Merpati Nusantara Airlines Flight 8968

Part of fuselage recovered after the crash

The aircraft was on final approach, after being in a holding pattern for fifteen minutes, to the Kaimana Airport at about 1400 local time (0500 UTC). During the approach to Kaimana, the flight crew flew to the south of the airport in an attempt to make a visual approach. The auto-pilot was disengaged at 960 feet pressure altitude. At 376 feet, the crew decided to discontinue the approach and climbed, turned to the left, increased the engine power, retracted flaps from 15 to 5 and subsequently to 0 position and retracted the landing gear. The aircraft rolled to the left with a bank angle of 11 and continuously increased up to 38 degrees. The rate of descent increased significantly up to about 3000 feet per minute. It crashed into the water about 500 metres (1,600 ft) southwest of the runway.[1] The weather at the time of the accident was rain and fog, with visibility less than 2,000 metres (6,600 ft).[1] An official at the Ministry of Air Transportation said that "there was heavy rainfall, which shortened the [pilot's] range of vision. It was also very dark."[6] After impacting the water, the aircraft broke into at least two main pieces and sank in about 30 metres (98 ft) of water.[1] According to a local navy officer, the aircraft "exploded" on impact, killing all on board.[7]

Based on the estimated weights, the center of gravity was determined to be within the normal operating range for the entire flight. Cargo overload alongside with improper balance were ruled out.

The two way communication between Kaimana AFIS and the crew was conducted normally and also did not contribute to the accident. However, limited communications were noted between the Captain and the First Officer. When the Captain gave important commands to the First Officer, he did not use standard phraseology as stated in the Company Operation Manual. The CVR revealed limited conversation between the Captain and the First Officer. This situation is uncommon in a good cockpit environment. It was known that the Captain had served the company for more than 30 years while the First Officer was a newly recruited pilot. As the aircraft approached Kaimana, the Captain gave several instructions to the First Officer related to the direction, speed, altitude and power setting of the aircraft. This type of interaction between the Captain and the First Officer suggested a steep trans-cockpit authority gradient in which the First Officer may not challenge the decisions and actions of the Captain. The Captain may have lack of trust to the First Officer, as indicated by giving the First Officer handling instructions and took over the control during the final phase of the approach. The action of the Captain may have created additional workload to the Captain and reduced his situational awareness.

An approach to Kaimana should be conducted in visual approach and require visibility greater than 5 kilometers. At the time of the accident, the weather at Kaimana was raining and the visibility was 2 kilometers. In such condition, a visual approach should not be performed. However, flight crews insisted to land in the airport.

From the CVR it was revealed that during the flight, the crew did not perform crew briefing and checklist reading. In absence of crew briefing, the crew could not synchronize the plan to conduct the approach, and what actions they would take if the situation deviated from the normal. As a result of the crew not completing the approach checklist, an action to change the Engine Regime Selector (ERS) from CRUISE to TOGA mode was not carried out. During the course of investigation, it was found that the ERS button was in the CRUISE mode. As a result, the torque only reached 70% and 82% during the discontinued approach, instead of around 95% if the ERS button was in TOGA mode. The lower power would have significantly affected the performance of the aircraft.

During go around the Captain commanded to retract the flaps to 5. The FCOM (Flight Crew Operating Manual) stated a go around with two engines operation initiated from flaps 30, in which the flaps should be set to 15, and remain at 15 until above 400 feet and the speed reaches 135 knots. There is a strong indication that the PIC reverted to a procedure for a previous aircraft type he had flown when he asked for “Flap 25”, which does not exist on the MA60 aircraft type. Another action was to set flaps position to 5 during the go around. This procedure was a typical action in the Fokker aircraft type. The Captain had 6,982 hours flying time of the Fokker 100 aircraft type, which does have a Flap 25 setting. In contrast, he had flown the MA60 for only 199 hours. Stress and workload can increase the likelihood of regressing to earlier well-learned habit patterns.

It was revealed that the Flight Officer was trained in the first three batches which was conducted by the aircraft manufacturer instructor and syllabus, while the Captain was trained by a Merpati instructor using modified syllabus. Inadequacy/ineffectivity in the training program may lead to actions that deviated from the standard procedure and regression to the previous type.

In May 2012, the NTSC released its final investigation report. It determined that a visual approach should not have been attempted due to low visibility. There was no checklist reading or crew briefing. The flight crew lacked situation awareness while trying to locate the runway and while performing the go-around. The aircraft entered a rapid descent during the go-around due to a 38-degree left roll and crew commanded flap retraction from 15 to 0 degrees. Both crew members had low experience and flying time on type. The inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the training program may lead to actions that deviate from standard operating procedure and that regress to a previous aircraft type.[5]