Deportation of Americans from the United States

Deportation of Americans from the United States refers to the involuntary removal of U.S. citizens or nationals who have been convicted of a common crime in the United States.[1][2][3][4] Such deportation entitles Americans to seek damages, which may include immigration benefits and/or money, in the form of injunctive relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.[5][6][7][8][9] Some Americans have been placed in immigration detention centers to be deported but were later released.[10][11][12][13][14][15][16] "Recent data suggests that in 2010 well over 4,000 U.S. citizens were detained or deported as aliens".[17][18]

History
Further information: Lawful permanent residents (United States) and Oath of Allegiance (United States)

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which was enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1952, states that an alien is a person who cannot qualify as a national of the United States.[19][20] "The term 'national of the United States' means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States."[21][20]

According to the INA, the terms "inadmissible aliens" and "deportable aliens" are synonymous.[22] An LPR who is not "removable" from the United States is plainly and unambiguously neither deportable from, nor inadmissible to, the United States.[22][23][24][25][26][27][28] Anything to the contrary will make deportation from the United States a paid international vacation for some and a "cruel and unusual punishment" for others.[29][30] For example, some deportees could successfully make the U.S. government pay them hundreds of thousands[2][31][16] (or possibly millions[32][33]) of dollars while others could end up committing suicide.[34][35] In this regard, Congress has warned all government officials by stating the following:

Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be subject to specified criminal penalties.[36][37][38]

Expansion of the definition of "nationals but not citizens of the United States"
Further information: Americans and United States nationality law

In 1986, less than a year before the United Nations Convention against Torture (CAT) became effective, Congress expressly and intentionally expanded the definition of "nationals but not citizens of the United States" by adding paragraph (4) to 8 U.S.C. § 1408, which plainly states that:

the following shall be nationals, but not citizens, of the United States at birth: .... (4) A person born outside the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a national, but not a citizen, of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than seven years in any continuous period of ten years—(A) during which the national parent was not outside the United States or its outlying possessions for a continuous period of more than one year, and (B) at least five years of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years.[39][38]

The natural reading of § 1408(4) demonstrates that it was not exclusively written for the 55,000 American Samoans but for all people who statutorily and manifestly qualify as "nationals but not citizens of the United States."[39][40][41] This means that any person who can show by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she meets (or at any time has met) the requirements of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1408(4) and 1436 is plainly and unambiguously a "national but not a citizen of the United States."[9][42][43][44] Such person must never be labelled or treated as an alien, especially after demonstrating that he or she has continuously resided in the United States for at least 10 years without committing in such years any offense that triggers removability.[23][45][15][16] "Deprivation of [nationality]—particularly American [nationality], which is one of the most valuable rights in the world today—has grave practical consequences."[46][37][7][47][48][2][31][16][33]

Consequences of an "aggravated felony" conviction
Further information: Aggravated felony, cancellation of removal, and waiver of inadmissibility (United States)

In 1988, Congress introduced the term "aggravated felony" by defining it under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a).[49] As of September 30, 1996, an "aggravated felony" only applies to a person whose "term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years."[50][51][52] And, as stated above, if a person is not "removable" from the United States then he or she is plainly and unambiguously not inadmissible to the country.[22][53][41] After such "15 years" successfully elapse (and without sustaining another aggravated felony conviction), a longtime LPR automatically becomes entitled to both cancellation of removal and a waiver of inadmissibility.[33] He or she may (at any time and from anywhere in the world[54][55]) request these immigration benefits depending on whichever is more applicable or easiest to obtain.[24][50][56]

The phrase "term of imprisonment" in the INA expressly excludes all probationary periods.[57] Only a court-imposed suspended sentence (i.e., suspended term of imprisonment) is included,[58] which must be added to the above 15 years. And it makes no difference if the aggravated felony was sustained in Afghanistan, American Samoa, Australia, Canada, Mexico, the United Kingdom, the United States, or in any other country or place in the world.[50][59][53][41][52]

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
Further information: Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996

In February 1995, U.S. President Bill Clinton issued an important directive in which he expressly stated the following:

Our efforts to combat illegal immigration must not violate the privacy and civil rights of legal immigrants and U.S. citizens. Therefore, I direct the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and other relevant Administration officials to vigorously protect our citizens and legal immigrants from immigration-related instances of discrimination and harassment. All illegal immigration enforcement measures shall be taken with due regard for the basic human rights of individuals and in accordance with our obligations under applicable international agreements. (emphasis added).[45][38]

Sample of a permanent resident card (green card), which lawfully permits its holder to live and work in the United States similar to that of all other Americans. Before any legal immigrant is naturalized as a U.S. citizen, he or she must be a green card holder for at least 5 years and satisfy all other U.S. citizenship requirements. Many green card holders are actually Americans without them knowing, and are thus not removable from the United States.[60][15][16]

On September 30, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which is particularly aimed at combating illegal immigration to the United States.[61] But despite what President Clinton said in the above directive, some plainly incompetent immigration officers began deporting longtime LPRs (i.e., potential Americans),[33][9] who have permanent resident cards, Social Security numbers, driver's licenses, state ID cards, bank accounts, credit cards, insurances, etc. These people own homes, businesses, vehicles and other valuable properties in the United States under their names. The ones admitted as refugees under 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c),[33][26][27] statutorily and manifestly qualify as "nationals but not citizens of the United States" after continuously residing in the country for at least 10 years without committing (in said years) any offense that triggers removability.[39][23][24] This appears to be the reason why the permanent resident card (green card) is valid for 10 years. It was expected that these legal immigrants would equally obtain U.S. citizenship within 10 years from the date of their "lawful entry" into the United States,[62][63] but if that was unachievable then they would statutorily become "nationals but not citizens of the United States" after such continuous 10 years successfully elapse.[41] Anything to the contrary will result in "deprivation of rights under color of law," which is a federal crime that entails, inter alia, capital punishment for the perpetrator(s).[37][7][47][48][46][45][64]

The above refugees have already "been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States" by the U.S. Attorney General,[25][26][27][28] which becomes a federally protected right, but decades later the plainly incompetent immigration officers wrongfully turned these firmly resettled Americans into refugees again.[30][65] These refugees have absolutely no safe country of permanent residence other than the United States, and they obviously owe permanent allegiance solely to the United States.[21] This makes them nothing but a distinct class of persecuted Americans.[33][30] They are indisputably Americans with no legal connection to any other country but the United States. The ones that cannot become U.S. citizens are statutorily allowed by Congress to live in the United States with their American families for the rest of their life.[43][26][27][15][16][66] Deporting such Americans not only shocks the conscience but also constitutes a grave international crime.[37][67][7][68][47][48][64][46][45][69]

"Only aliens are subject to removal."[70][19][22] It is common knowledge that these aliens mainly refer to the INA violators among the 75 million foreign nationals who are admitted each year as guests,[62][71][72] the 12 million or so illegal aliens,[73] and the INA violators among the 400,000 or so foreign nationals who possess the temporary protected status (TPS).[74] These aliens obviously do not have any legal right to U.S. nationality or permanent residency. Moreover, Congress made clear in 1996 that the aliens who were admitted to the United States as lawful permanent residents in accordance with Form I-130, Form I-140, Diversity Immigrant Visa, etc., be treated differently then those who were admitted as refugees.[33][26][27][28]

An LPR can either be a national of the United States (American) or an alien,[9][33][42][75] which requires a case-by-case analysis and depends mainly on the number of continuous years he or she has physically spent in the United States as a green card holder.[23][64] The INA makes clear that any alien or any "national but not a citizen of the United States" who has been convicted of any aggravated felony, whether the aggravated felony was committed inside or outside the United States, is ineligible for citizenship of the United States.[76][66][77]

However, unlike a "national but not a citizen of the United States," an alien convicted of any aggravated felony is removable from the United States as an aggravated felon, but only if his or her "term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years."[50][51] This 15-year statute of limitations equally applies to every alien, especially to a longtime LPR. Such alien or LPR cannot:

Challenging an aggravated felony charge
Further information: Petition for review and removal proceedings
Any person (or class of people) may take their deportation-related case to the U.S. Supreme Court by invoking 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(1) and 1252(f).[6]

An "order of deportation" may be reviewed at any time by any immigration judge or any BIA member and finally by any authorized federal judge.[55] Particular cases, especially those that were adjudicated in any U.S. district court prior to the enactment of the Real ID Act of 2005, can be reopened under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.[86] The review of the order does not require the alien (or the American) to remain in the United States. It can be requested from anywhere in the world via mail (e.g., Canada Post, DHL, FedEx, UPS, etc.) and/or electronic court filing (ECF), and the case can be filed in any court the alien (or the American) finds appropriate.[54] In other words, if one court refuses help then the alien (or the American) can simply move on to any or all of the other courts.[33]

Every United States nationality claim, illegal deportation claim, and CAT or asylum claim is adjudicated under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(4), 1252(b)(4), 1252(b)(5) and 1252(f)(2). When these specific provisions are invoked, all other contrary provisions of law, especially § 1252(b)(1) and Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995) (case obviously decided prior to IIRIRA of 1996, which materially changed the old "judicial review provisions of the INA"),[61] must be disregarded because the three aforementioned claims manifestly constitute exceptional circumstances.[52][86][9][42][6][8] The Supreme Court has pointed out in April 2009 that "the context surrounding IIRIRA's enactment suggests that § 1252(f)(2) was an important—not a superfluous—statutory provision."[87] In October 2009, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 249 ("Hate crime acts"), which warns all government officials and the public by expressly stating the following:

Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, willfully causes bodily injury to any person ... because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of any person—(A) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined in accordance with this title, or both; and (B) shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, fined in accordance with this title, or both, if—(i) death results from the offense; or (ii) the offense includes kidnapping....[67][37][7][68][47][48][45]

According to § 1252(f)(1), "no court (other than the Supreme Court)" is authorized to determine which two or more people in removal proceedings should be recognized as Americans.[6] This includes parents and children or relatives.[39][42][9] The remaining courts, however, are empowered pursuant to §§ 1252(b)(5) and 1252(f)(2) to, inter alia, issue an injunction to terminate any person's removal proceedings; return any previously removed person to the United States; and/or to confer United States nationality upon any person (but only using a case-by-case analysis).[9][8][6][88] In addition to that, under 8 C.F.R. 239.2, any immigration official mentioned in 8 C.F.R. 239.1 may at any time move to: (1) terminate the removal proceedings of any person who turns out to be an American; or (2) cancel the removal proceedings of anyone who is clearly not "removable" under the INA.[22][79][28][22]

Americans physically removed from the United States
Further information: Deportation of Afghan refugees from the United States, deportation of Cambodian refugees from the United States, and list of people deported or removed from the United States

A number of Americans have been placed in immigration detention centers to be deported but were later released.[10][11][12][13][14][15][16] The following is an incomplete list of Americans who have actually experienced deportation from the United States:

  • Pedro Guzman, born in the State of California, was physically deported from the United States in 2007 but returned several months later by crossing the border. He was finally compensated in 2010 by receiving $350,000 from the government.[31]
  • Mark Daniel Lyttle, born in the State of North Carolina, was physically deported from the United States but later returned and filed a money damages lawsuit in federal court, which he ultimately won.[1][5]
  • Andres Robles Gonzalez, derived U.S. citizenship through his American father before being deported. He was returned to the United States and filed a money damages lawsuit in federal court, which he ultimately won.[2][89]
  • Emilio Blas Olivo, born in Weslaco, Texas.[3]

See also

References

This article in most part is based on law of the United States, including statutory and latest published case law.

  1. Finnegan, William (April 29, 2013). "The Deportation Machine". The New Yorker. Retrieved October 14, 2018. A citizen trapped in the system.
  2. Stevens, Jacqueline (June 2, 2015). "No Apologies, But Feds Pay $350K to Deported American Citizen". LexisNexis. Retrieved October 8, 2018.
  3. Olsen, Lise (August 2, 2017). "Hundreds of American citizens end up in deportation proceedings each year, immigration data shows". The New Yorker. Retrieved October 15, 2018. Hundreds targeted each year despite documents, claims, court data show
  4. "Some citizens being held as illegal immigrants". Associated Press. NBC News. April 13, 2009. Retrieved October 14, 2018. Dozens of Americans have been locked up or thrown out over past 8 years
  5. Lyttle v. United States, 867 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1270 (M.D. Ga. 2012)
  6. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 830, 851 (2018); Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S.Ct. 2806, 2810-11 (2014) ("Under our precedents, an injunction is appropriate only if (1) it is necessary or appropriate in aid of our jurisdiction, and (2) the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear.") (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); Lux v. Rodrigues, 561 U.S. 1306, 1308 (2010); Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001) (stating that "injunctive relief has long been recognized as the proper means for preventing entities from acting unconstitutionally."); Alli v. Decker, 650 F.3d 1007, 1010-11 (3d Cir. 2011) (same); Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 482-85 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (same); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) ("Limitation on collateral attack on underlying deportation order").
  7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241–246 et seq.; United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 264 (1997) ("Section 242 is a Reconstruction Era civil rights statute making it criminal to act (1) 'willfully' and (2) under color of law (3) to deprive a person of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States."); United States v. Acosta, 470 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 are both "crimes of violence"); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1985 et seq.; Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018) ("A U.S. Border Patrol agent standing on American soil shot and killed a teenage Mexican citizen who was walking down a street in Mexico."); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. ___ (2017) (mistreating immigration detainees); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736-37 (2002) (mistreating prisoners).
  8. Singh v. USCIS, 878 F.3d 441, 443 (2d Cir. 2017) ("The government conceded that Singh's removal was improper.... Consequently, in May 2007, Singh was temporarily paroled back into the United States by the Attorney General...."); Orabi v. Att’y Gen., 738 F.3d 535, 543 (3d Cir. 2014) ("The judgment of the BIA will therefore be reversed, with instructions that the Government... be directed to return Orabi to the United States ...."); Avalos-Palma v. United States, No. 13-5481 (FLW), 2014 WL 3524758, p.3 (D.N.J. July 16, 2014) ("On June 2, 2012, approximately 42 months after the improper deportation, ICE agents effectuated Avalos-Palma's return to the United States."); In re Vikramjeet Sidhu, A044 238 062, at 1-2 (BIA Nov. 30, 2011) ("As related in his brief on appeal, the respondent was physically removed from the United States in June 2004, but subsequently returned to this country under a grant of humanitarian parole.... Accordingly, the proceedings will be terminated.") (three-member panel).
  9. Khalid v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 2018) ("[Petitioner] is a U.S. citizen and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must terminate removal proceedings against him."); Jaen v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2018) (same); Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 2012) (same); Dent v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2018) ("An individual has third-party standing when [(1)] the party asserting the right has a close relationship with the person who possesses the right [and (2)] there is a hindrance to the possessor's ability to protect his own interests.") (quoting Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 582 U.S. ___, ___, 137 S.Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Gonzalez-Alarcon v. Macias, 884 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 2018); Hammond v. Sessions, No. 16-3013, p.2-3 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 2018) ("It is undisputed that Hammond's June 2016 motion to reconsider was untimely because his removal order became final in 2003.... Here, reconsideration was available only under the BIA's sua sponte authority. 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(a). Despite this procedural posture, we retain jurisdiction to review Hammond's U.S. [nationality] claim."); accord Duarte-Ceri v. Holder, 630 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Duarte's legal claim encounters no jurisdictional obstacle because the Executive Branch has no authority to remove a [national of the United States]."); see also Yith v. Nielsen, 881 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2018) ("Once applicants have exhausted administrative remedies, they may appeal to a district court."); 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) ("Request for hearing before district court").
  10. Rosenberg, Eli (January 16, 2019). "A Latino Marine veteran was detained for deportation. Then ICE realized he was a citizen". The Washington Post. Retrieved January 21, 2019.
  11. Mindock, Clark (December 5, 2018). "Philadelphia-born US citizen detained by ICE and threatened with deportation to Jamaica". The Independent. Retrieved January 21, 2019.
  12. "ICE held an American man in custody for 1,273 days. He's not the only one who had to prove his citizenship". Paige St. John and Joel Rubin. Los Angeles Times. September 17, 2018. Retrieved October 15, 2018.
  13. "You Say You're An American, But What If You Had To Prove It Or Be Deported?". National Public Radio (NPR). December 22, 2016. Retrieved October 15, 2018.
  14. Hoffman, Meredith (March 8, 2016). "The US Keeps Mistakenly Deporting Its Own Citizens". news.vice.com. Retrieved October 15, 2018.
  15. Stanton, Ryan (May 11, 2018). "Michigan father of 4 was nearly deported; now he's a U.S. citizen". www.mlive.com. Retrieved October 16, 2018.
  16. Sakuma, Amanda (October 24, 2014). "Lawsuit says ICE attorney forged document to deport immigrant man". MSNBC. Retrieved October 20, 2018.
  17. Stevens, Jacqueline (September 22, 2011). "Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law" (PDF). jacquelinestevens.org. p. 608. Retrieved October 15, 2018.
  18. "UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS". Northwestern University. 2017. Retrieved October 15, 2018.
  19. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) ("The term 'alien' means any person not a citizen or national of the United States.") (emphasis added).
  20. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. 830, 855-56 (2018) (Justice Thomas concurring) ("The term 'or' is almost always disjunctive, that is, the [phrase]s it connects are to be given separate meanings.").
  21. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (emphasis added); Ricketts v. Att'y Gen., 897 F.3d 491, 493-94 n.3 (3d Cir. 2018) ("Citizenship and nationality are not synonymous."); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(31) ("The term 'permanent' means a relationship of continuing or lasting nature, as distinguished from temporary, but a relationship may be permanent even though it is one that may be dissolved eventually at the instance either of the United States or of the individual, in accordance with law."); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(33) ("The term 'residence' means the place of general abode; the place of general abode of a person means his principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent."); Black's Law Dictionary at p.87 (9th ed., 2009) (defining the term "permanent allegiance" as "[t]he lasting allegiance owed to [the United States] by its citizens or [permanent resident]s.") (emphasis added).
  22. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2) ("The term 'removable' means—(A) in the case of an alien not admitted to the United States, that the alien is inadmissible under section 1182 of this title, or (B) in the case of an alien admitted to the United States, that the alien is deportable under section 1227 of this title."); see also Tima v. Att'y Gen., 903 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 2018) ("Section 1227 defines '[d]eportable aliens,' a synonym for removable aliens.... So § 1227(a)(1) piggybacks on § 1182(a) by treating grounds of inadmissibility as grounds for removal as well."); Galindo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2018).
  23. Matter of Campos-Torres, 22 I&N Dec. 1289 (BIA 2000) (en banc) ("Pursuant to section 240A(d)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (Supp. II 1996), an offense must be one 'referred to in section 212(a)(2)' of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. II 1996), to terminate the period of continuous residence or continuous physical presence required for cancellation of removal."); see also, generally Jaghoori v. Holder, 772 F.3d 764 (4th Cir. 2014) (the court agreed with the LPR that "the BIA should not have applied the stop-time rule … because the offense and guilty plea occurred before Congress promulgated the stop-time rule."); Jeudy v. Holder, 768 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 2014) (same); Sinotes-Cruz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2006) (same).
  24. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) (stating that an LPR, especially a wrongfully-deported LPR, is permitted to reenter the United States by any means whatsoever, including with a grant of "relief under section 1182(h) or 1229b(a) of this title....") (emphasis added); accord United States v. Aguilera-Rios, 769 F.3d 626, 628-29 (9th Cir. 2014) ("[Petitioner] was convicted of a California firearms offense, removed from the United States on the basis of that conviction, and, when he returned to the country, tried and convicted of illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He contends that his prior removal order was invalid because his conviction ... was not a categorical match for the Immigration and Nationality Act's ('INA') firearms offense. We agree that he was not originally removable as charged, and so could not be convicted of illegal reentry."); see also Matter of Campos-Torres, 22 I&N Dec. 1289 (BIA 2000) (en banc) (A firearms offense that renders an alien removable under section 237(a)(2)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (Supp. II 1996), is not one 'referred to in section 212(a)(2)' and thus does not stop the further accrual of continuous residence or continuous physical presence for purposes of establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal."); Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 262 (2012).
  25. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) ("The term 'lawfully admitted for permanent residence' means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant....").
  26. Matter of H-N-, 22 I&N Dec. 1039, 1040-45 (BIA 1999) (en banc) (case of a female Cambodian-American who was convicted of a particularly serious crime but "the Immigration Judge found [her] eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility, as well as for adjustment of status, and he granted her this relief from removal."); Matter of Jean, 23 I&N Dec. 373, 381 (A.G. 2002) ("Aliens, like the respondent, who have been admitted (or conditionally admitted) into the United States as refugees can seek an adjustment of status only under INA § 209."); INA § 209(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) ("The provisions of paragraphs (4), (5), and (7)(A) of section 1182(a) of this title shall not be applicable to any alien seeking adjustment of status under this section, and the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may waive any other provision of [section 1182] ... with respect to such an alien for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest.") (emphasis added); Nguyen v. Chertoff, 501 F.3d 107, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2007) (petition granted of a Vietnamese-American convicted of a particularly serious crime); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) ("The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that ... all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.").
  27. Matter of J-H-J-, 26 I&N Dec. 563 (BIA 2015) (collecting court cases) ("An alien who adjusted status in the United States, and who has not entered as a lawful permanent resident, is not barred from establishing eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012), as a result of an aggravated felony conviction.") (emphasis added); see also De Leon v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 2015) ("[Petitioner] next claims that even if he is removable, he should nevertheless have been afforded the opportunity to apply for a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). Under controlling precedent from our court and the BIA's recent decision in Matter of J–H–J–, he is correct.") (emphasis added).
  28. "Board of Immigration Appeals". U.S. Dept. of Justice. March 16, 2018. Retrieved November 21, 2018. BIA decisions are binding on all DHS officers and immigration judges unless modified or overruled by the Attorney General or a federal court. See also 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(g) ("Decisions as precedents.") (eff. 2018); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010) ("Our precedent is to be respected unless the most convincing of reasons demonstrates that adherence to it puts us on a course that is sure error."); Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (same).
  29. Matter of Smriko, 23 I&N Dec. 836 (BIA 2005) (a cursory opinion of a three-member panel blatantly persecuting refugees and depriving them of rights); see also Maiwand v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 101, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2007) (same); Romanishyn v. Att'y Gen., 455 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); Kaganovich v. Gonzales, F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2006) (same).
  30. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) ("The term 'refugee' means ... any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable ... to return to, and is unable ... to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion....") (emphasis added); see also Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Persecution may be emotional or psychological, as well as physical."); Matter of B-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 119, 112 (BIA 2013) ("The core regulatory purpose of asylum . . . is . . . to protect refugees with nowhere else to turn.") (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
  31. "Peter Guzman and Maria Carbajal v. United States, CV08-01327 GHK (SSx)" (PDF). U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (CDCA). www.courtlistener.com. June 7, 2010. p. 3. Retrieved October 20, 2018.
  32. Harvey v. Chertoff, 263 F. App'x. 188, 190 (3d Cir. 2008) ("Harvey sought money damages in the amount of $15 million.") (non-precedential); see also Allen v. Holder, Civil Action No. 13-5736, p.3 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2016) ("He also seeks $5,000,000 in damages.").
  33. Ahmadi v. Ashcroft, et al., No. 03-249 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2003) ("Petitioner in this habeas corpus proceeding, entered the United States on September 30, 1982 as a refugee from his native Afghanistan. Two years later, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the 'INS') adjusted Petitioner's status to that of a lawful permanent resident.... The INS timely appealed the Immigration Judge's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (the 'BIA').") (Baylson, District Judge); Ahmadi v. Att'y Gen., 659 F. App'x 72 (3d Cir. 2016) (slip opinion, p.4 & n.1) (invoking statutorily nullified case law, the court dismissed an obvious illegal deportation case by asserting that it lacks jurisdiction to review an unopposed United States nationality claim under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5) and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2) solely due to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)) (non-precedential); Ahmadi v. Sessions, No. 16-73974 (9th Cir. Apr. 25, 2017) (same; unpublished single-paragraph order); Ahmadi v. Sessions, No. 17-2672 (2d Cir. Feb. 22, 2018) (same; unpublished single-paragraph order); cf. Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chicago, 583 U.S. ___, ___, 138 S.Ct. 13, 17-18 (2017) ("Mandatory claim-processing rules ... may be waived or forfeited."); United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S.Ct. 1625, 1632 (2015) ("In recent years, we have repeatedly held that procedural rules, including time bars, cabin a court's power only if Congress has 'clearly stated' as much.") (brackets omitted); see also Bibiano v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 966, 971 (9th Cir. 2016) ("Section 1252(b)(2) is a non-jurisdictional venue statute") (collecting cases) (emphasis added); Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (the court clarified "that § 1252(f)(2)'s standard for granting injunctive relief in removal proceedings trumps any contrary provision elsewhere in the law.").
  34. "Afghan Migrant Deported From Germany Kills Himself". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. July 11, 2018. Retrieved October 27, 2018.
  35. "Cambodian-Americans confronting deportation". Olesia Plokhii and Tom Mashberg. Boston Globe. January 27, 2013. Retrieved May 10, 2014.
  36. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 264-65 n.3 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)
  37. "Deprivation Of Rights Under Color Of Law". U.S. Dept. of Justice (DOJ). August 6, 2015. Retrieved September 27, 2018. Section 242 of Title 18 makes it a crime for a person acting under color of any law to willfully deprive a person of a right or privilege protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. For the purpose of Section 242, acts under 'color of law' include acts not only done by federal, state, or local officials within their lawful authority, but also acts done beyond the bounds of that official's lawful authority, if the acts are done while the official is purporting to or pretending to act in the performance of his/her official duties. Persons acting under color of law within the meaning of this statute include police officers, prisons guards and other law enforcement officials, as well as judges, care providers in public health facilities, and others who are acting as public officials. It is not necessary that the crime be motivated by animus toward the race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status or national origin of the victim. The offense is punishable by a range of imprisonment up to a life term, or the death penalty, depending upon the circumstances of the crime, and the resulting injury, if any. (emphasis added).
  38. Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153 (2001) ("The word 'shall' is ordinarily the language of command.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
  39. 8 U.S.C. § 1408 (emphasis added); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1436 ("Nationals but not citizens...."); 8 U.S.C. § 1452(b) ("Application to Secretary of State for certificate of non-citizen national status; proof; oath of allegiance"); 8 U.S.C. § 1503 ("Denial of rights and privileges as national").
  40. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(b) (Congress explaining that lawful permanent residents may lawfully remain outside the United States for up to one year (or even longer) in certain situations).
  41. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) ("The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole."); see also Matter of Dougless, 26 I&N Dec. 197, 199 (BIA 2013) ("The [Supreme] Court has also emphasized that the Chevron principle of deference must be applied to an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions, even where a court has previously issued a contrary decision and believes that its construction is the better one, provided that the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.").
  42. 8 U.S.C. § 1436 ("A person not a citizen who owes permanent allegiance to the United States, and who is otherwise qualified, may, if he becomes a resident of any State, be naturalized upon compliance with the applicable requirements of this subchapter...."); Ricketts v. Att'y Gen., 897 F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 2018) ("When an alien faces removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act, one potential defense is that the alien is not an alien at all but is actually a national of the United States.").
  43. "Certificates of Non Citizen Nationality". Bureau of Consular Affairs. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved September 26, 2018. If a person believes he or she is eligible under the law as a non-citizen national of the United States and the person complies with the provisions of section 341(b) of the INA, 8 USC 1452(b),he/she may apply for a passport at any Passport Agency in the United States.. When applying, applicants must execute a Form DS-11 and show documentary proof of their non-citizen national status as well as their identity. See also 22 C.F.R. 51.1 ("U.S. non-citizen national means a person on whom U.S. nationality, but not U.S. citizenship, has been conferred at birth under 8 U.S.C. § 1408, or under other law or treaty, and who has not subsequently lost such non-citizen nationality.").
  44. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(23) ("The term 'naturalization' means the conferring of nationality of [the] [United States] upon a person ... by any means whatsoever.")
  45. "60 FR 7885: ANTI-DISCRIMINATION" (PDF). U.S. Government Publishing Office. February 10, 1995. p. 7888. Retrieved September 26, 2018. See also Zuniga-Perez v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir. 2018) ("The Constitution protects both citizens and non‐citizens.") (emphasis added).
  46. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012) ("Perceived mistreatment of aliens in the United States may lead to harmful reciprocal treatment of American citizens abroad.")
  47. "Article 16". Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved September 27, 2018. [The United States] shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article I, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. (emphasis added).
  48. "Chapter 11 - Foreign Policy: Senate OKs Ratification of Torture Treaty" (46th ed.). CQ Press. 1990. pp. 806–7. Retrieved September 27, 2018. The three other reservations, also crafted with the help and approval of the Bush administration, did the following: Limited the definition of 'cruel, inhuman or degrading' treatment to cruel and unusual punishment as defined under the Fifth, Eighth and 14th Amendments to the Constitution.... (emphasis added).
  49. "Subtitle J—Provisions Relating to the Deportation of Aliens Who Commit Aggravated Felonies, Pub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4469-79, § 7342". U.S. Congress. November 18, 1988. pp. 289–90. Retrieved September 26, 2018. Section 101(a) (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph: '(43) The term 'aggravated felony' means murder, any drug trafficking crime as defined in section 924(c)(2) of title 18, United States Code, or any illicit trafficking in any firearms or destructive devices as defined in section 921 of such title....' (emphasis added).
  50. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) ("The term [aggravated felony] applies to an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law and applies to such an offense in violation of the law of a foreign country for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years.") (emphasis added); Matter of Vasquez-Muniz, 23 I&N Dec. 207, 211 (BIA 2002) (en banc) ("This penultimate sentence, governing the enumeration of crimes in section 101(a)(43) of the Act, refers the reader to all of the crimes 'described in' the aggravated felony provision."); Luna Torres v. Lynch, 578 U.S. ___, ___, 136 S.Ct. 1623, 1627 (2016) ("The whole point of § 1101(a)(43)'s penultimate sentence is to make clear that a listed offense should lead to swift removal, no matter whether it violates federal, state, or foreign law."); see also 8 C.F.R. 1001.1(t) ("The term aggravated felony means a crime ... described in section 101(a)(43) of the Act. This definition is applicable to any proceeding, application, custody determination, or adjudication pending on or after September 30, 1996, but shall apply under section 276(b) of the Act only to violations of section 276(a) of the Act occurring on or after that date.") (emphasis added).
  51. Zivkovic v. Holder, 724 F.3d 894, 911 (7th Cir. 2013) ("Because [Petitioner]'s aggravated felony convictions were more than a decade old before the 1988 statute took effect, they cannot be used as a ground for removal...."); Ledezma-Galicia v. Holder, 636 F.3d 1059, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) ("[Petitioner] is not removable by reason of being an aggravated felon, because 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) does not apply to convictions, like [Petitioner]'s, that occurred prior to November 18, 1988."); but see Canto v. Holder, 593 F.3d 638, 640-42 (7th Cir. 2010) (good example of absurdity and violation of the U.S. Constitution).
  52. NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U.S. ___, ___, 137 S.Ct. 929, 939 (2017) ("The ordinary meaning of 'notwithstanding' is 'in spite of,' or 'without prevention or obstruction from or by.' In statutes, the [notwithstanding any other provision of law] 'shows which provision prevails in the event of a clash.'"); In re JMC Telecom LLC, 416 B.R. 738, 743 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (explaining that "the phrase 'notwithstanding any other provision of law' expresses the legislative intent to override all contrary statutory and decisional law.") (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (emphasis added); see also In re Partida, 862 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2017) ("That is the function and purpose of the 'notwithstanding' clause."); Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1083 (9th Cir. 2014) ("As a general matter, 'notwithstanding' clauses nullify conflicting provisions of law."); Jones v. United States, No. 08-645C, p.4-5 (Fed. Cl. Sep. 14, 2009); Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 238-39 n.1 (2010); Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10, 18 (1993) (collecting court cases).
  53. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 583 U.S. ___ (2018) (Slip Opinion at 10) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Matter of Song, 27 I&N Dec. 488, 492 (BIA 2018) ("Because the language of both the statute and the regulations is plain and unambiguous, we are bound to follow it."); Matter of Figueroa, 25 I&N Dec. 596, 598 (BIA 2011) ("When interpreting statutes and regulations, we look first to the plain meaning of the language and are required to give effect to unambiguously expressed intent. Executive intent is presumed to be expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used. We also construe a statute or regulation to give effect to all of its provisions.") (citations omitted); Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004); TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) ("It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.") (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-539 (1955) ("It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute." (internal quotation marks omitted); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) ("The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destroy. We have repeatedly held that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the act. Even to avoid a serious doubt the rule is the same.").
  54. See generally Toor v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 1055, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2015) ("The regulatory departure bar [(8 C.F.R. 1003.2(d))] is invalid irrespective of the manner in which the movant departed the United States, as it conflicts with clear and unambiguous statutory text.") (collecting cases); see also Blandino-Medina v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1338, 1342 (9th Cir. 2013) ("An individual who has already been removed can satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement by raising a direct challenge to the removal order."); United States v. Charleswell, 456 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); Kamagate v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2004) (same); Zegarra-Gomez v. INS, 314 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that because petitioner's inability to return to the United States for twenty years as a result of his removal was "a concrete disadvantage imposed as a matter of law, the fact of his deportation did not render the pending habeas petition moot").
  55. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47); see generally Reyes Mata v. Lynch, 576 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S.Ct. 2150, 1253 (2015); Ku v. Attorney General United States, No. 17-3001, pp.7-8 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2019); Avalos-Suarez v. Whitaker, No. 16-72773 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 2018) (unpublished) (case remanded to the BIA which involves a legal claim over a 1993 order of deportation); Nassiri v. Sessions, No. 16-60718 (5th Cir. Dec. 14, 2017); Alimbaev v. Att'y, 872 F.3d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 2017); Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1202-03 (9th Cir. 2017); In re Baig, A043-589-486 (BIA Jan. 26, 2017) (unpublished three-member panel decision); In re Cisneros-Ramirez, A 090-442-154 (BIA Aug. 9, 2016) (same); In re Contreras-Largaespada, A014-701-083 (BIA Feb. 12, 2016) (same); In re Wagner Aneudis Martinez, A043-447-800 (BIA Jan. 12, 2016) (same); In re Vikramjeet Sidhu, A044 238 062 (BIA Nov. 30, 2011) (same); accord Matter of A-N- & R-M-N-, 22 I&N Dec. 953 (BIA 1999) (en banc); Matter of G-N-C-, 22 I&N Dec. 281, 285 (BIA 1998) (en banc); Matter of JJ-, 21 I&N Dec. 976 (BIA 1997) (en banc).
  56. Salmoran v. Attorney General of the U.S., ___ F.3d ___, ___, No. 17-2683, p.5 n.5 (3d Cir. 2018) (case involving cancellation of removal after the LPR has been physically removed from the United States on a bogus aggravated felony charge).
  57. United States v. Valencia-Mendoza, ___ F.3d ___, ___, No. 17-30158, p.20-21 & n.4 (9th Cir. Jan. 10, 2019) (stating that courts of appeals "have held that, when determining whether a [state] offense is 'punishable' by more than one year in prison, the Supreme Court's recent cases require an examination of the maximum sentence possible under the state's mandatory sentencing guidelines.").
  58. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B) ("Any reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part."); Matter of Cota, 23 I&N Dec. 849, 852 (BIA 2005).
  59. See generally, Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York County Prison, 783 F.3d 469 (3d Cir. 2015) ("[Petitioner], a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States at a young age without inspection and later adjusted to lawful permanent resident status.... In 2000, while serving in the United States Army in South Korea, a General Court-Martial convicted him of giving false official statements.... It sentenced him to eighteen months of imprisonment. He served thirteen months in prison and was released on February 4, 2002."); Chavez-Alvarez v. Att'y Gen., 783 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 2015); Matter of Chavez-Alvarez, 26 I&N Dec. 274 (BIA 2014).
  60. "Estimates of the Lawful Permanent Resident Population in the United States: January 2014" (PDF). James Lee; Bryan Baker. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS). June 2017. Retrieved October 16, 2018.
  61. Othi v. Holder, 734 F.3d 259, 264-65 (4th Cir. 2013) ("In 1996, Congress 'made major changes to immigration law' via IIRIRA.... These IIRIRA changes became effective on April 1, 1997.").
  62. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) ("The terms 'admission' and 'admitted' mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.") (emphasis added); Matter of D-K-, 25 I&N Dec. 761, 765-66 (BIA 2012).
  63. Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 287 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that the idea of refugees being admitted to the United States as lawful permanent residents was intentionally rejected by the U.S. Congressional Conference Committee); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-781, at 21 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 160, 162.
  64. Edwards v. Sessions, No. 17-87, p.3 (2d Cir. Aug. 24, 2018) ("In removal proceedings involving an LPR, the government bears the burden of proof, which it must meet by adducing clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (summary order); accord 8 C.F.R. 1240.46(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A); Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413, 429 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) ("The burden of proof required for clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence is greater than the burden of proof required for clear and convincing evidence."), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 36 (2016); Ward v. Holder, 733 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Thompson-Riviere, 561 F.3d 345, 349 (4th Cir. 2009) ("To convict him of this offense, the government bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that (inter alia) he is an 'alien,' which means he is 'not a citizen or national of the United States,'" (citations omitted); Francis v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 2006); Matter of Pichardo, 21 I&N Dec. 330, 333 (BIA 1996) (en banc); Berenyi v. Immigration Director, 385 U.S. 630, 636-37 (1967) ("When the Government seeks to strip a person of [United States nationality] already acquired, or deport a resident alien and send him from our shores, it carries the heavy burden of proving its case by 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.' . . . [T]hat status, once granted, cannot lightly be taken away....") (footnotes omitted)); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960).
  65. See generally Hanna v. Holder, 740 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. 2014) (discussing firm resettlement); Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 2011) (same).
  66. Al-Sharif v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 734 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (denying U.S. citizenship to an aggravated felon); see also Mobin v. Taylor, 598 F.Supp.2d 777 (E.D. Va. 2009) (same).
  67. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1)
  68. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 ("War crimes").
  69. "Some citizens being held as illegal immigrants". Associated Press. NBC News. April 13, 2009. Retrieved October 14, 2018. Dozens of Americans have been locked up or thrown out over past 8 years
  70. Matter of Navas-Acosta, 23 I&N Dec. 586 (BIA 2003).
  71. "Destination USA: 75 million international guests visited in 2014". share.america.gov. Retrieved September 30, 2018.
  72. "International Visitation to the United States: A Statistical Summary of U.S. Visitation" (PDF). U.S. Department of Commerce. 2015. p. 2. Retrieved September 30, 2018.
  73. 8 U.S.C. § 1365(b) ("An illegal alien ... is any alien ... who is in the United States unlawfully...."); United States v. Torres, ___ F.3d ___, No. 15-10492 (9th Cir. Jan. 8, 2019).
  74. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f) ("Benefits and status during period of temporary protected status").
  75. 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b) (stating that "the term 'foreign national' means—.... (2) an individual who is not a citizen of the United States or a national of the United States (as defined in section 1101(a)(22) of title 8) and who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence, as defined by section 1101(a)(20) of title 8.").
  76. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8); 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) ("Requirements of naturalization"); see also
  77. "Justice Department Seeks to Revoke Citizenship of Convicted Felons Who Conspired to Defraud U.S. Export-Import Bank of More Than $24 Million". Office of Public Affairs. U.S. Dept. of Justice (DOJ). May 8, 2018. Retrieved October 17, 2018.
  78. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi)
  79. Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 462 (A.G. 2018) ("Immigration judges may dismiss or terminate removal proceedings only under the circumstances expressly identified in the regulations, see 8 C.F.R. 1239.2(c), (f), or where the Department of Homeland Security fails to sustain the charges of removability against a respondent, see 8 C.F.R. 1240.12(c)."); see also Matter of G-N-C-, 22 I&N Dec. 281 (BIA 1998) (en banc).
  80. Chung, Andrew (April 17, 2018). "Supreme Court restricts deportations of immigrant felons". Reuters. Retrieved November 2, 2018. See also Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. ___ (2018); Mateo v. Att'y Gen., 870 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2017).
  81. Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I&N Dec. 339, 347 n.6 (BIA 2014).
  82. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) ("Paragraph (1) shall not apply to an alien if the Attorney General determines that— ... (ii) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United States") (emphasis added).
  83. Gomez-Sanchez v. Sessions, 892 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 2018); Anwari v. Attorney General of the U.S., Nos. 18-1505 & 18-2291, p.6 (3rd Cir. Nov. 6, 2018) (non-precedential); see also Matter of Y-L-, A-G- & R-S-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 270, 279 (A.G. 2002).
  84. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (stating that "the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under section 1158(a)....") (emphasis added); see also Bamaca-Cifuentes v. Att'y Gen., 870 F.3d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 2017).
  85. United States v. Vidal–Mendoza, 705 F.3d 1012, 1013-14 n.2 (9th Cir. 2013) ("Voluntary departure is not available to an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony.").
  86. United States v. Bueno-Sierra, No. 17-12418, p.6-7 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 2018) ("Rule 60(b)(1) through (5) permits a district court to set aside an otherwise final judgment on a number of specific grounds, such as mistake, newly discovered evidence, an opposing party’s fraud, or a void or satisfied judgment. Rule 60(b)(6), the catch-all provision, authorizes a judgment to be set aside for 'any other reason that justifies relief.' Rule 60(d)(3) provides that Rule 60 does not limit a district court’s power to 'set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.'") (citations omitted) (unpublished); Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 386-87 (3d Cir. 2005) ("In order to meet the necessarily demanding standard for proof of fraud upon the court we conclude that there must be: (1) an intentional fraud; (2) by an officer of the court; (3) which is directed at the court itself; and (4) in fact deceives the court."); 18 U.S.C. § 371; 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (court employees (including judges and clerks) have no immunity from prosecution under this section of law); Luna v. Bell, 887 F.3d 290, 294 (6th Cir. 2018) ("Under Rule 60(b)(2), a party may request relief because of 'newly discovered evidence.'"); United States v. Handy, ___ F.3d ___, ___, No. 18-3086, p.5-6 (10th Cir. July 18, 2018) ("Rule 60(b)(4) provides relief from void judgments, which are legal nullities.... [W]hen Rule 60(b)(4) is applicable, relief is not a discretionary matter; it is mandatory. And the rule is not subject to any time limitation.") (citations, brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); Mattis v. Vaughn, No. 99-6533, p.3-4 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 2018); accord Satterfield v. Dist. Att'y of Phila., 872 F.3d 152, 164 (3d Cir. 2017) ("The fact that . . . proceeding ended a decade ago should not preclude him from obtaining relief under Rule 60(b) if the court concludes that he has raised a colorable claim that he meets this threshold actual-innocence standard ...."); see also Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) ("In our collateral review jurisprudence, the term 'miscarriage of justice' means that the defendant is actually innocent.... The court of appeals should no doubt correct a plain forfeited error that causes the conviction or sentencing of an actually innocent defendant....") (citations omitted); Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1974); Gonzalez-Cantu v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2017) (same); Pacheco-Miranda v. Sessions, No. 14-70296 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2017) (same).
  87. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 443 (2009) (Justice Alito dissenting with Justice Thomas).
  88. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 428 (2009) ("When a court employs the extraordinary remedy of injunction, it directs the conduct of a party, and does so with the backing of its full coercive powers.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
  89. Yu Hsi Lee Ju, Esther (June 4, 2015). "What One Man Did When He Was Accidentally Deported To Mexico". ThinkProgress. Retrieved October 8, 2018.
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