Yahya Khan

Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan NePl (Urdu: آغا محمد یحییٰ خان; 4 February 1917 – 10 August 1980), widely known as Yahya Khan, was a Pakistani general who served as the third President of Pakistan, serving in this post from 25 March 1969 until turning over his presidency in December 1971.[1]


Yahya Khan
یحییٰ خان
3rd President of Pakistan
In office
25 March 1969  20 December 1971
Prime MinisterNurul Amin (1971)
Preceded byAyub Khan
Succeeded byZulfikar Ali Bhutto
Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army
In office
18 June 1966  20 December 1971
DeputyGeneral Abdul Hamid Khan
Preceded byGeneral Musa Khan
Succeeded byLt-Gen. Gul Hassan
Personal details
Born
Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan

(1917-02-04)4 February 1917
Chakwal, Punjab, British India
(now in Punjab, Pakistan)
Died10 August 1980(1980-08-10) (aged 63)
Rawalpindi, Punjab, Pakistan
Resting placePeshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
NationalityIndian (1917–1947)
Pakistan (1947–1980)
Political partyNone
Domestic partnerGeneral Rani (1967-1971)
Noor Jehan
EducationCol.Brown Cambridge School, Dehra Dun, Punjab University
Alma materCol. Brown Cambridge School, Dehra Dun, Punjab University
Indian Military Academy
United States Army Command and General Staff College|Command and General Staff College
Civilian awards Nishane-e-Pakistan (withdrawn)
Hilal-e-Pakistan (withdrawn)
Neshan-e-Pahlavi
Military service
Branch/service British Indian Army (1938-1947)
 Pakistan Army (1947-1971)
Years of service1938–1971
Rank General
Unit4th battalion, 10th Baluch Regiment (S/No. PA–98)
CommandsDeputy C-in-C of the army
7th Infantry Division, Peshawar
15th Infantry Division, Sialkot
14th Infantry Division, Dacca
105th Independent Brigade
Battles/warsWorld War II

Indo-Pakistani War of 1965

Indo-Pakistani War of 1971

Military awards Hilal-e-Jurat (withdrawn)

Having participated in the Mediterranean theatre of World War II on behalf of Great Britain's British Indian Army, he opted for Pakistani citizenship and joined its military after the United Kingdom partitioned India in 1947, and helped in executing the covert infiltration in Indian Kashmir that sparked the war with India in 1965.[2] After being controversially appointed to assume the army command in 1966, he took over the presidency from unpopular former dictator and elected President Ayub Khan, who was not able to deal with the 1969 uprising in East Pakistan, forced to resign by protests and offered him the office. Yahya Khan subsequently enforced martial law by suspending the constitution. Holding the nation's first nationwide elections in 1970, 23 years after independence, he delayed the power transition to victorious Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from East Pakistan, which further inflamed the civil violent unrest in the East, and authorized the East Pakistani authorities to violently suppress the rebellion in which somewhere from several hundred thousand to about 3,000,000 were killed in what is today widely considered the 1971 Bangladesh genocide.

Pakistan suffered a decisive defeat in the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971, resulting in the dissolution of the Eastern Command of the Pakistan Army and the secession of East Pakistan as Bangladesh – thus Yahya Khan's rule is widely regarded as a leading cause of the break-up of the unity of Pakistan.[3][4] Following these events, he turned over the leadership of the country to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the leading politician from West Pakistan, and resigned from the command of the military in disgrace, both on 20 December 1971.[5] He was then stripped of his service honours and put under house surveillance for most of the 1970s.[1]

After being released from these restrictions in 1977, he died in Rawalpindi in 1980.[6] He is viewed largely negatively by Pakistani historians and is considered among the least successful of the country's leaders.[7]

Early life

Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan was born in Chakwal, Punjab, British Indian Empire[7] on 4 February 1917, according to the references written by Russian sources.[8][9] He and his family were of Karlani Pashtun origin.[10][11][12][13][14]

Few Pakistanis knew anything about Yahya Khan when he was vaulted into the presidency two years ago. The stocky, bushy–browed Pathan had been the army chief of staff since 1966...

Editorial, Time, 2 August 1971[15]

According to Indian writer Dewan Berindranath's book Private Life of Yahya Khan (published in 1974), Yahya's father worked in the British Indian Police, in Punjab province. He joined as a head constable and retired as a deputy superintendent. Yahya's father was posted in Chakwal Punjab when Yahya Khan was born. Yahya studied in the prestigious Col. Brown Cambridge School Dehradun and later enrolled at the University of Punjab from where he passed B.A.[16]

Military career

Career before Pakistan's independence

Yahya Khan was commissioned into the British Indian Army from Indian Military Academy, Dehradun in 1938.[7] An infantry officer from the 4th/10th Baluch Regiment (4th Battalion of 10th Baluch Regiment, later amalgamated with the modern and current form of Baloch Regiment, 'Baloch' was spelled as 'Baluch' in Yahya's time), Yahya saw action during World War II in North Africa where he was captured by the Axis Forces in June 1942 and interned in a prisoner of war camp in Italy from where he escaped in the third attempt.[1][17]

Yahya Khan served in World War II as a lieutenant and later captain in the 4th Infantry Division (India). He served in Iraq, Italy, and North Africa. He was POW in Italy before returning to India.

After birth of Pakistan

After the partition of India, he decided to join the Pakistan Army in 1947, he had already been reached to the rank of Major (acting Lieutenant-colonel). In this year he was instrumental in not letting the Indian officers shift books from the famous library of the British Indian Army Staff College (now Command and Staff College) at Quetta, where Yahya was posted as the only Muslim instructor at the time of partition of India. There were other Muslim instructors besides him.[17] At the age of 34, he was promoted to Brigadier and is still considered the youngest one-star officer in the history of Pakistan Armed Forces. He was appointed as commander of the 105 Independent Brigade that was deployed in LoC ceasefire region in Jammu and Kashmir in 1951–1952.[17] He was described as a "hard drinking soldier" who liked young women's company and wine, though he was a meritorious and professional soldier.

Later Yahya, as Deputy Chief of General Staff, was selected to head the army's planning board set up by Ayub Khan to modernize the Pakistan Army in 1954–57. Yahya also performed the duties of Chief of General Staff from 1958 to 1962 from where he went on to command two infantry divisions from 1962 to 1965 including one in East Pakistan.[17] Yahya also renamed the Command and Staff College from 'Army Staff College' in Quetta, Balochistan.[1] He played a pivotal role in sustaining the support for President Ayub Khan's campaign in the 1965 presidential elections against Fatima Jinnah.[8] He was made GOC of 7th Infantry Division of Pakistan Army, which he commanded during the 1965 war with India. At this assignment, he was not instrumental in planning and executing the military infiltration operation, the Grand Slam, which failed miserably due to General Yahya's delay owing to change of command decision, the Indian Army crossed the intentional border and made a beeline for Lahore.[17]

Despite his failures, Yahya was promoted to lieutenant-general after his promotion papers were personally approved by President Ayub Khan in 1966, at a stint as an appointed Deputy Army Commander in Chief.[17] He was appointed as commander-in-chief of Pakistan Army in March 1966 and took command in June.[17] At promotion, Yahya Khan superseded two of his seniors: Lieutenant-General Altaf Qadir and Lieutenant-General Bakhtiar Rana.[18]

After becoming the c-in-c Yahya energetically started reorganizing the Pakistan Army in 1966. The post-1965 situation saw major organisational as well as technical changes in the Pakistan Army. Until 1965 it was thought that divisions could function effectively while getting orders directly from the army's GHQ. This idea failed miserably in the 1965 war and the need to have intermediate corps headquarters in between the GHQ and the fighting combat divisions was recognised as a foremost operational necessity after the 1965 war. In 1965 war the Pakistan Army had only one corps headquarters (the I Corps).[18]

Soon after the war had started the United States had imposed an embargo on military aid to both India and Pakistan. This embargo did not affect the Indian Army but produced major changes in the Pakistan Army's technical composition. US Secretary of State Dean Rusk well summed it up when he said, "Well if you are going to fight, go ahead and fight, but we’re not going to pay for it".[19]

Pakistan now turned to China for military aid and the Chinese tank T-59 started replacing the US M-47/48 tanks as the Pakistan Army's MBT (Main Battle Tank) from 1966. 80 tanks, the first batch of T-59s, a low-grade version of the Russian T-54/55 series were delivered to Pakistan in 1965–66. The first batch was displayed in the Joint Services Day Parade on 23 March 1966. The 1965 War had proved that Pakistan Army's tank-infantry ratio was lopsided and more infantry was required. Three more infantry divisions (9, 16 and 17 Divisions) largely equipped with Chinese equipment and popularly referred to by the rank and file as "The China Divisions" were raised by the beginning of 1968. Two more corps headquarters: the 2nd Corps Headquarters (Jhelum-Ravi Corridor) and the 4th Corps Headquarters (Ravi-Sutlej Corridor) were raised, also in East Pakistan a corps-sized formation titles as the Eastern Command was created.

President of Pakistan

President of Pakistan Yahya Khan with United States President Richard Nixon in October 1970.

Ayub Khan was President of Pakistan for most of the 1960s, but by the end of the decade, popular resentment had boiled over against him. Pakistan had fallen into a state of disarray, and long ongoing civil unrest in East Pakistan evolved into a mass uprising in January of the year. After having held unsuccessful talks with the opposition, Ayub Khan handed over power to Yahya Khan in March, who immediately imposed martial law. When Yahya assumed the office on 25 March 1969, he inherited a two-decade constitutional problem of inter-provincial ethnic rivalry between the Punjabi-Pashtun-Mohajir dominated West Pakistan province and the ethnically Bengali Muslim East Pakistan province. In addition, Yahya also inherited an 11 year old problem of transforming an essentially one man ruled country to a democratic country, which was the ideological basis of the anti-Ayub movement of 1968–69. As an Army Chief Yahya had all the capabilities, qualifications and potential. But Yahya inherited an extremely complex problem and was forced to perform the multiple roles of caretaker head of the country, drafter of a provisional constitution, resolving the One Unit question, satisfying the frustrations and the sense of exploitation and discrimination successively created in the East Wing by a series of government policies since 1948.

The American political scientist Lawrence Ziring observed that,

Yahya Khan has been widely portrayed as a ruthless uncompromising insensitive and grossly inept leader ... While Yahya cannot escape responsibility for these tragic events, it is also on record that he did not act alone ... All the major actors of the period were creatures of a historic legacy and a psycho-political milieu which did not lend itself to accommodation and compromise, to bargaining and a reasonable settlement. Nurtured on conspiracy theories, they were all conditioned to act in a manner that neglected agreeable solutions and promoted violent judgments.[20]

Yahya Khan attempted to solve Pakistan's constitutional and inter-provincial/regional rivalry problems once he took over power from Ayub Khan in March 1969. The tragedy of the whole affair was the fact that all actions that Yahya took, although correct in principle, were too late in timing, and served only to further intensify the political polarisation between the East and West wings.

  • He dissolved the one unit restoring the pre-1955 provinces of West Pakistan
  • He promised free direct, one man one vote, fair elections on adult franchise, a basic human right which had been denied to the Pakistani people since the pre-independence 1946 elections by political inefficiency, double play and intrigue, by civilian governments from 1947 to 1958 and by Ayub's one-man rule from 1958 to 1969.

However, dissolution of one unit did not lead to the positive results that it might have led to in case "One Unit" was dissolved earlier. Yahya also made an attempt to accommodate the East Pakistanis by abolishing the principle of parity, thereby hoping that greater share in the assembly would redress their wounded ethnic regional pride and ensure the integrity of Pakistan. Instead of satisfying the Bengalis it intensified their separatism since they felt that the west wing had politically suppressed them since 1958. Thus came the rise of anti-West Wing sentiment in the East Wing.

During the course of 1968, the political pressure exerted by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had weakened the President Ayub Khan, who had earlier sacked Bhutto after disagreeing with President Ayub's decision to implement on Tashkent Agreement, facilitated by the Soviet Union to end the hostilities with India.[21] To ease the situation, President Ayub had tried reaching out to terms with the major parties, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Awami League (AL), but remained unsuccessful.[21] In poor health, President Ayub abrogated his own constitution and suddenly resigned from the presidency.[22]

On 24 March 1969, President Ayub directed a letter to General Yahya Khan, inviting him to deal with the situation, as it was "beyond the capacity of (civil) government to deal with the... Complex situation."[23] On 26 March 1969, General Yahya appeared in national television and announced to enforce martial law in all over the country. The 1962 Constitution was abrogated, the parliament dissolved, and President Ayub's civilian officials dismissed.[23] In his first nationwide address, Yahya maintained: "I will not tolerate disorder. Let everyone remain at his post."[24]

On immediate effect, he installed a military government and featured active duty military officials:

Yahya Khan administration
MinistersPortraitMinistries and departmentsInter-services
General Yahya Khan[25]President and Chief Martial Law Administrator
Information and Broadcasting
Law and Justice
Foreign and Defence
 Pakistan Army
General Abdul Hamid Khan[25]Deputy CMLA
Interior and Kashmir Affairs
 Pakistan Army
Vice-Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan[25]Deputy CMLA
Finance and Planning Commission
Statistics, Commerce, and Industry
Pakistan Navy
Air-Marshal Nur Khan[25]Deputy CMLA
Communications and Health
Labour and Science and Technology
 Pakistan Air Force

National Security Council and LFO

President Yahya was well aware of this explosive situation and decided to bring changes all over the country. His earlier initiatives directed towards establishing the National Security Council (NSC) with Major-General Ghulam Omar being its first advisor.[26] It was formed to analyse and prepare assessments towards issues relating the political and national security.[26]

Secondly in 1969, President Yahya promulgated the Legal Framework Order No. 1970 which disestablished the One Unit programme where West Pakistan was formed.[27] Instead, LFO No. 1970 hence removed the prefix West, instead adding Pakistan.[27] The decree has no effect on East Pakistan.[27] Following this, President Yahya announced nationwide general elections to be held in 1970, and appointed Judge Abdus Sattar as Chief Election Commissioner of Election Commission of Pakistan.[21] Changes were carried out by President Yahya to reverse the country back towards parliamentary democracy.[21]

Last days of East Pakistan

1970 general elections

By 28 July 1969, President Yahya had set a framework for elections that were to be held in December 1970. Finally, the general elections were held in all over the country. In East Pakistan, the Awami League led by Mujibur Rahman held almost all mandate, but no seat in any of four provinces of West Pakistan. The socialist Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) had won the exclusive mandate in the four provinces of Pakistan, but none in the East Pakistan. The Pakistan Muslim League (PML) led by Nurul Amin was the only party to have representation from all over the country, though it had failed to gain the mandate to run the government. The Awami League had 160 seats, all won from the East Pakistan; the socialist PPP had secured 81; the conservative PML had 10 seats in the National Assembly. The general elections's results truly reflected the ugly political reality: the division of the Pakistani electorate along regional lines and political polarisation of the country between the two states, East Pakistan and Pakistan.

In political terms, therefore, Pakistan as a nation stood divided as a result. Series of bilateral talks between PPP and Mujibur Rahman produced no results and were unable to come to an agreement of transfer of power from to East Pakistan's representatives on the basis of the Six-Point programme. In Pakistan, the people had felt that the Six-point agenda was a step towards secession.

Massacres in East Pakistan

While, the political deadlock remains between the Awami League, PPP, and the military government after the general elections in 1970. During this time, Yahya began coordinating several meetings with his military strategists over the issue in East Pakistan. On 25 March 1971, President Yahya initiated the Searchlight in order to restore the writ of the government. The situation in East Pakistan worsened and the gulf between the two wings now was too wide to be bridged. Agitation was now transformed into a vicious insurgency as Bengali elements of Pakistan armed forces and Police mutinied and formed Bangladesh Forces along with common people of all classes to launch both unconventional and hit and run operations.

The Searchlight ordered by Yahya was a violent planned military pacification carried out by the Pakistan Armed Forces to curb the Bengali nationalist movement in erstwhile East Pakistan in March 1971.[28] Ordered by the government in Pakistan, this was seen as the sequel to Operation Blitz which had been launched in November 1970.

The original plan envisioned taking control of the major cities on 26 March 1971, and then eliminating all opposition, political or military,[29] within one month. The prolonged Bengali resistance was not anticipated by Pakistani planners.[30] The main phase of Operation Searchlight ended with the fall of the last major town in Bengali hands in mid-May.

The total number of people killed in East Pakistan is not known with any degree of accuracy.[31] Bangladeshi authorities claim that 3 million people were killed,[32] while the Hamoodur Rahman Commission, an official Pakistan Government investigation, put the figure as low as 26,000 civilian casualties.[33] According to Sarmila Bose, between 50,000 and 100,000 combatants and civilians were killed by both sides during the war.[34] A 2008 British Medical Journal study by Ziad Obermeyer, Christopher J. L. Murray, and Emmanuela Gakidou estimated that up to 269,000 civilians died as a result of the conflict; the authors note that this is far higher than a previous estimate of 58,000 from Uppsala University and the Peace Research Institute, Oslo.[35]

Khan arrested Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on charges of sedition and appointed Brigadier Rahimuddin Khan (later General) to preside over a special tribunal dealing with Mujib's case. Rahimuddin awarded Mujib the death sentence, and President Yahya put the verdict into abeyance. Yahya's crackdown, however, had led to a Bangladesh Liberation War within Pakistan and India drew into the war and fought on behalf of Bangladeshis against Pakistan which would later extend in to the Indo Pak war of 1971.

The aftermaths of this war were mainly that East Pakistan became independent as Bangladesh and India captured approximately 15,000+ square kilometres (5,000+ square miles) of land of West Pakistan (now Pakistan). Though the captured territory of West Pakistan was given back to Pakistan in the Simla Agreement.

The war lead to increased tensions between the countries but nonthless Pakistan accepted the independence of Bangladesh. But this event led to high tensions between Pakistan and India.


US role

The United States had been a major sponsor of President Yahya's military government. American journalist Gary J. Bass notes in The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide, "President Nixon liked very few people, but he did like General Yahya Khan."[36] Personal initiatives of President Yahya had helped to establish the communication channel between the United States and China, which would be used to set up the Nixon's trip in 1972.[37]

Since 1960, Pakistan was perceived in the United States as an integral bulwark against global Communism in the Cold War. The United States cautiously supported Pakistan during 1971 although Congress kept in place an arms embargo.[38] In 1970, India with a heavily socialist economy entered in a formal alliance with the Soviet Union in August 1971.

Nixon relayed several written and oral messages to President Yahya, strongly urging him to restrain the use of Pakistan forces.[39] His objective was to prevent a war and safeguard Pakistan's interests, though he feared an Indian invasion of Pakistan that would lead to Indian domination of the subcontinent and strengthen the position of the Soviet Union.[40] Similarly, President Yahya feared that an independent Bangladesh could lead to the disintegration of Pakistan. Indian military support for Bengali guerrillas led to war between India and Pakistan.[41]

In 1971, Richard Nixon met Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and did not believe her assertion that she would not invade Pakistan;[42] Nixon did not trust her and even once referred to her as an "old bitch".[43] Witness accounts presented by Kissinger pointed out that Nixon made specific proposals to Prime Minister Gandhi on a solution for the crisis, some of which she heard for the first time, including a mutual withdrawal of troops from the Indo-East Pakistan borders. Nixon also expressed a wish to fix a time limit with Yahya for political accommodation in East Pakistan. Nixon asserted that India could count on US endeavors to ease the crisis within a short time. But, both Kissinger and Gandhi's aide Jayakar maintained, Gandhi did not respond to these proposals. Kissinger noted that she "listened to what was, in fact, one of Nixon's better presentations with aloof indifference" but "took up none of the points." Jayakar pointed out that Gandhi listened to Nixon "without a single comment, creating an impregnable space so that no real contact was possible." She also refrained from assuring that India would follow Pakistan's suit if it withdrew from India's borders. As a result, the main agenda was "dropped altogether."[44]

On 3 December, Yahya preemptively attacked the Indian Air Force and Gandhi retaliated, pushing into East Pakistan.[45] Nixon issued a statement blaming Pakistan for starting the conflict and blaming India for escalating it[45] because he favored a cease-fire.[46] The United States was secretly encouraging the shipment of military equipment from Iran, Turkey, and Jordan to Pakistan, reimbursing those countries[47] despite Congressional objections.[48] The US used the threat of an aid cut-off to force Pakistan to back down, while its continued military aid to Islamabad prevented India from launching incursions deeper into the country. Pakistan forces in East Pakistan surrendered on 16 December 1971, leading to the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh.[49]

Fall from power

When the news of surrender of East Pakistan reached through the national television, the spontaneous and overwhelming public anger over Pakistan's defeat by Bangladeshi rebels and the Indian Army, followed by the division of Pakistan into two parts boiled into street demonstrations throughout Pakistan. Rumors of an impending coup d'état by junior military officers against President Yahya swept the country. Yahya became the highest-ranking casualty of the war: to forestall further unrest, on 20 December 1971 he handed over the presidency and government to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto— the ambitious leader of Pakistan's powerful and popular (at that time) People's Party.

Within hours of Yahya stepping down, President Bhutto reversed JAG's verdict against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and instead released him to see him off to London. President Bhutto also signed orders for Yahya's house confinement, the man who imprisoned Mujib in the first place. Both actions produced headlines around the world.

Death

Yahya remained under house arrest orders until 1979 when he was released from the custody by martial law administrator General Fazle Haq. He remained out from public events and died on 10 August 1980 in Rawalpindi, Punjab, Pakistan.

Notes

  1. "Yahya Khan". Story of Pakistan. Retrieved 7 January 2012.
  2. Shaikh Aziz (25 December 2011). "A chapter from history: Yahya Khan's quick action". Dawn. Retrieved 7 January 2012.
  3. Shah, Mehtab Ali (1997). The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy 1971–1994. I.B.Tauris. p. 15. ISBN 978-1-86064-169-5. Retrieved 7 November 2016.
  4. Raghavan, Srinath (2013). 1971: The Global History of Creation of the Bangladesh. Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674731271. Retrieved 7 November 2016.
  5. "Zulfikar Ali Bhutto becomes President [1971]". Story of Pakistan. June 2003.
  6. Ahmed, Munir (2001). "خان کی کہانی ان کے بیٹے علی یحٰیی کی زبانی". جنرل محمد یحٰیی خان: شخصیت و سیاسی کردار (in Urdu). Lahore, Pakistan: آصف جاوید برائے نگارشات پبلشرز. p. 240.
  7. "General Yahya Khan | Former Army Chief of Pakistan enforcing Martial Law in 1969". Story of Pakistan. 26 October 2013.
  8. Mikaberidze, Alexander, ed. (2011). Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World a Historical Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIOm 2011. ISBN 978-1598843378.
  9. Democracy, security, and development in India. By Raju G. C. Thomas.
  10. Tinker, Hugh (1990). South Asia: A Short History. University of Hawaii Press. p. 248. ISBN 978-0824812874.
  11. Wolper, Stanley (2010). India and Pakistan: Continued Conflict or Cooperation?. University of California Press. p. 35. ISBN 978-0520948006.
  12. Burki, Shahid Javed (2015). Historical Dictionary of Pakistan (4 ed.). Rowman & Littlefield. p. 596. ISBN 978-1442241480.
  13. Jaffrelot, Christophe (2015). The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 226–227. ISBN 978-0190235185.
  14. Hiro, Dilip (2015). The Longest August: The Unflinching Rivalry Between India and Pakistan. Nation Books. p. 183. ISBN 978-1568585031. A burly, double chinned, bushy-browed slothful Yahya Khan was, like Ayub Khan, an ethnic Pashtun.
  15. "Good Soldier Yahya Khan". Time. 2 August 1971. p. 32. Retrieved 17 April 2014.
  16. Berindranath, Dewan (2006). Private Life of Yahya Khan. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers. p. 14.
  17. Bhattacharya, IA, Brigadier (retd.) Samir (2013). Nothing But! Book Three: What Price Freedom. New Delhi India: Partridge Publishing. ISBN 978-1482816259.
  18. Brig A.R. Siddiqui. "Army's top slot: the seniority factor" Dawn, 25 April 2004
  19. Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1992), 239.
  20. Ziring, Lawrence (1980). Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development. Dawson. p. 104. ISBN 978-0-7129-0954-9.
  21. Akbar, M.K. (1997). Pakistan from Jinnah to Sharif. New Delhi: Mittal Publications. ISBN 978-8170996743.
  22. Peter R. Blood (1996). Pakistan: A Country Study. United States: Diane Publication Co. ISBN 978-0788136313.
  23. Omar, Imtiaz (2002). Emergency powers and the courts in India and Pakistan. England: KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL. ISBN 978-9041117755.
  24. KrishnaRao, K.V. (1991). Prepare or perish : a study of national security. New Delhi: Lancer Publ. ISBN 978-8172120016.
  25. Dr. GN. Kazi (21 May 2008). "Pakistan's Smallest Cabinet". Dr. GN. Kazi. Retrieved 17 April 2014.
  26. PILDT. "The Evolution of National Security Council in Pakistan". Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency. PILDT. Retrieved 2 March 2013.
  27. Newberg, Paula R. (2002). Judging the state : courts and constitutional politics in Pakistan (1st paperback ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521894401.
  28. Bose, Sarmila (8 October 2005). "Anatomy of Violence: Analysis of Civil War in East Pakistan in 1971". Economic and Political Weekly. Archived from the original on 1 March 2007.
  29. Salik, Siddiq (1997). Witness to surrender. Dhaka: University Press. pp. 63, 228–9. ISBN 978-984-05-1373-4.
  30. Pakistan Defence Journal, 1977, Vol 2, p2-3
  31. Bass 2013, pp. 350–351 reviews the various estimates here .
  32. White, Matthew, Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century
  33. Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, chapter 2, paragraph 33
  34. Jack, Ian (20 May 2011). "It's not the arithmetic of genocide that's important. It's that we pay attention". The Guardian.
  35. Obermeyer, Ziad; et al. (June 2008). "Fifty years of violent war deaths from Vietnam to Bosnia: analysis of data from the world health survey programme". British Medical Journal. 336 (7659): 1482–1486. doi:10.1136/bmj.a137. PMC 2440905. PMID 18566045.
  36. Bass 2013, p. 7
  37. Kissinger's Secret Trip to China
  38. Mosleh Uddin. "Personal Prejudice Makes Foreign Policy". Asiaticsociety.org.bd. Archived from the original on 6 July 2011. Retrieved 28 March 2011.
  39. Black 2007, p. 751
  40. "The Kissinger Tilt". Time. 17 January 1972. p. 17. Retrieved 30 September 2008.
  41. "World: Pakistan: The Ravaging of Golden Bengal". Time. 2 August 1971. Retrieved 28 March 2011.
  42. Black 2007, p. 752
  43. https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/indira-gandhi-is-a-bitch-the-indians-are-bastards/227789
  44. Jayakar, Indira Gandhi, p. 232; Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 878 & 881–82.
  45. Black 2007, p. 753
  46. Black 2007, p. 755
  47. Black 2007, p. 756
  48. Gandhi, Sajit (16 December 2002). "The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971". National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 79. National Security Archive. Retrieved 15 January 2009.
  49. Black 2007, p. 757

References

  • Bass, Gary J. (2013). The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. ISBN 978-0-307-70020-9.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Black, Conrad (2008) [First published 2007]. Richard M. Nixon: A Life in Full. New York: PublicAffairs. ISBN 9781586486747.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)

Bibliography

  • Sharlach, Lisa (2000). "Rape as Genocide: Bangladesh, the Former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda". New Political Science. 1 (22): 89. doi:10.1080/713687893.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Sajjad, Tazreena (2012). "The Post-Genocidal Period and its Impact on Women". In Samuel Totten (ed.). Plight and Fate of Women During and Following Genocide (Reprint ed.). Transaction. pp. 219–248. ISBN 978-1-4128-4759-9.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
Military offices
Preceded by
Sher Ali Khan Pataudi
Chief of General Staff
1957–1962
Succeeded by
Malik Sher Bahadur
Preceded by
Muhammad Musa
C-in-C of the Pakistan Army
1966–1971
Succeeded by
Gul Hassan Khan
Political offices
Preceded by
Ayub Khan
President of Pakistan
1969–1971
Succeeded by
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Chief Martial Law Administrator
1969–1971
Preceded by
Mian Arshad Hussain
Minister of Foreign Affairs
1969–1971
Preceded by
Afzal Rahman Khan
Minister of Defence
1969–1971
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