Operation Prone

Like all good battle plans, events on the ground caused well thought out plans to rapidly change and evolve and this was the case with the proposed SADF plan that came to be called Operation Prone. Caught off guard by the rapid movement southwards by the Cuban 10th Division, whose appearance was first noticed during April/May 1988 when SADF units in south-western Angola started to come into contact with advancing Cuban/FAPLA units, serious planning began.[1]^:702 Initially, the plans were developed as a proposed attack on the Cuban/FAPLA forces in south-western Angola but as events on the ground changed and peace talks developed, the plans evolved to one of defence of north-western South-West Africa.

With the Cuban movements southwards and continuing SADF/South West African Territorial Force operations against SWAPO in the same area, both forces would soon come into contact with each other.

On 18 April 1988, a SWATF unit, 101 Battalion, chasing a SWAPO unit was ambushed by Cuban elements from Xangongo near Chipeque.[2]^:249 The battle ended with the South Africans losing two men and eleven wounded.[3]^:237 Thereafter the Cubans continued patrolling southwards from Xangongo towards the SADF garrison at Calueque.

On 2 May 1988, SAAF Mirages attacked FAPLA positions south of Techipa.[3]^:238 The Cubans, fearing a South African advance, retaliated and planned another ambush.

During the first round tripartite talks in London on the 3 May 1988, behind the scene talks between the military contingents of Cuba and South Africa was tense. The Cubans threatened to invade SWA/Namibia if the South Africans did not agree to the Cuban proposals while the South African indicated if they tried, it would be Cuba's darkest day.[3]^:239 The talks ended the following day.

The Cuban ambush site was in position by 4 May 1988 less than 2 km south of Donguena.[3]^:238 A SADF unit, the 101 Battalion, with twenty Casspirs and two trucks had been sent forward to occupy Donguena. They ran into the ambush with Cubans destroying or damaging four Casspirs. The South Africans withdrew at dusk having lost seven men and one captured,[3]^:238 Sergeant Johan Papenfus[4]^:164 and failed to retrieve the fourth Casspir and its equipment. The Cubans were said to have lost forty-five soldiers.[3]^:238 Later that evening, a further three companies from 201 and 101 Battalions were sent forward to capture Donguena, but with Cuban tank positions south of the town, withdrew.[3]^:238 The Cuban later withdrew the same evening.

On 12 May 1988, the 32 Battalion commander was called to a meeting in Oshakati to discuss a plan for the unit to attack SWAPO units at Techipa.[2]^:249 The commander persuaded the planners to reconnoitre the area first before attacking. On 16 May, two reconnaissance units were airlifted to an area south of Techipa and while the second landed close to Xangongo but on the western side of the Cunene River.[2]^:250 The first team was unable to get close to Techipa while the second team found tank tracks on all roads showing extensive patrolling of the area. The first team was sent back in from the north of Techipa by vehicle, finding extensive trench systems around the town reminiscent of the same layered system around Cuito Cuanavale with vehicles, generators and radar systems and outposts at further distances south of the town.[2]^:250 A decision was then made to establish a new task force but it would only be in operation by early June, with a specific aim of protecting the water scheme at Calueque.[3]^:241 In the meantime, three companies of 32 Battalion would hold the line until the task force was operational and would continue to patrol and reconnoitre the area south of Techipa.[2]^:251

An ambush by 32 Battalion was planned for 22 May 1988. The plan called for a mortar attack on an outpost south of Techipa which would draw out the Cubans who would be then ambushed.[3]^:241 Members of 32 Battalion company ambushed a Cuban de-mining team before the mortaring began and then found themselves being attacked by four BRDM-2 armoured personnel carriers and from two other hidden outposts.[2]^:251 Fleeing back to the mortar position under covering mortar fire, the Cubans finally caught up and attacked with the BRDM's resulting in the abandonment of three damaged Unimogs.[2]^:251 The 32 Battalion company retreated again as BM-21s started shelling. The Cubans eventually gave up the chase and the company was able to return to the mortar position in search of the missing vehicles but these had been removed by the Cubans.[2]^:251 The remaining missing 32 Battalion members turned up at Ruacana and Calueque the following day.[2]^:251

Following the bungled ambush of the 22 May, the Cubans analysed the intelligence gathered from the captured SADF vehicles.[3]^:242 Cuban intelligence concluded that the South African were planning a major attack on Techipa which was not the case.

June 1988 was spent reinforcing the defences around Techipa with consisted of minefields, bunkers and anti-tank barriers which had been employed successfully to slow down the SADF and UNITA forces around Cuito Cuanavale during Operation Packer.[3]^:242 There was also a build-up of Cuban forces around the town and aggressive patrolling by SWAPO and FAPLA forces to establish the positions of the South African forces.

By the 27 May 1988, Brigadier Chris Serfontein was appointed 10 SA Division commander while Colonel Roland de Vries was appointed his Chief of Staff.[1]^:725–26

On the 30 May/1 June, operational instructions for Operation Hilti (to be renamed Operation Prone later) was released to the planners by SADF HQ. The instructions required the development of a conventional and counterinsurgency plan for north-west South-West Africa and south-western Angola.[1]^:727

The instructions called for a sub-phase called Operation Excite to gain military control of south-west Angola by August 1988.[1]^:728

Following Operation Excite, Operation Faction, restoration of SADF influence over 21 days in the area of dispute.[1]^:728 And finally Operation Florentine, the installation of UNITA in the area of dispute and to support them against a FAPLA and Cuban attempts to retake the area.[1]^:728

This plan would make use of the 10 SA Division, as well as elements of the SA Air Force, the SA Navy operating off the Angolan coast and the insertion of SA special forces deep in the FAPLA/Cuban rear.[1]^:728–29

To counter the immediate threat of the Cuban advance to the South-West African border, the 10 SA Division planning team moved to South-West Africa on the 7 June 1988 to the operational headquarters at Oshakati and worked on the plan until 17 June.[1]^:736

By 13 June 1988, the new South African Task Force planned in May, was now in operation under the command of Colonel Mucho Delport with SADF forces in place east of the Cunene River, south of Xangongo, and around Cuamato and Calueque.[2]^:252 Other SADF forces were positioned west of the Cunene River, with placements around and to the north-west of Calueque and Ruacana.[2]^:252 The Task Force's headquarters was at Ruacana.

On 18 June, G-2 and G-5 batteries were in position and ready for use by the Task Force.[2]^:252 These were used to shell the Cuban positions. On 22 June, a company from 32 Battalion clashed with a Cuban unit with tanks and infantry.[2]^:253 They were able to break off contact with the Cubans after assistance from SADF artillery.

On the 23 June, reconnaissance units and members of 32 Battalion spotted three Cuban columns moving southwards from Techipa towards Calueque, with this stop-start advance continuing until the 26 June.[4]^:164

Meanwhile, the Cubans and FAPLA forces advanced from Xangongo on 24 June, the first prong of their plan and attacked the SADF units at Cuamato.[2]^:252 201 Battalion[2]^:252 with additional elements of Ratels and mortars[3]^:243 stopped the advanced and occupation of the town and the Cubans retreated back to Xangongo. The South African lost a few vehicles and remained in the town.[2]^:252

By 26 June 1988, a 32 Battalion company was moved into position to provide early warning of the Cuban tanks and columns advancing from Techipa while 61 Mechanised Battalion was brought in behind them to intercept when required. Using their MRL's and artillery they hindered and slowed the Cuban advance.[4]^:164 Four Ratel ZT3 anti-tank missile units had also arrived at 61 Mechanised Battalion positions.[2]^:252 The evening of the 26 June, SADF reconnaissance discovered SA-6 launchers around Techipa. Using a ruse of releasing meteorological balloons with aluminium strips attached to them, the Cubans fired their SA-6's narrowing down their location for the SADF reconnaissance units, and the South African counterattacked with G-5 artillery destroying them and after four hours other Cuban artillery.[3]^:244

On the morning of the 27 June, the Cuban columns began to move again. Elements of 32 Battalion that were monitoring the column were unable to make contact with 61 Mechanised Battalion to warn them about the advancing Cubans.[4]^:164 61 Mechanised Battalion and their tanks begun moving at the same time to find a better position than the night lager and when advancing over a low ridge, ran into a forward Cuban units ambush.[4]^:165 The leading Ratel was hit by a RPG and during the battle, four further Ratels were damaged losing one soldier and a further three wounded. 61 Mechanised called in artillery fire as Cuban reinforcements arrived to support the ambush unit.[3]^:245

During the heavy fighting that followed this South African battalion destroyed a tank, a BTR-60, many trucks and inflicted heavy casualties on the Cuban infantry forcing them to withdraw.[4]^:165 During the battle, 32 Battalion eventually made contact with 61 Mechanised, informing them that Cuban tanks were on their way. 61 Mechanised released their tanks and sent them to intercept the Cuban tanks.[4]^:153 The SADF tanks made contact and after a half-hour had stopped the advance destroying another T-55 tank, trucks and a BTR-60. The Cubans were forced to withdraw again.[4]^:165 Spotting the advance of two Cuban columns Commandant Mike Muller withdrew his forces southwards towards Calueque attacking one column and then the other with G-5 artillery.[4]^:165 Both columns were halted.

Fearing a revenge attack by the SADF, the Cubans implemented plans that included possible attacks on SWA/Namibia itself.[3]^:246 These plans were scrapped when no retaliation occurred from the South Africans.

What followed the hostilities at Calueque was an undeclared ceasefire.[3]^:246 The South African public was shocked by the deaths at Calueque[4]^:165 and the government ordered a scaling back of operations.[3]^:245

Battle Group 20 whom with UNITA, guarding the minefields east of the Cuito River across from Cuito Cuanavale, were ordered to withdraw personnel and equipment so as not to take casualties and prevent any further SADF personnel becoming prisoners of war.[3]^:245[5]^:548

UNITA was informed with some regarding this withdrawal as an act of betrayal.[5]^:548 Orders were to ensure no Cubans advance any further than where they were currently positioned.[5]^:548

Following the clashes at the end of June 1988, the South African politicians and the military re-evaluated the SADF's role in the operational area. What was considered was the change in the military balance brought about by the Cuban division, the reluctance of the South African public to accept high casualties, the political direction towards the ending of Apartheid, and the international push to end South Africa's control of SWA/Namibia.[1]^:742

Round five of the Tripartite talks began on 2 August 1988 in Geneva, Switzerland. The Soviets joined the meeting in an observer role.

The South Africans opened the negotiations with several proposals:

• a ceasefire to begin on 10 August 1988,
• redeployment of South African and Cuban forces in Angola by 1 September 1988,
• implementation of UN Resolution 435 and all foreign forces leave Angola by 1 June 1989.[3]^:249

The 1 June 1989 proposal angered the Cuban and Angolans and the talks continued discussing the first three South African proposals. With the assistance of the Soviets, the American were able to get the Cubans, Angolans and South Africans to sign the Geneva Protocol on 5 August 1988. The protocol set the following dates:[3]^:249

• 10 August 1988 – South Africans to begin withdrawal from Angola
• 1 September 1988 – South Africans complete the withdrawal
• 10 September 1988 – Peace settlement signed
• 1 November 1988 – Implementation of UN Resolution 435

What was not agreed upon was the Cuban withdrawal from Angola. This would be negotiated at another meeting in the near future. Nor were SWAPO or UNITA party to the agreement.

On 8 August 1988, the South Africans, Angolans and Cubans announced a ceasefire in Angola and SWA/Namibia.[7]

A line was drawn from Chitado, Ruacana, Calueque, Naulili, Cuamato and Chitado that the Cubans would stay north of and would guarantee the water irrigation supply from Ruacana to SWA/Namibia.[4]^:166

SWAPO, not party to the agreement, said it would honour the ceasefire on 1 September[7] if South Africa did so, but this did not happen and SWAPO activities continued.[4]^:174

UNITA on the other hand stated that it would ignore the ceasefire and would continue to fight the Angolan government. It did however state that it wished to stop fighting if the Angolan government held talks with them or ceased attacking them and seek national reconciliation.[7]

10 August 1988 saw the South African government announce the beginnings of a troop withdrawal from southern Angola,[8] with the final day for withdrawal of SADF personnel set for 1 September.

Battle Group 20, the only SADF force in south-eastern Angola, had been assisting UNITA to maintain the siege of Cuito Cuanavale after the end of Operation Packer. This withdrawal by Battle Group 20 southwards was part of Operation Displace.

By 16 August the Joint Monitoring Commission was formed at Ruacana.[8] This Joint Monitoring Commission finalised the terms of the ceasefire by the 22 August and the formal ceasefire was signed between three parties.[4]^:170 Major General Willie Meyer represented South Africa, General Leopoldo Frias from Cuba and Angola by Colonel Antonio Jose.[1]^:759

The SADF elements arrived at the Angolan/SWA/Namibian border with ten days to spare and had to wait around as the Joint Monitoring Commission and world media organised themselves for the crossover at Rundu at a temporary steel bridge that was to take place on 1 September.[5]^:549 On 30 August 1988, the last of the South African troops crossed a temporary steel bridge into SWA/Namibia watched by the world's media and the Joint Monitoring Commission, 36 hours early than the planned time.[4]^:170[8] A convoy of fifty vehicles with around thousand soldiers crossed over singing battle songs.[8] After officers of the three countries walked across the bridge, the South African sappers begun to dismantle the temporary steel bridge.[8]

The Joint Monitoring Commission then declared on 30 August 1988, that the South African Defence Force had now left Angola.[3]^:250

On the 1 September 1988, the SADF disbanded its 10 SA Division and the Citizen Force units were returned to South Africa.[1]^:761

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