Pragmatic ethics

Much as it is appropriate for scientists to act as though a hypothesis were true despite expecting future inquiry to supplant it, ethical pragmatists acknowledge that it can be appropriate to practice a variety of other normative approaches (e.g. consequentialism, deontological ethics, and virtue ethics), yet acknowledge the need for mechanisms which allow society to advance beyond such approaches, a freedom for discourse which does not take any such theory as assumed.[1] Thus, aimed at social innovation, the practice of pragmatic ethics supplements the practice of other normative approaches with what John Stuart Mill called "experiments of living".[2][3]

Pragmatic ethics also differs from other normative approaches theoretically, according to Lafollette (2000) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFLafollette2000 (help):[3]

1. It focuses on society, rather than on lone individuals, as the entity which achieves morality.[3] In Dewey's words, "all conduct is ... social."[4]
2. It does not hold any known moral criteria as beyond potential for revision.[3] Pragmatic ethics may be misunderstood as relativist, as failing to be objective, but pragmatists object to this critique on grounds that the same could be said of science, yet inductive science is our epistemological standard. Ethical pragmatists can maintain that their endeavor is objective on the grounds that it converges towards something objective (a thesis called Peircean realism named after C. S. Peirce).[5]
3. It allows that a moral judgment may be appropriate in one age of a given society, even though it will cease to be appropriate after that society progresses (or may already be inappropriate in another society).[3] For example, the writings of Thomas Jefferson on slavery framed slavery as ultimately immoral, yet temporarily moral until America was ready for abolition.[6]

Lafollette (2000) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFLafollette2000 (help) bases his account of pragmatic ethics in the writings of John Dewey, but finds aspects of pragmatic ethics in the texts of Aristotle, John Stuart Mill, and Martha Nussbaum.[3]

Pragmatic ethics has been criticized as conflating descriptive ethics with normative ethics, as describing the way people do make moral judgments rather than the way they should make them. While some ethical pragmatists may have avoided the distinction between normative and descriptive truth, the theory of pragmatic ethics itself does not conflate them any more than science conflates truth about its subject matter with current opinion about it; in pragmatic ethics as in science, "truth emerges from the self-correction of error through a sufficiently long process of inquiry".[1]

Moral ecology is a variation of pragmatic ethics which additionally supposes that morality evolves like an ecosystem, and ethical practice should therefore include strategies analogous to those of ecosystem management (e.g. protecting a degree of moral diversity). The term "moral ecology" has been used since at least 1985 to imply a symbiosis whereby the viability of any existing moral approach would be diminished by the destruction of all alternative approaches.[7][8] According to Tim Dean, current scientific evidence confirms that humans do take diverse approaches to morality, and such polymorphism gives humanity resilience against a wider range of situations and environments (which makes moral diversity a natural consequence of frequency-dependent selection).[9][10]

• Applied ethics
• Good reasons approach
• James D. Wallace

• Bellah, Robert Neelly (1985). Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life. Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-25419-0.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
• Dewey, John (1922). Human Nature and Conduct. New York: Henry Holt and Company. ISBN 978-0-486-42097-4.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
• Hertzke, Allen D.; McRorie, Chris (1998). "The Concept of Moral Ecology". In Lawler, Peter Augustine; McConkey, Dale (eds.). Community and Political Thought Today. Westort, CT: Praeger.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
• LaFollette, Hugh (2000). "Pragmatic ethics". In LaFollette, Hugh (ed.). The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 400–419.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
• Mill, John Stuart (1863). On Liberty. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. ISBN 0-486-42130-9.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)

• Bernstein, R. (1983) Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
• Dewey, John (1988) [1922]. Human Nature and Conduct. Southern Illinois University Press.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
• Dewey, John (1985) [1932]. Ethics. Southern Illinois University Press.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
• Dewey, John (1970) [1920]. Reconstruction in Philosophy. Henry Holt.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
• Gibbard, Allan (2009). "7 A pragmatic justification of morality". In Voorhoeve, Alex (ed.). Conversations on ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 157–178. ISBN 978-0-19-921537-9.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
• Lekan, T. (2003) Making Morality: Pragmatist Reconstruction in Ethical Theory (The Vanderbilt Library of American Philosophy) Vanderbilt University Press. ISBN 978-0-8265-1421-9
• Margolis, J. (1986) Pragmatism without Foundations: Reconciling Realism and Relativism. Oxford, OX, UK ; New York: Blackwell Publishers.
• Margolis, J. (1996) Life without Principles. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
• Weston, Anthony (2018) A 21st Century Ethical Toolbox. 4th edition. New York: Oxford University Press.