Abdul Qadeer Khan

Abdul Qadeer Khan [note 1] (/ˈɑːbdəl ˈkɑːdɪər ˈkɑːn/ (listen); Urdu: عبد القدیر خان‎; born 1 April 1936[2]) NI, HI, FPAS, DEng, known as A. Q. Khan, is a Pakistani nuclear physicist and metallurgist who is colloquially known as the "father of uranium enrichment project" for his nation's clandestine atomic bomb program— though he was only part of a team who developed the technology.[3] In public circles, Khan is known both for his scientific ability and for his difficult interpersonal relations and volatile personality.[4][5]

For Cricketer named Abdul Qadeer Khan, see Abdul Qadir (cricketer).

Abdul Qadeer Khan
Born (1936-04-01) 1 April 1936
Bhopal, Bhopal State, British India
(Present-day, Bhopal in Madhya Pradesh in India)
CitizenshipPakistani
Alma materUniversity of Karachi
Delft University of Technology
Catholic University of Louvain
Known forPakistan nuclear deterrent program, gaseous diffusion, martensite and graphene morphology
Awards Nishan-i-Imtiaz (1996;1999)
Hilal-i-Imtiaz (1989)
Scientific career
FieldsMetallurgical Engineering
InstitutionsKhan Research Laboratories
GIK Institute of Technology
Hamdard University
Urenco Group
ThesisThe effect of morphology on the strength of copper-based martensites (1972)
Doctoral advisorMartin J. Brabers[1]

An émigré from India who migrated to Pakistan in 1951, Khan was educated in Western Europe's technical universities in metallurgical engineering where he pioneered studies in phase transitions of metallic alloys, uranium metallurgy, and isotope separation based on gas centrifuges. After learning of India's 'Smiling Buddha' nuclear test in 1974, Khan joined his nation's clandestine efforts to develop atomic weapons when he founded the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) in 1976, and was both its chief scientist and director for many years.

In January of 2004, Khan was subjected to a controversial debriefing by the Musharraf administration over the evidence of nuclear proliferation handed over by the Bush administration of the United States.[6][7] Khan admitted his role in running the atomic ring–only to retract his statements in later years when he leveled accusations at the former administration of Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 1990.[8][9] After years of house arrest, Khan successfully filed a lawsuit against the Federal Government of Pakistan at the Islamabad High Court whose verdict declared his debriefing unconstitutional and freed him on 6 February 2009.[10]

The United States reacted negatively over the verdict, rendered by Chief Justice Muhammad Aslam, when the Obama administration issued an official statement warning that Khan still remained a "serious proliferation risk".[11]

Early life
See also: Pathans of Bhopal, Pathans of Madhya Pradesh, and Urdu-speaking

Abdul Qadeer Khan was born on 27 April 1936 in Bhopal, Bhopal State, in the then British Indian Empire, into a family of Khanzada Rajputs.:54[12][13][14] His family was of Pashtun descent who traced their genealogical roots to a Turkish origin of Ghauri and Yusufzai tribes that settled in India during the 12th century.[13][15] His father, Abdul Ghafoor, was a schoolteacher who once worked for the Ministry of Education, and his mother, Zulekha, was a housewife with a very religious mind.[16] His older siblings, along with other family members, had emigrated to Pakistan during the bloody partition of India (spitting off the independent state of Pakistan) in 1947, who would often write to Khan's parents about the new life they had found in Pakistan.[13]

After his matriculation from a local school in Bhopal, Khan emigrated from India to Pakistan on the Sind Mail train, partly due to the numerus clausus, and religious violence in India during his youth that instilled a lingering animosity for 'Hindutva' (Hindu nationalism) and Hindu fascism.[17] Upon settling in Karachi with his family, Khan briefly attended the D. J. Science College before transferring to the University of Karachi where he graduated in 1956 with a Bachelor of Science (BSc) in physics with a concentration on solid-state physics.:66-67[18][19]

From 1956–59, Khan was employed by the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (city government) as an Inspector of weights and measures, and applied for a scholarship that allowed him to study in Germany.[20][21] In 1961, Khan departed for Germany to study material science at the Technical University in Berlin where he academically excelled in courses in metallurgy, but left for Belgium when he switched to the Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands in 1965.[13] In 1967, Khan obtained an engineer's degree in Materials technology– an equivalent to a Master of Science (MS) offered in English-speaking nations such as Pakistan– and joined the doctoral program in metallurgical engineering at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium.[22]

He worked under Belgian professor, Martin J. Brabers at Leuven University, who supervised his doctoral thesis which Khan successfully defended, and graduated with a Doctor of Engineering in Metallurgical engineering in 1972.[23] His thesis included fundamental work on martensite and its extended industrial applications in the field of graphene morphology.[24]

Research in Europe
Main articles: Nuclear power in the Netherlands and Netherlands and weapons of mass destruction

Receiving his engineering doctorate in 1972, Khan joined the senior staff of the Physics Dynamics Research Laboratory in Amsterdam from a recommendation by his mentor, Martin J. Brabers.[25] His initial studies were on the high-strength metals used in the development of gas centrifuges.[25] Gas centrifuges were first conceived by American physicist Jesse Beams as part of the Manhattan Project but the studies were discontinued in 1944.[26] The Physics Laboratory was a subcontractor for Urenco Group which was operating a uranium-enrichment plant in Almelo, Netherlands.[25] Established in 1970, Urenco Group employed the centrifuge method to assure a supply of enriched uranium for nuclear power plants in the Netherlands.[27] When Urenco offered for him to join the senior scientific staff there, Khan left the Physics Laboratory, where he performed physics experiments on uranium metallurgy,[25] to produce reactor-grade uranium usable for light water reactors.[25] Urenco used Zippe-type gas centrifuges— a method invented by German mechanical engineer Gernot Zippe in the Soviet nuclear program.[25] uranium enrichment is an extremely difficult physical process, as uranium-235 (U235) exists in natural uranium at a concentration of only 0.7%; Urenco used Zippe-type centrifuges to separate the fissile isotope U235 from non-fissile uranium-238 (U238) by spinning uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas at up to ~100,000 revolutions per minute (rpm).[25] His research led to the improvement of the Zippe-type centrifuge, which at that time, was an emerging technology, whose publications were classified 'Top Secret' by the Soviet Union.[25] Khan's leading-edge research in metallurgy brought laurels to Urenco, which had him as one of the most senior scientists at the facility.[25] Eventually, Urenco gave Khan access to the blueprints for the Zippe centrifuges to find mathematical solutions for physics problems in the centrifuges.[25]

1971 war and return to Pakistan
Main articles: Operation Smiling Buddha, Project-706, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto § Father of the Nuclear weapons program

On 20 January 1972, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto approved a crash program to develop an atomic bomb after a seminar – the Multan meeting – with scientists at Multan.[3] Reporting directly to Bhutto, the program was managed by Munir Ahmad Khan, the chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC); the outcomes of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 had greatly threatened Pakistan's strategic position.[3][5] Earlier efforts had attempted implosion-type nuclear weapons using military-grade plutonium.[3][28]

Before 1974 Khan had no knowledge of the program, which calls into question his "father-of" claim.[28] Following India's surprise "Smiling Buddha" test in 1974, Bhutto accelerated Pakistan's effort to attain atomic capability.[3] Sensing the importance of the test, Munir Ahmad launched the secretive Project-706.[3]

After learning of the Indian nuclear test, Khan wanted to contribute to the military posture. He approached Pakistan government officials, who dissuaded him, saying it was as "hard to find" a job in PAEC as a "metallurgist".[29][30]

Undaunted, he wrote to Prime Minister Bhutto, highlighting his specific experience, and encouraged him to develop an atomic bomb using military-grade uranium.[29] According to Kuldip Nayyar, although the letter was received by Prime minister Secretariat, Khan was still unknown to the Pakistan Government, leading Bhutto to ask the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency to run a complete background check and prepare an assessment report on him.[31] The ISI assessed him as "incompetent" but Bhutto was dissatisfied and eager to know more about him, eventually asking Munir Ahmad to dispatch a Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) team to meet him.[32] The PAEC team, including Bashiruddin Mahmood, arrived in Almelo at his family home at night.[25] After an interview, the team returned to Pakistan and Prime Minister Bhutto decided to meet with Khan, and directed a confidential letter to him. Soon after, Khan took a leave from Urenco, and departed for Pakistan in 1974.[32]

Initiation and atomic bomb project
Main article: Project-706

In 1974, Abdul Qadeer Khan went to Pakistan and took a taxi straight to the Prime Minister's Secretariat.[33] The session with Bhutto was held at midnight and remained under extreme secrecy when Qadeer Khan met with Bhutto, Munir Ahmad, and Mubashir Hassan– the Science Adviser.[33] At this session, he enlightened the importance of uranium as opposed to plutonium, but Bhutto remained unconvinced to adopt uranium instead of plutonium for the development of an atomic bomb.[33] Bhutto ended the session quickly, remarking: "He seems to make sense."[33] Early morning the next day another session was held where he focused the discussion on highly enriched uranium (HEU) against plutonium with other PAEC officials.[30] He explained to Bhutto why he thought the idea of "plutonium" would not work.[30] Many of the theorists at that time, including Munir Ahmad, maintained that "plutonium and the fuel cycle has its significance."[5] They insisted that with the "French extraction plant in the offing, Pakistan should stick with its original plan."[5] Bhutto did not disagree but saw the advantage of mounting a parallel effort toward acquiring enriched uranium (HEU) fuel.[5][34] At the last session with Zulfikar Bhutto, Khan also advocated for the development of a fused design to compress the single fission element in the metalised gun-type atomic device, which many of his fellow theorists said would be unlikely to work.[30]

In 1975, Khan finally joined the atomic bomb program, and became a member of the enrichment division at PAEC, collaborating with Dr. Khalil Qureshi– a physical chemist.[33] Calculations performed by him were valuable contributions to centrifuges, and a vital link to nuclear weapon research.[28] He continued to push his ideas for uranium methods even though they had a low priority, with most efforts still aimed to produce military-grade plutonium.[33] Because of his interest in uranium, and his frustration at having been passed over for director of the uranium division (the job was instead given to Bashiruddin Mahmood), Khan refused to engage in further calculations and caused tensions with other researchers.[33] He became highly unsatisfied and bored with the research led by Mahmood; finally, he submitted a critical report to Bhutto, in which he explained that the "enrichment program" was nowhere near success.[33]

Kahuta Research Laboratories
Main articles: Khan Research Laboratories and Kahuta

Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto sensed great danger as the scientists were split between military-grade uranium and plutonium.[33] Therefore, he called Khan for a meeting and with the backing of Bhutto, Khan took over the enrichment division from Bashiruddin Mahmood at the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC); separating it, and founding the Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL).[33] Wanting no PAEC involvement, Khan's request to work with the Corps of Engineers was granted by the Pakistan Government in 1976.[33] The Engineer-in-Chief directed Brigadier Zahid Ali Akbar of the Corps of Engineers to work with Khan in the ERL.[33] The Corps of Engineers and Akbar quickly acquired lands of the village of Kahuta for the project.[35] The military realised the dangers of atomic experiments being performed in populated areas and thus remote Kahuta was considered an ideal location for research.[35] Bhutto would subsequently promote Brigadier Akbar to Major-General and handed over to him the directorship of ERL, with Khan being its senior scientist.[28]

On the other hand, the PAEC did not forgo their electromagnetic isotope separation research, and a parallel program was conducted by G. D. Alam, a theoretical physicist at the Air Research Laboratories (ARL) located at Chaklala Airbase, even though Allam had not seen a centrifuge, and only had a rudimentary knowledge of the Manhattan Project.[28]

At first, the ERL suffered many setbacks, and relied heavily on the knowledge from URENCO supplied by Khan.[28] Meanwhile, in April 1976, theorist Alam accomplished a great feat by successfully rotating their first generation centrifuges to ~30,000 rpm.[28] When the news reached Khan, he immediately requested Bhutto to have Alam's assistance, which was granted by the PAEC dispatching a team of scientists including Alam, to ERL.[28] At ERL, Khan joined the team of theoretical physicists headed by theorist Alam, working on the physics problems involving differential equations in the centripetal forces and angular momentum calculations in the ultra-centrifuges.[28] On 4 June 1978, the enrichment program became fully functional after Alam succeeded in separating the uranium-235 (235U) and uranium-238 (238U) fissile isotopes in an important experiment in which Khan also took part.[28][36] Contrary to his expectation, the military approved the appointment of Major-General Zahid Ali Akbar as the scientific director of the entire uranium division.[28]

In 1981, when Akbar was posted back to combat assignments, Khan took over the operations of ERL as its interim director and senior scientist.[35] In 1983, his appointment as director of ERL was personally approved by President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq who renamed the ERL after him as the A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories.[4] Despite his role, Khan was never in charge of the actual development of atomic bombs, mathematical and physics calculations, and eventual weapons testing.[4] Outgoing General Akbar recommended Munir Ahmad Khans' appointment as the scientific director of the atomic bomb project. This appointment came as a shock to Munir Khan, and surprised many in the government and the military, as Munir Khan was not known to be aligned to military conservatives.[28][28][4] The government itself refused to provide full scientific data of the atomic projects, and required of him a government security clearance, and clarifications of his visits to such secret weapons development sites, which he would be visiting with senior active duty officers.[28]

In 1984, the KRL claimed to have carried out its own cold test of a nuclear weapon, which was unsuccessful while PAEC under Munir Khan had already carried out a test in 1983, codenamed: Kirana-I.[28]

PAEC's senior scientists who worked with him and under him remember him as "an egomaniacal lightweight"[4] given to exaggerating his scientific achievements in centrifuges.[4] At one point, Munir Khan said that, "most of the scientists who work on the development of atomic bomb projects were extremely "serious". They were sobered by the weight of what they don't know; Abdul Qadeer Khan is a showman."[4] During the timeline of the bomb project, Qadeer Khan pushed his research into mathematically rigorous calculations in theoretical physics and topics to compete, but still failed to impress his fellow theorists at PAEC, generally in the physics community. In later years, Qadeer Khan became a staunch critic of Munir Khan's research in physics, and on many different occasions tried unsuccessfully to belittle Munir Khan's role in the atomic bomb projects. Their scientific rivalry became public and widely popular in the physics community and seminars held in the country over the years.[5]

Uranium tests: Chagai-I
Main articles: Chagai-I and Chagai-II
The PAEC testing team at Koh Kambaran, with team leader in center, fifth from left, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Samar Mubarakmand (right of the man in the blue beret), Tariq Salija, Irfan Burney

Many of his theorists were unsure that gaseous uranium would be feasible on time without the centrifuges, since Alam had notified PAEC that the "blueprints were incomplete" and "lacked the scientific information needed even for the basic gas-centrifuges."[28][30] However, calculations by Tasneem Shah, and confirmation by Alam showed the possibility of improvise transformation of different centrifugal methods.[30] Against popular perception, the URENCO blueprints were based on civilian nuclear reactor technology; and were filled with serious technical errors.[3] Its separative work unit (SWU) rate was extremely low, so that it would have to be rotated for thousands of RPMs at the cost of millions of dollars, Allam maintained.[37] Calculations and innovation came from the team of his fellow theorists, including mathematician Tasneem Shah, and Alam, who solved the centrifuges problems and developed powerful versions of them.[28] Scientists have claimed that Qadeer Khan would have never gotten any closer to success without the assistance of Alam and others.[38] The issue is controversial;[28] Khan maintained to his biographer that when it came to defending the "centrifuge approach and really putting work into it, both Shah and Alam refused.[28]

In 1998, India conducted the 'Pokhran-II' nuclear tests series at a site in Pokhran, Rajasthan.[30] Political momentum in Pakistan began to build up on conservative Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from the influential 'political circle' to authorize the nuclear testing program.[28][39] Together with PAEC, Khan repeatedly lobbied seeking permission in favor of the tests.[28] At the National Security Council meetings with Prime Minister Sharif, Khan even maintained that the tests could be performed at the test site in Kahuta.[28] But this was rebuffed by the Pakistani military and Prime Minister Sharif ordered Ishfaq Ahmad of PAEC to perform the tests in Chagai due to their long testing experience.[39]

When the news reached him, Khan was badly upset and frustrated with the Prime Minister's decision.[39] Without wasting a minute, Khan drove to Joint Staff Headquarters where he met with the Chairman joint chiefs General Jehängir Karamat, lodging a strong protest.[39] General Karamat] thereupon called the Prime Minister, and decided that KRL scientists, including Khan, would also be involved in the test preparations and present at the time of testing alongside those of the PAEC.[39] It was the KRL's highly enriched uranium (HEU) that was used in the successful detonation of Pakistan's first nuclear devices on 28 May 1998, under the codename Chagai-I.[36] Two days later, on 30 May, a small team of scientists belonging to PAEC, detonated a plutonium nuclear device, codenamed Chagai-II.[40] The sum of forces and yields produced by the devices were around ~40 kilotons (kt), with the largest weapon producing around 35–36 kt. In contrast, the single plutonium device had produced a yield of ~20 kt, and had a much bigger impact than uranium devices.[40]

Many of Qadeer Khan's colleagues were irritated that he seemed to enjoy taking full credit for something he had only a small part in, and in response, he authored an article, Torch-Bearers, which appeared in The News International, emphasising that he was not alone in the weapon's development. He made an attempt to work on the Teller–Ulam design for the hydrogen bomb, but PAEC had objected to the idea as it went against the government policy of N-deterrence (aka Minimum Credible Deterrence).[28][30][41] Khan often got engrossed in projects which were theoretically interesting but practically unfeasible.[42]

Proliferation of URENCO technology
See also: Nuclear proliferation

A proliferation network was established, by Khan, in the 1970s to acquire knowledge about electronic materials for Zippe-type centrifuge technology transfer at the Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL).[36][43][44][45] This atomic network was subsequently used by Libya, North Korea, Iran and China as media reports first surfaced on the China–Pakistan Free Trade Agreement negotiations between China and Pakistan for the sale of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas and highly enriched uranium (HEU).[46] Allegations were made that "Khan paid visit to China to provide technical support to Chinese nuclear program when building a HEU plant in China's Hanzhong city."[46] The Chinese Central Government offered nuclear material from their side, but Pakistan refused, calling it a "gift of gesture" to China.[46] According to an independent International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) report, Zia had given a "free hand" to Khan and given unlimited import and export access to him. The report showed that his acquisition activities were on the whole not supervised by Pakistan governmental authorities; his activities went undetected for several years.[47]

Court controversy and US objections
Main article: Operation Brasstacks

Pakistan's scientific activities rapidly attracted the attention of the world, which quickly suspected outside assistance. Suspicions soon fell on Khan's knowledge obtained during his years working for the Urenco Group.[48] In 1983, Khan was sentenced in absentia to four years in prison by the local court in Amsterdam for attempted nuclear espionage.[48] When the news reached Pakistan, Barrister S.M. Zafar immediately travelled to Amsterdam and filed a petition at the Court.[48] Zafar teamed up with Khan's old mentor professor Martin Brabers and his Leuven University to prepare evidence for the case.[48] At the trial, Zafar and Brabers argued that the technical information supplied by Khan was commonly found, and was taught in undergraduate and doctoral physics at the university.[4] The sentence was overturned on appeal on a legal technicality by the Court.[4] Reacting to the suspicions of espionage, Khan stated: "I had requested for it as we had no library of our own at KRL, at that time".[4] He strongly rejected any suggestion at Pakistan's proliferation attempts and stressed: "All the research work [at Kahuta] was the result of our innovation and struggle. We did not receive any technical "know-how" from abroad, but we cannot reject the use of books, magazines, and research papers in this connection."[4]

In a local interview given in 1987 he stated that: the U.S. had been well aware of the success of the atomic quest of Pakistan.[49] Allegedly confirming the speculation of export of nuclear technology, the Pakistan Government sharply denied all claims made by Khan. Following this, Khan was summoned for a quick meeting with President Zia-ul-Haq, who used a "tough tone" and strongly urged Khan to cease any information "he'd been providing in statements, promising severe repercussions if he continued to leak harmful information against the Pakistan Government."[49] Subsequently, Khan made several contacts with foreign newspapers, denying any and all statements he had previously released.[49] After the U.S. Pressler amendment terminating major aid to Pakistan, the Benazir Bhutto government reached an understanding with the United States to "freeze" and "capped" the program to low-enriched uranium (LEU) which is up to 3–5%. Later, the program was restored back to 90% HEU in 1990, and on July 1996, he maintained, "at no stage was the program of producing 90% weapons-grade enriched uranium ever stopped".[49]

North Korea, Iran and Libya
In 2003, Libya gave up the weapons-related material including the gas-ultra centrifuges. These gas-ultra centrifuges were marked as early models that Abdul Qadeer Khan developed in the 1980s, known as PakSat-I.[50]

Trade and diplomatic relations were established between Pakistan and North Korea since Pakistans' Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto's period in the 1970s.[51] After Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's state visit to North Korea in 1990, it was reported that highly sensitive information was being exported to North Korea in exchange for ballistic missile technology.[51] On multiple occasions, Khan alleged that Benazir Bhutto had "issued clear directions" for that matter. In 1993, downloaded secret information on uranium enrichment was delivered to North Korea in exchange for information on developing ballistic missiles.[47]

In 1987, Iran wanted to purchase nuclear fuel cycle technology from Pakistan, but was rebuffed.[47] Zia decided that the civil nuclear co-operation with Iran was purely a "civil matter" and part of maintaining good relations with Tehran; Zia did not further approve any nuclear deals, but Khan passed over a sensitive report on centrifuges in 1987–89.[47] Only in 2003 were the nature of such agreements made public when the Iranian government came under intense pressure from the European Union to fully disclose its nuclear program.

Accepting the tough International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, it revealed that Iran had established a large uranium enrichment facility using gas centrifuges based on the Urenco designs, which had been obtained "from a foreign intermediary in 1989".[51][51] The Iranians supplied the names of their suppliers and the international inspectors quickly identified the Iranian gas centrifuges as Pak-1's–the gas centrifuges invented by Khan during the atomic bomb project.[51]

In 2003, the IAEA successfully dismantled Libya's nuclear program after persuading Libya to roll back its program to have the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act economic sanctions lifted.[51] The Libyan officials turned over a list of its suppliers, such as Friedrich Tinner, which also included Khans name.[51] The same year, the Bush administration launched its investigation of Khan's leak in 2001 and 2002, focusing on his personal role.[51]

Dismantlement and revelation

Libyan government officials were quoted saying that Libya bought nuclear components from various black market dealers, including Pakistan.[51] US officials who visited the Libyan plants reported that the centrifuges were very similar to the Pak-1 centrifuges in Iran.[51] By the time evidence against Khan had surfaced, he was a public icon in the Pakistan and the government's Science Adviser.[51] His vigorous advocacy for atom bombs and missiles became an embarrassment to the Pakistan government.[51] On 31 January 2004, Khan was dismissed from his post, and the government launched an investigation of the allegations surrounding him.[51] The Wall Street Journal quoted unnamed "senior Pakistan government officials" as conceding that Khan's dismissal from KRL had been prompted by US suspicions.[51] On 4 February 2004, Khan appeared on state-owned media Pakistan Television (PTV) and confessed to running a proliferation ring, and transferring technology to Iran between 1989 and 1991, and to North Korea and Libya between 1991 and 1997.[52][53]

Although Khan was not arrested, national security hearings were launched by joint law officers from Pakistan's Judge Advocate General Branch.[51] The debriefings implicated the former Chief of Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg.[51] The Wall Street Journal quoted US government officials saying that Khan had told the military lawyers that General Beg had authorized the transfers to Iran.[54] According to IISS reports, for several years Khan had security clearances over import and export operations which were largely unsupervised and undetected.[47] Khan's security has been tightened since the 1970s, and he never travelled alone; always accompanied by secret agents of the Pakistani military establishment.[4]

Pardon, IAEA calls and aftermath
Main article: Benazir Bhutto atomic proliferation controversy
See also: Pervez Musharraf atomic proliferation controversy

On 5 February 2004, President Musharraf pardoned Khan as he feared that the issue would be politicised by his rivals.[55] The Constitution of Pakistan allows the President of Pakistan to issue presidential pardons.[55] The hearings of Khan badly damaged the political credibility of President Musharraf and the image of the United States. While, the Pakistani media aired sympathetic documentaries, the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy used that issue politically to cause the fall of Musharraf. The Embassy of the United States, Islamabad had pointed out that Tariq Majid, the successor to Musharraf, could be less friendly towards the United States; this restrained the U.S. from applying further direct pressure on Musharraf due to a strategic calculation that it might cause the loss of Musharraf as an ally.

Strong calls were made by many senior IAEA officials, U.S. and European Commission politicians, to have Khan interrogated by IAEA investigators, given the lingering scepticism about the disclosures made by Pakistan regarding Khan's activities. All such requests were however strongly dismissed by the Prime minister Shaukat Aziz and the Government of Pakistan, terming it as "case closed".

In December 2006, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC) headed by Hans Blix, a former IAEA chief and United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) chief; said in a report that Abdul Qadeer Khan could not have acted alone "without the awareness of the Pakistan Government".[56] Blix's statement was also reciprocated by the United States government, with one anonymous American government intelligence official quoted by independent journalist and author Seymour Hersh: "Suppose if Edward Teller had suddenly decided to spread nuclear technology around the world. Could he really do that without the American government knowing?".[57]

In 2007, the hearings were suspended when Musharraf was succeeded by General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani as Chief of Army Staff.[58] Officially, all security hearings were terminated by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Tariq Majid on November 2008; Khan was never officially charged with espionage activities nor were any criminal charges pressed against him.[58] The military maintained that the debriefings were the process of questioning Khan to learn about and dismantle the atomic ring.[58] The details of debriefings were marked as "classified" and were quickly wrapped up quietly, following the fall of General Pervez Musharraf.[58]

In 2008, in an interview, Khan laid the whole blame on Musharraf, and labelled Musharraf as a "Big Boss" for proliferation deals. In 2012, Khan later implicated Benazir Bhutto in proliferation matters, pointing to the fact as she had issued "clear directions in thi[s] regard." Domestically it is believed by some that Khan was made a scapegoat by Musharraf to prove his uttermost loyalty to the West whose support was urgently and desperately needed for the survival of his presidency.[57] It was done to protect the names of those high-ranking military officials and civilian politicians, under whom Musharraf served in the past.[57]

Government work and political advocacy

Controversially, Khan was ostracised by much of the scientific community, but was still quite welcome in military science circles. In 2001, Musharraf promoted Khan to Science Adviser to the President.[51]

Khan remains a popular figure and many saw him as a national hero of Pakistan. He often served as Pakistan's extreme national pride, and his long association with science bought Khan a tremendous popularity. In the late 1980s, Khan promoted the funding of the Pakistani missile research and development program and vigorously supported, and supervised the 'Hatf-I' and 'Ghauri-I' missile programs.[59] In a television speech in 2007, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz paid tribute to Khan and while commenting on last part of his speech, Aziz stressed: "(...)....The services of (nuclear) scientist... Dr. (Abdul) Qadeer Khan are "unforgettable" for the country..(..)....".[60] In 2012, Khan announced he was forming a political party Tehreek-e-Tahaffuz-e-Pakistan, Movement for the Protection of Pakistan.[61]

Khan secured a fellowship with, and the presidency, of the Pakistan Academy of Sciences.[62] Through the Academy Khan published two books on metallurgy and material science.[63] Khan began to publish his articles from KRL in the 1980s, and began to organise conferences on metallurgy by inviting scientists from all over the world.[63] Gopal S. Upadhyaya, an Indian nuclear scientist and metallurgist as well, attended Khan's conference in the 1980s and met him along with Kuldip Nayar.[63] In Upadhyaya's words, Khan was a proud Pakistani who wanted to show the world that scientists from Pakistan are inferior to no one in the world.[63]

He contributed to the Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering Sciences and Technology when he served as the Project-Director.[62] After the construction of the Institute, Khan took the Professorship of Physics while also serving as the Chairman of the Department of Metallurgy and Materials Science.[62] Later, Khan helped established the A. Q. Khan Institute of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering at Karachi University.[62]

Legacy

During his time in the atomic bomb project, Khan pioneered research in the Thermal quantum field theory and Condensed matter physics, while he co-authored articles on chemical reactions of the highly unstable isotopic particles in the controlled physical system.[64] He maintains his stance of the use of controversial technological solutions to both military and civilian problems, including the use of military technologies for civilian welfare. Khan also remained a vigorous advocate for a nuclear testing program and defence strength through nuclear weapons. He has justified Pakistan's nuclear deterrence program as sparing his country the fate of Iraq or Libya.[65] In a 2011 interview, Khan maintained that he has no regrets for what he did and said that:

[P]akistan's motivation for nuclear weapons arose from a need to prevent "nuclear blackmail" by India. Had Iraq and Libya been nuclear powers, they wouldn't have been destroyed in the way we have seen recently.... If (Pakistan) had an [atomic] capability before 1971, we [Pakistanis] would not have lost half of our country after a disgraceful defeat.

— Abdul Qadeer Khan, statement on 16 May 2011, published in Newsweek, [66]

Khan faced heated and intense criticism from his fellow theorists whom he had worked with on the atomic bomb project, most notably Pervez Hoodbhoy.[67] In addition, Khan's false claims that he was the "father" of the atomic bomb project since its inception and his personal attacks on Munir Ahmad Khan caused even greater animosity from his fellow theorists, and most particularly, within the general physics community, such as the Pakistan Physics Society, towards Khan.[68][67] Due to public promotion by the Pakistan media, he remains one of the best known but also most controversial scientists in the country.

[58] He has been depicted in the media as Pakistan's own Dr. Strangelove (commonly referred to Edward Teller) in Stanley Kubrick's 1964 satirical film of the same name.[69]

Muhammad of Ghor mausoleum was built by Pakistani Scientist Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan through a nexus of illegal private contractors Raja Arshad and Kayani - (the funding erased from KRL balance sheets ) 1994-1995 and later handed over to the Punjab archaeology department[70] He is the recipient of the following honours:

Publications

Selected research papers and patents

Nuclear and Material physics
  • Dilation investigation of metallic phase transformation in 18% Ni maraging steels, Proceedings of the International Conf. on Martensitic Transformations (1986), The Japan Institute of Metals, pp. 560–565.
  • The spread of Nuclear weapons among nations: Militarization or Development, pp. 417–430. (Ref. Nuclear War Nuclear Proliferation and their consequences "Proceedings of the 5th International Colloquium organised by the Group De Bellerive Geneva 27–29 June 1985", Edited by: Sadruddin Aga Khan, Published by Clarendon Press-Oxford 1986).
  • Flow-induced vibrations in Gas-tube assembly of centrifuges. Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology, 23(9), (September 1986), pp. 819–827.
  • Dimensional anisotropy in 18% of maraging steel,[72] Seven National Symposium on Frontiers in Physics, written with Anwar-ul-Haq, Mohammad Farooq, S. Qaisar, published at the Pakistan Physics Society (1998).
  • Thermodynamics of Non-equilibrium phases in Electron-beam rapid solidification,[64] Proceedings of the Second National Symposium on Frontiers in Physics, written with A. Tauqeer, Fakhar Hashmi, publisher Pakistan Physics Society (1988).

Books
  • Khan, Abdul Qadeer (1972). Advances in Physical Metallurgy (in English, German, and Dutch). Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier Press.
  • Khan, Abdul Qadeer (1983). Metallurgical Thermodynamics and Kinetics (in English, German, and Dutch). Islamabad, Pakistan: The Proceedings of the Pakistan Academy of Sciences.
  • Khan, Abdul Qadeer; Hussain, Syed Shabbir; Kamran, Mujahid (1997). Dr. A.Q. Khan on science and education. Islamabad, Pakistan: Sang-e-Meel Publications. ISBN 978-969-35-0821-5.

See also

References
Notes
  1. His name can be spelled in various ways; the Pakistan Academy of Sciences (PAS) and the Islamic Academy of Science spell his name Abdul Qaudeer Khan. Other educational organisations might spell his name Abdul Qadir Khan or Abdul Kadeer Khan. Alternative spellings for his name are Gaudeer or Gadeer. Khan's birth certificate reads "Abdul Qadeer Khan".
Citations
  1. "The Wrath of Khan". The Atlantic. 4 February 2004. Retrieved 26 September 2010.
  2. Qadeer Khan | Pakistani scientist | Britannica.com
  3. Shabbir, Usman (5 June 2003). "The Uranium Route to the Bomb". PakDef Military Consortium. Islamabad, Pakistan: Usman Shabbir, special report on Pakistan's atomic bomb program. Archived from the original on 20 January 2015. Retrieved 20 January 2015.
  4. Sublette, Carey; et al. (2 January 2002). "Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan". Nuclear Weapon Archives, Reuters and Los Angeles Times news reports were used in preparing this article. Nuclear weapon archives. p. 1. Retrieved 18 October 2012.
  5. "The Wrath of Khan – Magazine". The Atlantic. 4 February 2004. Retrieved 26 September 2010.
  6. "A.Q. Khan & Iran". Global Security. Retrieved 24 November 2014.
  7. The New York Times Staff (16 April 2006). "Chronology: A.Q. Khan". The New York Times. Retrieved 24 November 2014.
  8. "Mush helped proliferate N-technology : AQ Khan". The Times of India. 6 July 2008.
  9. "AQ Khan".
  10. "IHC declares Dr A Q Khan a free citizen". GEO.tv. 6 February 2009. Archived from the original on 15 April 2012. Retrieved 26 September 2010.
  11. Warrick, Joby Warrick (7 February 2009). "Nuclear Scientist A.Q. Khan Is Freed From House Arrest". The Washington Post. Retrieved 2 October 2016.
  12. Magazine, Time (27 November 2007). Time: Almanac 2008. Time Home Entertainment, Incorporated. ISBN 9781933821214.
  13. "Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan". storyofpakistan.com/. Islamabad: Story of Pakistan Press Foundation. 17 October 2013. p. 1. Retrieved 22 January 2015.
  14. Magazine, Time (27 November 2007). Time: Almanac 2008. Time Home Entertainment, Incorporated. ISBN 9781933821214.
  15. "People sacrificed their lives for Pakistan" (3 May 2014), The Pak Banker, p. 2. Retrieved 25 February 2019.
  16. Times, The New York (16 April 2006). "Chronology: A.Q. Khan". The New York Times.
  17. "The mysterious world of Pakistan's Dr Strangelove". 7 February 2004.
  18. Bernstein, Jeremy (2014). "§Unintended Consequences". Nuclear Iran. United States: Harvard University Press. pp. 66–67. ISBN 978-0674744561.
  19. "Karachi University Physics Department alumni". Karachi University. Retrieved 22 January 2015.
  20. "Profile: Abdul Qadeer Khan". 20 February 2004 – via BBC News.
  21. "Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, Founder and Ex-Chairman Dr. A Q Khan Research Laboratories". Pakistanileaders. Archived from the original on 29 September 2010. Retrieved 26 September 2010.
  22. Bowcott, Owen (6 February 2009). "Profile: Abdul Qadeer Khan". the Guardian.
  23. Bowcott, Owen (6 February 2009). "Profile: Abdul Qadeer Khan". the Guardian.
  24. Khan, Abdul Qadeer (March 1972). The effect of morphology on the strength of copper-based martensites (PhD). thesis prepared under the supervision of Professor Martin J. Brabers. Leuven, Belgium: Faculty of Applied Sciences, University of Leuven.
  25. Rehman, Shahidur (May 1999), "§Dr. A. Q. Khan: Nothing Succeed like Success", Long Road to Chagai, Islamabad, Islamabad Capital Territory: Printwise Publications, pp. 47–60, ISBN 969-8500-00-6
  26. (Bernstein 2008, pp. 51)
  27. (Bernstein 2008, pp. 51–52)
  28. Shahid-ur-Rehman (1999). "The Gas centrifuge controversy"". Long road to Chagai. Islamabad: Shahid-ur-Rehman, 1999. ISBN 969-8500-00-6.
  29. History Commons. "Profile: Abdul Qadeer Khan". History Commons.
  30. Khan, Feroz Hassan (7 November 2012). "The clash of the Khans:Centrifuge Khan vs. Reactor Khan". Eating grass : the making of the atomic bomb. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. p. 552. ISBN 978-0804776011. Viewed 7 January 2013.
  31. Nayar, Kuldip. "Do not give importance to Dr. A.Q. Khan". Kuldip Nayar (only available in Urdu). Kuldip Nayardubious. Archived from the original on 15 December 2011.
  32. "Interview with Sultan Bashir Mahmood". Scientists of Pakistan. Season 1. Episode Edward Nasim. 23 July 2009. 0:30 minutes in. Nawai-e-Waqt Media Network (NWMT). Captail Studios.
  33. Causar Nyäzie (May 1994) [1994], "§9: The Reprocessing Plant—The Inside Story", Last days of Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 1, 1 (1 ed.), Islamabad, Islamabad Capital Territory: Maulana Causar Nyazie and Sani Panwjap, pp. 55–56
  34. "Zulfikar Ali Bhutto". Historycommons.org. Archived from the original on 15 June 2011. Retrieved 26 September 2010.
  35. Khan, A. Qadeer (29 July 2009). "Bhutto, Zia-ul-Haq And Kahuta". A.Q. Khan. draqkhan.com. Archived from the original on 7 October 2011.
  36. John Pike. "A.Q. Khan". Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 26 September 2010.
  37. (Rahman 1998, pp. 59–60)
  38. (Rahman 1998, pp. 60)
  39. Azam, Rai Muhammad Saleh (20 June 1998). "Where Mountains Move: The Story of Chagai". Special editorial work prepared and published by Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam in 1998. Islamabad: The Nation, 1999. The Nation. Archived from the original on 20 January 2015. Retrieved 20 January 2015.
  40. Hoodbhoy, Pervez (2001). "Chagai-II: The Plutonium Bomb". Federation of American Scientists and Pakistan Atomic Scientists Foundation. Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved 2 October 2016.
  41. See: Project Hydrogen
  42. "Interview of Dr. Samar Mubarak-Head of Pakistan Missile program". Hamid Mir.
  43. Armstrong, David; Joseph John Trento; National Security News Service (2007). America and the Islamic Bomb: The Deadly Compromise. Steerforth Press. p. 165. ISBN 9781586421373.
  44. "Eye To Eye: An Islamic Bomb". CBS News.
  45. "On the trail of the black market bombs". BBC News. 12 February 2004.
  46. Kan, Shirley A. (2009). "§A.Q. Khan's nuclear network". China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy issues. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS): Congressional Research Service (CRS). pp. 5–6.
  47. IISS reports. A.Q. Khan and onward proliferation from Pakistan. Copyright 2006–2012 The International Institute For Strategic Studies (IISS). Viewed 24 October 2012.
  48. Khan, Abdul Qadeer (June 2010) [2010], "How we developed the program", Sehar Honay Tak (Until Sunrise), 1 (in English and Urdu), 1, Islamabad, Pakistan: Ali Masud books publication, pp. 34–39
  49. Pike, John (16 May 2000). "Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL)". The Federation of American Scientists (John Pike). John Pike of Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved 24 October 2012.
  50. "American Spaces Dashboard". usinfo.org.
  51. Fitzpatrick, Mark (2007). "§Dr. A. Q. Khan and the rise and fall of proliferation network". Nuclear black markets. London, United Kingdom: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). ISBN 978-0-86079-201-7.
  52. David Rohde; David Sanger (2 February 2004). "Key Pakistani is Said to Admit Atom Transfers". The New York Times. p. A1.
  53. AQ Khan (5 February 2004). "I seek your pardon". The Guardian.
  54. John Lancaster; Kamran Khan (3 February 2004). "Musharraf Named in Nuclear Probe: Senior Pakistani Army Officers Were Aware of Technology Transfers, Scientist Says". The Washington Post.
  55. Bill Powell and Tim McGirk, "The Man Who Sold the Bomb; How Pakistan's A.Q. Khan outwitted Western intelligence to build a global nuclear-smuggling ring that made the world a more dangerous place", Time Magazine, 14 February 2005, p. 22.
  56. "A Q Khan did not act alone" says Hans Blix team
  57. Hersh, Seymour (1 March 2004). "is Washington going easy on Pakistan's nuclear black marketers?" (google docs). Work by Seymour Hersh, with the assistance from the US government. The New Yorker. Retrieved 9 December 2012.
  58. Bernstein, Jeremy (28 May 2009). "He Changed History". The New York Review of Books. Retrieved 2 October 2016.
  59. "The past and the present (12-Nov-2008)". A. Q. Khan. Archived from the original on 14 February 2010. Retrieved 26 September 2010.
  60. APP, APP (26 October 2007). "Dr. Qadeer's services unforgettable, says PM Shaukat Aziz". Pakistan Tribune, 26 October 2007. Retrieved 30 May 2012. The services of Nuclear Scientist Dr. Qadeer Khan are unforgettable for the country; we will not hand him over to any other country...
  61. Gishkor, Zahid (27 August 2012). "AQ Khan set to launch own political party". The Tribune Express. Retrieved 18 October 2012.
  62. Pask. "Abdul Qadeer Khan". Press Directorate Office of the Pakistan Academy of Sciences. Pakistan Academy of Sciences. Archived from the original on 4 February 2014. Retrieved 18 October 2012.
  63. Upadhyaya, Gopal S. (2011). "§Dr. A.Q. Khan of Pakistan". Men of Metals and Materials: My Memoires. Bloomington, Indiana, United States: iUniverse.com. pp. 138–140.
  64. "Frontiers in Physics" (PDF). 13 December 1988. Proceedings of the Second National Symposium on Frontiners in Physics. Retrieved 16 January 2012.
  65. GEO TV (17 May 2011). "Nuclear capability saved Pakistan". Geo Television Network (GTN). GEO News (GNews). Archived from the original on 20 May 2011. Retrieved 8 December 2011.
  66. Khan, Abdul Qadeer (17 May 2011). "I saved my country from nuclear blackmail'". Newsweek; The Tribune; The NTI; various others. Retrieved 3 December 2011.
  67. Hoodbhoy, Pervez (4 May 1999). "Bombs, Missiles and Pakistani Science: The Chaghi tests, and more recent Ghauri-II and Shaheen-I missile launches, have been deemed heroic symbols of high scientific achievement... Are they?". Chowk.com. Archived from the original on 3 January 2011. Retrieved 2 October 2016.
  68. (IISS), International Institute for Strategic Studies (2006). "Bhutto was father of Pakistan's Atom Bomb Program". International Institute for Strategic Studies. Archived from the original on 14 March 2012. Retrieved 2 October 2016.
  69. Harrison, Selig S. (31 January 2008). "Pakistan's Dr. Strangelove". The New York TImes. Retrieved 2 February 2013.
  70. https://www.dawn.com/news/1362383
  71. Khan, Abdul Qadeer (1998). "Islamic Academy of Sciences Fellowship members". Islamic Academy of Sciences. Archived from the original on 28 January 2002.
  72. Murtaza, Ghulam; Zhahour Ahmad (19–21 November 1998). "Condense Matter Physics" (PDF). Seven National Symposium on Frontiers in Physics. 7. 7 (7): 2/3. Retrieved 16 January 2012.

Bibliography
  • Burr, William. "The 'Labors of Atlas, Sisyphus, or Hercules'? US Gas-Centrifuge Policy and Diplomacy, 1954–60." The International History Review 37.3 (2015): 431–457.
  • Khan, Abdul Qadeer (2010). "§Sehar Honay Tak: Dr. A.Q. Khan gave us the sense of security, Javed Hashmi.". In Khan, Abdul Qadeer (ed.). Sehar Honay Tak. Islamabad, Pakistan: Ali Masud books publication. pp. 1–158.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Upadhyaya, Gopal S. (2011). "§Dr. A.Q. Khan of Pakistan". Men of Metals and Materials: My Memoires. Bloomington, Indiana, United States: iUniverse.com. pp. 138–140.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Rahman, Shahid (1998). "§Dr. A. Q. Khan: Nothing Succeed like Success". In Rahman, Shahid (ed.). Long Road to Chagai. Islamabad, Pakistan: Printwise publication. pp. 49–60. ISBN 969-8500-00-6.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Fitzpatrick, Mark (2007). "§Dr. A. Q. Khan and the rise and fall of proliferation network". Nuclear black markets. London, United Kingdom: International Institute for Strategic Studies. ISBN 978-0-86079-201-7.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Kan, Shirley A. (2009). "§A.Q. Khan's nuclear network". China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy issues. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS). pp. 5–6.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • (BIIP), Bureau of International Information Programs (2005). "§A.Q. Khan and the nuclear market". In Cooney, Thomas E.; Denny, David Anthony (eds.). E=mc²: Today's Nuclear Equation. Washington, DC: United States: Judith S. Seagal. pp. 1–40 [30–33].CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Bernstein, Jeremy (2008). Physicists on Wall Street and other essays on science and society. New York: Springer. ISBN 978-0387765068.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)

Anecdotes
Written by Abdul Qadeer Khan
Online books
Government offices
Preceded by
Ishfaq Ahmad		 Science Advisor to the Presidential Secretariat
1 January 2001 – 31 January 2004		 Succeeded by
Atta ur Rahman
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