Democratic backsliding

In political science, democratic backsliding, also known as democratic erosion or de-democratization,[1] is a gradual decline in the quality of democracy.[2] This decline is caused by the state-led weakening of political institutions that sustain the democratic system. These essential components of democracy can be threatened in different ways. Thus, the concept of democratic backsliding can take various forms.

Political scientist Nancy Bermeo has written that blatant forms of democratic backsliding such as classic, open-ended coups d'état and election-day fraud have declined since the end of the Cold War, while more subtle and "vexing" forms of backsliding have increased. The latter forms of backsliding entail the debilitation of democratic institutions from within. These subtle forms of backsliding are especially dangerous when they are legitimized through the very institutions that ought to protect democratic values.[3]

Manifestations

Democratic backsliding occurs when essential components of democracy are threatened. Examples of democratic backsliding include:[4][5]

  • Free and fair elections are degraded;[4]
  • Liberal rights of freedom of speech and association decline, impairing the ability of the political opposition to challenge the government, hold it to account, and propose alternatives to the current regime;[4]
  • The rule of law (i.e., judicial and bureaucratic restraints on the government) is weakened,[4] such as when the independence of the judiciary is threatened, or when civil service tenure protections are weakened or eliminated.[6]
  • The government manufactures or overemphasizes a national security threat to create "a sense of crisis" that allows the government "to malign critics as weak-willed or unpatriotic" and to depict defenders of democratic institutions "as representatives of a tired, insulated elite."[6]

Forms

Democratic backsliding can occur in a number of common ways. Backsliding is often led by democratically elected leaders, and uses tactics that are "incremental rather than revolutionary."[7] Because this process involves democracy breaking down "slowly, in barely visible steps" it is difficult to pinpoint a single specific moment at which a government no longer democratic, as Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt point out.[8] Ozan Varol uses the phrase stealth authoritarianism to describe the practice of an authoritarian leader (or a would-be authoritarian leader) using "seemingly legitimate legal mechanisms for anti-democratic ends ... concealing anti-democratic practices under the mask of law."[9] Varol describes the manipulation of libel laws, electoral laws, or "terrorism" laws as tools to target or discredit political opponents, and the employment of democratic rhetoric as a distraction from anti-democratic practices, as manifestations of stealth authoritarianism.[9]

Promissory coups

In a promissory coup, an incumbent elected government is deposed in a coup d'etat by coup leaders who claim to defend democracy and promise to hold elections in order to restore democracy. In these situations, coup-makers emphasize the temporary and necessary nature of their intervention in order to ensure democracy in the future.[3] This is unlike the more open-ended coups that occurred during the Cold War. Political scientist Nancy Bermeo says that "The share of successful coups that falls into the promissory category has risen significantly, from 35 percent before 1990 to 85 percent afterward."[3] Examining 12 promissory coups in democratic states between 1990 and 2012, Bermeo found that "Few promissory coups were followed quickly by competitive elections, and fewer still paved the way for improved democracies."[3]

Executive aggrandizement

This process contains a series of institutional changes by the elected executives, impairing the ability of the political opposition to challenge the government and hold it to account. The most important feature of executive aggrandizement is that the institutional changes are made through legal channels, making it seem as if the elected official has a democratic mandate.[3][8] Some examples of executive aggrandizement are the decline of media freedom and the weakening of the rule of law (i.e., judicial and bureaucratic restraints on the government), such as when judicial autonomy is threatened.[3]

Over time, there has been a decline in active coups (in which a power-seeking individual, or small group, seizes power through forcibly, violently removing an existing government) and self-coups (involving "a freely elected chief executive suspending the constitution outright in order to amass power in one swift sweep") and an increase in executive aggrandizement.[3] Political scientist Nancy Bermeo notes that executive aggrandizement occurs over time, through institutional changes legitimized through legal means, such as new constituent assemblies, referenda, or "existing courts or legislatures ... in cases where supporters of the executive gain majority control of such bodies."[3] Bermeo notes that these means mean that the aggrandizement of the executive "can be framed as having resulted from a democratic mandate."[3] Executive aggrandizement is characterized by the presence of distress in axes of democracy, including institutional or horizontal accountability;[10] and executive or discursive accountability.[11]

Strategic harassment and manipulation during elections

This form of democratic backsliding entails the impairment of free and fair elections through tactics such as blocking media access, disqualifying opposition leaders, or harassing opponents. This form of backsliding is done in such a way that the elections do not appear to be rigged and rarely involves any apparent violations of the law, making it difficult for international election monitoring organizations to observe or criticize these misconducts.[3]

Causes and characteristics of democratic backsliding

Populism

Pippa Norris of the Harvard Kennedy School and the University of Sydney argues that the two "twin forces" pose the largest threat to Western liberal democracies: "sporadic and random terrorist attacks on domestic soil, which damage feelings of security, and the rise of populist-authoritarian forces, which feed parasitically upon these fears."[12] Norris defines populism as "as a governing style with three defining features": (1) a rhetorical emphasis on the idea that "legitimate political authority is based on popular sovereignty and majority rule"; (2) disapproval of, and challenges to the legitimacy of, established holders of "political, cultural, and economic power"; and (3) leadership by "maverick outsiders" who claim "to speak for the vox populi and to serve ordinary people."[12] Some but not all populists are also authoritarian, emphasizing "the importance of protecting traditional lifestyles against perceived threats from 'outsiders', even at the expense of civil liberties and minority rights."[12] According to Norris, the reinforcement of the insecurities from the "twin forces" has led to more support for populist-authoritarian leaders, and this latter risk is especially pronounced in the United States during the presidency of Donald Trump. For example, Norris argues that Trump has benefited from the mistrust of "the establishment" and that he continuously seeks to undermine faith in the legitimacy of the media and the independence of the courts.[12]

In 2017, Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovire Kaltwasser wrote that:

Populism does not have the same effect in each stage of the democratization process. In fact, we suggest that populism tends to play a positive role in the promotion of an electoral or minimal democracy, but a negative role when it comes to fostering the development of a full-fledged liberal democratic regime. Consequently, while populism tends to favor the democratization of authoritarian regimes, it is prone to diminish the quality of liberal democracies. Populism supports popular sovereignty, but it is inclined to oppose any limitations on majority rule, such as judicial independence and majority rights. Populism-in-power has led to processes of de-democratization (e.g., [Viktor] Orbán in Hungary or [Hugo] Chávez in Venezuela) and, in some extreme cases, even to the breakdown of the democratic regime (e.g., [Alberto] Fujimori in Peru).[13]

A 2018 analysis by political scientists Yascha Mounk and Jordan Kyle links populism to democratic backsliding, showing that since 1990, "13 right-wing populist governments have been elected; of these, five brought about significant democratic backsliding. Over the same time period, 15 left-wing populist governments were elected; of these, the same number, five, brought about significant democratic backsliding."[14]

A December 2018 report by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change concluded that populist rule, whether left- or right-wing, leads to a significant risk of democratic backsliding. The authors examine the effect of populism on three major aspects of democracy: the quality of democracy in general, checks and balances on executive power and citizens' right to politically participate in a meaningful way. They conclude that populist governments are four times more likely to cause harm to democratic institutions than non-populist governments. Also, more than half of populist leaders have amended or rewritten the countries' constitution, frequently in a way that eroded checks and balances on executive power. Lastly, populists attack individual rights such as freedom of the press, civil liberties, and political rights.[7]

In a 2018 journal article on democratic backsliding, scholars Licia Cianetti, James Dawson, and Seán Hanley argued that the emergence of populist movements in Central and Eastern Europe, such as Andrej Babiš's ANO in the Czech Republic, are "a potentially ambiguous phenomenon, articulating genuine societal demands for political reform and pushing issues of good governance centre stage, but further loosening the weak checks and balances that characterise post-communist democracy and embedding private interests at the core of the state."[15]

In a 2019 paper, presented to the International Society of Political Psychologists, Shawn Rosenberg argues that right-wing populism is exposing a vulnerability in democratic structures and that "democracy is likely to devour itself."[16]

Economic inequality and social discontent

Many political economy scholars, such as Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, have investigated the effect of income inequality on the democratic breakdown.[2] Studies of democratic collapse show that economic inequality is significantly higher in countries that eventually move towards a more authoritarian model.[17] Hungary is an example of a country where a large group of unemployed, low-educated people were dissatisfied with the high levels of inequality, especially after the financial crisis of 2007–2008. Viktor Orbán used this dissatisfaction of a relatively large segment of the population in his advantage, winning popular support by using national-populist rhetoric.[18]

Personalism

A 2019 study found that personalism had an adverse impact on democracy in Latin America: "presidents who dominate their own weakly organized parties are more likely to seek to concentrate power, undermine horizontal accountability, and trample the rule of law than presidents who preside over parties that have an independent leadership and an institutionalized bureaucracy."[19]

Other

The 2019 Annual Democracy Report of the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg identified three challenges confronting global democracy: (1) "Government manipulation of media, civil society, rule of law, and elections"; (2) rising "toxic polarization," including "the division of society into distrustful, antagonistic camps"; diminishing "respect for opponents, factual reasoning, and engagement with society" among political elites; and increasing use of hate speech by political leaders; and (3) foreign disinformation campaigns, primarily digital, and mostly affecting Taiwan, the United States, and former Soviet bloc nations such as Latvia.[20]

Prevalence

A study by the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem) of the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg, which contains more than eighteen-million data points relevant to democracy, measuring 350 highly specific indicators across 174 countries as of the end of 2016, found that the number of democracies in the world modestly declined from 100 in 2011 to 97 in 2017; some countries moved toward democracy, while other countries moved away from democracy.[21] V-Dem's 2019 Annual Democracy Report found that the trend of autocratization continued, while "24 countries are now severely affected by what is established as a 'third wave of autocratization'" including "populous countries such as Brazil, India and the United States, as well as several Eastern European countries" (specifically Bulgaria and Serbia).[20] The report found that an increasing proportion of the world population lived in countries undergoing autocratization (2.3 billion in 2018).[20] The report found that while the majority of countries were democracies, the number of liberal democracies declined to 39 by 2018 (down from 44 a decade earlier).[20] The research group Freedom House, in reports in 2017 and 2019, identified democratic backsliding in a variety of regions across the world.[22][23] Freedom House's 2019 Freedom in the World report, show Democracy in Retreat, showed freedom of expression declining each year over the preceding 13 years, with sharper drops since 2012.[24]

Scholarly work in the 2010s detailed democratic backsliding, in various forms and to various extents, in Hungary and Poland,[15] the Czech Republic,[25] Turkey,[26][27] and Venezuela.[28][29]

The scholarly recognition of the concept of democratic backsliding reflects a reversal from older views, which held "that democracy, once attained in a fairly wealthy state, would become a permanent fixture."[4] This older view came to be realized as erroneous beginning in the mid-2000s, as multiple scholars acknowledged that some seemingly-stable democracies have recently faced a decline in the quality of their democracy.[17] Huq and Ginsburg identified in an academic paper "37 instances in 25 different countries in the postwar period in which democratic quality declined significantly (though a fully authoritarian regime didn't emerge)," including countries that were "seemingly stable, reasonably wealthy" democracies.[6]

Central and Eastern Europe

In the 2010s, a scholarly consensus developed that the Central and Eastern Europe region was experiencing democratic backsliding, most prominently in Hungary and Poland.[15] According to Rutgers University political scientist R. Daniel Kelemen, the EU has failed to prevent democratic backsliding in some of its member states, and may even make it easier for authoritarian-minded leaders to erode democracy.[30] He argues that the EU's system of party politics, a reluctance to interfere in domestic political matters, appropriation of EU funds by backsliding regimes, and free movement for dissatisfied citizens under the backsliding regimes helps to support backsliding regimes.[30]

Poland
See also: 2015 Polish Constitutional Court crisis

In the Polish case, the European Commission stated in December 2017 that in the two preceding years, the Polish legislature had adopted "13 laws affecting the entire structure of the justice system in Poland" with the "common pattern [that] the executive and legislative branches [were] systematically enabled to politically interfere in the composition, powers, administration, and functioning of the judicial branch."[31]

Hungary

Since 2010, Hungary under Viktor Orbán has been described as a prominent example of democratic backsliding.[15][32][33][34] As in Poland, political interference by the legislative and executive branches of government threatens the institutional independence of the judiciary.[35] In 2012, the legislature abruptly lowered the age of retirement for judges from 70 to 62, forcing 57 experienced court leaders (including the President of the Supreme Court) to retire.[36] After the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that this decision violated EU laws relating to equality in the employment context, the government repealed the law and compensated the judges, but did not reinstate those forced to retire.[35][37][38][39] The 2012 judiciary reform also centralized administration of the courts under the newly-established National Judiciary Office, then headed by Tünde Handó (a lawyer married to a prominent member of Fidesz).[35][36] Under Handó, the NJO also weakened the institutions of judicial self-governance, provoking what the European Association of Judges, Amnesty International, and the Hungarian Helsinki Committee describe as a “constitutional crisis” within the Hungarian judiciary.[40] Hungarian judges interviewed by Amnesty International also expressed concerns about attacks on the judiciary and individual judges by politicians and in the media.[35] The Hungarian government has dismissed criticism of its record on democracy issues.[41][42]

Watchdog groups and news outlets have raised concerns that the 2019-20 coronavirus pandemic could accelerate democratic backsliding in Hungary and elsewhere.[43][44][45] On March 30, 2020, the Hungarian parliament passed sweeping emergency legislation, drawing criticism from a number of civil society organizations.[46] The law allows Orbán to “suspend the enforcement of certain laws, depart from statutory regulations and implement additional extraordinary measures by decree”.[47][48] By-elections and referendums are also suspended until the end of the state of emergency, which only Parliament can lift.[47][48][49] Under the new legislation, publishing “false” or “distorted” facts is a criminal offence punishable by up to five years in prison.[48][49] According to Human Rights Watch, this law “virtually abolish[es] all democratic checks-and-balances.”[49] The law was lifted on 16 June, 2020, as the emergency situation concerning the pandemic has ended.[50]

Serbia and Montenegro

Freedom House's annual Nations in Transit report in 2020 reported that, due to democratic backsliding, Serbia and Montenegro in the Balkans were no longer democracies (as they had been classified since 2003) but had instead become hybrid regimes (in the "gray zone" between "democracies and pure autocracies").[51] The reported cited "years of increasing state capture, abuse of power, and strongman tactics employed" by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Montenegrin President Milo Đukanović.[51]

Israel

A number of scholars and commentators have identified Israel since the late 2010s, under the premiership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, as facing a crisis of liberal democracy and a risk of right-wing populism-fueled democratic decline, undermining its traditional status as a democratic state.[52][53][54][55][56] Yaniv Roznai of the Radzyner Law School at Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya wrote in 2018 that while Israel remained "a vibrant democracy with strong and effective judicial and democratic institutions," its liberal democracy was at risk "incremental erosion of Israel's democratic institutions through countless initiatives to prevent antigovernment criticism, to weaken the judiciary, to infringe minority rights, and to modify the democratic rules of the game."[52] Various scholars and commentators have cited as examples of democratic risks in Israel the "rise of ethno-nationalist populism"[53] and the passage of the Nation-State Law;[54][56] the use of nativist and exclusionary rhetoric by Netanyahu and his cabinet ministers,[56][53] including comments during the 2015 election campaign delegitimizing Arab Israeli voters[52][56] and comments labeling opponents and left-wing critics as traitors and tools of outside forces;[53] proposals to change Israeli law to modify the status of (or unilaterally annex) the West Bank;[52][54] Netanyahu's effort to grant himself immunity from prosecution on charges of corruption;[54] legislative proposals to limit the powers and independence of the Israeli Supreme Court, including the scope of its judicial review competence;[52] overtly racist or fear-mongering campaign advertisements by some parties of the populist right;[53]; and efforts to exert greater control over the media[52][54] and NGOs.[54]

In a 2019 report, Tamara Cofman Wittes and Yael Mizrahi-Arnaud of the Brookings Institution argue that Israeli politics has "sources of resilience" that offer "pathways away from illiberal populism" including structural features of the Israeli political system (such as norms of liberal democracy and a fragmented parliamentary system that leads to competing populist parties) and cultural features of the Israeli society (such as a burgeoning women's movement that spans "secular-religious, Ashkenazi-Mizrachi, and Jewish-Arab divides").[53]

Russia

Under 20 years of Vladimir Putin's leadership, Russia has experienced democratic backsliding. Experts do not generally consider Russia to be a democracy, citing purges and jailing of political opponents, curtailed press freedom, and the lack of free and fair elections.[2][7][17][22][34] Scholars differ in their perspectives on the significant post-1998 democratic backsliding in Russia under Putin.[57] Some view Russia's 1990s-era trend toward European-style democratization as fundamentally an ephemeral aberration, with Russia's subsequent democratic backsliding representing a return to its "natural" historical course.[57] The opposite perspective is that the democratic decline under Putin will be a relatively short-term episode in Russian history: "From this perspective, Russia after 1991 was back on the path to Europe after the seventy-year interruption represented by communism," and "that path was inevitably to be bumpy and subject to setbacks."[57]

Singapore

According to a 2020 study, Singapore experienced democratic backsliding after the 2015 general election.[58]

Turkey

Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has experienced democratic backsliding.[26][27][59] Scholar Ozan Varol writes that Erdoğan engaged in a form of "stealth authoritarianism" that incrementally increased pressure on democratic institutions over time and eventually culminated in authoritarianism.[9] Although Erdoğan was originally viewed as a possible reformer, the Turkish government took a sharp authoritarian turn when it violently suppressed the Gezi Park protests in May 2013.[60] Increasing curbs on freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly coincided with Erdoğan's purge of liberal and conciliatory figures from the Justice and Development Party (AKP).[60] A constitutional referendum in October 2007 changed the method of selection of the president from election by Parliament to direct election, marking a shift to a presidential system.[60] Erdoğan consolidated executives power through his re-election in 2014 and his subsequent dismissal of Ahmet Davutoğlu.[60] Following a failed coup attempt in 2016 (which Erdoğan blamed on the Hizmet movement of his former ally-turned-rival, Fethullah Gülen), Erdoğan declared a state of emergency; undertook a series of major purges targeting civil society and perceived political opponents, including those within the bureaucracy, police, judiciary, and academia, and prosecutors; and dismantled the rule of law.[60] A 2017 constitutional referendum formally adopted a presidential system and further aggrandized executive power.[60][9] The effect of the shifts, partly enabled by a weak and internally divided Turkish opposition,[60][9] was to transform Turkey into a hybrid regime.[27] In its 2018 annual report, Freedom House classified Turkey as "not free" (the first time the country has been classified as such by Freedom House, which began publishing annual reports in 1999).[60] A 2019 report from the European Commission identified Turkey as "seriously backsliding" on areas of human rights, the rule of law and economic policy.[61]

Venezuela

Since the late 1990s, Venezuela has been considered a nation that has undergone a significant backslide in democratic institutions.[29] Chavismo propelled democratic backsliding in Venezuela.[62]

From 1958 onward, Venezuela was considered to be a relatively stable democracy within a continent that was facing a wave of military dictatorship, consuming almost all Latin American countries in the 1970s.[63][64] Until the early 1980s, it was one of Latin America's four most prosperous states; with an upper-middle economy, and a stable centre-left democracy.[64] The collapse of the oil market in the 1980s left Venezuela (a major crude oil exporter) in great debt.[63][64]

The country implementing neoliberal, market-oriented strategies in order to receive monetary aid from the International Monetary Fund, cuts spending on social programs, and imposed price controls on consumer goods and gas,[63] which caused social unrest and high inflation.[64] Hugo Chávez won the presidency in December 1998 by appealing on the desires of the poor and pledging economic reforms,[63][64] and, once in office, securing his power by creating an authoritarian regime, following a relatively stable pattern between 1999 and 2003.[65] Chávez started rewriting the constitution swiftly after arriving in-office.[66] The weakening of political institutions and increased government corruption transformed Venezuela into a personal dictatorship.[65][67][68]

Chavez's dominance of the media (including a constant presence on television) and his charismatic personality contributed to democratic backsliding in Venezuela,[69] in addition to constitutional revisions that concentrated Chávez's power and diminished the executive's accountability.[70]

A rapid increase in crude oil prices around 2003 fueled economic growth in the country, allowing Chávez and his party to further entrench their dominance.[66] By 2004, Chávez had gained full authority over the democracy-sustaining institutions, diminishing checks and balances and the power of the National Assembly.[66] Accusing traditional parties from causing the initial economic distress through exploitation of the country, he justified the weakening of non-executive branches by arguing that those branches were dominated by the traditional parties, and therefore unreliable. [66] After enabling himself to legally rewrite the constitution and therewith amending a presidential term from five to six years, with a single reelection, Chávez gained full control over the military branch. This allowed him to determine military promotions, and eliminate the Senate. As a result he no longer required legislative approval.[66][71] After Chávez' death in 2013, his successor Nicolás Maduro continued an authoritarian style of governance.[68][72][73] After the Venezuelan opposition won a majority of the National Assembly in the 2015 elections, Maduro and his allies retained control of the other key levers of power, including the military, state-run oil company, Supreme Court, and National Electoral Council.[74] In 2017, Maduro and his allies, moved to circumvent the opposition-controlled National Assembly by creating a Constituent National Assembly, dominated by government loyalists,[74] and declaring it the supreme organ of state power.[69] This move further intensified Venezuela's democratic backsliding.[74] Currently, Venezuela is an authoritarian regime,[72][73] and had even been described as a personal dictatorship.[68]

United States

Beginning in 2017, political scientists identified the United States under President Donald Trump as being in danger of democratic backsliding.[75][76] In a 2019 journal article, political scientists Robert C. Lieberman, Suzanne Mettler, and others wrote that Trump's presidency presented a threat to the American democratic order because it simultaneously brought together three specific trends—"polarized two-party presidentialism; a polity fundamentally divided over membership and status in the political community, in ways structured by race and economic inequality; and the erosion of democratic norms"—for the first time in American history.[77] Lieberman et al. noted that Trump has "repeatedly challenged the very legitimacy of the basic mechanics and norms of the American electoral process, invoking the specter of mass voter fraud, encouraging voter suppression, selectively attacking the Electoral College, and even threatening to disrupt the peaceful transfer of power" and noted that "Never in the modern era has a presidential candidate threatened to lock up his opponent; castigated people so publicly and repeatedly on the basis of their country of origin, religion, sex, disability, or military service record; or operated with no evident regard for facts or truth."[77] In 2020, political scientists Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon, wrote that "the Trump administration has consistently de-emphasized the importance of human rights and democracy in its rhetoric and while adopting language and tropes similar to those of right-wing, illiberal movements."[78] Colley and Nexon cited Trump's praise of autocratic rulers, his echoing of ethno-nationalist rhetoric, his efforts to delegitimize journalism and journalists as "fake news" and his policies erecting new barriers to refugees and asylum-seekers as similar to politics "found in backsliding regimes."[78]

The 2019 annual democracy report of the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg found that the U.S. under Trump was among the world's liberal democracies experiencing "democratic erosion" (but not full-scale "democratic breakdown"). The report cited an increase in "polarization of society and disrespect in public deliberations" as well as Trump's attacks on the media and opposition and attempts to contain the judiciary and the legislation.[20] The report concluded, however, that "American institutions appear to be withstanding these attempts to a significant degree," noting that Democrats had won a majority the House of Representatives in the 2018 midterm elections, which "seems to have reversed the trajectory of an increasingly unconstrained executive."[20]

Effects of judicial independence

A 2011 study examined the effects of judicial independence in preventing democratic backsliding. The study, which analyzed 163 nations from 1960 to 2000, concluded that established independent judiciaries are successful at preventing democracies from drifting to authoritarianism, but that states with newly formed courts "are positively associated with regime collapses in both democracies and nondemocracies."[79]

See also

References

Notes

  1. Mudde, Cas and Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira (2017) Populism: a Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press. pp.86-96. ISBN 978-0-19-023487-4
  2. Walder, D.; Lust, E. (2018). "Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding". Annual Review of Political Science. 21 (1): 93–113. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-114628.
  3. Bermeo, Nancy (January 2016). "On Democratic Backsliding" (PDF). Journal of Democracy. 27 (1): 5–19. doi:10.1353/jod.2016.0012. ISSN 1086-3214.
  4. "How democratic backsliding happens". Democracy Digest. 21 February 2017.
  5. Waldner, David; Lust, Ellen (11 May 2018). "Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding". Annual Review of Political Science. 21 (1): 93–113. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-114628. ISSN 1094-2939.
  6. Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to lose a constitutional democracy, Vox (21 February 2017).
  7. Kyle, Jordan; Mounk, Yascha (December 2018). "The Populist Harm to Democracy: An Empirical Assessment" (PDF). Tony Blair Institute for Global Change.
  8. Levitsky, Steven; Ziblatt, Daniel (2018). How Democracies Die. United States: Crown. pp. 76–78.
  9. Ozan O. Varol. "Stealth Authoritarianism in Turkey". In Mark A. Graber; Sanford Levinson; Mark V. Tushnet (eds.). Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?. Oxford University Press. pp. 339–354. ISBN 978-0-19-088898-5. OCLC 1030444422.
  10. Sadurski, Wojciech; Sevel, Michael; Walton, Kevin, eds. (1 April 2019). Legitimacy: The State and Beyond. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-882526-5.
  11. Issacharoff, Samuel. "III Factors, 25 Populism versus Democratic Governance". Oxford Constitutions. doi:10.1093/law/9780190888985.001.0001/law-9780190888985-chapter-25 (inactive 6 June 2020). Retrieved 15 May 2020.
  12. Norris, Pippa (April 2017). "Is Western Democracy Backsliding? Diagnosing the Risks" (PDF). Journal of Democracy (Scholarly response to column published online). Online Exchange on “Democratic Deconsolidation”. Johns Hopkins University Press. Archived from the original (PDF) on 11 April 2018. Retrieved 28 August 2018.
  13. Mudde, Cas and Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira (2017) Populism: a Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press. pp.95-96. ISBN 978-0-19-023487-4
  14. Kyle, Yascha Mounk, Jordan (26 December 2018). "What Populists Do to Democracies". The Atlantic. Retrieved 27 December 2018.
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  16. Rosenberg, S (1 January 2019). Democracy Devouring Itself: The Rise of the Incompetent Citizen and the Appeal of Right-Wing Populism. eScholarship, University of California. OCLC 1055900632.
  17. Huq, Aziz; Ginsburg, Tom (2018). "How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy". UCLA Law Review. 65: 78–169.
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  19. Rhodes-Purdy, Matthew; Madrid, Raúl L. (27 November 2019). "The perils of personalism". Democratization. 0 (2): 321–339. doi:10.1080/13510347.2019.1696310. ISSN 1351-0347.
  20. Democracy Facing Global Challenges: V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2019 (PDF) (Report). V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg. May 2019.
  21. Mechkova, Valeriya; Lührmann, Anna; Lindberg, Staffan I. (2017). "How Much Democratic Backsliding?". Journal of Democracy. 28 (4): 162–169. doi:10.1353/jod.2017.0075. ISSN 1086-3214. S2CID 158736288.
  22. Democracy in Retreat (Report). Freedom House. 2019.
  23. Esther King (31 January 2017). "Democratic backsliding threatens international order". Politico.
  24. Democracy in Retreat: Freedom in the World 2019 (Report). Freedom House. 2020.
  25. Seán Hanley & Milada Anna Vachudova (2018). "Understanding the illiberal turn: democratic backsliding in the Czech Republic". East European Politics. 34 (3): 276–296. doi:10.1080/21599165.2018.1493457.
  26. Cemal Burak Tansel (2018). "Authoritarian Neoliberalism and Democratic Backsliding in Turkey: Beyond the Narratives of Progress". South European Society and Politics. 23 (2): 197–217. doi:10.1080/13608746.2018.1479945.
  27. Kadir Akyuz & Steve Hess (2018). "Turkey Looks East: International Leverage and Democratic Backsliding in a Hybrid Regime". Mediterranean Quarterly. 29 (2): 1–26. doi:10.1215/10474552-6898075. S2CID 158084228.
  28. Laura Gamboa (2017). "Opposition at the Margins: Strategies against the Erosion of Democracy in Colombia and Venezuela". Comparative Politics. 49 (4): 457–477. doi:10.5129/001041517821273044. S2CID 157426820.
  29. Sabatini, Christopher (1 November 2016). "The Final Blow to Venezuela's Democracy: What Latin America Can Do About It". Foreign Affairs. ISSN 0015-7120.
  30. Kelemen, R. Daniel (8 September 2019). "The European Union's Authoritarian Equilibrium". SSRN 3450716.
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