Foreign Policy of William Ewart Gladstone

British traders had developed a highly profitable business of purchasing opium in British India, and selling it on the China market. When the Chinese government tried to shut it down, foreign minister Lord Palmerston sent in the Royal Navy. It used brute force to reopen the market in 1840. Gladstone, whose own sister at this time was addicted to opium, was outraged. He supported Robert Peel’s motion to denounce the trade and the government support. Gladstone a 30-year-old ally of Peel and the Whig coalition, argued that the Chinese government had the right to stop British traders, on account of their:

obstinacy in persisting with this infamous and atrocious traffic....Justice in my opinion, is with them; and whilst they, the Pagans, the semi-civilized barbarians have it on their side, we, the enlightened and civilized Christians, are pursuing objects at variance both with justice and with religion....A war more unjust in its origin, or calculated in its progress to cover the country with a permanent disgrace, I do not know and I've not read of....[our] flag is become a pirate flag to protect an infamous traffic.[9]

Peel's vote of censure against the government's handling of the opium war was defeated in the House of Commons by a vote of 262 in favour and 271 against.[10] He repeated opinions when the second war with China broke out in 1857. There was no glory he said in fighting China--it was more like making war on women and children. The basis of British trade there was injustice and that would never do. Britain should be guided by principles of mercy, peace and justice toward China. Gladstone was on the winning side of this vote, alongside Disraeli.[11]

Although Gladstone served under Lord Palmerston in several capacities, the two very strong personalities clashed profoundly. Especially in foreign policy, each man considered the other to be a dangerous demagogue. To Gladstone, Palmerston was a chauvinist who deliberately excited public opinion against foreign adversaries. Palmerston felt Gladstone's religiosity and sincere declarations of principle were a matter of cant or excessive religious enthusiasm. Palmerston was annoyed that Gladstone was so successful in using enthusiasm, passion, sympathy and simplicity and building public support, especially when he was out of office.[12] They both supported Italy and worked together on that issue but they were driven apart on issues of Army, Navy, and finance. Gladstone was the little Englander who believed in international conciliation and peace, and build his base upon the middle-class businessmen who demanded low taxes and economy in government expenditures. Gladstone as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1852–1855 and 1859–1866) repeatedly tried to cut back on naval and military budgets. In dramatic contrast Palmerston was an adventurer in foreign policy who demanded that England be respected and feared in every foreign capital, a policy that demanded an expensive Royal Navy ready for action.[13] The two men disagreed fundamentally about morality applied to foreign affairs, and defense spending , as well as religious issues and democratic reform.[14]

European affairs soon came to the fore, as Prussia, under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, defeated Denmark in a complicated war, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire as well. War between Prussia and France was looming, and British public opinion considered France the aggressor and generally supported Germany. Queen Elizabeth had very strong German ties, and was sharply hostile to France. Gladstone told the Queen that it was important that Britain not act alone in interventions in European affairs, but only act in concert with other powers. He was not knowledgeable about European affairs, and showed no interest in intervening. As the tensions escalated between Berlin and Paris, Gladstone took a strong position that warn both sides, especially France, against an invasion of Belgium. Neither side had any such plans, and both promised to honor Belgian neutrality.[21][22]

Gladstone was angry at German seizure of Alsace-Lorraine from France in 1871, without giving the inhabitants a voice. British public opinion, and even the Queen, agreed with him. However in the 1870s and 1880s, apart from the 1875 'war in sight' false alarm, Britain and Germany were usually in agreement over European problems. Both made it a high priority to preserve the peace; both were suspicious of the ambitions of France and Russia. Bismarck ridiculed Gladstone's liberal trust in a concert of Europe, as well as his efforts to promote democracy in Britain and end power-politics abroad. Bismarck saw his own manipulation of power politics as the best guarantee of peace, not realizing how Kaiser William II would misuse German power after 1890.[23]

Before going to war, Bismarck had arranged for neutrality of Russia. Russian now took advantage by disavowing the Treaty of Paris (1856) provisions that neutralized its naval forces on the Black Sea. Gladstone was angry that Russia acted alone in rejecting any treaty provisions. He called a conference that met in London, November 1870 to March 1871. It acknowledged the fait accompli Russia had achieved but reaffirmed the strongly held views of Gladstone on the sanctity of treaties. The conference officially stated as an, "essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of the treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting Powers by means of an amicable agreement."[24][25]

The Cardwell Reforms were a series of reforms of the British Army undertaken by Secretary of State for War Edward Cardwell between 1868 and 1874 with the Gladstone's support. Usually Gladstone paid scant attention to military affairs but he was keen on efficiency and cost-cutting. In 1870, he pushed through Parliament major changes in Army organisation. Prussia's stunning triumph over France in the Franco-Prussian War proved that the Prussian system of professional soldiers with up-to-date weapons was far superior to the traditional system of gentlemen-soldiers that Britain used.[26] The most important of Caldwell's reforms were the Army Enlistment Act of 1870, Regulation of the Forces Act of 1871, and the localization scheme of 1872. They provided the foundation for the late Victorian Army: short service, a reserve, and a comprehensive regimental system based on the local depot. He made other reforms as well such as the abolition of flogging in peace time, an increase in pay, and some improvement in living conditions. In 1871 he began the first large-scale maneuvers.[27]

The reforms were not radical; they had been brewing for years and Gladstone seized the moment to enact them. The goal was to centralise the power of the War Office, abolish the purchase of officers' commissions, and create reserve forces stationed in Britain by establishing short terms of service for enlisted men. By far the controversial element was ending the purchase system. The rich families of young officers invested millions of pounds in the commissions and when a man was promoted he sold his junior commission to help pay for the more expensive senior commission. Legislation in Commons would reimburse the officers for their full purchase price. However the measure was defeated, whereupon the government announced that all purchases were abolished, thereby destroying the value of all of those commissions. The House of Lords passed the remedial legislation and the final expenditure made by officers was reimbursed but purchase was never reinstated.[28]

These reforms started to turn British forces into an effective imperial force capable of fighting a modern European army. The defeat of Gladstone's government in 1874 put Cardwell out of office, but his reforms stayed in place despite attempts from the Regular Army to abolish them and return to the comfortable and familiar old post-1815 situation. The main obstacle had been objections by the defunct British East India Company and its executors, who wished to maintain their own military establishment, and by the "die-hards", senior officers who opposed almost any reform on principle. The arch-conservatives were led by the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces, Prince George, Duke of Cambridge, who was Queen Victoria's cousin and head of the Army from 1856 to 1895.[29][30]

Historians of the British army have generally praised the Cardwell reforms as an essential steps to full modernization. They point out that Lord Cambridge blocked many other reforms, such as the adoption of a general staff system as pioneered by the successful Prussian army.[31][32][33][34]

However a minority of historians, chiefly political specialists, have criticized the limited nature of the reforms. Theodore Hoppen says these reforms were:

at best partial, at worst ineffective....No planning department was established and no chief of staff appointed to set out the purpose and strategy of the army as a whole because politicians, Civil Servants, and soldiers all proved reluctant to take seriously the idea that Britain could ever again be involved in a large scale European war.[35]

Lord Granville served as foreign secretary (1870–1874 and 1880–1885). His Gladstonian foreign policy based on patience, peace, and no alliances kept Britain free from European wars. It brought better relations with the United States, and it was innovative in supporting Gladstone's wish to settlement British-American fisheries and Civil War disputes over the Confederate cruisers built in Britain, like the Alabama, through international arbitration in 1872. For example, the long-standing San Juan Island Water Boundary Dispute in Puget Sound, which had been left ambiguous in the Oregon Treaty of 1846 to salve relations and get a treaty sorting out the primary differences, was arbitrated by the German Emperor also in 1872. In putting British-American relations up to the world as a model for how to resolve disputes peacefully, Granville helped create a breakthrough in international relations.[36]

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 broke out within a few days after Granville in the House of Lords quoted the opinion of the permanent under-secretary (Edmund Hammond) that "he had never known so great a lull in foreign affairs." Russia took advantage of the situation to denounce the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris, and Lord Granville's protest was ineffectual. In 1871 an intermediate zone between Asiatic Russia and Afghanistan was agreed on between him and Shuvalov; but in 1873 Russia took possession of the Khanate of Khiva, within the neutral zone, and Lord Granville had to accept the aggression[37] (See also: The Great Game).

When the Conservatives came into power in 1874, Granville stepped down as Foreign Minister. His role for the next six years was to criticise Disraeli's "spirited" foreign policy, and to defend his own more pliant methods. He returned to the foreign office in 1880, only to find an anti-British spirit developing in German policy which the temporising methods of the Liberal leaders were generally powerless to deal with.[38]

copy ex "Spain–United Kingdom relations" During 1865-76 Britain sought to calm the Iberian Peninsula. The issues were many: Spain tried to unite with Portugal; there was internal strife in Spain over the throne; and France and Germany argued over the Spanish succession in 1870. Furthermore there was a "War-in-Sight" crisis of 1875, problems in Morocco, religious intolerance, and the usual issues of trade, which British merchants dominated. London opposed the union of Spain and Portugal because it wanted to keep Portugal as a loyal ally with its strategic location in the Atlantic. Britain held Gibraltar but it was not yet a fully satisfactory base. The unsuccessful attempts after September 1868 to find a successor to Queen Isabella who would satisfy the French, Germans, Portuguese, Austrians, Italians, and Spanish kept British diplomats busy with peacemaking moves in many capitals. With British help, Spain slowly ceded control of Morocco to France. Spanish anti-Protestant intolerance troubled British merchants and bankers, so Spain softened religious intolerance. For the most part British diplomats were able to defuse tensions and defend British interests in the Peninsula.[39]

copy ex "International relations of the Great Powers (1814–1919)"

After 1800 the Ottoman Empire steadily weakened militarily, and lost most of its holdings in Europe (starting with Greece) and in North Africa, starting with Egypt. Its great enemy was Russia, while its chief supporter was Britain.[40][41]

As the 19th century progressed the Ottoman Empire grew weaker and Britain increasingly became its chief ally and protector, even fighting the Crimean War in the 1850s to help it against Russia. Three British leaders played major roles. Lord Palmerston, who in the 1830–1865 era considered the Ottoman Empire an essential component in the balance of power, was the most favourable toward Constantinople. William Gladstone in the 1870s sought to build a Concert of Europe that would support the survival of the empire. In the 1880s and 1890s Lord Salisbury contemplated an orderly dismemberment of it, in such a way as to reduce rivalry between the greater powers.[42] The Berlin Conference on Africa of 1884 was, except for the abortive Hague Conference of 1899, the last great international political summit before 1914. Gladstone stood alone in advocating concerted instead of individual action regarding the internal administration of Egypt, the reform of the Ottoman empire, and the opening-up of Africa. Bismarck and Lord Salisbury rejected Gladstone’s position and were more representative of the consensus. Gladstone abandoned Salisbury’s Ottoman policy; withdrew the military consuls; and disregarded several British guarantees to the Porte. He did not return Cyprus.[43]

“Splendid isolation” was the term used to characterize the British policy of operating without alliances. The worst moment came in spring 1885, when the Russians defeated the Afghans along their frontier. London feared Russia would invade Afghanistan and threatened India from the north. Gladstone secured a vote of credit from Parliament, in preparation for a war with Russia. His strategy was to send the Royal Navy through The Straits into the Black Sea and threatened Russia. However the Ottoman officials, strongly supported by all the European powers, refused to allow passage. It was the most formidable display of Continental hostility to Britain between Napoleon's day and Hitler's. Russia, however, had no interest in conquering Afghanistan and that tension was peacefully settled with Afghanistan remaining a buffer state.[44]

copy ex "International relations of the Great Powers (1814–1919)" The most decisive event emerged from the Anglo-Egyptian War, which resulted in the British occupation of Egypt for seven decades, even though the Ottoman Empire retained nominal ownership until 1914.[45] France was seriously unhappy, having lost control of the canal that it built and financed and had dreamed of for decades. Germany, Austria, Russia, and Italy – and of course the Ottoman Empire itself-- were all angered by London's unilateral intervention.[46] Britain insisted over and over that the Porte was still sovereign and the occupation of Egypt was temporary. A complete takeover of Egypt, turning it into a British colony like India was much too dangerous for it would be the signal for the powers to rush in for the spoils of the tottering Ottoman Empire, with a major war a likely result.[47][48] Historian A.J.P. Taylor says that this "was a great event; indeed, the only real event in international relations between the Battle of Sedan and the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese war."[49] Taylor emphasizes the long-term impact:

The British occupation of Egypt altered the balance of power. It not only gave the British security for their route to India; it made them masters of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East; it made it unnecessary for them to stand in the front line against Russia at the Straits....And thus prepared the way for the Franco-Russian Alliance ten years later.[50]

Gladstone and his Liberal Party had a reputation for strong opposition to imperialism, so historians have long debated the explanation for this sudden reversal of policy.[51] The most influential was study by John Robinson and Ronald Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians (1961), which focused on The Imperialism of Free Trade and was promoted by the Cambridge School of historiography. They argue there was no long-term Liberal plan in support of imperialism, but the urgent necessity to act to protect the Suez Canal was decisive in the face of what appeared to be a radical collapse of law and order, and a nationalist revolt focused on expelling the Europeans, regardless of the damage it would do to international trade and the British Empire. Gladstone's decision came against strained relations with France, and maneuvering by "men on the spot" in Egypt. Critics such as Cain and Hopkins have stressed the need to protect large sums invested by British financiers and Egyptian bonds, while downplaying the risk to the viability of the Suez Canal. Unlike the Marxists, they stress "gentlemanly" financial and commercial interests, not the industrial, capitalism that Marxists believe was always central.[52] More recently, specialists on Egypt have been interested primarily in the internal dynamics among Egyptians that produce the failed Urabi Revolt.[53][54]

• St. John, Ian. The Historiography of Gladstone and Disraeli (Anthem Press, 2016) 402 pp excerpt

• Bourne, Kenneth, ed. The foreign policy of Victorian England, 1830-1902 (1970)
• Gladstone, William E. Midlothian Speeches 1879 with an Introduction by M. R. D. Foot, (New York: Humanities Press, 1971) online
• Guedalla, Philip, ed. Gladstone and Palmerston: Being the Correspondence of Lord Palmerston with Mr. Gladstone, 1851-1865 (1928)
• Guedalla, Philip, ed. Queen And Mr. Gladstone (1933) online
• Knaplund, Paul, ed. "Letters from the Berlin Embassy, 1871-1874, 1880-1885." in Annual Report Of The American Historical Association For The Year 1942 Volume II (1944) online
• Matthew, H.C.G. and M.R.D. Foot, eds. Gladstone Diaries. With Cabinet Minutes & Prime-Ministerial Correspondence (13 vol; vol 14 is the index; 1968–1994); includes diaries, important selections from cabinet minutes and key political correspondence.
• Partridge, Michael, and Richard Gaunt, eds. Lives of Victorian Political Figures Part 1: Palmerston, Disraeli and Gladstone (4 vol. Pickering & Chatto. 2006) reprints 27 original pamphlets on Gladstone.
• Ramm, Agatha, ed. The Political Correspondence of Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886. (2 vol, 1962; reprinted in 1 vol. 1998) online
• Temperley, Harold and L.M. Penson, eds. Foundations of British Foreign Policy: From Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902) (1938), primary sources pp 88-304 online
• Tollemache, Lionel A. (1898). Talks with Mr. Gladstone (1 ed.). London: Edward Arnold. Retrieved 13 October 2017 – via Internet Archive..