George Ogilvie-Forbes

Sir George Arthur Drostan Ogilvie-Forbes KCMG[1](1891–1954) was a British diplomat who held two key postings in the years leading up to the Second World War, as chargé d'affaires in Madrid and Valencia 1936–37 and as Counsellor and chargé d'affaires in Berlin 1937–1939.[2] He was known for his humanitarian efforts in both situations.[3] In 2008 his name was included on a plaque in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, commemorating seven British diplomats "…who by their personal endeavours helped to rescue victims of Nazi racial policy".[4]

Early life

Ogilvie-Forbes was born on 6 December 1891 in Edinburgh, son of an Aberdeenshire landowner. He was educated at The Oratory School, Beaumont College, Bonn University and New College Oxford. In 1914 he joined the Scottish Horse Yeomanry, was wounded at Gallipoli and twice mentioned in Dispatches.[5] In 1916 he was promoted to Captain and became ADC to Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Stanley Maude the Commander-in-Chief, Mesopotamia and served on the General Staff.[6]

Early diplomatic career

Ogilvie-Forbes joined HM Diplomatic Service in 1919[7] and early postings included Denmark, Finland, Yugoslavia and Mexico (1927–30). Ogilvie-Forbes served as the chargé d'affaires to the Holy See (1930–32) and then as Counsellor to Embassy in Baghdad (1932–35).[8] Ogilvie-Forbes was described as a "brilliant diplomat" who was a favorite protege of Sir Robert "Van" Vansittart, the Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office 1930-37.[9]

Spain 1936–1937

At the outbreak of the civil war in July 1936 several embassies, including the British, evacuated to Hendaye. Ogilvie-Forbes was appointed charge d'affaires in Madrid, which was then a war zone governed by the Republicans. British policy during the Spanish Civil War was officially that of non-intervention, but many believed at the time that this was a false image and subsequent opening of official records has shown the British government's support for Franco from the start.[10] In contrast to this, Ogilvie-Forbes set out firstly to be as impartial as possible, and secondly to cultivate good relations with the differing factions within the Republican side because of the opportunity it provided for humanitarian aid and assistance to refugees from both sides of the conflict.[11] During his four and a half months running the embassy in Madrid the city was torn by the violence of the chaotic reign of terror within and the shelling by Franco's army from the outside. The historian Tom Buchanan wrote of Ogilvie-Forbes: "He had no interest in the competing ideologies in Spain … and never lost sight of the fact that the conflict represented above all, private suffering on an immense scale which it was within his power – in however small a way – to mitigate."[12]

Towards the end of 1936 the Foreign Office was keen for Ogilvie-Forbes to close the embassy in Madrid, whilst acknowledging "that in the present welter of agony he feels a personal call to continue as long as possible his work of mercy, and that he cannot leave without doing violence to his conscience."[13] On 1 January 1937 after the Republican government moved out of Madrid, Ogilvie-Forbes was instructed to move the Embassy to Valencia.[14] Soon after that he was appointed as Counsellor to the British Embassy in Berlin.

By January 1937 British officials had helped in the evacuation of some 17,000 refugees.[15] When Ogilvie-Forbes received his KCMG in May 1937 for his services in Spain, he pointed out in a letter to Anthony Eden that it was in recognition of all his colleagues who had helped him in Spain "often in terribly cruel circumstances".[16]

Berlin 1937–1939

Ogilvie-Forbes was appointed Counsellor to the Embassy in Berlin in early April 1937. Sir Neville Henderson, the new ambassador, arrived shortly afterwards. It was unusual to replace an ambassador and his second-in-command at the same time especially in an embassy of such significance. Ogilvie-Forbes and Henderson had differing attitudes towards Hitler and the Nazi regime, and their personal relationship was strained from the start.[17][18] In the various degrees of approach to Appeasement, Henderson certainly shared the views of Neville Chamberlain, and as far as possible he dealt with Chamberlain directly, regularly bypassing the Foreign Office.[19] Henderson was appointed in the hope that he might befriend Hitler and thus help to moderate the latter's behaviour towards Britain. As late as February 1939 Henderson wrote "If we handle him (Hitler) right, my belief is that he will become gradually more pacific. But if we treat him as a pariah or mad dog we shall turn him irrevocably into one".[20]

By mid 1938 it was clear that Henderson was a very sick man, and in October he had to return to London and take five months leave for treatment for the cancer from which he died in 1942. During this time Ogilvie-Forbes was in charge of the embassy. He had a much more pessimistic view of Hitler than Henderson and this was reflected in his dispatches back to the Foreign Office.[21] Ogilvie-Forbes shared the widespread feeling in Britain that the Treaty of Versailles had been too harsh on Germany and he had supported the Munich Agreement under the grounds that the Sudetenland should never had been included in Czechoslovakia in the first place.[22] However, unlike Henderson, Ogilvie-Forbes believed that the Nazi regime had foreign policy goals that well went beyond revising the Treaty of Versailles and was aimed at winning Germany the "world power status" that she sought in the First World War.[23]

In the work involving the implementation of the Munich Agreement, Ogilvie-Forbes became increasingly tired "of the Germans' arrogant and dictatorial actions, and their blatant disregard for the letter and spirit of Munich.".[24] In the months that followed, his appraisal of the situation was bleak, emphasising that Hitler could not be trusted and "had unlimited aims of world domination and an ‘insensate’ hatred of Britain...That appeasement could never succeed...That the German economy was solely directed towards military ends...and Hitler could only be removed after a military defeat – Britain would have to choose between war and surrender." He could see no possibility at all of Goering (whom he knew personally) leading a movement against the Fuhrer, and dismissed the idea of an internal German revolt to overthrow the Nazis.[25]

It has been argued by the Canadian historian Bruce Strang, that during the time of Henderson's absence, Ogilvie-Forbes, was able to have a significant effect on British Foreign policy, as he wrote: "It was not a coincidence that the decisive turn in the Cabinet's perception of Hitler occurred while Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes temporarily headed the Berlin Embassy, as he helped to undermine Chamberlain's often inaccurate views, and to create the climate of moral revulsion and the heightened sense of danger in which the Cabinet operated."[26]

This "moral revulsion" was perhaps most keenly conveyed by the barrage of strongly worded reports concerning the plight of the Jews in Germany sent by Ogilvie-Forbes. In a letter to Lord Halifax after Kristalnacht (10 November 1938),[27] Ogilvie-Forbes described how he and members of his staff witnessed the looting and destruction of Jewish property. The attacks, he wrote, started at a given hour, targeted with uncanny precision Jewish shops and buildings and ended on the word of Goebbels who condoned what had been done. Towards the end of his letter Ogilvie-Forbes wrote "I think the murder of Herr vom Rath by a German born Polish Jew has only accelerated the elimination of the Jews which has for long been planned. ...It has let loose the forces of mediaeval barbarism... I can find no words strong enough in condemnation of the disgusting treatment of innocent people and the civilized world is faced with the appalling sight of 500,000 people about to rot away in starvation." He points out that this is not just a national problem but also a world problem.[28]

In a dispatch to London on 6 December 1938, Ogilvie-Forbes quoted from Mein Kampf to argue that Hitler that Germany could not obtained "world power status" without first winning Lebensraum ("living space") in Russia.[29] Ogilvie argued that with the Reich rearmed and in possession of Austria and the Sudetenland, that he was hearing from sources in Berlin "that Herr Hitler is about to embark on the third stage of his programme, namely expansion beyond the boundaries of the territories inhabited by Germans. How exactly this is be achieved is the object of much speculation. One thing is certain: Nazi aims are on a grandiose scale, and there is no limit to their ultimate ambitions".[30] Some sources were telling Ogilvie-Forbes that Hitler was planning to attack the Soviet Union in 1939 to establish "an independent Russian Ukraine under German tutelage", and afterwards Germany would expand into the Balkans and seek an "outlet on the Mediterranean via Italy".[31] Other sources were telling Ogilvie-Forbes that Hitler was thinking about turning west in 1939 to "liquidate" France and Britain before Germany fell behind in the arms race.[32] Ogilvie-Forbes quoted one German official as saying to him that Hitler was still undecided about whatever he would turn west or east in 1939, but "it is the profound conviction of almost every thinking German that the tiger [Hitler] will jump soon".[33]

Ogilvie-Forbes further reported that Hitler regarded the Munich Agreement as a diplomatic defeat as what he wanted was a war to "smash" Czechoslovakia, not an agreement to hand over the Sudetenland.[34] Ogilvie-Forbes wrote his sources were telling him that Hitler had wished he had taken a "stronger line" at the Munich conference, was now "abusing his moderate counselors for their pusillanimity" and had "dubbed all his generals cowards" for advising him not to attack Czechoslovakia in September 1938.[35] In another dispatch, Ogilvie-Forbes reported that the Nazi regime was upset that the British spending on defense had not decreased after the Munich Agreement as expected, and that Hitler was planning to increase defense spending in order to win the arms race and allowed Germany to dominate Europe.[36] Ogilvie-Forbes concluded that another was imminent as even if he could not predicate for certain what Hitler would do in 1939 "what is certain is that the military and civilian resources of the country are prepared for an emergency".[37]

In the Berlin Embassy's annual report for 1938 Ogilvie-Forbes notes that at the beginning of the year it was ascertained that there were 15,700 prisoners at Dachau of whom over 12,000 were Jewish who were being subjected to harsh treatment. In the concentration camp at Buchenwald there were 30,000 Jews who were in many cases treated with brutality. He warned that unless Hitler were stopped by war then the Jews "extermination in Germany can only be a matter of time."[38] Ogilvie-Forbes argued on several occasions that the British Government might persuade Hitler to use the one billion Reichmarks fine, which had been levied against the Jews, to fund Jewish emigration, an action that he believed could really save Jewish lives. The government ignored this suggestion.[39] He was also keen to point out that Nazi anti-Semitism was symptomatic of Hitler's frame of mind; that it was Hitler who was personally conducting the campaign against the Jews.[40] The historian Abraham Ascher, himself a German Jew who fled the Third Reich, wrote that there was a real sense of personal empathy with the sufferings of German Jews in Ogilvie-Forbes's dispatches that Henderson never displayed.[41] Unlike Henderson, Ogilvie-Forbes attached far greater significance to Nazi antisemitism.[42]

On 3 January 1939, Ogilvie-Forbes engaged in what Ascher called an act of personal appeasement towards Henderson, when he wrote in a dispatch that the Wehrmacht was so overwhelmingly powerful that there was now nothing Britain could do to stop Germany from dominating Eastern Europe, and that British diplomats should make more efforts "to cultivate Field Marshal Göring and the moderate Nazis with a view to their exercising a restraining influence on the extremists such as Ribbentrop, Goebbels, and Himmler who at present have the ear of Hitler".[43] In the same dispatch, he wrote that Göring "is so devotedly loyal to his chief that I see no indication whatever of his leading a movement against the Führer".[44] Ascher wrote this dispatch is completely at odds with the rest of the dispatches Ogilvie-Forbes sent between October 1938-February 1939 that it is hard to guess what Ogilvie-Forbes was thinking when he wrote it, and the most likely explanation was it was meant to appease Henderson when he returned to the embassy in Berlin, as Ogilvie-Forbes knew that Henderson would disapprove of what he was writing, as indeed he did.[45]

After Hitler gave his "Prophecy Speech" to the Reichstag on 30 January 1939, Ogilvie-Forbes wrote the "extermination" of the Jews in Germany "can only be a matter of time".[46] Ogilvie-Forbes wrote that antisemitism in Germany was "not a national, but a world problem, which if neglected, contains the seeds of a terrible vengeance".[47]

As regards helping individual Jews to escape from the Nazis, in his position as a senior diplomat Ogilvie-Forbes could not be seen to be "bending the rules". However, he was able to help an acquaintance, Klaus Neuberg and secure the release of his son and three nephews from Sachsenhausen, and the subsequent move of eight of the family to New Zealand. This was organised through Captain Frank Foley, the passport control officer in the embassy, whom Ogilvie-Forbes supported, unofficially, in his work to enable thousands of Jews to escape.[48]

When Henderson returned to Berlin on 13 February 1939, his first act was to assemble the senior embassy staff to castigate Ogilvie-Forbes for what he had writing in his dispatches during his absence.[49] Henderson announced that henceforward all dispatches from the embassy to Berlin would have to conform to his views and that any diplomat he disobeyed this directive would be fired from the Foreign Office.[50] In a lengthy dispatch Henderson sent on 6 March 1939, he denounced almost everything that Ogilvie-Forbes had written during his absence.[51]

Later diplomatic career

After leaving Berlin soon after the outbreak of war, Ogilvie-Forbes was sent as Counsellor to the British Embassy in Norway, but had to leave almost immediately in company with the ambassador and the royal family when the Germans invaded. From 1940–1944 he was Minister to Cuba[52] and then from 1944–1949 Ambassador to Venezuela[53]

Retirement and death

On retirement Ogilvie-Forbes farmed his estate of Boyndlie, Aberdeenshire, was appointed a Deputy Lieutenant for Aberdeenshire, and became actively involved in various local charities and cultural organisations. He was a member of the Scottish Council for Development and Industry and the Catholic Council of Great Britain. For a short time he supported the Scottish Nationalist Party and was then designated by the 4th Scottish National Assembly to negotiate with the UK Government on the principle of self-government for Scotland under the Scottish Covenant Association Scheme of 1950. He died of a heart attack in 1954 at the age of 63.

Family

Ogilvie-Forbes married Clare Louise Hunter in 1921 and had two children, Lt Colonel Thomas Drostan Ogilvie-Forbes, Royal Engineers, who died in 1946 at the age of 24, and Christine Mary Margaret Ogilvie-Forbes (Mrs. Brose) who worked in Hut 8, Bletchley Park (1939–1945). One of his half-brothers, Air Vice Marshall Neill Ogilvie-Forbes OBE was Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Intelligence) 1950–52 and a half-sister Marion Wilberforce was one of the first eight women pilots to join the ATA in January 1940.

References

  1. ↑ London Gazette, 11 May 1937, p.3082
  2. ↑ The Times, Obituary, 12 July 1954, p.10
  3. ↑ The Times, 7 November 1939,.p.8
  4. ↑ Gilbert, Martin Beyond the Call of Duty: British Diplomats who helped Jews to escape from Nazi Tyranny, FCO Historians, 2008, pp.11–12
  5. ↑ The Times, Obituary, 12 July 1954, p.10
  6. ↑ Strang, Bruce, "Two Unequal Tempers: Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, Sir Neville Henderson and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39", Diplomacy and Statecraft, 5.1. (March 1994) p.117
  7. ↑ London Gazette, 23 April 1919, p. 327
  8. ↑ The Times, Obituary, 12 July 1954, p.10
  9. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012 p.74.
  10. ↑ Buchanan, Tom, "The edge of Darkness : British 'Front-line' Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil War,1936–1937", Contemporary European History,12.3.(2003) p.279
  11. ↑ The Times, 7 November 1939,.p.8
  12. ↑ Buchanan, Tom, "The edge of Darkness : British ‘Front-line’ Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil War,1936–1937", Contemporary European History,12.3.(2003) p.284
  13. ↑ Buchanan, Tom, "The edge of Darkness : British ‘Front-line’ Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil War,1936–1937", Contemporary European History,12.3.(2003) p.288
  14. ↑ The Times, 11 May 1937, p.12
  15. ↑ Buchanan,Tom, "The edge of Darkness : British ‘Front-line’ Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil War,1936–1937", Contemporary European History12.3.(2003) p.292
  16. ↑ Buchanan, Tom, "The edge of Darkness : British 'Front-line' Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil War,1936–1937", Contemporary European History,12.3.(2003) p.302
  17. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, ISBN 978-0-8047-8355-2, p.74
  18. ↑ Strang, Bruce, "Two Unequal Tempers: Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, Sir Neville Henderson and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39", Diplomacy and Statecraft, 5.1, (March 1994) pp.112–113
  19. ↑ Strang, Bruce, "Two Unequal Tempers: Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, Sir Neville Henderson and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39", Diplomacy and Statecraft, 5.1, (March 1994) p.111
  20. ↑ Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton University Press, 1976ISBN 0-691-05656-0, p.83
  21. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, ISBN 978-0-8047-8355-2, p.76
  22. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012 p.75.
  23. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012 p.75.
  24. ↑ Strang, Bruce, "Two Unequal Tempers: Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, Sir Neville Henderson and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39", Diplomacy and Statecraft, 5.1, (March 1994) p.114
  25. ↑ Strang, Bruce, "Two Unequal Tempers: Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, Sir Neville Henderson and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39", Diplomacy and Statecraft, 5.1, (March 1994) 'p.123-125
  26. ↑ Strang, Bruce, "Two Unequal Tempers: Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, Sir Neville Henderson and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39", Diplomacy and Statecraft, 5.1, (March 1994) p.132
  27. ↑ Strang, Bruce, "Two Unequal Tempers: Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, Sir Neville Henderson and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39", Diplomacy and Statecraft, 5.1, (March 1994) pp.115–116
  28. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, ISBN 978-0-8047-8355-2, p.74
  29. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, p.75
  30. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, p.75
  31. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, p.75
  32. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, p.75
  33. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, p.75
  34. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, p.75
  35. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, p.75
  36. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012 p.77.
  37. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012 p.77.
  38. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, ISBN 978-0-8047-8355-2, p.76
  39. ↑ Strang, Bruce, "Two Unequal Tempers: Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, Sir Neville Henderson and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39", Diplomacy and Statecraft, 5.1, (March 1994) p.116
  40. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, ISBN 978-0-8047-8355-2, p.76
  41. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, p.76
  42. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, p.76
  43. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, p.77
  44. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, p.77
  45. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, p.77
  46. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, p.76
  47. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, p.76
  48. ↑ Gilbert, Martin, Beyond the Call of Duty: British Diplomats who helped Jews to escape from Nazi Tyranny, FCO Historians, 2008, pp.11–12
  49. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, p.77-78
  50. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, p.78
  51. ↑ Ascher, Abraham, Was Hitler a Riddle? Western Democracies and National Socialism, Stanford University Press, 2012, p.78
  52. ↑ London Gazette,16 April 1940,p.2241
  53. ↑ London Gazette, 6 October 1944, p.4591
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