History of democracy in Mexico

With the fall of Iturbide's monarchy, Mexican leaders began crafting a constitution, creating a federal republic. A Second Constituent Congress was formed, which represented the provinces and people of Mexico more equitably, paving the way for a move way from authoritarianism and towards democratic representation. The 1824 Constitution made Mexico a federal republic with a president, vice president, a bicameral legislature and a judiciary. In addition to the federal government, the constitution established 19 states, each of which would elect its own governor and state congress.[27]

Despite the promises for democracy, the military coups marked the era after the ratification of the Constitution of 1824. General Guadalupe Victoria was the only president over the next forty years that remained in office for his full term, as liberal and conservative factions fought fiercely for control of the government. According to historian Robert Miller, "Upon taking power, the new group not only changed key government personnel, it also rewrote laws and even the constitution to reflect its philosophy."[28] During this time, liberals in Mexico continued to favor states' rights and federalism; conservatives advocated for a centralized state, not discarding the option of a dictatorship, with government positions controlled by the elite. The first two presidents elected under the Constitution of 1824 partnered with conservative vice presidents. In both instances, the conservative vice presidents fostered the loyalty of the military and used it to stage coups in a bid to remove the liberals from power.[27] The second - led by Anastasio Busamante - was successful. Busamante, nonetheless, was not strong enough to impose the centralist regime he wanted; thus, factions emerged. Gomez Fariasral led an ideological campaign in conjunction with a military campaign led by Santa Anna.[29]

After successfully ousting Bustamante, Santa Anna took over the presidency, though he left executive power primarily in the hands of Gomez Farias. Gómez Farías was shortly thrown out of office by a military coup, after he attempted to reduce the size of the military and curtailed the power of the Roman Catholic Church. Shortly after in 1835, Congress passed a centralist constitution that replaced the states with departments whose governors would be selected by the president. Chaos ensued from a French invasion, and the congress elected in 1842 was tasked with creating a new constitution in the shadow of Santa Anna's presidency. The congressmen - mainly young liberals and federalists - produced two drafts of constitutions, neither of which fulfilled Santa Anna's desire for a centralist regime. The army, thus, disbanded the congress. A new committee of leading conservative land owners, clerics, army officers and lawyers created a new centralist constitution, and while it did not give the president absolute powers, it was to Santa Anna's taste and soon ratified. Santa Anna stayed in power until 1855 when increasing revolts forced him to abdicate.[29]

Santa Anna's ousting prompted the creation of another constitution, this one on principles of radical liberalism. The Constitution of 1857 incorporated Juarez and Lerdo Law. The simultaneous election of a conservative president and the selection of a liberal president of the supreme court and the liberals' push for strong reform laws triggered the Reform War. The war ended with a liberal victory, and elections were held in 1867 with Benito Juarez president.[30] While the nation continued to be sharply divided between conservative and liberal factions, the next nine years saw democratic elections for both the presidency and congress.

The growth of democracy was truncated by France's successful invasion of Mexico in 1862. Conservatives crowned Maximilian Hapsburg as emperor of the country, marking the nation's return to monarchy. The army which had attempted to prevent the invasion, led by Benito Juárez, received US aid at the end of the American Civil War in 1865. The same year, Napoleon III declared he would no longer aid Maximilian i and urged him to abdicate. Maximilian was taken prisoner by Juárez' army, along with conservative Generals Miguel Miramón and Tomás Mejía and all three were executed in June 1867. Juárez was reinstated as president.[31][32][33]

After Juarez's death, Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada was elected president. Yet Tejada did not reinforce the existing democratic structure. He successfully proposed a motion to transform the unicameral legislature into a bicameral system. In adding the Senate to the existing Chamber of Deputies, Tejada sought to increase the executive's influence over the Congress and push for the increased centralization of power. In junction with his anti-clerical policies, Tejada became highly unpolular; Porfirio Díaz, thus, was able to rally the support of some of his fellow generals and successfully launch a revolt.[31][32][33]

During his first term, Diaz employed no mass repression, imprisonments or execution of his enemies, and allowed for national and local elections to be held.[35] Nonetheless, even though he had originally catapulted himself to public favor by advocating against the centralization promoted by Tejada, once in office he successfully the passage of an amendment which would allow an individual to run for re-election after a lapse. This allowed Diaz' friend General Manuel Gonzalez to take the presidency. Fredrich Katz argues that "Gonzalez distinguished himself by his corruption" allowing Diaz to easily win a second term.[36][37][38]

Diaz'second term installed the "first effective and long-lasting dictatorship to emerge in Mexico since the advent of independence" through a series of anti-democratic moves.[39] Every candidate that wished to be elected or re-elected had to obtain Diaz' approval. The dictator barred the election of any of his opponents to congress, making the institution nothing more than a rubber stamp. This rubber stamp congress, at Diaz' urging, approved amendments that made it possible for Diaz to run fro re-election if the population wished him to do so. The constitution was also amended to extend the president's terms for six years. With these reforms thus, Diaz was successfully re-elected in 1888,1892,1898,1904 and 1910. Diaz also took several measures to silence his opposition during this time - he limited freedom of the press, used a reinforced military to quickly put down any dissenters and rebellions, and shifted government officials constantly to ensure they did not develop a following that could oppose him.[36][37][38] Diaz' undemocratic actions were never challenged by the academia as universities were acted as a safe haven for the privileged and wealthy, who largely economically benefited and supported Diaz.[40]

The extended rule of Porfirio Díaz seemed to have the potential to end in 1908, when in the Creelman Interview the dictator announced Mexico was ready for a democracy and that he would not seek re-election. Francisco Madero, a wealthy landowner, took this opportunity to run for the presidency on an anti-re-electionist, pro-democracy platform. Madero, unlike any candidate before him, toured the entire nation advocating for his platform, creating the first modern campaign in Mexico's history. Diaz, nonetheless, went against his word and also ran for the presidency. Shortly before the elections, Diaz ordered Madero's arrest, and on election day, Diaz won in a landslide. This outraged the vast majority of the population. Madero managed to escape from prison and published the Plan de San Luis Potosí, calling for people to fight to re-instill democratic principles in the nation, thus catalyzing the Mexican Revolution.[36][37][38]

Following Obregon's presidency, Plutarco Calles was elected president. Despite the constitution's prohibition of re-election, Obregon wanted to run for a second term, and successfully convinced Calles to change the law in his favour. Obregon was able to win a second term, yet he was assassinated before he could take office. In a speech, Calles claimed that various politicians had begged him to run for re-election, and he honorably chose not to do so in order to protect Mexico's institutions and democracy. Calles, however, hand-picked the next three presidents and their cabinets, creating a series of puppet regimes that came to be known as the Maximato.[41][42] In 1929, Calles established the primary political party of the country, Partido Nacional Revolucionario (later known as the PRI), to quell the ideological disputes among revolutionaries. (add PAN in spanish article citation here)[43]

The Maximato ended with Lazaro Cardenas' cunning and opportunism. When Calles left the country to seek medical attention in the United States, Cardenas dismissed Callistas (as Calles' supporters were known) from all political posts and exiled Calles' most powerful allies, establishing the first administration independent of Calles' rule in 12 years.[42][41]

During the Lázaro Cárdenas administration, the federal government reinforced its role as the third-party enforcer for disputes between labor unions and employers. The government used its negotiator role. Rather than focusing on solving labor-employer disputes, used it to negotiate exchange benefits and favorable policies for political loyalty with the unions. This method also secured divisions within the labor movement; but more importantly, it made the labor movement inseparable from the PRI [45] and paved the way for the regularization of a governance by consensus. Under this method, the president would go individually to each of the unions that represented the populations in the PRI coalition until a piece of legislation that appeased all parties was negotiated. The legislation was then put through congress, who had already agreed to the legislation and simply acted as a rubber stamp of approval for legislation. In exchanging benefits for political loyalty, the PRI ensured that when elections came, an ample majority would turn out in their support and generate constant victories.[44][45] In addition, in 1951 the PRI oversaw the passage of an Electoral Law that defined political parties as associations with electoral aims responsible for the electorate's civic education and political orientation. The law also increased the minimum number of people required to form a political party from 30,000 to 65,000. These reforms not only guaranteed landslide victories for the PRI, such as in the presidential election of 1970 when the party won 78.9% of the vote, but also underlines, according to historian Soledad Loaeza, the role of minor political parties as integrators of the larger political system rather than a replacement or electoral challenger to the PRI establishment.[25]

To ensure the dominance of the president, the PRI also took steps to ensure the Supreme Court would not function as a check on the combined power of the executive and legislative branches. (all of this is from supreme court decisions on electoral rules after 1994) The Supreme Court did not have the power of judicial review and it avoided major involvement in politically sensitive issues to eliminate the possibility of judicial constraints on unconstitutional actions. The twenty-six judges on the court were nominated by the president and approved by a simple majority in the Senate, and had relatively low prerequisites for a nominee to become a judge. According to scholar Pilar Domingo, this subordination, which lasted until a 1994 reform, reflected both the multiplicity of constitutional revisions to the judiciary and the establishment of a judicial career structure that left judges beholden to the ruling party - preventing them from being an independent branch of the government that effectively restrained the executive branch.[45]

Partido Accion Nacional or PAN – the first opposition party to the PRI

Cardenas also ushered the PRI's pragmatic ideological stance. After pursuing significant efforts to redistribute land and overseeing the government appropriation of key industries, the Cardenas administration faced a downturn in the economy that prompted public opinion to support more right leaning policies. During this time, the Partido de Accion Nacional or PAN was created from ex-Callistas who thought the government was overstepping its role in the economy and Catholics who feared the government's secular education policies would bring an end to Catholic schools. Cardenas, concerned with ensuring a PRI victory and maintaining political stability, did not allow the party to choose the next presidential candidate, opting instead to hand-pick Avila Camacho – a right-leaning politician – to run to succeed him. With an appeal to the sentiments of the majority of the public and a weak opposition, Camacho easily won the presidency.[44][45] Later in 1963, under President Adolfo Lopez Mateos, the PRI decided to reform electoral law to allow parties other than the PRI to have representation in Congress - if opposition parties obtained at least 2.5% of the national vote they would receive two representatives.[46] The primary goal of this reform was to channel the energy of dissenters that had emerged from political and economic crises into opposition parties that could still be controlled by the PRI.[47]

The success of Cardenas' legislative and electoral approaches inspired the following presidents – all from the PRI party – to continue the strategies of governing by consensus and choosing a successor based on political pragmatism, not ideological purity.[44][48] The PRI, thus, established a soft-line authoritarian regime and a one-party dictatorship by only allowing cosmetic opposition with a hegemony so strong it would not be seriously challenged until Vicente Fox's election in 2000.[49][50] The PAN, according to Soledad Loaeza, a Mexican historian, gave superficial legitimacy to the PRI's rule by taking on the role of the loyal opposition - a party whose dissenters represented a minority political opinion that challenged the dominant party but still functioned within the institutions and norms laid out by the overarching power - never thus, challenging the constitutionality of its actions.[25]

The administration of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz became notorious for overseeing a significant increase in censorship, arbitrary arrests of political opponents, and extrajudicial executions. On the eve of the Olympics, 10,000 students, housewives, workers, neighbourhood groups, and young professionals gathered to protest, calling for an end to police violence, the overwhelming power of the state, the lack of democracy in the nation, political arrests, and the accountability of those responsible.[43][51] The protesters were met by severe repression by the police, resulting in the assassination, wounding and disappearance of thousands of students. The repression was ordered by the president at the time, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz; and orchestrated by his minister of the interior, Luis Echeverria.[43]

Partido Revolucionario Democratico, established by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas

After being selected as Díaz Ordaz's successor, Luis Echeverría enacted a series of pro-democratic reforms to legitimize his presidency. He incorporated the surviving leaders of the student protests into his government and lowered the voting age to 18. But more importantly, Echeverria oversaw an overhaul of electoral reform which lowered the number of members needed to officially register a new political party, increased the number of seats that would be chosen through proportional representation and lowered the minimum candidacy age - reforms that increased both the number and opportunities for opposition parties. citation

Despite these reforms, internal fighting in the PAN resulted in José López Portillo, the PRI candidate, running for the presidency unopposed.[52] The PRI during his presidency saw its legitimacy and hegemony diminished, as demonstrated by the success of opposition parties in local elections.[53] Minor opposition parties, such as the Mexican Democratic Party, Socialist Workers' Party, Communist Left Group, Movement for Socialist Action and Unity, Mexican Workers' Party, the Revolutionary Socialist Party, and the Revolutionary Workers' Party emerged in the first half of the 1970s, reflecting the continuation of popular discontent.[46] The 1977 electoral reforms combined with the 1982 economic downturn allowed the conservative PAN to transform into a more notable political power. It began to win local elections more regularly, obtaining a strong hold in the northern region of Mexico and winning the respect of the public for their pro-democratic and pro-rule of law stances.[54] The PRI reneged on their reforms and refused to honor the victories of the PAN in more isolated districts. The PAN responded to the attempted repressions with mobilizations of their electorate into protests, most notably conducting a hunger strike to protest the gubernatorial elections of Chihuahua in 1986. This in turn lead to the regularization of under the table deals where the PRI gave various concessions to the PAN for their submission. Some scholars,such as Jon Shefner, have attributed increased push for democratization to the increased globalization of Mexico, noting that democratization was seen as a "as a cure for the ills of the globalizing economy."[55]

Miguel López Portillo chose Miguel de la Madrid as his successor, and his presidency had no significant pro-democratic changes. Yet the federal government's failure to adequately respond to the 1982 economic crisis and the 1985 earthquake enhanced public discontent with the government. When de la Madrid's chose Carlos Salinas as his successor, he upset the popular leftist Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, son of President Lázaro Cárdenas, who expected to be designated the PRI's candidate. Cárdenas to leave the PRI and establish the Partido Revolucionario Democratico, or PRD, in 1989 as the second significant opposition party to the PRI. On election day, Cardenas seemed to be approaching a victory over Salinas, but a breakdown of electoral machines pulled Salinas ahead, eventually giving him the slimmest of victories.[56] As the PRD gained electoral power in local elections throughout the 1990s, it adopted the PAN's strategy of using mobilization to extract concessions from the PRI, though their mobilizations were more spontaneous and local compared to their conservative counterparts. The PRI continued to give concessions, viewing them as the only way to keep their opposition at bay. The first five years of the 1990s saw an increase in the filing of electoral complaints in courts, reflecting more wins for the opposition parties and the continuation of the PRI's attempt to hold on to power.

Despite the largely anti-democratic nature of national elections in this period, several electoral reforms were enacted to put the country in a pro-democratic route. In 1977 under López Portillo electoral law was reformed, creating a random selection of citizens to serve at polling places, and added representatives from all political parties to the federal election commission.[57] This law also required political parties to submit a declaration of principles, a program for action and statues to be recognized as an official political party. Parties also had to obtain at least 1.5% of the national vote or have at least 3,000 members in at least half of the states or at least 300 affiliates in at least half of all single member electoral districts to be officially recognized. According to Kevin Middlebrook, the regime sponsored initiative was a response to the liberal and progressive factions within the PRI had become "increasingly convinced" that the regime was suffering a significant erosion, along with the public's shifting evaluations of government success. The public, during this time, had become increasingly discontent with the government's inability to satisfy the historical aspirations of the revolution, such as socioeconomic equity and opportunities for political participation. Only 32.8% of people participated in politics and 89.4% felt there was no freedom to do so.[46] In 1987 under Miguel de la Madrid the federal electoral code was reformed to increase the representation of political parties in the federal election commission and required the results of each polling place to be made public. In 1990 under Salinas, the Federal Code for Electoral Institutions and Procedures (COFIPE) was crafted in response to the chaos and perceived fraud of the 1988 election and was one of the most significant pro-democratic reforms yet. It established the Federal Electoral Institute or IFE under the direction of the ministry of the interior to organize federal elections. In 1992 COFIPE was reformed, now requiring voters to have a special identification for voting; and in 1993 COFIPE was amended again to regulate the particiaption of electoral observers.[57]

Despite the electoral reforms from the administrations during this period, indigenous populations continued to be marginalized by the government, resulting in many of them channeling their frustration into rebellions. After a 1982 economic crisis, the government removed historic protections that limited foreign land ownership, ended agrarian reform and allowed for the privatization of agrarian resources previously treated as social property. According to George Collier and Jane Collier, "by disbanding credits and infrastructural supports for peasant agriculture, and by phasing out price supports under the terms of NAFTA, the government appeared willing to sacrifice rural producers to unfair competition from imported and subsidized United States crops, particularly corn."[58] Indigenous peasants, especially the coffee producers of Chiapas, caught on to this fact.[2] These indigenous populations were regularly subject to the strict rule of indigenous caciques who put them in line with the PRI voting bloc[59] and did not receive the benefits of the clientalist strategy the PRI regularly used to subject its other electoral blocks into compliance, as they were not located in the electorally and population rich cities. This lead to the creation of the Zapatista Army and the Zapatista Rebellion.[2] June Nash notes that the Zapatistas strove to bring democratic changes by demanding the undelivered land rights of the Constitution of 1917 and the recognition and expansion of distinct indigenous languages and cultural practices, reflecting the lack of full democratic integration of the diverse populations in Mexico.[59] After military conflict with the Mexican Army, international pressure mounted for the Mexican government and the Zapatista Army to reach a peaceful negotiation. Yet Nash notes that in the wake of negotiations, "The Zapatistas, once they agreed to negotiations, thus found themselves being offered the two ‘solutions’ advocated by transnational capital: ‘fair elections’ to replace a pact with government, and the ‘protection of human rights’ both to replace government services and to handle criticisms of the military's role in suppressing domestic unrest."[59] While the government touted the pro-democratic reforms it achieved after the rebellion, the Zapatista Army encouraged their sympathizers to boycott the elections, reasonably believing the process could not be trusted, and thus indirectly contributed to local PRI wins. Moreover while national and state committees on human rights were established, they did not promote the autonomy of indigenous communities or the interpretation of human rights to include economic and social principles as the Zapatistas wanted, creating a stalemate in negotiations. The Zapatista Rebellion, in short, highlighted the lack of democratic integration of the historically marginalized indigenous groups of Mexico.[59]

Under Zedillo, the PRI enacted even more pro-democratic reforms. In 1994 COFIPE was amended to increase the weight of citizen councilors on the IFE's general council, and in 1996 it was reformed again, this time to make the IFE an autonomous institution run by citizens, and to create the Federal Electoral Court as a specialized branch of the judiciary.[57] In 1994 Zedillo also oversaw significant reforms to the Supreme Court. These reforms reduced the twenty-six judges back to eleven as the Constitution of 1917 originally mandated, increased the requirements to become a candidate by requiring candidates to have at least ten years of legal experience, allowed the Senate to pick the nominee from a list of three candidates presented by the presidency, submitted candidates to face interviews with the Senate, required nominees to obtain two-thirds of Senate approval before being approved, and reduced judges' life tenure to staggered fifteen year terms. But most importantly, the reforms gave the Supreme Court the power to resolve disputes and check laws for their constitutionality, effectively giving them the power of judicial review and paved the way for the Supreme Court to be a counterbalance to the executive and legislative branches. In 2002, moreover, an electoral reform was passed requiring at least 30% of all the candidates for all political parties to be women, but exemptions are made for parties that select candidates by primary election.[24]

Ernesto Zedillo's administration saw the crumbling of governance by consensus. Additionally, the president's refusal to name his successor and intervene in the elections in favor of the PRI like his predecessors, triggered the destabilization of the PRI's formula for electoral success. This led to the election of the first non - PRI president, Vicente Fox of the PAN. Some scholars, such as Enrique Krauze ,Steven Barracca, and Lorenzo Meyer viewed Fox's election as the consolidation of democracy.[60][61] Lorenzo Meyer, in light of the election, believed that there was "a good chance of going from authoritarianism to something that I hope is going to be democracy without the traumatic experience of the past-without repeating ourselves." According to Krauze, "The 2000 presidential election was Mexico's first truly democratic national contest in a century, and the victory of Vicente Fox...put an end to 71 years of oligarchic rule by the PRI."[61] Yet other scholars did not view Fox's election in such a positive light, as the election of Fox did not mark the end of the PRI's overwhelming influence. Since the PRI continued to dominate the legislature, the PAN was forced to cooperate with them. This developed a number of shared interests between the two parties, making the public nickname the coalition the PRIAN.[56][62]

The 2006 election was heavily contested between Felipe Calderón, the PAN candidate, and Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the PRD candidate. The extremely tight race resulted in Calderón's victory, however, López Obrador made a series of allegations claiming there were significant irregularities in the election, including a favorable intervention for Calderón orchestrated by President Fox, voter intimidation and ballot box stuffing. While López Obrador's base vehemently accused the PAN of tampering with the elections, the Federal Electoral Tribunal determined there had been no wrong-doing and that the elections were valid. Despite that, López Obrador proclaimed himself the "legitimate president" and held an inauguration for himself.[63][64][65] Scholars who look back on the issue, such as Jorge Castañeda, argues that the presence of national and international observers and a special prosecutor, along with the counting of votes by hand before party representatives and the series of electoral reforms from the 1980s and 1990s made it "virtually impossible" for there to be electoral wrongdoing.[57] Castañeda does note that this does not mean the elections were equitable, arguing that the national broadcasts extolling the Fox administration's accomplishments, a series of statements from the president of the perils of "changing horses while crossing the river," Calderón's ads comparing López Obrador to Venezuelan populist president Hugo Chávez. The Business Coordinating Council bought these ads and the poor's benefit of social welfare programs run by the PAN all favored the incumbent party in the election.[57]

Despite Calderón's presidency representing the second non-PRI administration since 1910, Mexicans remained largely unsatisfied with the progress of their democracy, namely because of economic malaise and the disapproval of incumbents.[66] Drug cartel violence exploded under Calderón, as he declared war on the cartels.[67] Many have viewed the crisis during Calderón's presidency as "the explosion of a long and historic negligence of the Mexican authorities to make the changes necessary to prevent a crisis of public security of this magnitude."[68] The drug cartel-related instability resulted largely from the PRI's historic agreements with drug cartels. The PRI had long established mutually beneficial agreements with cartels, with politicians on the municipal, state and national level becoming complacent to the cartels in exchange for bribes. The election of both Fox and Calderón had upset the delicate balance and long-term agreements that had held steady during the era of the PRI's time of unchallenged rule.[2]

MORENA logo

Because of Calderón's ineffective policies towards drug cartels, many people hoped that the election of a PRI candidate would reinstate the relative peace that had existed prior to the PAN's rule. This helped lead to the election of Enrique Peña Nieto, the PRI candidate in 2012. Yet contrary to expectations, tensions with drug mafias did not subside; and the general incompetency of the administration significantly increased popular discontent.

The discontent translated into another victory of a candidate from a new political party, the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) with election of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, marking the first election of a left wing candidate and the first presidential candidate to officially win a majority of the vote. According to César Cansino, López Obrador's administration is the most turbulent in memory, but one not characterized by in-fighting like that within the PRI, as with previous turmoil, but by heightened calls for democracy.[69]

With the 2018 election of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Mexico’s recent democratic gains might be at risk. Enrique Krauze contends that AMLO is an “elected despot,” similar to Venezuela’s late President Hugo Chávez. He sees AMLO as illegitimately blending the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary “into a single power that distorts the truth and appropriates history.” In Krauze’s assessment, AMLO has accumulated far more power than any previous president of Mexico and that currently “there is no political force that can compete with him,” given the ruin of the PRI, lack of le, adership of the PAN, and nonexistence of political power of the other opposition parties. A multiparty system began emerging in 1997, when the PRI failed to win a legislative majority in the lower house. The judiciary was becoming more independent of the executive, but those changes have been reversed under AMLO. He has The institution set up in 2003 to create transparency in the spending of public money, National Institute for Access to Information and Data Protection (INAI) has cut its funding and it is at risk of AMLO's eliminating it entirely. Although AMLO was elected with promises to the electorate to end corruption, contracts are now awarded with no oversight to companies owned by the president’s friends.[70]

Kathleen Bruhn argues that democratic methods to chose candidates in primaries elect less radical candidates than nondemocratic methods, not because voters pick candidates who reflect the positions of the electorate the most, but because the process encourages the election of candidates who are acceptable to multiple internal factions of the party. Bruhn notes that the primary system in Mexico specifically varies across and within political parties - as of 2006 the PAN uses primaries to select 52% of their candidates while the PRD uses them to chose 36% of them, and the PRI does not use primaries at all. The PAN only allows active members to participate in its primaries, and to become an active member, one must be nominated by a previous member, take courses on the party doctrine, and serve as apprentices. This leads to 33% of potential electors per 1000 registered voters being represented in the PAN primaries. The PRD, conversely, has fewer barriers - one must be an official party member to participate in the primaries, but the turn around from becoming a party member to voting in the primaries is fast. This results in 97.5% of potential electors per 1000 registered voters being represented in the primaries. Thus, the selection of candidates is not fully democratic for any party, and some barriers exist to full citizenry participation.[71]

Clientelism continues to have a lasting legacy in Mexico. Some scholars, such as Alberto Olvera, dispute the effectiveness of the most recent wave of reforms to reduce clientelism. Olvera contends that Mexico's "transition to democracy has not been completed in terms of either the destitution of the authoritarian regime or the establishment of a democratic regime, a situation that explains the continuity of authoritarian practices and culture in public life. Not only did the Partido Revolucionario Institucional preserve impressive veto power over constitutional reforms and even small changes in matters of public policy, but also the other two main political parties (Partido Accion Nacional and Partido de la Revolucion Democratica) had no alternative democratic projects and reproduced the clientelistic and particularistic political culture of the past; civil society was (and is) both socially and politically weak, and its popular sectors suffered important strategic defeats along the process." According to Olvera, PRD politicians use clientelism not only because of its entrenchment or the high rates of poverty in Mexico but also because of the limited institutionalization of its internal democratic rules. When the PRD first became a party, it merged various left wing activists, parties and social movements with diverse views.[72][73] The emergence of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas as a predominant leader set the party on a pattern of having personalistic factions and centralized power. Because most of the resources were focused on elections rather than institutionalizing party rules, each faction continued to pursue its own goals and leadership alliances and factions battled over voters, creating clientelistic tenancies. As of 2004, there were reported instances of ballot box stuffing, ballot box theft, vote buying, membership list inflation, and member deletion in internal elections of the PRD. Similarly, PRI electoral machines continue to work strongly in local elections, carrying the legacy of clientelism and extralegal deals from the PRI's earlier days.[73][50] The only way to remedy the simultaneous over politicization of democratic systems and depoliticization of public life that have resulted, according to Olvera, is for new social and political actors to emerge.[72]

While various reforms have established institutions to prevent electoral fraud, and an electoral court was created, Todd Eisenstadt contends that these institutions have not extended their influence to the fullest level. State and local level progress to make elections credible has been slower as PRI machines are still working strong despite opposition wins at the national level. The expensive and autonomous electoral institutions are ignored when they are the most needed in post electoral conflicts - in 13% of all local elections between 1988-2001 and 15% of local elections from 19989-2000 opposition parties and incumbents negotiate extralegal bargains to resolve their disputes instead of submitting legal complaints.[50][74] While local political bosses or caciques can defy local formal electoral institutions in their zones of influence, the informal bargaining institutions in which the reach agreements are subject to presidential discretion. This informal system, thus, has created an uphill battle for the establishment of transparency in local elections.[74]

The anti-re-electionist principle continues to be a point of contention among scholars and the populace again. Some scholars, such as conservative Jorge Castañeda, have criticized the anti-re-electionist principle as they argue candidates are made more likely to subject themselves to voters' will when re-election is at play.[57] Similarly, Alberto Olvera of the Universidad Veracruzana argued that this principle also means the legislative and executive powers cannot develop cycles of professionalization and specialization, the political class has become beholden to a few governors, the president, and some defacto powers who manage their careers. The anti-re-election principle has also generated significant electoral system and campaign costs, creating a dependency on those who finance campaigns.[72] Inequality in campaigns' financing continues to result in inequality of air and ad time like in the 2006 election, Castañeda aruges, and thus continues to make the exposure of candidates and elections unequal today. Nonetheless, other scholars have seen this principle as a way to prevent repeating the mistakes of dictatorial pasts.[57] Enrique Krauze is concerned that President Andrés Manuel López Obrador might be tempted to challenge the principle, given his charismatic as well as constitutional power.[75] The topic of re-elections and their effects on accountability continues to be a contentious topic in Mexican politics.

A 2002 electoral reform established gender quotas for all political parties. Lisa Baldez argues that that in times of electoral uncertainty, gender quotas allow for internal party reform, which parties can exploit in campaigns to appear more democratic. Courts play a central role in the interpretation of these laws so that without independent courts the law can be interpreted in a way favoring the party with the most control.[76] The results of this law are mixed, although it did lead to a notable increase in female representation in the 2003 midterms, where women won 23% of the seats up in that election, a 7% increase from the previous midterms. The IFE did not hold parties accountable to a specific definition of what counted as primary elections, diluting the full potential of the effect of the gender quota implementation. The PRI and PAN especially used primaries to avoid the gender quota, and the IFE did not closely scrutinize the variance among primaries. Baldez argues that this highlights that progress in implementation can and should be made for the sake of having more equitable policies.[24]

Historically, in Mexico and elsewhere, electoral manipulation has been associated with discouraged voters and thus lower turn out. This was especially true during the peak of the PRI's rule. Scholars believed, thus, that after the electoral reforms of the 1990s turn out would increase. But while electoral manipulation decreased from these reforms, aggregate turnout in elections has remained stagnant - it averaged 58.5% in the six elections prior to 1991 and 58.1% in the seven elections in 1991–2009 according to Alberto Simpser. His study finds that "each percentage point of the vote that the PRI added to its total via manipulation in the pre-reform period was associated with a 1.7% to 2.4% decrease in the pre-reform level of voter (true) turnout." Moreover, it notes that there is a significant discrepancy between true turnout and turnout figures, as self reported turnout figures regularly inflate turnout rates to paint a better picture of elections. Simpser, professor and chair of the Political Science Department at the Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico, also emphasizes that a failure to detect turnout anomalies does not equate with lack of wrongdoing because of this misreporting, and warns electoral manipulation likely continues today.[77]

The president is selected by popular vote at the national level and serves one six year term. They hold the sole power of the Executive branch, and serve as the Chief of State and the Army.[78]

The Mexican National Congress is bicameral. It is required to hold two ordinary sessions per year - the first of which begins on September 1 and goes until December 15 of the same year, (unless it is the year a new president takes office,) the second begins on February 1 and ends on April 30. A standing commission composed of 19 members of the lower chamber and 18 of the upper chamber has the sole power to call extraordinary sessions. Congressmen, regardless of chamber, may only be re-elected after their first term.[78]

The lower chamber is composed of 500 representatives, each of which serves for a three year term. Each state and Mexico City is allocated a number of representatives proportional to their population. 300 of the representatives are elected by majority vote in their respective states. The remaining 200 of these representatives are elected through via proportional representation party lists. For this process, the nation is divided into five districts that combine multiple states, and each district is given 40 representatives. To earn representation through this proportional voting portion, parties must earn at least 2% of the total votes. Moreover, parties may not win more than 215 seats and thus not hold an absolute majority.[78]

The upper chamber is composed of 128 members each of which serves for a six year term. Each state elects three senators - two of these are allocated through a relative majority and the third seat is given according to the first minority principle, meaning it is given to the party that earned the second largest number of votes. The remaining 32 seats are appointed through a proportional representation system according to the voter rolls at a national level, and the natural quotient and higher remainder electoral formulas are used.[78]