René Massigli

René Massigli
Born 22 March 1888 Edit this on Wikidata
Died 3 February 1988 Edit this on Wikidata (aged 99)

René Massigli (French: [ʁəne masiɡli]; 22 March 1888 – 3 February 1988) was a French diplomat who played a leading role as a senior official at the Quai d'Orsay. He was regarded as one of the leading French experts on Germany, which he greatly distrusted.[1]

Early life

The son of a Protestant law professor, Massigli was born in Montpellier in Southern France, in the department of Hérault. He joined the French foreign service during the First World War. During the war, Massigli served in the Maison de la Presse section of the Quai d'Orsay in Bern, Switzerland, where he analysed German newspapers for the French government.[1]

In the spring of 1919, Massigli was sent on several unofficial missions to Berlin to contact German officials about the terms of the Treaty of Versailles.[2] In May 1919, Massagli had a series of secret meetings with various German officials in which he offered, on behalf of his government, to revise the peace terms of the upcoming Treaty of Versailles in Germany's favour in regards to territorial and economic clauses of the proposed treaty.[3] Massigli suggested "practical, verbal discussions" between French and German officials in the hope of creating "French-German collaboration."[3]

During his meetings, Massigli let the Germans know of the deep divisions between the "Big Three" at the Paris Peace Conference: Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau.[4] Speaking on behalf of the French government, Massilgi informed the Germans that the French considered the "Anglo-Saxon powers" (the United States and the British Empire) to be the real post-war threat to France, argued that both France and Germany had a common interest in opposing "Anglo-Saxon domination" of the world and warned that the "deepening of opposition" between the French and the Germans "would lead to the ruin of both countries, to the advantage of the Anglo-Saxon powers".[4]

However, the overtures to the Germans were rejected because the Germans feared them to be a French trap to trick Germany into accepting the Versailles treaty. Also, German Foreign Minister Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau thought that it was the United States that was more likely than France to soften the terms.[4]

Conference of Ambassadors

Massigli served as the secretary-general for the Conference of Ambassadors between 1920 and 1931 before he became the head of the Quai d'Orsay's section dealing with the League of Nations.[1] Using a pseudonym, Massigli wrote an article in the L'Ere Nouvelle newspaper in March 1920 in which condemned "the revival of militarism" in Germany as represented by the Kapp Putsch, predicated that the Reichswehr would never accept democracy and claimed that there was a genuine desire for democracy among the German people.[5] In another series of articles published in June 1920, Massigli articulated what he regarded as the central dilemma of France's German policy. To insist upon a too forceful enforcement of Versailles would undermine German moderates, but enemies of democracy were so strong in Germany that it might fail even if the treaty were revised. Thus, to loosen Versailles would make the task of any potential future anti-democratic government in Germany easier.[6]

During his time at the Conference of Ambassadors, Massigli was closely involved in the disputes about Upper Silesia, the Memelland, the Vilnius/Wilno dispute, the borders of Austria and Hungary and the enforcement of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, on disarmament.[7] In the early 1920s, Massigli was known for his vigorous efforts to enforce Part V, and he attempted to thwart German efforts to violate Part V.[7] He thought that the French should be moderate in the enforcement of Versailles, if the Germans obeyed all of the treaty, especially Part V: "The touchstone for Germany is the execution of the Treaty, or at least, since I am prepared to believe that certain of its clauses cannot be applied, to give evidence of goodwill in its execution. The starting point must be the disarmament of the Reichswehr".[8]

In September 1923, during the Ruhr crisis, Massigli was sent to the Rhineland to report to Paris on the viability of the Rhenish separatist movement and what support, if any, France should offer the separatists.[8] Massigli was very cool in his assessment of the Rhenish separatists and described them as badly organised and lacking popular support. He advised against supporting a Rhenish Republic.[8]

From the mid-1920s, Massigli came to relax his views, and started to advocate reconciliation with Germany but not at the expense of French security.[5] In 1925, Massigli played a major role in the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Locarno. Though welcoming Gustav Stresemann's initiative in renouncing claims upon Alsace-Lorraine as a very important step for peace, Massigli was privately troubled by the refusal of the Germans to give similar guarantees for their neighbours in Eastern Europe, especially Poland, or to abide by the terms of Part V.[9] A close friend and associate of Aristide Briand, Massigli worked strongly in the late 1920s for Franco-German détente.[10] However, Massigli never lost any of his concerns about the Reichswehr and felt that Franco-German rapprochement should best take place within the broader framework of European integration and collective security.[10]

As Massigli later told historian Georges-Henri Soutou, "Briandism had the great merit of drawing a good number of European states towards the French viewpoint".[10] Massigli played a major role in working behind the scenes in the talks that would lead to Germany joining the League of Nations as a Council permanent member, in 1926.[11] He was open to revising Versailles within Germany's favour but only within the context of multilateral organisations like the League of Nations.[11]

In 1929 and 1930, Massigli worked closely with Briand in his project for creating a European "federation", which many have seen as a prototype for the European Union.[11]

World Disarmament Conference

In 1930, Massigli started to be intimately involved in the preparatory work for the World Disarmament Conference, which was scheduled to open in 1932.[12] The increasing divergence between German demands for Gleichberechtigung ("equality of armaments"), which meant abolishing Part V, and the French demand for sécurité ("security"), which meant maintaining Part V, together with the strains in Franco–German relations imposed by the attempt at an Austrian-German customs union in 1931 left Massigli increasing disillusioned with the Weimar Republic.[13] In 1931, Massigli advised French Premier Pierre Laval, before his summit with German Chancellor Heinrich Brüning for France to offer a bailout for the collapsing German bank system, tied to the Germans ending their demand for Gleichberechtigung, during the upcoming World Disarmament Conference.[14] Brüning refused the offer.

Massigli was a prominent player in the conference, in Geneva, and helped to write the so-called ‘Barthou note’ of 17 April 1934[14], in which French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou announced that France refused to agree to a German rearmament and would no longer play any part in the Conference, and from now on would ensure its own security with its own resources.

Massigli was especially opposed to Premier Édouard Herriot's acceptance in December 1932 "in principle" of Gleichberechtigung and predicated correctly that it would open the door for German rearmament.[14]

Opponent of appeasement

In 1933, Massigli was appointed the deputy political director at the French foreign ministry. In the 1930s, Massigli was a leading member of the so-called "Protestant clan", namely a group of Protestants who held high offices in the Quai d'Orsay.[15] As a diplomat, Massigli was noted for his efficiency and his crisp, lucid writing style.[15] In general, Massigli was identified with as an advocate of "firmness" in dealing with the new German government, and in note of 11 December 1933, he argued that the main thrust of German policy was to preserve a strong Franco-German relation in exchange for acceptance of German expansionism into Eastern Europe, before Germany went for a final showdown with France.[16]

Compared to his superior, the Secretary-General of the Quai d'Orsay, Alexis Léger, Massilgi was more open to enlisting Italy as an ally against Germany.[15] During the crisis that was caused in March 1936 by the German remilitarization of the Rhineland, Massigli urged for Paris to use the crisis as a way to strengthen the French ties with the United Kingdom and Belgium as well as the League of Nations.[17] Massigli especially hoped to use the Rhineland crisis as a way of securing the British "continental commitment", an unequivocal British commitment to defend France via an expeditionary force of the same size as the British Expeditionary Force of the First World War.

After meeting with the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in London in March 1936, Massigli was angry with what he regarded as the feeble British response to the Rhineland remilitarisation.[17] Massigli regarded the vague British promise to come to France's aid in the event of a German attack, coupled with staff talks of a very limited scope, as a most unsatisfactory substitute for the "continental commitment". On 17 March 1936, Massigli expressed his worries about the possible consequences of the Rhineland crisis when he complained to General Victor-Henri Schweisguth that the concept of international co-operation was collapsing in the face of the German move into the Rhineland, that the League of Nations was losing all of its moral authority and that "if all this isn't repaired immediately, we stand on the verge of a complete change in policy and a return to continental alliances".[18] It was only the hope of maintaining good Anglo-French relations that led Massigli to see at least some silver lining in the Rhineland crisis.[18] In 1937, he was promoted the Political Director of the Quai d'Orsay, upon the recommendation of Léger.[1]

During the crisis in 1938 over Czechoslovakia, Massigli opposed his government's policy and privately deplored the Munich Agreement as a disaster to France.[19] In September 1938, Massigli followed the Premier Édouard Daladier to Munich as part of the French delegation, and upon returning to Paris, he witnessed the vast cheering crowds. He wrote in a letter, "Poor people, I am overwhelmed with shame".[20]

After the Munich Agreement, Massigli wrote in memo, "Far from bringing Germany back to a policy of co-operation, the success of her method can only encourage her to persevere in it. The enormous sacrifice conceded by the Western powers will have no counterpart: once more we will be reduced to an act of faith in the peaceful evolution of the new Pangermanism".[21] In August 1938, Massigli argued to British Chargé de Affairs Campbell what he saw as the significance of Czechoslovakia, which blocked German expansion into Eastern Europe.[20] However, Massigli felt that various economic and strategic concerns made France unable to go to war over Czechoslovakia without British support. Otherwise, it would be best for the French to explain the strategic state of affairs "frankly" to Prague.[20] Massigli felt that in the event of a German attack, then France should not automatically declare war, as the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance of 1924 required, but Paris should present the hypothetical German-Czechoslovak war to the League of Nations Council and then wait until the Council decided if the war was a case of aggression or not.[20]

Massigli saw the Czechoslovak crisis as a way of strengthening Anglo-French ties and on 17 September 1938, he wrote a memorandum:

"If the British Government pushes us along the path of surrender, it must consider the resulting weakness of French security, which on numerous occasions, has been declared inseparable from British security. To what extent might a reinforcement of the ties of Franco-British collaboration compensate for this weakening in the common interests of the two countries? This is a matter to which the attention of the British leaders should be drawn."[20]

Relations between Massigli and his superior in 1938, Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet, were very poor and Bonnet's memoirs lambasted Massigli quite severely.[22] Massigli accused Bonnet of seeking to alter the documentary record in his favour.[23]

Ambassador to Turkey

On 19 October 1938, Massigli was sacked as political director by Bonnet, who exiled him to Turkey as ambassador.[24] An Anglophile, Massigli's removal meant a weakening of those officials in the Quai d'Orsay who favoured closer ties to Britain.[25]

During his time in Ankara, Massigli played an important role in ensuring that the Hatay dispute was resolved in Turkey's favour.[26] Massagli felt that the be the best way of ensuring a pro-Western tilt in Turkey was to accede to the Turkish demands for the sanjak of Alexandretta (modern İskenderun).[26] During his talks with the Turkish foreign minister, Şükrü Saracoğlu, Massigli was hindered by the continual poor state of his relations with Bonnet. In addition, Massigli faced much opposition from Arab nationalists and the French High Commission in Syria, both opposed to ceding the sanjak of Alexandretta.[26] When the talks over Hatay began in February 1939, Massagli went for weeks without negotiating instructions by Bonnet and so was unable to complete the Hatay negotiations until 23 June 1939.[26]

Though Massigli was appalled by the Turkish chantage (blackmail) of concentrating troops on the Turkish-Syrian frontier and sending raiders over the border to pressure the French into handing over Alexandretta, he felt that it was better to turn it over as a way of winning Turkey favour and to allow France to focus on opposing Germany.[27]

Massigli argued to his superiors in Paris that it was Germany, not Turkey, that was the major danger to France and so having a large number of French troops in Syria to guard against a Turkish attack was thus an unneeded distraction. Moreover, Massigli maintained that if France did not return Alexandretta and a Franco-German war broke out, Turkey would probably invade Syria to take back Alexandretta. However, if France did return Alexandretta, Turkey would maintain a pro-Allied neutrality or even fight on the Allied side. During his talks with the Turks, Massigli was often attacked by Les Syriens, an influential Roman Catholic lobby that believed strongly in France's mission civilisatrice (civilising mission) in the Middle East. It was stoutly opposed to giving up Alexandretta as a betrayal of France's mission civilisatrice.[28] Most of the Les Syriens were Anglophobes, who saw Britain, rather than Germany, as the main enemy of France.[28]

Massigli for his part held them in contempt, arguing that France could not be distracted by adventures in the Middle East when Germany was on the march.[29] In March 1939, Massigli visited the headquarters of the French High Commission in Beirut and bluntly stated that Turkey was not, as the High Commission claimed, seeking to annex all of Syria, only Alexandretta.[29] Massigli was able, during his talks with the Turks, to persuade his hosts to stop sending irregulars over the Turkish-Syrian frontier to attack French troops.[29] During his negotiations with Saracoğlu, the Turks suggested a ten-year alliance of Turkey, Britain and France in exchange for the French handing over Alexandretta.[29] When the Turkish offer became public, it provoked a major outcry from the Les Syriens.[29]

On 24 March 1939, Saracoğlu told Massigli that Britain and France should do more to oppose German influence in the Balkans, which was followed on 29 March by an offer of a Franco-Turkish alliance, which would go into effect if the British also joined.[30] In April 1939, Deputy Soviet Foreign Commissar Vladimir Potemkin, during a visit to Turkey, told Massigli that the aim of Soviet foreign policy was to bring into line a "peace front" to oppose German expansionism comprising Britain, France, the Soviet Union and Turkey.[31]

In 1939, Massigli was heavily preoccupied with competition with the German Ambassador Franz von Papen to secure Turkish adherence to the Allied side in case war broke out. As part of the effort to increase French influence on the Turkish government, Massigli arranged for the visit of General Maxime Weygand to Turkey in early May 1939, which was made into a state event.[32] During Weygand's visit, Turkish President İsmet İnönü told the French that he believed that the best way of stopping Germany was an alliance of Turkey, the Soviet Union, France and Britain. If such an alliance came into being, the Turks would allow Soviet ground and air forces onto their soil. He also wanted a major programme of French military aid to modernise the Turkish armed forces.[33]

Massigli was most disappointed when the British sent a mere brigadier instead of an admiral to offer military aid to the Turks. He remarked, "The Turks respect the Royal Navy; they no longer believe in the British Army".[34] In July 1939, Massigli argued that if the British and French were able to offer a stabilisation fund for the Turkish pound, it would undercut German economic influence in Turkey and tie Turkey to the West.[35] In July 1939, Massigli was able to play a major part in arranging for French arms shipments to Turkey. In August, he helped to create an Anglo-French stabilisation fund to help with Turkey's economic problems.[36]

The signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact on 23 August 1939 undid much of Massigli's effort, as the Turks always believed that it was essential to have the Soviet Union as an ally to counter Germany, and the signing of the German–Soviet pact undercut all the assumptions behind Turkish security policy.[37]

Though Massigli was often hampered by his poor relations with Bonnet, the efforts of the Les Syriens and the stingy attitude of the French Treasury towards supporting Turkey, British historian D.C. Watt argues that Massigli was an outstanding able ambassador who helped French interests in Turkey in 1939.[38]

Second World War

In October 1939, the furious rivalry between Massagli and von Papen finally ended with the conclusion of a mutual security pact between the United Kingdom, France and Turkey. However, as Massagli admitted in his memoir of time as ambassador in Ankara, La Turquie devant la Guerre, his triumph proved to be an ephemeral one as the Turks chose to interpret Clause Two of the Anglo-French-Turkish alliance to justify its continuing neutrality.[39] However, Massigli contended that while he failed to bring Turkey into the war on the Allied state, he at least foiled von Papen's efforts to bring Turkey into the war on the Axis side.

In August 1940, Massigli was removed by the Vichy government as Ambassador to Turkey. Massigli returned to France and was in contact with several Resistance leaders in the Lyon area, most notably Jean Moulin. In January 1943, Massigli was retrieved from France and came to London to serve as Charles de Gaulle's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. He acted, in effect, as the Free French foreign minister from 1943 to 1944. Immediately afterwards, Massigli was at the eye of a storm in an Anglo-French crisis, when Churchill tried to stop de Gaulle from visiting the Middle East under the grounds that would make trouble for the British.[40] Massigli did his best to persuade de Gaulle not to visit Algeria, but when the latter learned that he was confided to Britain, he shouted at Massigli, "Alors, je suis prisonnier!" (So I am a prisoner!")[41]

Massigi did his best to defuse the crisis and the British diplomat Charles Peake reported after talking to Massigli:

"He [Massigli] thought that... General de Gaulle would himself want to leave for Algiers about the 31st March. Mr. Massigli then asked me whether the Prime Minister would receive the General before the latter left. I said that if Mr. Massigil was making a request for this, I would certainly put it forward, but that I did not think it likely that the Prime Minister would feel able to accede...the reason lay in the record of General de Gaulle's own behaviour.

Mr. Massigli said he did not contest that General de Gaulle was an unusually difficult and unsatisfactory man with whom to do business, but, speaking to me as a friend, he begged me to use my best endeavors to persuade the Prime Minister to see the General before he left. It was of course true that General de Gaulle had been built up by the British government, but the fact remained that he had been built up, and he thought that, on any objective consideration, it would not be agreed that his position in metropolitan France as paramount, and that the tendency was for it to become so elsewhere. He felt it right, speaking personally and very confidentially, to warn me of the dangers which must inevitably lie ahead if General de Gaulle should go to North Africa feeling that the Prime Minister's face was turned against him..and it was surely therefore of real advantage, purely as a matter of policy, that the Prime Minister should say a kind word to him before he left. One of General de Gaulle's limitations, as I would know well, was that he was apt to nurse a grievance and to brood over facied wrongs. Would it not be wise, in the interests of Anglo-French relations, to remove any pretext for his doing so? The Prime Minister was so great a figure and so magnanimous that he believed that if this appeal were conveyed to him, he would not be deaf to it. Moreover, General de Gaulle cherished a deep-seated admiration for the Prime Minister and, he was sure, would respond to a kind word from him".[42]

On 30 March, Churchill agreed to meet de Gaulle, but only to learn that de Gaulle had not requested a meeting as Massigli was acting on his own in trying to set up a Churchill-de Gaulle summit.[43] Finally, in the presence of Massigli and Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, the Prime Minister and the General met on 2 April 1943.[44] Despite all the bad blood between Churchill and de Gaulle, the meeting was friendly, with Churchill agreeing that de Gaulle would go to Algeria after all.[45] The meeting ended with Churchill saying that he "was convinced that a strong France was in the interests of Europe, and especially of England.... The Prime Minister was a European, a good European-at least he hoped so-and a strong France was an indispensable element in his conception of Europe. The General could rely on these assurances, whatever unpleasant incidents might occur. It was a principle of English policy... which corresponded to the interests of France, of Great Britain, and also of the United States. The Prime Minister again asked the General to rely on this declaration, and to remember it in times of difficulty".[46] When de Gaulle finally arrived in Algiers on 30 May 1943, Massigli followed him to assist de Gaulle in his struggle against the rival faction for the leadership of the Free French movement led by General Henri Giraud.[47] In 1943, Massigli opposed the visit of the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri as-Said, to Algeria after a summit with the Prime Minister of Egypt, Mustafa el-Nahhas, on the grounds that such visit would encourage Arab nationalist sentiment in French North Africa, would give the impression that France was aligning itself with one fraction, centred around as-Said Pasha, and might weaken the electoral chances of pro-French Lebanese nationalists in the upcoming Lebanese elections.[48] In January 1944, at the conference called by Gaulle to consider the postwar fate of the French African colonies in Brazzaville in the French Congo, Massigli strongly urged that representatives from the protectorates of Tunis and Morocco and the government of Algeria not be allowed to attend the conference.[49] Massigli's advice was followed.[49]

In the spring of 1944, Massigli, on the behalf of de Gaulle, presented an offer to Churchill] and Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden for a "Third Force" in the postwar world, between the Soviet Union and the United States. It would have the United Kingdom, France and Belgium, who to integrate their defence and economic policies and control jointly the western half of Germany.[50] The British were not initially interested in the proposal, and de Gaulle was always cool to the idea of British involvement in the "Third Force" concept; he had agreed to British participation only to allay Belgian concerns about postwar French domination.[50] Moreover, de Gaulle had imposed as a precondition for British participation that London should support France annexing the Ruhr and Rhineland regions of Germany after the war, which the British rejected.[50]

In 1944, de Gaulle decided that Massigli was too pro-British for his liking and demoted him to Ambassador to London. From August 1944 to June 1954, Massigli was the French Ambassador to the Court of St. James's. In August 1944, Massigli lobbied Churchill to allow a greater French role in the war in the Far East as the best way of ensuring that French Indochina would stay French after World War II had ended.[51] In November 1944, when Churchill visited Paris, he presented to de Gaulle his offer for an Anglo-French pact, which Massigli unsuccessfilly urged the General to accept.[50]

Cold War

During his time in Britain, Massigli was very much involved in the debates about the Cold War and European integration. Massigli was strongly opposed to the vision of European federation of Jean Monnet. Instead, he urged the creation of an Anglo-French bloc, which would serve as the basis for a federation of Europe. In 1954 to 1956, Massigli served as the Secretary-General of the Quai d'Orsay. As Secretary-General, Massigli played a major role behind the scenes in resolving the 1954 crisis in trans-Atlantic relations after the rejection by the French National Assembly of the European Defence Community.

Later life

In 1956, Massigil retired. His memoirs, Une Comédie des Erreurs, were published in 1978. He died in Paris on 3 February 1988, seven weeks before his 100th birthday.

Honours

Massigli was appojnted Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour in 1954. He was appointed an honorary Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire in 1938, honorary Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order in 1950, and honorary Companion of Honour in 1954.

Works

  • "New Conceptions of French Policy in Tropical Africa" pp. 403–415 from International Affairs, Volume 33, No. 4, October 1957.
  • La Turquie devant la Guerre: Mission a Ankara 1939–1940, Paris: Plon, 1964.
  • Une Comédie des Erreurs, 1943–1956 souvenirs et réflexions sur une étape de la construction européenne, Paris: Plon, 1978.

Further reading

  • Burgess, Patricia (editor) pp. 100–102 from The Annual Obituary 1988, St James Press, 1990 ISBN 1-55862-050-8
  • Pastor-Castro, Rogelia "The Quai d'Orsay and the European Defence Community Crisis of 1954" pp. 386–400 from History, Volume 91, Issue #303, July 2006.

References

Sources

  • Adamthwaite, Anthony (1977). France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936–1939. London: Frank Cass. ISBN 0-7146-3035-7.
  • Duroselle, Jean Baptiste (2004). France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy, 1932–1939. New York: Enigma Books. ISBN 1-929631-15-4.
  • El-Solh, Raghid (2004). Lebanon and Arabism: National Identity and State Formation. London: I. B. Tauris. ISBN 9781860640513.
  • Kersaudy, François (1981). Churchill and de Gaulle. New York: Atheneum. ISBN 0-689-11265-3.
  • Loth, Wilfried (1988). "General Introduction". In Walter Lipgens & Wilfried Loth. Documents on the History of European Integration: The Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Count. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. pp. 1–16. ISBN 9783110114294.
  • Purcell, H. D. (1965). "Review of La Turquie devant la Guerre: Mission a Ankara 1939–1940". International Affairs. 41 (1): 152–153. doi:10.2307/2612003. JSTOR 2612003.
  • Schuker, Stephen (1997). "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland, 1936". In Patrick Finney. The Origins of the Second World War: a Reader. London: Arnold Press. pp. 206–221. ISBN 9780340676400.
  • Shipway, Martin (2002). The Road To War: France and Vietnam 1944–1947. Oxford: Berghahn Books. ISBN 978-1-57181-149-3.
  • Thomas, Martin (2001). "Free France, the British Government and the Future of French Indochina 1940–45". In Paul H. Kratoska. Independence through Revolutionary War. South East Asia: Colonial History. 6. London: Routledge. pp. 223–251. ISBN 0-415-24785-3.
  • Trachtenberg, Marc (1979). "Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference" (PDF). The Journal of Modern History. 51 (1): 24–55. doi:10.1086/241847. JSTOR 1877873.
  • Ulrich, Raphäelle (1998). "René Massigli and Germany, 1919–1938". In Robert Boyce. French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918–1940 The Decline and Fall of A Great Power. London: Routledge. pp. 132–148. ISBN 0-415-15039-6.
  • Vaïsse, Maurice (1983). "Against Appeasement: French Advocates of Firmness, 1933–38". In Wolfgang Mommsen & Lothar Kettenacker. The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement. London: George Allen & Unwin. pp. 227–235. ISBN 0-04-940068-1.
  • Watt, D. C. (1989). How War Came: the Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–1939. New York: Pantheon Books. ISBN 0-394-57916-X.
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