International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants

  members

  EU members, not separately ratified

As of October 2, 2015 the following 74 parties were members of UPOV:[3] African Intellectual Property Organisation, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, the People's Republic of China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, European Union,[4] Finland, France, Georgia,[5] Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States of America (with a reservation),[6] Uruguay, Uzbekistan, and Viet Nam.[7]

The membership to the different versions of the convention is shown below:

Party	1961 Convention	1978 Convention	1991 Convention	Comments
Albania			October 15, 2005
Argentina		December 25, 1994
Australia		March 1, 1989	January 20, 2000
Austria		July 14, 1994	July 1, 2004
Azerbaijan			December 9, 2004
Belarus			January 5, 2003
Belgium	December 5, 1976
Bolivia		May 21, 1999
Brazil		May 23, 1999
Bulgaria			April 24, 1998
Canada		March 4, 1991	July 19, 2015
Chile		January 5, 1996
China		April 23, 1999
China		September 13, 1996
Costa Rica			January 12, 2009
Croatia			September 1, 2001
Czech Republic		January 1, 1993	November 24, 2002
Denmark	October 6, 1968	November 8, 1981	April 24, 1998
Dominican Republic			June 16, 2007
Ecuador		August 8, 1997
Estonia			September 24, 2000
European Union			July 29, 2005
Finland		April 16, 1993	July 20, 2001
France	October 3, 1971	March 17, 1983	May 27, 2012
Georgia			November 29, 2008
Germany	August 10, 1968	April 12, 1986	July 25, 1998
Hungary		April 16, 1983	January 1, 2003
Iceland			May 3, 2006
Ireland		November 8, 1981	January 8, 2012
Israel	December 12, 1979	May 12, 1984	April 24, 1998
Italy	July 1, 1977	May 28, 1986
Japan		September 3, 1982	December 24, 1998
Jordan			October 24, 2004
Kenya		May 13, 1999
Kyrgyzstan			June 26, 2000
Latvia			August 30, 2002
Lithuania			December 10, 2003
Mexico		August 9, 1997
Moldova			October 28, 1998
Montenegro			September 24, 2015
Morocco			October 8, 2006
Netherlands	August 10, 1968	September 2, 1984	July 1, 2004	European Netherlands only
New Zealand		November 8, 1981
Nicaragua		September 6, 2001
North Macedonia			May 4, 2011
Norway		September 13, 1993
OAPI			April 24, 1998
Panama		May 23, 1999	November 22, 2012
Paraguay		February 8, 1997
Peru			August 8, 2011
Poland		November 11, 1989	August 15, 2003
Portugal		October 14, 1995
Romania			March 16, 2001
Russia			April 24, 1998
Serbia			January 5, 2013
Singapore			July 30, 2004
Slovakia		January 1, 1993	June 12, 2009
Slovenia			July 29, 1999
South Africa	November 6, 1977	November 8, 1981
South Korea			January 7, 2002
Spain	May 18, 1980		July 18, 2007
Sweden	December 17, 1971	January 1, 1983	April 24, 1998
Switzerland	July 10, 1977	November 8, 1981	September 1, 2008
Trinidad and Tobago		January 30, 1998
Tunisia			August 31, 2003
Turkey			November 18, 2007
Ukraine		November 3, 1995	January 19, 2007
United Kingdom	August 10, 1968	September 24, 1983	January 3, 1999
United States		November 8, 1981	February 22, 1999
Uruguay		November 13, 1994
Uzbekistan			November 14, 2004
Vietnam			December 24, 2006

The Convention defines both how the organization must be governed and run, and the basic concepts of plant variety protection that must be included in the domestic laws of the members of the Union. These concepts include:[8]

• The criteria for new varieties to be protected: novelty, distinctness, uniformity, and stability.
• The process for application for a grant.
• Intellectual property rights conferred to an approved breeder.
• Exceptions to the rights conferred to the breeder.
• Required duration of breeder's right.
• Events in which a breeder's rights must be declared null and void.

In order to be granted breeder's rights, the variety in question must be shown to be new. This means that the plant variety cannot have previously been available for more than one year in the applicant's country, or for more than four years in any other country or territory. The variety must also be distinct (D), that is, easily distinguishable through certain characteristics from any other known variety (protected or otherwise). The other two criteria, uniformity (U) and stability (S), mean that individual plants of the new variety must show no more variation in the relevant characteristics than one would naturally expect to see, and that future generations of the variety through various propagation means must continue to show the relevant distinguishing characteristics. The UPOV offers general guidelines for DUS testing.[9]

A breeder can apply for rights for a new variety in any union member country, and can file in as many countries as desired without waiting for a result from previous applications. Protection only applies in the country in which it was granted, so there are no reciprocal protections unless otherwise agreed by the countries in question. There is a right of priority, and the application date of the first application filed in any country is the date used in determining priority.

The rights conferred to the breeder are similar to those of copyright in the United States, in that they protect both the breeder's financial interests in the variety and his recognition for achievement and labor in the breeding process. The breeder must authorize any actions taken in propagating the new variety, including selling and marketing, importing and exporting, keeping stock of, and reproducing. This means that the breeder can, for example, require a licensing fee for any company interested in reproducing his variety for sale. The breeder also has the right to name the new variety, based on certain guidelines that prevent the name from being deliberately misleading or too similar to another variety's name.

There are explicit exceptions to the rights of the breeder, known as the "breeder's exemption clause", that make it unnecessary to receive authorization for the use of a protected variety where those rights interfere in the use of the variety for a private individual's non-monetary benefit, or the use of the variety for further research. For example, the breeder's rights do not cover the use of the variety for subsistence farming, though they do cover the use of the variety for cash crop farming. Additionally, the breeder's authorization is not required to use a protected variety for experimental purposes, or for breeding other varieties, as long as the new varieties are not "essentially derivative" of the protected variety.[8]

The Convention specifies that the breeder's right must be granted for at least 20 years from grant date, except in the case of varieties of trees or vines, in which case the duration must be at least 25 years.[8]

Finally, there are provisions for how to negate granted breeders' rights if the rights are determined to be unfounded. That is, if it is discovered after the application has been granted that the variety is not actually novel or distinct, or if it is discovered to not be uniform or stable, the breeder's rights are nullified. In addition, if it is discovered that the person who applied for protection of the variety is not the actual breeder, the rights are nullified unless they can be transferred to the proper person. If it is discovered after a period of protection that the variety is no longer uniform and stable, the breeder's rights are canceled.

The UPOV has been updated several times to reflect changing technology and increased understanding of how plant variety intellectual property protection must work. The last revision was in 1991, and specifically mentioned genetic engineering only insofar as it is a method of creating variation.[10] Under the UPOV Convention alone, genetically modified crops and the intellectual property rights granted to them are no different from the intellectual property rights granted for traditionally bred varieties. It is important to note that this necessarily includes the ability to use protected varieties for subsistence farming and for research.

In October 2004, two joint Symposia were held in Geneva with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). These Symposia were the WIPO-UPOV Symposium on Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Biotechnology (October 24, 2003) and the WIPO-UPOV Symposium on the Co-Existence of Patents and Plant Breeders’ Rights in the Promotion of Biotechnological Developments (October 25, 2003). No new policy was created at either of these events, but a consensus emerged that both patents and plant-breeders' rights must combine to promote plant biotechnology.[11]

As a policy matter, the UPOV is known to consider open and un-restricted access to the genetic resources of protected plant varieties to be important to the continued development of new varieties.[12] This opinion is indicated in the "breeders' exemption" clause of the Convention, as described above, and was reinforced in October 2005 in a reply to a notification from the Convention on Biological Diversity.

In April 2003, the Convention on Biological Diversity asked the UPOV for comment on the use of Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (also known pejoratively as 'terminator genes') as they relate to the promotion of intellectual property rights. In the summary of their response, the UPOV stated that intellectual property protection is necessary because breeders must have the ability to recoup their money and labor investment in creating new varieties, and in that light, plants with 'terminator genes' may still be accepted for protection if they meet the other criteria. However, the UPOV comment states that the Convention and its system of protection is sufficient to protect intellectual property rights, and that with proper legal protections in place, technologies like 'terminator genes' should not be necessary.[13]

Whether or not UPOV negatively affects agriculture in developing countries is much debated. It is argued that UPOV's focus on patents for plant varieties hurts farmers, in that it does not allow them to use saved seed or that of protected varieties. Countries with strong farmers' rights, such as India, cannot comply to all aspects of UPOV. François Meienberg is of this opinion, and writes that the UPOV system has disadvantages, especially for developing countries, and that "at some point, protection starts to thwart development".[14]

On the other hand, Rolf Jördens argues that plant variety protection is necessary. He believes that by joining UPOV, developing countries will have more access to new and improved varieties (better yielding, stronger resistance) instead of depending on old varieties or landraces, thus helping fight poverty and feed the growing world population.[15]

UPOV supports an agricultural system that is clearly export-oriented. In other words, developing countries moving towards UPOV-consistent systems tend to favour breeders who are producing for export. The example of Kenya is telling in this regard, as UPOV's own study points out, the majority of varieties are owned by foreign producers and are horticultural crops, clearly destined for export. An over-heavy dependence on agriculture for export is increasingly recognized as being unwise.[16][17]

It would make sense to encourage debate, exchange of knowledge and research on the impacts of UPOV-type plant variety protection on farming, food sovereignty, human rights (in particular a right balance of farmers' rights, peasants' rights and breeders' rights) and other public interest objectives.

However, several Social movements and civil society organisations such as Oxfam, Third World Network and Via Campesina[18] have pointed out the resistance of the UPOV Secretariat and Member States to dialogue with all interested parties, in particular:

• by keeping meetings secret,
• by not making its documents publicly available,
• by refusing farmers' organisations NGO observer status with UPOV[19].

A recent study by Professor Graham Dutfield[20] concluded that UPOV's governance falls short in many different ways, UPOV officials know very little about actual farming, and how small-scale farmers actually develop new varieties and produce them, and that they knew much more about breeding, which favours commercial breeders. The UPOV system thus favours commercial breeders over farmers and producers, and private interests over public interests.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, came to similar findings in his study of UPOV in 2009. He found that IP-related Monopoly rights could cause poor farmers to become "increasingly dependent on expensive inputs" and at risk of indebtedness. Further, the system risks neglecting poor farmers’ needs in favour of agribusiness needs, jeopardising traditional systems of seed saving and exchange, and losing biodiversity to "the uniformization encouraged by the spread of commercial varieties.[21]

The UPOV Convention, in particular UPOV 1991, is often criticized as it overlaps, and is found to be difficult to concile with, other existing and widely ratified international legal instruments such as FAO's International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (Plant Treaty), the Convention on Biological Diversity, or its Nagoya Protocol[22][23][24] but also with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and other people working in rural areas adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2018.