Hizbul Mujahideen

The first three years of the insurgency (1990–92) were dominated by the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).[25] Despite being supported by Pakistan, they under the renewed ideology of their new leaders shifted to a secular pro-independence stance and attracted huge support in the valley in their strategy to organize a mass-resistance, that would compel India to withdraw from Kashmir.[13][25]

But, a lack of social fabric among the new mass-recruits, (who often did not share a common ideology) coupled with an urban-centric focus led to the gradual weakening of JKLF[26] Indian counter-insurgency operations removed much of its leadership, wiping out its central control.[27] Pakistan was also heavily incentivized by the popularization of Jihadi sentiments in the Kashmiri youth; and utilized the situation to gain control over Kashmir.[28] By 1991, ISI had begun to cease providing of funds to JKLF, (which stood its ground for independence of the territory) and were instead advocating splinter factions to break off and form their own militant groups after receiving due training in their territory.[28] Subsequently, Hizbul Mujahideen came to be favored by the ISI as a potentially valuable resource and finally, after JKLF rejected certain demands of nuancing their pro-independence stance; all of their erstwhile camps in Azad Kashmir were handed over to Hizbul.[12] Jamaat also scoped the opportunity and choose to infiltrate Hizbul from within, by installing loyal members at key central positions.[18] Numerous jihadi factions too departed from JKLF and were subsumed within Hizbul.[29]

Soon enough, arrests by Indian forces necessitated a re-organisation of the central command and in the reshuffle, Ahsan Dhar, a moderatist leader with an independent mind was asked to step down and Sayeed Salahudeen, a radical Jamaat loyalist, was appointed instead.[18][19] Dar was soon expelled by Salahudeen loyalists in late 1991 and formed a splinter group-- "Muslim Mujahideen", which quickly fell apart after his arrest in 1993.[24] An overall restructuring to enable a collective, hiearchical and institutionalized leadership along the lines of Jaamat[20] soon followed which lend a much-needed organisational strength that lacked JKLF.[24][30] Hizbul also managed to increase their penetration into the rural belt courtesy the utilization of Jaamat's socio-religious authority and homogeneity.[20][30] An implementation of Sunni culture in the ground-roots helped their cause further.[15]

In the meanwhile, Hizb-ul Mujahideen rigidly opposed JKLF, all throughout and had rejected JKLF's nationalist agenda in favor of an Islamist one.[19][12] There were increasing clashes with one another and the differences reached their peak by 1991, as it publicly opposed JKLF's agreement to a solution of the dispute without the aid of UN resolutions.[19] Military clashes between JKLF and Hizbul became increasingly commonplace after the first such incident in April, 1991 wherein a JKLF area commander was killed.[31] It began to systematically target members of JKLF, killing them and intimidating others to defect.[14][32][31] JKLF leaders had alleged HM militants to be informers for the Indian forces and Amanullah Khan even complained of his cadres in Pakistan being coerced to join the ranks of HM.[33] Fuelled by resources from Pakistan State actors and Pakistan Jamaat; Hizbul also targeted other militant groups, killing hundreds while neutralising and disarming more than 7,000.[14][31][34]

Hizbul also murdered several of the pro-independence intelligentsia with JKLF leanings. Some of these killings included Hriday Nath Wanchoo, a Kashmiri Pandit human rights advocate.[35] Hizbul militant Ashiq Hussain Faktoo was convicted for his killing.[36] Other prominent killings included Dr. Abdul Ahad Guru who was a cardiologist and JKLF ideologue, Mirwaiz Qazi Nisar and Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq, Mohammed Maqbool Malik, Prof. Abdul Ahad Wani,[35][37] Muhammad Sultan Bhat, Abdul Ghani Lone, and Abdul Majeed Dar.

Hizbul was instrumental in preventing the return of Kashmiri Pandits after their ethnic cleansing from the valley, Salahudeen spoke of them being Hindu agents whilst threatening to auction their properties.[15] Many of operations of the outfit during 1994-95 were designed to polarise the masses along religious lines.[15]

By 1994, many JKLF members had denounced militancy and some even joined state politics, which led to further splintering amongst JKLF and a complete yield of its military dominance to Hizbul which grew up to be the major force in Kashmir despite facing a much widespread and effective counter insurgency response from the Indian forces.[35][17][38] This survival has been attributed to its widespread penetration across rural networks. By 1996, the arm-bearing factions of JKLF were entirely crushed[32] and with other local insurgent factions having either disbanded or becoming defunct or having switched loyalties to the Indian cause; Hizbul was the sole militant group operating in the valley.[39]

Analysts and academics though believe that Hizbul lacked popular support in the valley and that their aversion to pro-independence ideas and Sufi practices alienated many Kashmiris.[15]

But roughly beginning the same time, Hizbul actually started to lose their popular influence in the valley.[40] People from the fellow militant groups often aligned with the counter insurgency operations to avenge the Hizbul or protect themselves from the Hizbul, killing many Hizbul commanders in the process.[40] They also imparted ground intelligence to the Indian forces; thus systematically degrading Hizbul's own networks.[40] A simultaneous targeting of Jaamat's militants led to their revoking theirs open support for Hizbul, which destroyed the social fabric of Hizbul to a large extent.[40] By the end of the 1990s; Hizbul was forced to go for a retreat.[40] The Al-Badr faction split in 1998 due to a dislike of excessive interference by Jaamat.[41]

In the following years, the group started to fragment as ISI pushed foreign extremists into Hizbul. Rivalries developed often leading to violence, and one such incident culminated in the killing of 21 people in a Pakistan administered Kashmir village in 1998.[17] Several Hizbul members were increasingly displeased with ISI's manners of treating the Kashmiris and with more militants joining mainstream politics, they were pushed to the sidelines.[17]

Starting April 2000, there were alleged parleys between Abdul Majid Dar, the Kashmir commander and other top leaders of Hizbul with Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and Intelligence Bureau (IB) officials in Delhi and other venues; that led to the build-up of a ceasefire offer.[17][41] Offensive counter-insurgency operations against the group were also reduced.[17] On 24 July 2000, Dar, along with four other Hizb commander (some Hizb commanders didn't agree with Dar) made an unconditional ceasefire declaration for a span of 3 months, from the outskirts of Srinagar[19] and asserted it to be backed by the consent of the local populace, who were surveyed.[17] Majeed Dar had also apparently visited Pakistan before the announcement for consultations with the HM Central Command.[17] The ceasefire was welcomed and approved in India, near unanimously and was immediately ratified by the Pakistan-based commander Sayeed Salahudeen who until then was against any diplomatic resolution.[17][42][43] The Pakistani government soon enough ordered its forward posts on the LOC, to abide by a no-shoot first policy.[17]

A unit-commander from Pakistan-administered Kashmir in the Pir-Panjal area disagreed with the ceasefire and was expelled along with his faction; leading to a violent clash with the Pakistan Jaamat.[41]

On the next day, Muttahida Jihad Council (MJC), a coalition of 16 radical Islamist organisations (that comprised Hizbul and was incidentally chaired by Salahudeen himself), severely criticised the ceasefire declaration.[17] Hizbul was soon revoked of its council membership and Salahudeen lost his chair.[17] Jamaat leaders too vociferously criticised the ceasefire declaration and alleged it to be an act of sabotage.[17] LeT launched multiple attacks killing and injuring numerous civilians as a form of protest against the ceasefire declaration with an aim to derail it.[17]

Whilst two rounds of talks were smoothly held and a cricket match was played out between Indian armed forces and Hizbul, Salahuddin was allegedly forced by ISI to set out a deadline for tripartite talks of August 8.[17] The Indian government did not agree to indulge with Pakistan and whilst Pakistani government initially maintained a neutral posture of abiding by the wishes of the Kashmiri populace, it later changed its stance and demanded a representation.[17] Salahuddin then called off the talks on August 8 under flimsy pretexts; interpreting an address of Vajpayee to the Parliament as calling for a strict abidance of the Indian delegation to the Indian constitution.[17] He also re-warned[29] of more escalation and threatened to spill their activities over the rest of India; incidentally Hizbul's earlier stance was to wage war against the Indian occupation but not against India.[17][43] The US State Department as well as the British Foreign Office blamed Hizbul for the failure of the process.[17]

The ceasefire move, its immediate endorsement and subsequent withdrawal highlighted deep divisions between the more hawkish operatives in Pakistan administered Kashmir and those based in India.[44] Dar was soon removed from his role of military commander and in May 2002, he was formally expelled from the Hizb along with a number of supporters and commanders whilst being.denounced as an agent of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).[45][46] Dar and several other ex-leaders were assassinated by Hizbul between 2001 and 2003.[47][48] By 2003, most key leaders of Hizbul were in Azad Kashmir and they were quite inactive in Kashmir; a fragmented Hizbul survived a total collapse but had metamorphosed into a vanguard group.[40]

Yet, in 2004 it was still “regarded as one of the most influential groups involved in the conflict over Kashmir.”[46] As of 2009, it was supposedly “the brand name of the Kashmir militancy because of being the largest and the most important in terms of its effectiveness in perpetrating violence across Kashmir.”[46]