The Establishment (Pakistan)

The Establishment in Pakistan is the terminology used to describe the deep state cooperative federation of the Pakistan Armed Forces, the Pakistani intelligence community and other pro-military government officials and civilians. Responsible for various military coups, the military dominated Establishment has directly ruled for nearly half of its nation's existence since Pakistan's creation in 1947.[1][2] The Establishment in Pakistan includes the key decision makers in country's military and intelligence services, national security, foreign and domestic policies including the state policy of Islamisation of Pakistan during Zia-ul-Haq's tenure.[3] Although the military establishment later reversed their support of political Islam, under General Pervez Musharraf who pursued enlightened moderation in the 2000s, joining the US-led war on terror, with Pakistan becoming a Major non-NATO ally.[4] Furthermore, in the 2010s, General Raheel Sharif pursued a hardline crackdown on Islamist militant groups, continuing this reversal of General Zia's pro-Islamist policy.[5]

This article is about about The Establishment in Pakistan. For the general usage of the term, see The Establishment.

Characteristics and composition

Ayesha Siddiqa notes that the Establishment is dominated by the military (serving and retired officers, SPD, think-tanks, military-sponsored journalists and universities, military officers in the Parliament etc), with core members also including some civil bureaucrats, politicians, media houses and economic players.[6][7] Abubakar Siddique writes that the civilians included in the Establishment such as politicians and judges are also 'pro-military'.[8] In the book, The Idea of Pakistan, Stephen Cohen explains:[9]

Of all of Ayub’s achievements, the most enduring was [...] an informal political system that tied together the senior ranks of the military, the civil service, key members of the judiciary, and other elites. Subsequently dubbed the “Establishment," it resembles a classic oligarchy [...]

Writing in 1996, a contemporary chronicler of the Establishment, Syed Mushahid Hussain, pegged it at about 500 people... Members of the Establishment included members of the business community; journalists, editors, and media experts; and a few academics and members of think tanks [...] At times, some foreign ambassadors with particularly close ties to the leadership were de facto members [...] Military officers and civilian bureaucrats above a certain level were potential members [...] As Hussain notes, the informality of the Establishment ensures that occupying a particular post does not confer membership.

Over time the civil-military power equation has undergone changes such as increased power sharing between the civilian and military sides and convergence of interests in issues such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.[10] During Ayub Khans’s years the Establishment's code/tenants included the following (as outlined in The Idea of Pakistan) : India was the main threat to Pakistan and accordingly the military was a priority.[11] Since Pakistan could not take on India alone, military alliances were important and essential to survival.[11] Other natural allies included other moderate Islamic states which were seen as role models.[11] Domestically the military was a role model for the people. Kashmir was always an issue for the Establishment to the extent it became a reason for the existence of Pakistan.[11] Quick reforms and revolutions were considered problematic.[11] Foreign aid from United States, Japan, and then China after 1970s was a driver of the economy.[12] The Establishment ensured control over information dissemination through the media and academia.[12] Radical or violent Islamic groups were slowly tolerated.[12] The Establishment theoretically tolerated democratic rule and never seriously imposed Islam; the army being less tolerant of Islamists. Just by surviving Pakistan and its Establishment would be defeating India.[12]

Over time Establishment members have included Sharifuddin Pirzada, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, Tariq Aziz,[13] A. K. Brohi,[14] , Ghulam Ishaq Khan[15] and Zafar Ahmed Ansari.[16]

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a founding member of the Establishment,[17] started looking for a new identity for Pakistan, other than the one it shared with India. Pakistan started to look towards the Middle East for "aid, ideology, and strategic cooperation"; while at the same time turning its back away from its own history in South Asia.[18]Kashmir is/was important for the Establishment, even if the people of Pakistan do/did not think so. Not only was it strategically important to the nation, it would have allowed Pakistan to fulfil the vision of the two-nation theory, that of being a "homeland for oppressed Indian Muslims".[11] (Though very few, the number of those in the Establishment who want Pakistan to get out of the Kashmir conflict with India are growing.)[19] Other than Kashmir, India as a nation was perceived as an existential threat in every way.[20][21][22] On the other hand Bangladesh, (what was once East Pakistan), does not believe that India "poses an existential threat".[23]

Modus operandi: Reinforcing deep-state dominance

The Establishment was behind the 1953-54 Constitutional Coup,[24][25] 1958 Pakistani coup d'état,[25] 1977 coup,[26][27][28] and 1999 Pakistani coup d'état.[29] The army has been involved in enforcing martial law against the elected governments in claiming to restore law and order in the country by dismissing the legislative branch, the Parliament, four times in past decades, and has wider commercial, foreign, and political interests in the country, and consequently faces the allegations of acting as state within a state.[30][31][32][33][34]

Implementation of policies
Main article: Criticism of Pakistan Armed Forces

Core principles/values of the Establishment are the policy of treating India as an arch-rival and existential threat, the Kashmir dispute, Islamisation of Pakistan, Punjab as the heartland/core of Pakistan, strategic use of non-state militants and forming alliances with other Muslim majority nations.[35][36]

See also
* Establishment Division

References

Notes

    Citations
    1. Jaffrelot, Christophe (2015). The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience. Oxford University Press. p. 586. ISBN 978-0-19-023518-5. The civil-military establishment ruled Supreme for 60 years - from 1947 to 2007 - by crushing or betraying social movements and preventing the development of society.
    2. Pakistan Extends Powerful Army Chief’s Term, Wall Street Journal, 19 August 2019.
    3. Ḥaqqānī, Husain (2005). Pakistan: between mosque and military. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. p. 131. ISBN 978-0-87003-214-1. Retrieved 23 May 2010. Zia ul-Haq is often identified as the person most responsible for turning Pakistan into a global center for political Islam. Undoubtedly, Zia went farthest in defining Pakistan as an Islamic state, and he nurtured the jihadist ideology ...
    4. "A Plea for Enlightened Moderation", by Pervez Musharraf, June 1, 2004, The Washington Post
    5. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/15/pakistan-offensive-militants-north-waziristan
    6. "Mapping the establishment – by Ayesha Siddiqa". LUBP. 15 January 2010. Retrieved 8 December 2019.
    7. Ahmad, Ishtiaq; Rafiq, Adnan (3 November 2016). "Mapping the 'Establishment' - Ayesha Siddiqa". Pakistan's Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence. Routledge. pp. Chapter 3. ISBN 978-1-317-23594-1.
    8. Siddique, Abubakar (15 June 2014). "The Military's Pashtun Wars". The Pashtun Question: The Unresolved Key to the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Hurst. pp. Chapter 6. ISBN 978-1-84904-499-8.
    9. Cohen 2004, p. 68-70.
    10. Ahmad, Ishtiaq (3 November 2016). "Pakistan's third democratic transition". In Ahmad, Ishtiaq; Rafiq, Adnan (eds.). Pakistan's Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence. Taylor & Francis. pp. 31–33. ISBN 978-1-317-23595-8.
    11. Cohen 2004, p. 71.
    12. Cohen 2004, p. 72.
    13. Cohen 2004, p. 68 - 70.
    14. Cohen 2004, p. 85.
    15. Cohen 2004, p. 146.
    16. Haqanni 2005, p. 25.
    17. Cohen 2004, p. 73:"In this Ayub had been egged on by his activist foreign minister, the young Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was ambitious, ruthless, and a charter member of the Establishment."
    18. Cohen 2004, p. 170.
    19. Murthy, Gautam (2008). International Economic Relations. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House. p. 71. ISBN 978-81-7835-615-0.
    20. Fair, C. Christine (2014). Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War. Oxford University Press. p. 173. ISBN 978-0-19-989270-9. [...] conviction of Pakistan's defense establishment that India is fundamentally opposed to Pakistan's existence, rejects the two nation theory, and seeks every opportunity to undo history [...] the two states are thus locked in an existential conflict with no obvious resolution.
    21. Cohen 2004, p. 121.
    22. Haqqani 2005, p. 15.
    23. Cohen 2004, p. 282.
    24. Pakistan Constitutional Beginnings PAKISTAN - A Country Study
    25. declassified US Intelligence.
    26. Hyman, Anthony; Ghayur, Muhammed; Kaushik, Naresh (1989). Pakistan, Zia and After--. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications. p. 30. ISBN 81-7017-253-5. Operation Fair Play went ahead … as the clock struck midnight [on 4 July 1977] ... [Later,] General Zia [told Bhutto] that Bhutto along with other political leaders of both the ruling and opposition parties would be taken into what he called 'protective custody'.
    27. Dossani, Rafiq; Rowen, Henry S. (2005). Prospects for Peace in South Asia. Stanford University Press. p. 42. ISBN 978-0-8047-5085-1. Zia-ul-Haq, however, chose not to abrogate the 1973 Constitution. Rather, Zia's government suspended the operation of the Constitution and governed directly, through the promulgation of martial law regulations … Between 1977 and 1981 Pakistan did not have legislative institutions.
    28. Cohen, Stephen P. (2004). The idea of Pakistan (1. paperback ed.). Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0815715021.
    29. Hassan Abbas (2005). Pakistan's drift into extremism: Allah, the army, and America's war on terror. M.E. Sharpe. pp. 16–40. ISBN 978-0-7656-1496-4.
    30. Javid, Hassan (23 November 2014). "COVER STORY: The Army & Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan". DAWN.COM. Dawn Newspapers. Dawn Newspapers. Archived from the original on 16 August 2017. Retrieved 16 August 2017.
    31. Aqil, Shah (1973). The army and democracy : military politics in Pakistan. ISBN 9780674728936.
    32. Haqqani, Husain (2005). Pakistan between mosque and military. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. ISBN 0870032852.
    33. Aziz, Mazhar (2007). Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State. Routledge. ISBN 9781134074099. Retrieved 16 August 2017.
    34. Chengappa, Bidanda M. (2004). Pakistan, Islamisation, Army and Foreign Policy. APH Publishing. ISBN 9788176485487.
    35. Cohen 2004, p. 71-72.
    36. Baloch, Qadar Bakhsh (2006). "[Book Review] The Idea of Pakistan". The Dialogue: 136–137. ISSN 1819-6470.

    Bibliography
    • Cohen, Stephen F. (2004). The idea of Pakistan. University of Michigan: Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 9780815715023.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
    • Haqqani, Husain (2005). Pakistan : between mosque and military (1. print. ed.). Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. ISBN 978-0870032141.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
    • Khan, Reham (2018). Reham Khan (memoir). Pakistan. ISBN 9789353023225.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)


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