Nikopol–Krivoi Rog Offensive

Preliminary attacks

3rd Ukrainian Front commander General armii Rodion Malinovsky in the late 1940s

At the end of 1943, the 3rd Ukrainian Front, commanded by General armii^{[lower-alpha 1]} Rodion Malinovsky, was entrenched on the line of Veselyye Terny, Tomakovka, and Belenkoye. It included the 8th Guards, 6th, and 46th Armies, the 17th Air Army, and the 23rd Tank Corps. The front included only nineteen rifle divisions and a tank corps, and faced the German LVII Panzer, XXX, and XVII Army Corps. General armii Fyodor Tolbukhin's 4th Ukrainian Front included the 3rd Guards, 5th Shock, and 28th Armies, the 8th Air Army, the 2nd and 4th Guards Mechanized Corps, and the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps, operating against the Nikopol bridgehead. These elements of the front fielded 22 rifle divisions, three cavalry divisions, and two mechanized corps.^[10] They faced the IV and XXIX Army Corps in the Nikopol bridgehead.^[15]

The 3rd Ukrainian Front and elements of the 4th Ukrainian Front were tasked in January with destroying the German forces in the area of Nikopol and Krivoi Rog, eliminating the Nikopol bridgehead, and pushing the German troops back behind the line of the Inhulets and the Southern Bug. On 29 December 1943, Marshal Sovetskogo Soyuza^{[lower-alpha 2]} Aleksandr Vasilevsky, the representative of the Soviet high command, Stavka, reported that the defeat of the German troops opposing the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Zhitomir–Berdichev Offensive and the redirection of the 2nd Ukrainian Front towards an attack on Kirovograd forced a reconsideration of the operational plans for the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts. He concluded that a German withdrawal from the Nikopol bridgehead was likely and thus advocated a renewed attack to begin between 10 and 12 January 1944.^[16]

Stavka approved his plan,^[17] and after preparations between 10 and 12 January, the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts began the attack. The former's 8th Guards and 46th Armies advanced towards Apostolovo against XXX Army Corps on 10 January,^[18] and the latter's 3rd Guards, 5th Shock, and 28th Armies attacked the IV and XXIX Army Corps in the Nikopol bridgehead on 12 January.^[15][19] The attack of the 3rd Ukrainian Front on 10 January, spearheaded by tanks estimated at 80 by German reports and preceded by an artillery barrage, included nine rifle divisions from both armies, advancing in two waves. It was stopped after gaining 3 miles (4.8 km) by two German panzer divisions, which claimed to have destroyed two-thirds of the Soviet tanks after the latter outran their supporting infantry. Continued German counterattacks reduced the breach to about a mile by the end of the day. In four to five days of stubborn fighting, the Soviet troops were unable to make decisive gains. The 3rd Ukrainian Front wedged into the German line between 6 and 8 kilometers through preponderance in infantry, but could not break through due to German resistance, shortages of ammunition and its lack of tanks, which prevented the creation of a strong attack group. Hollidt briefly considered withdrawing the 24th Panzer Division from the Nikopol bridgehead to lead a counterattack against the Soviet gains in the north, but decided against it after the 4th Ukrainian Front began its attack against the bridgehead. The 4th Ukrainian Front suffered a similar lack of success and the attacks were halted^[20] by 17 January to allow the troops to consolidate their positions and to plan a more thorough offensive.^[21]

Between 11 and 20 January, in the period which included these attacks, the 3rd Guards, 5th Shock, and 28th Armies of the 4th Ukrainian Front suffered total casualties of 3,191 killed and 9,938 wounded, with the 3rd Guards and 28th Armies bearing the brunt of the casualties.^[22] In the ten-day period between 11 and 20 January that included the Soviet attack, the German 6th Army reported casualties of 1,339 killed, 4,865 wounded, and 446 missing. Casualties of 834 killed, 3,214 wounded, and 419 missing were reported in the next ten-day period between 21 and 31 January.^[4]

Soviet planning and preparations

On the day that the attacks concluded, Vasilevsky submitted a new plan to Stavka for an attack to begin on 30 January. The 3rd Ukrainian Front was given the main role in the operation, and was reinforced with the 37th Army from the 2nd Ukrainian Front with six rifle divisions, the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps from the 4th Ukrainian Front, and the 31st Guards Rifle Corps from Stavka Reserve with three rifle divisions. The front received 64 tanks, and was replenished with significant quantities of ammunition and fuel.^[23] The 4th Ukrainian Front also received more ammunition.^[21]

Vasilevsky's plan stipulated that General-leytenant^{[lower-alpha 3]} Mikhail Sharokhin's 37th Army and General-leytenant Ivan Shlemin's Soviet 6th Army were to launch diversionary attacks towards the German LVII Panzer Corps at Krivoi Rog and the XVII Army Corps of General der Gebirgstruppe Hans Kreysing at Nikopol, respectively. The main blow of the 3rd Ukrainian Front was planned to be delivered against the XXX Army Corps of General der Artillerie Maximilian Fretter-Pico by General-leytenant Vasily Glagolev's 46th Army, General-polkovnik^{[lower-alpha 4]} Vasily Chuikov's 8th Guards Army,^[7] and General-leytenant Trofim Tanaschishin's 4th Guards Mechanized Corps towards Apostolovo and the Dnieper in order to link up with the 4th Ukrainian Front. The 8th Guards and 46th Armies attacked in a sector of 21 kilometers, with a density of 140 guns and mortars and nine tanks and self-propelled guns per kilometer.^[17] General-leytenant Vladimir Sudets' 17th Air Army provided air support for the 3rd Ukrainian Front.^[24]

Meanwhile, General-leytenant Dmitry Lelyushenko's 3rd Guards, General-leytenant Vyacheslav Tsvetayev's 5th Shock, and General-leytenant Alexey Grechkin's 28th Armies of the 4th Ukrainian Front, supported by General-leytenant Timofey Khryukin's 8th Air Army, were to destroy the German troops in the Nikopol bridgehead – the IV and XXIX Army Corps of Group Schörner, commanded by General der Infanterie Friedrich Mieth and General der Panzertruppe Erich Brandenberger, respectively.^[7] General-leytenant Karp Sviridov's 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps was to be inserted into the breakthrough in the 5th Shock Army's sector.^[24]

Over three nights between 16 and 18 January, the 8th Guards Army was concentrated by reducing its sector west of the Dnieper, and divisions from the Soviet 6th Army crossed the Dnieper to take over the former's previous positions. The 46th Army was concentrated on the flank of the 8th Guards Army, and the 37th Army moved forward on the 46th Army's right. The 4th Guards Mechanized Corps was shifted forward from south of the Dnieper to take positions reinforcing the intersection of the 8th Guards Army and the 46th Army.^[17] The concentration of the 3rd and 8th Guards and 37th Armies was picked up by German intelligence; however, the full extent of 8th Guards Army's concentration went undetected and the movement of the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps was missed entirely.^[25]

German redeployments

Anticipating an attack on the northern part of the salient, Hollidt withdraw his three panzer divisions from the front to become an armored reserve for the former on 24 January. Within days, however, he had to transfer an infantry division to Crimea and two infantry division equivalents to the 8th Army. This was capped by the sending of the 24th Panzer Division, the army's best equipped panzer division, on a 310-kilometer (190 mi) march to reinforce the right flank of the 1st Panzer Army on 28 January during the Battle of the Korsun–Cherkassy Pocket, significantly reducing the armored forces available to the German 6th Army.^[26] The latter was left with only the 9th Panzer Division for a reserve, which fielded only thirteen tanks – a third of its authorized strength – and had a much-reduced number of infantry and artillery.^[27]

German

Following the transfers in late January, the German 6th Army fielded twenty divisions (including three panzer) with an average combat strength of 2,500 and eight assault gun battalions, as well as a large number of artillery and pioneer units.^[28] Of these, eight infantry divisions (four each in IV and XXIX Army Corps) and three assault gun battalions formed part of Group Schörner in the Nikopol bridgehead.^[2][3] The German infantry units had been reinforced by scraping the rear units for manpower, which enabled the 17th, 111th, and 258th Infantry Divisions and the 3rd Mountain Division to field 7,855 combat infantrymen by 16 January. Though the remainder of these were combat-experienced veterans, 5,500 were transferred from the rear units.^[29]

The German 6th Army was nominally supported by the 1st Air Corps of Luftflotte 4. At the beginning of the Nikopol–Krivoy Rog Offensive on 30 January, the army fielded 260,000 men, 6,420 guns and mortars, 480 tanks and assault guns, and 560 aircraft. However, a quarter of the tanks, assault guns, and artillery were unserviceable.^[2][3] In addition, a shortage of anti-aircraft ammunition prevented the German ground forces from defending against Soviet air superiority, which Schörner described as "absolute" in a report to the 6th Army command. Soviet air attacks attacked supply lines and prevented the effective employment of German artillery by destroying communications, in addition to hindering the movement of reserve forces by disrupting command and control.^[29]

Soviet

The Soviet troops totaled 705,000 men, 8,048 guns and mortars, 390 tanks, and 1,200 combat aircraft, as well as 140 Polikarpov U-2 and Polikarpov R-5 reconnaissance aircraft.^[2][3] The 3rd Ukrainian Front fielded thirty infantry divisions, including one airborne fighting as infantry, in addition to a mechanized corps. It was supported by one breakthrough artillery division and four anti-aircraft artillery divisions, among others.^[31] The elements of the 4th Ukrainian Front that fought in the operation fielded seventeen additional infantry divisions and a mechanized corps, supported by two breakthrough artillery divisions and an anti-aircraft artillery division.^[32] They numbered 115,537 men and 2,925 guns on 1 February, not including the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps and the front reserve artillery.^[33]

3rd Ukrainian Front operations, 30 January–5 February

Soviet artillerymen firing at fortifications during the offensive

The diversionary attacks of the Soviet 6th and 37th Armies began on the morning of 30 January. The latter's 82nd Rifle Corps with the 15th and 28th Guards and 188th Rifle Divisions achieved the most success, breaking through the German line, in an 8 kilometer sector and advancing 3–4 kilometers from Veselyye Terny against the 62nd Infantry Division of LVII Panzer Corps.^[34] Stubborn resistance and counterattacks slowed the Soviet advance,^[35] which devolved into what American historian Earl F. Ziemke described as a "series of uncoordinated skirmishes."^[27] The Soviet 6th Army attacked with its 60th Guards and 244th Rifle Divisions, managing to create a small foothold in the line of XVII Army Corps northeast of Nikopol.^[36][37]

Chuikov began the main attack on 31 January by having his troops conduct reconnaissance with one battalion from each first echelon rifle division in order to retain surprise, instead of conducting reconnaissance with one to two battalions from each corps between one and three days preceding the operation, a tactic that later became known as the special echelon.^[26] At dawn, a 50-minute Soviet artillery and air bombardment commenced, and the infantry and tanks of the 8th Guards and 46th Armies jumped off at 09:15.^[36] Fierce fighting ensued as the Soviet troops broke through the defenses of the 46th and 123rd Infantry Divisions and the 16th Panzergrenadier Division, inflicting heavy losses and forcing them to retreat, leaving behind artillery, vehicles, and ammunition. Hollidt, realizing that the main blow was being directed towards Apostolovo, immediately transferred the 9th and 23rd Panzer Divisions from the 37th Army sector.^[38]

Closely cooperating with infantry and artillery, the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps with 120 tanks and assault guns^[39] was inserted into the Soviet breakthrough in the sector of the 8th Guards Army at 16:00 on 1 February. In its advance, the 4th Guards scattered retreating units of the 123rd Infantry Division and captured 85 soldiers, before reaching the northern outskirts of Kamenka and Sholokhovo by the end of the day and running into the 23rd Panzer Division, which fielded around 60 tanks. In the first days of the offensive, despite bad weather, Soviet aviation was active over the front.^[38] As a result of the Soviet attacks, on 2 February, the German 6th Army was transferred back to Army Group A, commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Ewald von Kleist.^[40]

Continuing the attack in the spring rasputitsa, which made roads impassable, the 46th Army's 4th and 34th Guards Rifle Divisions reached the key rail junction of Apostolovo, the German 6th Army's main supply base, on the evening of 4 February. There, the remnants of the 123rd Infantry Division and elements of the 9th Panzer Division were concentrated in an all-around defense with up to 3,000 men, 80 guns, and 30 tanks and assault guns. The 4th Guards attacked from the north and east, and the 34th Guards from the west and northwest. With the assistance of locals, the scouts from the 34th Guards Division found a gap in German defenses 4 kilometers northwest of the city, and its 105th Guards Rifle Regiment penetrated the German position and captured the railway station early on the morning of 5 February. Around this time the rest of the two divisions launched the attack, and Apostolovo was captured by 8:00 that morning. The loss of Apostolovo split the German 6th Army in half, one part in the area of Krivoi Rog and the other in the area of Nikopol and Marganets.^[41]

Meanwhile, the 8th Guards Army and 4th Guards Mechanized Corps captured Kamenka, Sholokhovo, and Perevizskiye, threatening the encirclement of the five divisions of the XVII Army Corps in the area of Marganets and Nikopol. In six days, the 3rd Ukrainian Front had broken through the German defenses and advanced between 45 and 60 kilometers, inflicting heavy losses on the 6th Army. From Apostolovo, the 46th Army continued to advance west towards the Inhulets, and the 8th Guards Army and 4th Guards Mechanized Corps attempted to reach the Dnieper to cut off the German troops around Nikopol.^[41]

4th Ukrainian Front operations, 31 January–8 February and capture of Nikopol

The 4th Ukrainian Front began its attack on the Nikopol bridgehead on 31 January, with the 5th Shock Army's 50th Guards Rifle Division pushing the German troops back 1.5 kilometers in an attack beginning at 04:00. At 08:00 the 54th Guards Rifle Division began its attack. At noon the 3rd Guards and 28th Armies began supporting attacks to assist the 5th Shock Army. The 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps with around 30 tanks and self-propelled guns entered the breakthrough in 5th Shock's sector at 15:00 and advanced up to 11 kilometers by the end of the day against dogged German resistance, outpacing 5th Shock, which advanced up to 7 kilometers. On 2 February the German troops began to withdraw to the Dnieper crossings at Velikaya Lepetikha and Nikopol, which were under constant Soviet air attacks and shelling. These disrupted the German withdrawal, but despite heavy losses, Group Schörner was able to withdraw across the river. Bolshaya Lepetikha was captured on the morning of 8 February, completing the elimination of the Nikopol bridgehead.^[42]

On the night of 7 to 8 February, the Soviet 6th Army of the 3rd Ukrainian Front entered Nikopol from the north and east. Its 203rd, 244th, and 333rd Rifle Divisions fought their way into the city, while the 4th Ukrainian Front's 3rd Guards Army attacked from the south after crossing the Dnieper. Its 266th Rifle Division and 5th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade were among the first into the city. The city was cleared of German troops by 8 February,^[43] after a night of heavy street fighting.^[44]

Between 1 and 10 February, the 4th Ukrainian Front's 3rd Guards, 5th Shock, and 28th Armies suffered casualties of 1,725 killed, 4,960 wounded, and 94 missing. The majority of the casualties were inflicted on the 5th Shock Army.^[45]

German counterattack

German Panzer IV tanks on the move

In the following days, fierce fighting took place over a narrow corridor held by German troops west of Nikopol. The main German forces were concentrated against the advance of the 8th Guards Army in the Perevizskiye area, including elements of six infantry divisions withdrawn from the Nikopol bridgehead, the remnants of the 9th Panzer Division, and the 24th Panzer Division, rushed back from its abortive march to the Korsun Pocket, and the 506th Heavy Panzer Battalion, equipped with Tiger I tanks. On 11 February, four German infantry divisions and the 9th and 24th Panzer Divisions (part of IV Army Corps)^[46] launched a strong counterattack towards Apostolovo, at the junction of the 8th Guards and 46th Armies. The few Soviet units in the area were forced to withdraw, and by the end of the day the German troops had gained 8 to 10 kilometers, threatening the recapture of Apostolovo.^[47]

Malinovsky hastily rushed the 48th Guards Rifle Division and two anti-tank artillery regiments forward from the front reserve, and the 82nd Guards and 152nd Rifle Divisions were concentrated to defend the city. The German counterattack ran out of steam, but the 8th Guards Army was significantly weakened due to bad road conditions causing its artillery and tanks to lag behind, as well as ammunition shortages. On 10 February the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps was withdrawn to the reserve in the Apostolovo area due to losses.^[47]

Pursuit to Krivoi Rog

During the next several days, the German troops held the Dnieper marshes and the Nikopol–Dudchino road, allowing elements of five infantry divisions to retreat, although losing almost all their heavy equipment. Simultaneously, the 37th Army continued to fight south of Veselyye Terny, the 46th Army advanced northwest of Apostolovo, the 8th Guards Army advanced to the southwest of that city, and the Soviet 6th Army entered the Novovorontsovka area. On 10 February, the 3rd Guards Army transferred to the 3rd Ukrainian Front, but was soon withdrawn to Stavka Reserve. The 5th Shock Army, also transferred to the 3rd Ukrainian, crossed the Dnieper in conditions worsened by floating ice on 10 February and captured a bridgehead northwest of Malaya Lepetikha. For the next several days, the advance paused as ammunition and artillery were brought up, awaiting the resumption of the attack on Krivoi Rog.^[48]

The attack on Krivoi Rog was conducted by the 37th and 46th Armies against five German infantry divisions and two Panzer divisions from LVII Panzer Corps.^[49] The former was to attack in a 10 kilometer sector northeast of the city and bypass the city from the north, while the latter was tasked with breaking through the center of the German line in a 16 kilometer sector and frontally assaulting the city from the southeast. In the breakthrough sectors of the armies, 40 to 50 guns and mortars were concentrated per kilometer.^[48]

Soviet troops entering Krivoy Rog in February 1944

The attack began on 17 February: 37th Army jumped off at 05:00 and 46th Army at 10:00 following a 30-minute artillery preparation. Blizzard conditions made the advance difficult and grounded Soviet aviation, but in the first two days the two armies advanced between 5 and 12 kilometers in heavy fighting in mud and snow. Against German counterattacks, the 37th Army's 82nd Rifle Corps reached the city outskirts from the northeast on 21 February. At the same time, the 46th Army's 6th Guards Rifle Corps and 34th Rifle Corps reached the eastern and southeastern outskirts of the city. The bulk of the German defenses were concentrated in the east, where it was anticipated that the main blow would come. Exploiting weak points discovered by Soviet reconnaissance, the 37th and 46th Armies moved into the city at dawn on 21 February from the northwest and southeast, respectively; it was cleared by 16:00 that day. In celebration of the capture of Krivoi Rog, a 224-gun artillery salute was fired in Moscow.^[48] A special 37th Army detachment prevented the German demolition of the power stations in the city and the Saksahan dams.^[44]

Advance to the Inhulets

After the capture of Krivoi Rog, the 37th Army advanced to the Inhulets west of the city, and the 46th Army to the Inhulets south of the city. On 25 February the 8th Guards and 6th Armies resumed the advance to the Inhulets. The 5th Shock Army resumed the attack southwest from a bridgehead on the Dnieper on 26 February and reached the line of Velikaya Aleksandrovka and Dudchino three days later. The Inhulets became the main German defensive line as a convenient natural barrier, although the 8th Guards Army's 35th and 57th Guards Rifle Divisions captured a bridgehead in the Shyroke area. Almost simultaneously, the 37th Army captured a bridgehead west of Krivoi Rog, and the 46th Army a bridgehead north of Shyroke.^[50]

Citations

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