Problem of other minds
The problem of other minds is a philosophical problem traditionally stated as the following epistemological challenge raised by the skeptic: given that I can only observe the behavior of others, how can I know that others have minds?[1] It is a central tenet of the philosophical idea known as solipsism; the notion that for any person only one's own mind is known to exist. Solipsism maintains that no matter how sophisticated someone's behavior is, behavior on its own does not guarantee the presence of mentality.
See also
- Animal consciousness
- Boltzmann brain
- Brain in a vat
- Chinese room
- Dream argument
- Explanatory gap
- Hard problem of consciousness
- Mind–body problem
- Mirror neuron
- Other Minds: The Octopus, the Sea, and the Deep Origins of Consciousness
- Philosophical skepticism
- Philosophical zombie
- Philosophy of mind
- Psychophysics
- Qualia
- Turing test
References
- ↑ Hyslop, Alec (14 January 2014). Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri, eds. "Other Minds". Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University. ISSN 1095-5054. Retrieved May 26, 2015.
Further reading
- Wisdom, John, Other Minds (1952)
- Dennett, D.C., Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology (1978)
- Anita Avramides, Other Minds (2001). Routledge.
- Masahiro Inami, The Problem of Other Minds in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition (2001), Journal of Indian Philosophy
External links
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