Minos (dialogue)

Minos
Oldest manuscript
Manuscript: Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Gr. 1807 (19th century)
Author Plato or Pseudo-Plato
Original title Μίνως
Country Ancient Greece
Language Greek
Subject Philosophy of law

Minos (/ˈmaɪnɒs, -nəs/; Greek: Μίνως) is purported to be one of the dialogues of Plato. It features Socrates and a companion who together attempt to find a definition of "law" (Greek: νόμος, nómos).

Despite its authenticity having been doubted by many scholars,[1] it has often been regarded as a foundational document in the history of legal philosophy,[2] particularly in the theory of natural law.[3] It has also conversely been interpreted as describing a largely procedural theory of law.[4]

Content

The dialogue is normally separated into two sections. In the first half, Socrates and a companion attempt to seek a definition of "law," while in the second half Socrates praises Minos, the mythical king of Crete.[5]

Definition of law

The dialogue opens with Socrates asking his nameless companion, "What is the law for us?"[6] The companion's common-sense understanding of law has him define it as the decreed "official opinion" of a city, or "what is accepted."[7] The Greek word for law is nomos, which is also used to describe an established custom or practice. The companion defines nomos as something nomizomenon (the present passive participle of the related verb nomizō), meaning "accepted."[5] Nomizō is used to mean "practice," "have in common or customary use," "enact," "treat," "consider as" and "belief," amongst other things.[5] Socrates opposes this definition:

Friend: What else would law (nomos) be, Socrates, but what is accepted (nomizomenon)?

Socrates: And so speech, in your view, is what is spoken, or sight what is seen, or hearing what is heard? Or is speech one thing, what is spoken another, sight one thing, what is seen another, hearing one thing, what is heard another—and so law one thing, what is accepted another? Is that so, or what is your view?

Friend: They are two different things, as it now seems to me.

Socrates: Law, then, is not what is accepted.[8]

Supposing that laws are resolutions of a city,[9] Socrates points out the contradiction that while we would always consider law and justice to be "something very fine,"[10] we can imagine a particular resolution of a city as being either "admirable" or "wicked." It therefore follows that it is incorrect to say that law describes the resolutions of a city.[11]

Instead, Socrates proceeds by supposing that "law is a kind of judgement. And since it is not the wicked judgement... it is the admirable."[11]

Socrates: But what is admirable judgement? Is it not true judgement?

Friend: Yes.

Socrates: Now isn't true judgement discovery of reality?

Friend: It is.

Socrates: Then ideally law is discovery of reality.[12]

Socrates goes on to defend this extraordinary definition of law, as that which "wishes to be the discovery of what is," or as the "discovery of reality."[13]

Praise of Minos

The dialogue eventually proceeds into praise of Minos, the mythical leader of Crete and an ancient enemy of Athens.[14]

Interpretation

Bradley Lewis conceives of the Minos as doing three things: it begins by showing that the ultimate aspiration of law should be truth, while also acknowledging the variety of human laws. This diversity is often taken as an argument against natural law, but the dialogue suggests that the diversity is compatible with the account of the human good being the end of politics. Next, the dialogue underscores the origins of law and legal authority as concrete. Thirdly, the dialogue suggests, but does not explicitly mention, the inherent limitations of contemporary theories of law.[15]

Though the dialogue is often noted as introducing a theory of natural law,[3] the word "nature" (Greek: φύσις phusis) is never used in the dialogue.[16]

The unnamed interlocutor (Greek: ἑταῖρος hetairos) can be translated in several different ways. Outside of the dialogue, the word is typically translated as "companion," "comrade," "pupil," or "disciple."[17] In the context of Minos however, other conceptions of the interlocutor have been suggested, including being an ordinary citizen,[18][19] a student,[20] a friend,[21] an "Everyman"[22] and the "voice of common sense."[23]

D.S. Hutchinson has pointed out that the combination of "dry academic dialectic together with a literary-historical excursus" is similar to that of other Platonic dialogues, such as the Atlantis myth in Timaeus and Critias, as well other cases in Alcibiades, Second Alcibiades and Hipparchus.[5]

In the dialogue, bodies of laws are conceived as written texts that can be either true of false.[5] In Plato's later dialogue, Laws, he similarly held that legal texts benefit from literary elaboration.[5][24] A proper law is expected to express the reality of social life, which endures just as the ideal city described in Laws would.[5]

The culminating praise of Minos has been interpreted as part of Socrates' intention to liberate the companion from loyalty to Athens and its opinions.

Authenticity

The majority of modern scholars oppose Platonic authorship,[25] including Werner Jaeger,[26] Anton-Hermann Chroust,[27] Jerome Hall,[28] A. E. Taylor[29] and most recently Christopher Rowe.[30] Conversly, there have been cases made arguing in favor of Plato’s authorship, including from George Grote,[31] Glenn R. Morrow[32] and William S. Cobb.[33] Paul Shorey suggested that the dialogue may have been partly written by Plato and partly by someone else.[34]

Arguments regarding authorship

The main arguments against the authenticity of Minos typically say that it is too stylistically crude, philosophically simplistic and too full of poor argumentation to legitimately be Plato.[25] Grote pointed out a flaw in this reasoning, noting that if the dialogue being "confused and unsound"[35] and "illogical"[36] were grounds to exclude it from the Platonic corpus, then one would also have to cast doubt on the Phaedo since Plato's arguments in it for the immortality of the soul are so ineffective.[31][16]

W. R. M. Lamb doubts the authenticity of the dialogue because of its unsatisfying character, though he does consider it a "fairly able and plausible imitation of Plato's early work."[37] Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns do not even include it among Plato's spurious works in their Collected Dialogues.[38] Leo Strauss, on the other hand, considered the dialogue to be authentic enough to write a commentary on it.[39]

The tension between the first half, which extols law as the "discovery of reality," followed by the praising of the mythical figure Minos, who is typically described in tradition as a brutal despot, has been viewed by some as reason to doubt the dialogue.[40] This apparent incoherence between the two parts of the dialogue has been utilized as one argument against Platonic authorship,[34] though others have seen the introduction of Minos as being perfectly coherent.[41]

Placement in the Platonic Corpus

Many historical commentators have viewed the Minos as a kind of introduction to the Laws.[15] Aristophanes of Byzantium placed the Minos with the Laws in his organization of Plato's writings as trilogies and tetralogies,[42][lower-alpha 1] as did Thrasyllus in his later tetralogical organization of the Platonic corpus:[43][lower-alpha 2]

Placement Aristophanes's trilogy organization[42] Aristophanes's tetralogy organization[42] Thrasyllus's tetralogy organization[43]
1 Laws Minos Minos
2 Minos Laws Laws
3 Epinomis Epinomis Epinomis
4 - Letters Letters

Because of the similarities in style to the Hipparchus, many scholars have concluded that they are the work of the same author, written soon after the middle of the fourth century B.C.[21] Böckh ascribed the dialogue to a minor Socratic, Simon the Shoemaker,[25][44] who is mentioned by Diogenes Laërtius as a note-taker of Socrates.[45]

References

Footnotes

  1. ↑ Aristophanes placed Minos in the third of five collections for the trilogy organization, and in the ninth and final collection for the tetralogy organization.[42]
  2. ↑ Thrasyllus placed Minos in the ninth and final collection in his tetralogy organization.[43]

Citations

  1. ↑
    • Boeckh 1806
    • Heidel 1896, pp. 39-43
    • Lewis 2006, p. 17
    • Pavlu 1910
    • Schleiermacher 1996, pp. 171-3
  2. ↑
    • Cairns 1949, pp. 31-2
    • Cairns 1970
    • Chroust 1947
    • Jaeger 1947, pp. 369-70
    • Lewis 2006, p. 17
  3. 1 2
    • Annas 1995, p. 303 n. 47
    • Cairns 1949, pp. 33-7
    • Chroust 1947, pp. 48-9
    • Crowe 1977, p. xi
    • Fassò 1966, pp. 78-9
    • George 1993, pp. 149-50
    • Grote 1888, pp. 421-5
    • Hathaway & Houlgate 1969
    • Jaeger 1947, pp. 370-1
    • Lewis 2006, p. 18
    • Maguire 1947, p. 153
    • Shorey 1933, p. 425
  4. ↑ Best 1980, pp. 102-13
  5. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Hutchinson 1997, p. 1307
  6. ↑ Plato, Minos, 313a
  7. ↑ Plato, Minos, 313a-b
  8. ↑ Plato, Minos, 313b-c
  9. ↑ Plato, Minos, 314c
  10. ↑ Plato, Minos, 314d
  11. 1 2 Plato, Minos, 314e
  12. ↑ Plato, Minos, 314e-315a
  13. ↑ Plato, Minos, 315a-318d
  14. ↑ Plato, Minos, 318d-321b
  15. 1 2 Lewis 2006, p. 20
  16. 1 2 Lewis 2006, p. 18
  17. ↑ Lidell & Scott 1940
  18. ↑ Grote 1888, p. 71
  19. ↑ Jaeger 1947, p. 370
  20. ↑ Chroust 1947, p. 49
  21. 1 2 Hutchinson 1997, p. 1307-8
  22. ↑ Hathaway and Houlgate 1969, p. 107
  23. ↑ Best 1980, p. 103, 107
  24. ↑ Plato, Laws, 718c-723d
  25. 1 2 3 Lewis 2006, p. 17
  26. ↑ Jaeger 1947, pp. 369-70, 375 n. 74
  27. ↑ Chroust 1947, pp. 52-3
  28. ↑ Jerome 1956, p. 199
  29. ↑ Taylor 1952, p. 540
  30. ↑ Rowe 2000, pp. 303-9
  31. 1 2 Grote 1888, p. 93-7
  32. ↑ Morrow 1960, pp. 35-9
  33. ↑ Cobb 1988, pp. 187-207
  34. 1 2 Shorey 1933, p. 425
  35. ↑ Grote 1888, p. 88
  36. ↑ Grote 1888, p. 95
  37. ↑ Lamb, 1927, 386
  38. ↑ Hamilton & Cairns 1961
  39. ↑ Strauss 1968
  40. ↑ Lewis 2006, p. 19
  41. ↑
    • Best 1980, p. 102
    • Chroust 1947, pp. 52-3
    • Jaeger 1947, pp. 370-71
    • Strauss 1968
  42. 1 2 3 4 Schironi 2005
  43. 1 2 3 Tarant 1993
  44. ↑ Boeckh 1806
  45. ↑ Diogenes Laërtius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, 2.122-3

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