HMS Sheffield (D80)

In response to the Argentine invasion of the Falklands Islands, Sheffield was ordered on 2 April 1982 to join the task force being assembled to retake the islands.[3] Ammunition and supplies were loaded, loose fittings stowed, and unnecessary memorabilia disembarked. All carpets were removed except for those on Deck 1 and above (which subsequently caught fire when she was hit). To avoid her being mistaken for the Argentine Hércules and Santísima Trinidad, a vertical black marking was painted on the funnel and down to the side to her waterline to aid recognition.[3]

Departing for the South Atlantic on 10 April, Sheffield reached Ascension Island on 14 April, accompanied by HMS Arrow, HMS Brilliant, HMS Coventry, HMS Glasgow to be later joined by RFA Appleleaf. They joined other vessels of the Task Force 317 and commenced operations in the Total Exclusion Zone around the Falklands on 1 May 1982.[3]

It was British policy that any Royal Navy vessel that suspected itself to be under missile attack turn toward the threat, accelerate to maximum speed and fire chaff to prevent the ship being caught defenceless. The codeword used to start this procedure was 'handbrake', which had to be broadcast once the signal of the Super E Agave radar of Super Étendard aircraft was picked up.[11] Within the task force, the threat from the Type 209 submarine was seen as a higher priority than the threat from the air. Following the sinking of General Belgrano, Captain Salt had ordered the ship to change course every 90 seconds to counter any potential Argentine submarine threat.[12]

Argentine Navy Dassault-Breguet Super Étendard.

Sheffield was first detected by an Argentine Naval Aviation Lockheed SP-2H Neptune (2-P-112) patrol aircraft at 07:50 on 4 May 1982. The Neptune kept the British ships under surveillance, verifying Sheffield's position again at 08:14 and 08:43. Two Argentine Navy Super Étendards, both armed with AM39 Exocets, took off from Río Grande naval air base at 09:45 and met with an Argentine Air Force KC-130H Hercules tanker at 10:00. The two aircraft were 3-A-202, piloted by mission commander Capitán de Fragata (Commander) Augusto Bedacarratz, and 3-A-203, piloted by Teniente (Lieutenant) Armando Mayora.[13]

At 10:35, the Neptune climbed to 1,170 metres (3,840 ft) and detected one large and two medium-sized contacts. A few minutes later, the Neptune updated the Super Étendards with the positions. Flying at very low altitude, at approximately 10:50 both Super Étendards climbed to 160 metres (520 ft) to verify these contacts, but failed to locate them and returned to low altitude. They later climbed again and after a few seconds of scanning, the targets appeared on their radar screens.[14][15]

Both pilots loaded the coordinates into their weapons systems, returned to low level, and after last minute checks, each launched an AM39 Exocet missile at 11:04 while 20 to 30 miles (32 to 48 km) away from their targets. The Super Étendards did not need to refuel again from the KC-130, which had been waiting, and landed at Río Grande at 12:04.

Supporting the mission were an Argentine Air Force Learjet 35 as a decoy and two IAI Daggers as the KC-130 escorts.[14][15]

At approximately 10:00 on 4 May, Sheffield was at defence watches (second degree readiness), the southernmost of three Type 42 destroyers (the others being HMS Glasgow and Coventry) operating as a forward anti-aircraft picket 18 to 30 miles (29 to 48 km) to the west of the main task force which were south-east of the Falklands. The weather was fair and the sea calm with a 2-metre swell. HMS Invincible which was with the main task force was responsible for Anti-Air Warfare Coordination (AAWC). Sheffield had relieved her sister ship Coventry as the latter was having technical trouble with her Type 965 radar.[16]

Prior to the attack, Sheffield's radar operators had been experiencing difficulty distinguishing Mirage and Super Étendard aircraft, and the destroyer may have lacked effective IFF or radar jamming.[17] Despite intelligence briefings that identified an Exocet attack by Super Étendards as possible, Sheffield had assessed the Exocet threat as overrated for the previous two days, and disregarded another as a false alarm.

As the Type 965 could not detect low flying aircraft, the two incoming enemy aircraft were not detected flying at 98 feet (30 m),[18] The two planes were only detected at a distance of 40 nautical miles (74 km) by the UAA1, a radar warning receiver. This was then confirmed by the 965M long range aircraft warning radar of Glasgow when the aircraft popped up 120 feet (37 m) above sea-level for a radar check at 45 nautical miles (83 km).[19] The Glasgow immediately went to action stations, and communicated the warning codeword 'Handbrake' by UHF and HF to all task force ships. The radar contacts were also seen in Invincible, which directed Sea Harriers on combat patrol to investigate, but they detected nothing. The AAWC on Invincible declared the radar contacts as false and left the Air Warning at yellow, instead of raising it to red.[3]

In response to Glasgow's warning, an order to stand to was issued to the crews of the 4.5 inch gun, Sea Dart and 20 mm guns. The aircraft were detected on the forward Type 909 radar but not on the aft set.[3] Sheffield's UAA1 sensor was then blocked by an unauthorized transmission by the ship's satellite communications systems (SCOT). No information was received via data link from Glasgow. Seven seconds later, the first Exocet missile was fired, in response to which Glasgow fired its chaff. Onboard Sheffield, it was not until smoke from the missile was sighted by lookouts that the crew realized they were under attack. The bridge officers did not call the captain to the bridge, made no call to action stations, made no evasive measures, and made no effort to prepare the 4.5-inch gun, the Sea Dart missiles, or order chaff to be fired.[11][10] The antiair warfare officer was called to the operations room by the principal warfare officer, arriving just before the first missile hit.

Two Exocets had been launched, the second missile being sighted by Yarmouth and missing Sheffield, splashing into the sea a half mile off her port beam.[20] The Exocet that struck Sheffield impacted on the starboard side at deck level 2, travelling through the junior ratings scullery and breaching the Forward Auxiliary Machinery Room/Forward Engine Room bulkhead 2.4 metres (7 ft 10 in) above the waterline, creating a hole in the hull roughly 1.2 by 3 metres (3.9 by 9.8 ft). Accounts suggest the missile failed to explode but its impact disabled the ship's electrical distribution systems and breached the pressurised sea water fire main, severely hampering any firefighting response and eventually dooming the ship to be consumed by the fire.[21]

At the time of the hit, the captain was off duty in his cabin after having previously visited the operations room, while Sheffield's anti-air warfare officer (AAWO) was in the wardroom chatting to the stewards and his assistant was in the heads.[3] Sheffield and Coventry were chatting over UHF and communications ceased until an unidentified message was heard flatly stating, "Sheffield is hit."[16]

The flagship, HMS Hermes, dispatched the escorts Arrow and Yarmouth to investigate, and a helicopter was launched. Confusion reigned until Sheffield's Lynx helicopter unexpectedly landed aboard Hermes carrying the air operations officer and operations officer,[16] confirming the strike.

With the main fire fighting systems out of action due to the loss of the fire main the crew were reduced to fighting the fire using portable electrically powered pumps and buckets. The control of firefighting lacked cohesion and was uncoordinated with no emergency HQ being established, while crew members were unclear as to where Command was located. Arrow and Yarmouth assisted in fighting the fire from the outside (to little effect) by stationing themselves to port and starboard respectively.[3]

The crew of Sheffield fought for almost four hours to save the ship before Captain Salt made the decision to abandon ship due to the risk of fires igniting the Sea Dart magazine, the loss of the combat capability of the destroyer , and the exposed position to air attack of Arrow and Yarmouth. Most of the Sheffield's crew climbed over onto Arrow, a few transferred by Gemini RHIB to Yarmouth, while some were taken by helicopter to Hermes.[3] As Sheffield's crew departed in Arrow, Sub-lieutenant Carrington-Wood led the crew in singing "Always Look on the Bright Side of Life" from Monty Python's Life of Brian.[22][23]

Over the next six days from 4 May 1982, as the ship drifted, five inspections were made to see if any equipment was worth salvaging. Orders were issued to shore up the hole in Sheffield's starboard side and tow the ship to South Georgia.[11] Before these orders were issued, the burnt-out hulk had already been taken under tow by Yarmouth. The high seas that the ship was towed through caused slow flooding through the hole in the ship's side, causing a list to starboard and which eventually caused Sheffield to roll over and sink on the edge of the Total Exclusion Zone in 1,000 fathoms (6,000 ft; 1,800 m) of water at 53°04′S 56°56′W on 10 May 1982, the first Royal Navy vessel sunk in action since World War II.[24]

The grave of a sailor who died in the Argentine attack on Sheffield Lavender Hill Cemetery, Enfield.

Of the 281 crew members, 20 (mainly on duty in the galley area and computer room) died in the attack with another 26 injured, mostly from burns, smoke inhalation or shock. Only one body was recovered. The survivors were taken to Ascension Island on the tanker British Esk.[21] The wreck is presently a war grave and designated as a protected place[25] under the Protection of Military Remains Act 1986.

The sinking of Sheffield is sometimes blamed on a superstructure made wholly or partially from aluminium, the melting point and ignition temperature of which are significantly lower than those of steel. However, this is incorrect as Sheffield's superstructure was made entirely of steel.[29] The confusion is related to the US and British navies abandoning aluminium after several fires in the 1970s involving USS Belknap and HMS Amazon and other ships that had aluminium superstructures.[29][lower-alpha 1] The sinking of the Type 21 frigates Antelope and Ardent, both of which had aluminium superstructures, probably also had an effect on this belief, though these cases are again incorrect and the presence of aluminium had nothing to do with their loss.[30][31][32]

The fires in Sheffield and other ships damaged by fire caused a later shift by the Royal Navy from the nylon and synthetic fabrics then worn by British sailors. The synthetics had a tendency to melt on to the skin, causing more severe burns than if the crew had been wearing non-synthetic clothing.