9% 56,610 11.8% 28,985 6.1% 37,852 7.9% 756 0.2% 5,651 1.2% 2,374 0.5% 1,484 0.3% 867 0.2% 0 0.0% 10,222 2.1% 472,210 6,105 697,451
Arkhangelsk Oblast 288,225 40.9% 129,200 18.3% 121,910 17.3% 76,136 10.8% 46,277 6.6% 1,440 0.2% 11,037 1.6% 3,981 0.6% 3,805 0.5% 1,590 0.2% 34 0.0% 13,874 2.0% 697,608 8,045 1,056,542
Astrakhan Oblast 150,190 29.5% 185,925 36.5% 82,140 16.1% 30,710 6.0% 36,407 7.2% 704 0.1% 4,674 0.9% 1,623 0.3% 916 0.2% 762 0.2% 0 0.0% 7,018 1.4% 501,069 7,699 734,487
Bashkortostan 769,089 34.2% 941,539 41.9% 200,859 8.9% 152,557 6.8% 64,541 2.9% 3,949 0.2% 12,256 0.5% 17,411 0.8% 7,202 0.3% 2,992 0.1% 0 0.0% 31,861 1.4% 2,204,156 45,139 2,846,065
Belgorod Oblast 189,320 22.9% 383,688 46.4% 140,322 17.0% 47,592 5.8% 35,666 4.3% 1,018 0.1% 4,336 5.8% 2,777 0.3% 1,220 0.2% 1,106 0.1% 0 0.0% 10,373 1.3% 817,418 10,397 1,093,357
Bryansk Oblast 210,257 26.2% 397,454 49.6% 92,948 11.6% 27,904 3.5% 40,777 5.1% 856 0.1% 4,746 0.6% 2,657 0.3% 1,190 0.2% 1,035 0.1% 0 0.0% 10,247 1.3% 790,071 11,528 1,110,307
Buryatia 134,856 30.6% 177,293 40.2% 46,609 10.6% 33,451 7.6% 21,329 4.8% 554 0.1% 5,464 1.2% 2,544 0.6% 1,190 0.3% 770 0.2% 0 0.0% 6,185 0.4% 430,245 10,541 688,483
Chechnya 239,905 65.1% 60,119 16.3% 9,371 2.5% 15,666 4.3% 5,172 1.4% 817 0.2% 3,804 1.0% 6,508 1.8% 1,118 0.3% 1,489 0.4% 0 0.0% 8,190 2.2% 352,159 16,318 507,243
Chelyabinsk Oblast 685,273 36.6% 463,071 24.7% 371,120 19.8% 164,230 8.8% 97,937 5.2% 2,703 0.2% 13,732 0.7% 8,936 0.5% 6,594 0.4% 2,716 0.2% 0 0.0% 25,542 1.4% 1,841,854 30,487 2,663,820
Chita Oblast 130,011 24.5% 207,282 39.1% 61,981 11.7% 29,071 5.5% 68,603 13.0% 840 0.2% 6,688 1.3% 2,870 0.5% 1,794 0.3% 949 0.2% 0 0.0% 11,116 2.1% 521,205 8,645 823,229
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug 20,859 48.5% 5,808 13.5% 7,337 17.1% 2,741 6.4% 3,254 7.6% 114 0.3% 844 2.0% 264 0.6% 116 0.3% 124 0.3% 17 0.0% 1,123 2.6% 42,601 418 58,848
Chuvashia 132,422 20.6% 347,524 53.9% 49,296 7.7% 29,446 3.2% 27,381 4.3% 977 0.2% 20,906 3.2% 2,329 4.3% 2,166 0.3% 916 0.1% 0 0.0% 7,068 1.1% 620431 23,945 959,432
Dagestan 230,614 28.5% 511,202 63.2% 10,799 1.3% 13,753 1.7% 9,041 1.1% 1,026 0.1% 2,208 0.3% 2,791 0.4% 703 0.1% 622 0.1% 15 0.0% 4,336 0.5% 787,110 21,418 1,172,872
Evenk Autonomous Okrug 3,678 43.4% 1,694 20.0% 1,390 16.4% 553 6.3% 597 7.1% 16 0.2% 140 1.7% 69 0.8% 41 0.5% 30 0.4% 0 0.0% 157 1.9% 8,345 125 12,932
Ingushetia 37,129 46.3% 19,653 24.5% 1,786 2.2% 12,195 15.2% 1,398 1.7% 305 0.4% 616 0.8% 3,574 4.5% 299 0.4% 148 0.2% 0 0.0% 1,534 1.9% 78,647 1,614 114,605
Irkutsk Oblast 363,648 32.2% 311,353 27.6% 183,962 16.3% 100,075 8.9% 95,810 8.5% 1,698 0.2% 22,271 2.0% 7,150 0.6% 4,552 0.4% 2,635 0.2% 11 0.0% 19,003 1.7% 1,112,168 17,019 1,798,752
Ivanovo Oblast 204,084 29.6% 160,105 23.2% 203,997 29.6% 41,38 6.1% 48,275 7.0% 1,128 0.2% 4,215 0.6% 2,549 0.4% 1,864 0.3% 1,082 0.2% 0 0.0% 11,199 1.6% 642,094 8,954 957,607
Jewish Autonomous Oblast 28,859 30.4% 31,220 32.8% 14,544 15.3% 6,134 6.5% 7,594 8.0% 201 0.2% 1,725 1.8% 626 0.7% 348 0.4% 190 0.2% 0 0.0% 2,318 2.4% 93,759 1,294 140,631
Kabardino-Balkaria 163,872 43.8% 139,521 37.3% 36,685 9.8% 12,590 3.4% 5,358 1.4% 465 0.1% 1,809 0.5% 1,290 0.3% 712 0.2% 452 0.1% 0 0.0% 2,824 0.8% 365,578 8,947 507,194
Kaliningrad Oblast 173,769 33.5% 119,830 23.1% 110,264 19.3% 66,703 12.9% 37,412 7.2% 878 0.2% 3,189 0.6% 2,245 0.4% 821 0.2% 823 0.2% 9 0.0% 7,506 1.5% 513,449 5,818 724,142
Kalmykia 88,615 58.5% 38,954 25.7% 8,215 5.4% 3,791 2.5% 5,407 3.6% 177 0.1% 633 0.4% 531 0.4% 227 0.2% 121 0.1% 0 0.0% 1,372 0.9% 148,053 3,443 200,224
Kaluga Oblast 190,706 31.4% 241,933 35.4% 94,650 15.6% 45,258 7.5% 31,018 5.1% 1,140 0.2% 5,249 0.9% 2,379 0.4% 2,791 0.5% 1,158 0.2% 0 0.0% 9,194 1.5% 598,476 8,352 832,954
Kamchatka Oblast 57,435 34.3% 31,307 18.8% 23,549 14.1% 28,935 17.3% 16,689 10.0% 347 0.2% 1,731 1.0% 872 0.5% 542 0.3% 487 0.3% 20 0.0% 3,840 2.3% 165,754 1,740 282,857
Karachay-Cherkessia 54,823 25.8% 117,677 55.4% 18,624 8.8% 6,527 3.1% 5,286 2.5% 616 0.3% 1,014 0.5% 1,060 0.5% 525 0.3% 229 0.1% 0 0.0% 1,619 0.8% 208,000 4,322 293,024
Karelia 165,584 42.4% 66,428 17.0% 47,0543 12.0% 55,768 14.3% 33,134 8.5% 744 0.2% 3,817 1.0% 1,914 0.5% 2,066 0.5% 722 0.2% 0 0.0% 7,573 1.9% 384,803 6,137 577,087
Kemerovo Oblast 332,376 23.0% 561,397 38.9% 220,789 15.3% 77,099 5.3% 167,925 11.6% 1,565 0.1% 23,566 1.6% 7,154 0.5% 5,260 0.4% 1,967 0.1% 0 0.0% 23,640 0.6% 1,422,738 21,111 2,167,343
Khabarovsk Krai 288,585 39.0% 169,586 22.9% 90,550 12.2% 77,077 10.4% 64,007 8.7% 988 0.1% 15991 2.2% 5,097 0.7% 2,680 0.4% 1,391 0.2% 5 0.0% 16,239 2.2% 732,196 7,580 1,103,898
Khakassia 75,801 29.2% 91,956 35.5% 32,491 12.5% 18,784 7.3% 25,108 9.7% 458 0.2% 3,098 1.2% 1,643 0.6% 1,074 0.4% 677 0.3% 0 0.0% 4,255 1.6% 255,345 3,866 393,711
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug 271,345 52.5% 66,241 12.8% 78,175 15.1% 34,138 6.6% 39,217 7.6% 799 0.2% 7,178 1.4% 2,984 0.6% 2,424 0.5% 822 0.2% 0 0.0% 7,040 1.4% 510,363 6,143 827,553
Kirov Oblast 272,471 31.2% 252,624 29.0% 119,504 13.7% 105,934 12.2% 75,155 8.6% 1,688 0.2% 7,232 0.8% 3,706 0.4% 3,499 0.4% 1,609 0.2% 0 0.0% 17,554 2.0% 860,976 11,194 1,199,668
Komi Republic 202,373 40.5% 81,572 16.3% 90,830 18.2% 47,240 9.5% 49,103 9.8% 878 0.18% 4,262 0.9% 2,992 0.6% 1,990 0.4% 949 0.2% 3 0.0% 9,193 1.8% 491,385 8,572 799,889
Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug 37,649 53.3% 16,751 23.7% 3,850 5.5% 2,116 3.0% 6,013 8.5% 174 0.3% 360 0.5% 603 0.9% 208 0.3% 116 0.2% 0 0.0% 1,460 2.01% 69,300 1,350 102,136
Koryak Autonomous Okrug 7,270 46.0% 2,367 15.0% 2,497 15.8% 1,411 8.9% 1,028 6.5% 55 0.4% 208 1.3% 136 0.9% 66 0.4% 45 0.3% 0 0.0% 459 2.9% 15,542 267 21,783
Kostroma Oblast 122,971 28.0% 125,399 28.6% 102,078 23.3% 34,112 7.8% 33,426 7.6% 747 0.2% 3,357 0.8% 2,024 0.5% 1,197 0.3% 875 0.2% 0 0.0% 6,940 1.6% 433,126 5,730 596,580
Krasnodar Krai 682,602 26.3% 1,024,603 39.4% 454,555 17.5% 165,231 6.4% 165,721 6.4% 4,284 0.2% 23,266 0.9% 8,092 0.3% 5,498 0.2% 4,002 0.2% 0 0.0% 31,460 1.2% 2,569,314 29,791 3,878,024
Krasnoyarsk Krai 523,135 34.8% 428,781 28.5% 208,494 13.9% 150,527 10.0% 113,853 7.6% 1,947 0.1% 13,264 0.9% 8,885 0.6% 6,127 0.4% 2,471 0.2% 20 0.0% 26,434 1.8% 1,484,038 19,410 2,141,669
Kurgan Oblast 170,311 29.3% 218,464 37.5% 64,877 11.1% 38,479 6.6% 58,143 10.0% 1,071 0.2% 4,582 0.8% 3,112 0.5% 2,029 0.4% 958 0.2% 0 0.0% 12,139 2.1% 574,165 7,996 786,510
Kursk Oblast 177,328 24.1% 376,880 51.1% 81,555 11.1% 39,641 5.4% 28,666 3.9% 971 0.1% 4,280 0.6% 2,661 0.4% 1,145 0.2% 1,140 0.2% 0 0.0% 9,626 1.3% 723,893 13,244 1,007,467
Leningrad Oblast 348,505 37.5% 215,511 23.2% 168,540 18.1% 107,896 11.6% 39,882 4.3% 2,210 0.2% 11,038 1.2% 5,757 0.6% 3,491 0.4% 1,812 0.2% 0 0.0% 15,735 1.7% 920,377 9,858 1,329,030
Lipetsk Oblast 168,077 25.1% 310,671 46.4% 88,165 13.2% 37,251 5.6% 35,638 5.3% 750 0.1% 4,616 0.7% 1,898 0.3% 1,279 0.2% 1,070 0.2% 0 0.0% 10,084 1.5% 659,499 10,535 945,709
Magadan Oblast 40,679 36.9% 17,666 16.0% 26,288 23.9% 6,770 6.2% 12,021 10.9% 259 0.2% 1,570 1.4% 517 0.5% 421 0.4% 296 0.3% 5 0.0% 2,677 2.4% 109,169 987 170,058
Mari El Republic 93,124 24.4% 166,131 43.4% 41,948 11.0% 28,179 7.4% 28,418 7.4% 650 0.2% 5,047 1.3% 1,790 0.5% 2,327 0.6% 696 0.2% 0 0.0% 7,395 1.9% 375,705 6,756 550,104
Mordovia 116,693 24.1% 240,263 49.7% 51,434 10.6% 14,493 3.0% 33,138 6.9% 627 0.1% 3,323 0.7% 1,439 0.3% 652 0.1% 961 0.2% 0 0.0% 4,396 0.9% 467,419 15,927 688,846
Moscow 2,861,058 61.2% 694,862 14.9% 449,900 9.6% 372,524 8.0% 68,285 1.5% 8,891 0.2% 37,790 0.8% 23,524 0.5% 29,858 0.6% 20,614 0.4% 0 0.0% 67,873 1.5% 4,635,180 42,771 6,784,920
Moscow Oblast 1,675,374 44.2% 912,684 24.1% 571,886 15.1% 298,656 7.9% 113,883 3.0% 9,575 0.3% 34,510 0.9% 17,478 0.5% 31,929 0.8% 11,721 0.3% 0 0.0% 65,959 1.7% 3,743,655 50,920 5,375,052
Murmansk Oblast 190,719 40.6% 56,789 12.1% 119,396 25.4% 45,435 9.7% 32,775 7.0% 1,154 0.3% 4,177 0.9% 2,447 0.5% 1,166 0.3% 1,743 0.4% 0 0.0% 9,345 2.0% 465,188 4,355 787,978
Nenets Autonomous Okrug 9,033 42.6% 3,891 18.4% 2,537 12.0% 1,619 7.6% 2,104 9.9% 64 0.3% 465 2.2% 215 1.0% 105 0.5% 68 0.3% 12 0.0% 738 3.5% 20,851 332 29,097
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast 657,961 34.8% 614,467 32.5% 279,053 14.8% 134,905 7.1% 102,621 5.4% 4,426 0.2% 16,620 0.9% 8,070 0.4% 5,074 0.3% 4,220 0.2% 0 0.0% 32,601 1.7% 1,860,018 29,046 2,852,173
North Ossetia-Alania 57,849 19.3% 187,007 62.3% 28,895 9.6% 5,390 1.8% 9,703 3.2% 460 0.2% 1,705 0.6% 861 0.3% 503 0.2% 556 0.2% 0 0.0% 3,303 1.1% 296,132 3,899 435,145
Novgorod Oblast 148,515 35.7% 98,682 23.7% 76,912 18.5% 45,786 11.0% 25,813 6.2% 960 0.2% 3,398 0.8% 2,437 0.6% 1,250 0.3% 773 0.2% 0 0.0% 7,045 1.7% 411,531 4,734 577,881
Novosibirsk Oblast 371,210 25.6% 506,791 35.0% 144,918 10.0% 202,117 13.9% 141,440 9.8% 1,505 0.1% 14,609 1.0% 16,106 1.1% 3,086 0.2% 1,864 0.1% 2 0.0% 24,735 1.7% 1,428,383 21,131 2,036,398
Omsk Oblast 369,782 32.8% 417,029 37.0% 94,396 8.4% 101,027 9.0% 78,352 7.0% 1,364 0.1% 8,693 0.8% 5,061 0.5% 7,961 0.7% 1,907 0.2% 0 0.0% 23,244 2.1% 1,108,816 18,689 1,528,138
Orenburg Oblast 288,865 26.0% 468,689 42.1% 151,489 13.6% 65,027 5.8% 83,523 8.5% 1,836 0.2% 10,316 0.9% 7,036 0.6% 2,378 0.2% 1,620 0.2% 0 0.0% 13,920 1.3% 1,094,699 17,835 1,582,780
Oryol Oblast 109,020 21.5% 275,643 54.3% 59,782 11.8% 19,788 3.9% 22,402 4.4% 589 0.1% 3,187 0.6% 1,580 0.3% 783 0.2% 788 0.2% 0 0.0% 8,002 1.6% 501,754 6,377 687,020
Penza Oblast 181,839 20.8% 442,066 50.6% 105,389 12.1% 60,565 6.9% 46,188 5.3% 1,055 0.1% 5,775 0.7% 2,447 0.3% 1,724 0.2% 1,289 0.2% 0 0.0% 12,508 1.4% 860,845 12,836 1,166,105
Perm Krai 742,968 55.3% 216,713 16.1% 130,203 6.7% 96,926 7.2% 83,952 6.2% 2,346 0.2% 12,410 0.9% 8,303 0.6% 4,295 0.3% 2,367 0.2% 0 0.0% 23,795 1.8% 1,324,278 20,067 2,020,049
Primorsky Krai 308,747 29.6% 256,574 24.6% 203,384 19.5% 74,840 7.2% 133,029 12.7% 1,889 0.2% 13,094 1.3% 5,751 0.6% 8,692 0.8% 2,084 0.2% 42 0.0% 23,619 2.3% 1,031,745 13,097 1,580,011
Pskov Oblast 121,667 24.8% 149,056 30.4% 115,549 23.6% 34,537 7.0% 49,999 10.2% 832 0.2% 3,319 0.7% 2,028 0.4% 1,196 0.2% 738 0.2% 0 0.0% 7,023 1.4% 485,935 4,497 648,971
Rostov Oblast 725,949 29.1% 873,609 35.0% 500,263 20.0% 192,273 7.7% 115,162 4.6% 3,114 0.1% 15,082 0.6% 7,925 0.3% 5,312 0.2% 3,591 0.1% 2 0.0% 26,318 1.1% 2,468,600 27,853 3,301,262
Ryazan Oblast 186,477 24.7% 302,484 40.1% 149,544 19.8% 42,242 5.6% 40,968 5.4% 1,089 0.1% 4,981 0.7% 2,641 0.4% 2,347 0.3% 1,372 0.2% 0 0.0% 12,206 1.6% 746,351 8,525 1,027,429
Sakha Republic 228,398 51.9% 90,529 20.6% 55,551 12.6% 20,620 4.7% 16,099 3.7% 715 0.2% 1158 0.3% 3,459 0.8% 1,158 0.3% 770 0.2% 12 0.0% 7,342 1.7% 429,300 11,178 611,990
Sakhalin Oblast 87,577 29.9% 78,935 26.9% 54,755 18.7% 27,174 9.3% 26,581 9.1% 569 0.2% 4,030 1.4% 1,683 0.6% 1,207 0.4% 566 0.2% 32 0.0% 6,181 2.1% 289,290 4,018 462,223
Saint Petersburg 1,137,382 49.6% 342,466 14.9% 321,244 14.0% 347,488 15.2% 49,273 2.2% 4,114 0.2% 25,410 1.1% 17,640 0.8% 6,748 0.3% 6,320 0.3% 0 0.0% 25,467 1.1% 2,283,552 9,415 3,695,014
Samara Oblast 620,526 36.1% 604,110 35.2% 200,054 11.7% 105,776 6.2% 96,378 5.6% 1,807 0.1% 16,932 1.0% 8,198 0.5% 11,351 0.7% 4,471 0.3% 0 0.0% 27,684 1.6% 1,697,287 20,298 2,459,138
Saratov Oblast 426,533 28.4% 624,996 41.6% 191,822 12.8% 79,404 5.3% 106,482 7.1% 2,201 0.2% 14,135 0.9% 5,445 0.4% 4,131 0.3% 2,854 0.2% 2 0.0% 25,043 1.7% 1,483,048 19,830 2,045,823
Smolensk Oblast 141,854 22.0% 287,621 44.6% 102,726 15.9% 32,942 5.1% 53,764 8.3% 783 0.1% 3,834 0.6% 2,347 0.4% 1,603 0.3% 918 0.1% 0 0.0% 9194 1.4% 637,586 7,675 885,377
Stavropol Krai 302,236 22.0% 603,570 43.9% 265,729 19.3% 56,353 4.1% 84,991 6.2% 2,133 0.2% 10,654 0.8% 8,219 0.6% 5,397 0.4% 2,091 0.2% 0 0.0% 16,479 1.2% 1,357,852 15,933 1,862,784
Sverdlovsk Oblast 1,302,951 59.5% 255,514 11.7% 310,841 14.2% 117,496 5.4% 107,039 4.9% 2,980 0.1% 23,103 1.1% 9,368 0.5% 5,850 0.3% 3,671 0.2% 0 0.0% 30,353 1.4% 2,169,166 22,506 3,440,385
Tambov Oblast 144,669 20.9% 361,552 52.3% 81,045 11.7% 32,003 4.6% 42,183 6.1% 991 0.1% 5,576 0.8% 2,103 0.3% 1,343 0.2% 1,174 0.2% 0 0.0% 9,413 1.4% 682,052 9,829 976,750
Tatarstan 745,181 38.4% 740,451 38.1% 143,429 7.4% 134,161 6.9% 50,119 2.6% 3,553 0.2% 17,895 0.9% 15,775 0.8% 4,620 0.2% 3,289 0.2% 0 0.0% 31,374 1.6% 1,889,847 53,720 2,635,844
Taymyr Autonomous Okrug 9,434 49.7% 2,304 12.1% 2,843 15.0% 1,234 6.5% 1,920 10.1% 33 0.2% 292 1.5% 192 1.0% 100 0.5% 35 0.2% 0 0.0% 386 2.0% 18,773 207 28,940
Tomsk Oblast 178,881 36.0% 113,281 22.1% 100,788 19.7% 55,780 10.9% 36,419 7.1% 725 0.1% 4,026 0.8% 3,096 0.6% 1,525 0.3% 881 0.2% 0 0.0% 8,224 1.6% 503,626 8,252 745,336
Tula Oblast 311,280 30.0% 314,098 30.2% 249,663 24.0% 68,439 6.6% 47,545 4.6% 1,462 0.1% 6,196 0.6% 3,334 0.3% 3,543 0.3% 1,762 0.2% 0 0.0% 15,702 1.5% 1,023,024 16,031 1,440,267
Tuva 69,971 59.9% 24,716 21.2% 5,297 4.5% 4,926 4.2% 3,529 3.0% 175 0.2% 532 0.5% 1,167 1.0% 246 0.2% 169 0.2% 0 0.0% 1,170 1.0% 111,898 4,851 170,685
Tver Oblast 299,435 32.1% 313,168 33.6% 159,813 17.1% 64,843 7.0% 51,496 5.5% 1,587 0.2% 6,799 0.7% 3,551 0.4% 3,820 0.4% 1,804 0.2% 0 0.0% 16,367 1.8% 922,683 9,750 1,256,109
Tyumen Oblast 238,171 39.1% 116,491 27.3% 80,961 13.3% 34,850 5.7% 57,206 9.4% 982 0.2% 4,988 0.8% 3,224 0.5% 2,150 0.4% 982 0.2% 18 0.0% 10,770 1.77% 600,693 8,920 907,788
Udmurtia 271,865 36.8% 225,074 30.5% 85,125 11.5% 68,215 9.2% 44,243 6.0% 1,404 0.2% 6,802 0.9% 5,092 0.7% 3,056 0.4% 1,679 0.2% 0 0.0% 14,731 2.0% 727,286 11,375 1,151,991
Ulyanovsk Oblast 184,218 23.8% 355,066 45.8% 95,559 12.3% 45,748 5.9% 57,67 7.4% 989 0.1% 7,158 0.9% 2,557 0.3% 2,061 0.3% 1,136 0.2% 0 0.0% 11,355 1.5% 763,014 11,682 1,090,344
Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug 21,827 37.0% 23,604 40.0% 5,041 8.5% 2,335 4.0% 2,691 4.6% 107 0.2% 663 1.1% 419 0.7% 161 0.3% 98 0.2% 0 0.0% 811 1.4% 57,757 1,244 82,940
Vladimir Oblast 270,736 30.9% 261,808 29.9% 174,490 19.9% 64,783 7.4% 58,774 6.7% 1,591 0.2% 6,980 0.8% 3,618 0.4% 3,923 0.5% 1,957 0.2% 0 0.0% 14,222 1.6% 862,882 13,592 1,243,738
Volgograd Oblast 411,822 28.6% 576,802 40.0% 196,609 13.7% 92,623 6.4% 94,418 6.6% 1,995 0.1% 19,237 1.3% 6,055 0.4% 3,543 0.3% 2,572 0.2% 0 0.0% 19,832 1.4% 1,425,508 14,897 2,003,793
Vologda Oblast 306,663 45.2% 126,665 18.7% 119,719 17.6% 40,200 5.9% 48,338 7.1% 1,320 0.2% 5,894 0.9% 4,633 0.7% 2,295 0.3% 1,302 0.2% 0 0.0% 14,799 2.2% 671,828 7,054 983,482
Voronezh Oblast 319,402 22.7% 641,540 45.5% 246,234 17.5% 62,458 4.4% 82,429 5.8% 1,846 0.1% 10,767 0.8% 4,316 0.3% 2,247 0.2% 2,428 0.2% 0 0.0% 19,982 1.4% 1,393,649 16,799 1,963,015
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug 104,486 55.3% 17,360 9.2% 29,789 15.8% 11,824 6.3% 14,304 7.6% 352 0.2% 2,975 1.6% 1,286 0.7% 1,086 0.6% 315 0.2% 0 0.0% 2,713 1.43% 186,490 2,577 296,650
Yaroslavl Oblast 260,919 32.9% 144,188 18.2% 245,613 31.0% 65,886 8.3% 38,380 4.8% 1,157 0.2% 4,896 0.6% 3,338 0.4% 4,113 0.5% 1,464 0.2% 0 0.0% 12,865 1.6% 782,819 9,462 1,098,249
Sources: Central Election Commission International Republican Institute;Electoral Geography 2.0

Second round results by federal subject

Federal subjects with a plurality of vote for Yeltsin
Federal subjects with a plurality of vote for Zyuganov
Borris Yeltsin
Independent		 Gennady Zyuganov
Communist		 Against All Total Invalid ballots Registered voters/turnout
Federal subject # % # % # % # % # %
Adygea 76,146 34.5% 133,665 60.5% 7,575 3.4% 217,386 3,435 340,508 64.9%
Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug 14,405 49.2% 13,839 47.2% 599 28,843 457 44,231 66.3%
Altai Krai 505,270 38.6% 727,548 55.5% 65,029 5.0% 1,297,847 12,605 1,953,564 67.1%
Altai Republic 40,026 43.0% 48,057 51.7% 3,527 91,610 1,385 131,097 71.0%
Amur Oblast 186,867 40.7% 243,823 53.1% 24,993 5.4% 455,683 3,733 700,393 65.6%
Arkhangelsk Oblast 448,477 63.9% 194,704 27.8% 52,315 7.5% 695,496 6,215 1,058,566 66.4.%
Astrakhan Oblast 229,153 47.3% 233,738 48.2% 21,623 4.5% 484,514 4,567 735,471 66.6%
Bashkortostan 1,170,774 52.2% 990,148 44.1% 83,484 3.7% 2,244,406 50,577 2,851,338 80.6%
Belgorod Oblast 300,481 36.3% 485,024 57.6% 33,850 4.1% 819,355 8,779 1,098,946 75.4%
Bryansk Oblast 286,515 36.3% 467,552 59.2% 27,173 3.4% 781,240 8,186 1,114,079 70.9%
Buryatia 192,933 45.3% 210,791 49.5% 16,036 3.8% 419,760 6,108 689,933 61.8%
Chechnya 275,455 73.4% 80,877 21.5% 15,184 4.0% 371,516 3,887 503,671 74.9%
Chelyabinsk Oblast 1,081,811 58.5% 646,306 35.0% 98,015 1,826,132 22,594 2,667,324 69.5%
Chita Oblast 209,803 40.9% 269,459 52.5% 27,348 506,510 6,553 827,378 62.1%
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug 30,009 74.3% 7,730 19.1% 2,435 6.0% 40,174 223 52,771 76.8%
Chuvashia 205,959 31.8% 405,129 62.6% 21,614 632,702 14,564 962,349 67.3%
Dagestan 471,231 53.1% 401,069 44.3% 7,423 0.8% 879,723 15,263 1,208,348 73.8%
Evenk Autonomous Okrug 5,273 65.8% 2,272 28.3% 409 5.1% 7,954 65 12,852 62.3%
Ingushetia 75,768 79.8% 14,738 15.5% 3,136 3.3% 93,642 1,308 113,849 83.5%
Irkutsk Oblast 578,469 52.6% 437,105 39.8% 69,087 1,084,661 14,331 1,802,839 61.1%
Ivanovo Oblast 349,433 53.2% 256,556 39.1% 45,408 6.9% 651,407 5,392 957,311 68.7%
Jewish Autonomous Oblast 45,791 49.4% 40,464 43.7% 5,333 91,588 1,057 141,466 65.6%
Kabardino-Balkaria 259,313 63.6% 135,287 33.2% 7,952 2.0% 402,552 5,133 513,132 79.7%
Kaliningrad Oblast 289,088 57.7% 177,077 35.3% 30,770 6.1% 496,935 4,144 724,343 69.3%
Kalmykia 103,515 70.3% 39,354 26.7% 2,919 2.0% 145,788 1,523 200,806 73.4%
Kaluga Oblast 290,595 272,592 29,800 592,987 5,036 839,267 71.4%
Kamchatka Krai 99,980 47,664 12,901 160,454 1,210 274,830 58.9%
Karachay-Cherkessia 109,747 101,379 5,286 216,412 3,546 296,321 74.4%
Karelia 251,205 100,104 25,025 376,334 3,059 580,909 65.4%
Kemerovo Oblast 567,761 704,322 80,109 1,352,182 14,501 2,169,590 63.1%
Khabarovsk Krai 430,870 246,378 47,765 725,013 5,539 1,106,030 66.2%
Khakassia 116,729 116,644 11,842 491,550 4,877 814,347 62.5%
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug 368,650 100,303 22,707 491,660 4,877 814,664 61.1%
Kirov Oblast 425,465 348,835 56,929 831,229 7,887 1,201,171 69.9%
Komi Republic 308,250 134,224 31,577 474,051 4,889 791,846 60.6%
Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug 44,136 22,908 2,384 69,428 879 102,567 68.6%
Koryak Autonomous Okrug 10,364 3,401 915 14,680 173 21,889 67.9%
Kostroma Oblast 208,153 178,238 27,709 414,110 3,358 598,475 69.8%
Krasnodar Krai 1,116,007 1,308,765 96,752 2,521,524 20,997 3,904,612 65.2%
Krasnoyarsk Krai 764,633 572,555 80,834 1,418,022 12,987 2,145,968 66.8%
Kurgan Oblast 246,097 284,731 30,668 561,495 5,436 786,547 72.1%
Kursk Oblast 258,183 419,756 24,699 702,638 9,739 1,010,449 70.5%
Leningrad Oblast 570,702 300,501 52,915 924,118 6,123 1,344,260 69.3%
Lipetsk Oblast 259,529 378,393 27,217 665,139 6,947 948,106 71.0%
Magadan Oblast 65,965 28,573 8,528 103,066 703 166,632 62.4%
Mari El 154,301 199,872 19,628 373,801 4,904 550,715 68.8%
Mordovia 238,441 249,451 16,328 504,220 18,283 692,878 75.5%
Moscow 3,629,464 842,092 193,785 4,665,341 30,767 6,672,788 70.6%
Moscow Oblast 2,462,197 1,146,348 194,639 3,803,184 31,745 5,417,224 70.9%
Murmansk Oblast 303,401 94,664 31,851 429,916 2,726 763,877 56.7%
Nenets Autonomous Okrug 11,919 5,596 1,625 19,140 229 28,606 67.6%
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast 967,307 791,738 91,315 2,860,893 19,108 1,850,360 65.5%
North Ossetia-Alania 133,748 164,308 7,317 305,373 5,691 441,614 70.8%
Novgorod Oblast 244,129 140,329 25,371 409,829 2,999 584,018 70.8%
Novosibirsk Oblast 596,564 43.7% 666,858 48.9% 85,698 6.3% 1,349,120 14,673 2,039,828 67.0%
Omsk Oblast 514,384 528,562 57,177 1,100,123 12,464 1,525,989 73.0%
Orenburg Oblast 160,162 316,213 1,151 495,526 4,180 686,945 67.9%
Oryol Oblast 441,163 583,090 45,423 1,047,660 11,408 1,595,245 62.8%
Penza Oblast 299,780 497,773 38,734 804,316 8,118 1,168,541 72.4%
Perm Krai 933,294 310,546 60,109 1,303,949 13,446 2,022,676 65.2%
Primorsky Krai 524,428 395,463 74,206 994,107 9,300 1,586,108 63.4%
Pskov Oblast 217,500 231,201 28,212 476,913 3,932 656,216 73.3%
Rostov Oblast 1,219,594 1,063,135 102,293 2,385,022 21,740 3,295,420 73.2%
Ryazan Oblast 313,087 379,626 36,175 728,888 65,75 1,031,496 71.4%
Sakha Republic 274,570 64.7% 126,888 29.9% 17,293 4.1% 428,752 5,979 601,252 70.7%
Sakhalin Oblast 152,795 111,085 19,578 283,458 2,792 461,110 62.6%
Samara Oblast 910,134 747,946 79,083 1,737,163 14,781 2,455,498 71.5%
Saratov Oblast 664,799 753,173 73,309 1,491,281 16,910 2,042,831 73.9%
Smolensk Oblast 234,125 345,190 29,352 608,667 4,990 887,257 69.2%
Stavropol Krai 548,749 722,889 56,324 1,327,962 12,576 1,870,996 71.8%
Saint Petersburg 1,759,950 502,553 112,723 2,375,206 7,571 3,659,544 65.3%
Sverdlovsk Oblast 1,726,549 401,515 98,563 2,226,627 17,934 3,452,336 65.1%
Tambov Oblast 217,499 419,639 24,705 661,843 5,882 980,607 68.1%
Tatarstan 1,253,121 658,782 74,178 1,986,081 53,145 2,632,389 77.5%
Taymyr Autonomous Okrug 12,787 3,851 1,082 17,20 135 28,920 61.8%
Tomsk Oblast 290,199 165,241 29,667 485,107 5,328 744,010 66.01
Tula Oblast 536,783 421,169 54,934 1,012,866 11,042 1,440,510 71.2%
Tuva 73,113 37,227 2,433 112,763 3,160 171,742 67.6%
Tver Oblast 455,731 396,627 40,877 902,235 6,387 1,268,488 71.7%
Tyumen Oblast 343,391 234,743 30,539 608,673 6,528 915,585 67.3%
Udmurtia 392,551 302,649 40,302 735,502 7,513 1,156,145 64.3%
Ulyanovsk Oblast 286,860 426,778 35,168 748,806 9,460 1,093,057 69.4%
Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug 29,014 28,016 1,610 58,640 974 82,814 72.0%
Vladimir Oblast 4421,352 342,077 46,057 809,486 7,661 1,250,544 65.4%
Volgograd Oblast 616,368 703,784 63,496 1,383,648 10,546 2,006,436 69.6%
Vologda Oblast 426,532 189,989 45,558 661,979 4,814 989,121 67.5%
Voronezh Oblast 501,114 781,260 62,022 1,344,396 11,052 1,968,924 68.9%
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug 467,896 243,526 55,520 776,932 6,004 1,100,070 66.2%
Yaroslavl Oblast 467,896 243,526 55,510 766,932 6,004 1,100,080 70.3%
Sources: Central Election Commission; Central Election Commission; Central Election Commission; International Republican Institute;Electoral Geography 2.0

See also

References

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