CIA activities in China

This is a list of activities carried out by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in China.

Activities in the Republic of China (Taiwan)

Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), suspected that the United States was plotting a coup against him. In 1950, Chiang Ching-kuo became director of the secret police, which he remained until 1965. Chiang also considered some people who were friends to Americans to be his enemies. An enemy of the Chiang family, Wu Kuo-chen, was kicked out of his position of governor of Taiwan by Chiang Ching-kuo and fled to America in 1953.[1] Chiang Ching-kuo, educated in the Soviet Union, initiated a Soviet style military reorganization in the Republic of China's military, which reorganized and Sovietized the political officer corps, surveillance, and Kuomintang party activities. Opposed to this was Sun Li-jen, who was educated at the American Virginia Military Institute.[2] Chiang orchestrated the controversial court-martial and arrest of General Sun Li-jen in August 1955, for plotting a coup d'état with the American CIA against his father Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. The CIA allegedly wanted to help Sun take control of Taiwan and declare its independence.[1][3]

Activities in the People's Republic of China (Mainland China)

1951

In order to open a second front in the Korean War, CIA officers decided to rely upon a second plan. CIA operators were fearful of Mao Zedong's entry into the war and estimated that a substantial amount of Kuomintang Nationalist guerillas were available to work with the agency. They also estimated that Muslim horseman led by Ma Bufang would be willing to launch attacks against China in its western regions. When both of these efforts proved to be overly projected in terms of success and strategic actualities, the U.S., convinced that a third force was available within China, decided to invest resources into securing such a force to its efforts. In order to facilitate resistance against China's involvement in Korea, the CIA invested over $100 million in buying weapons that would be used by "third force" guerillas in China. The Agency scarcely could find any anti-Mao sentiment within their contacts, however, with the only signs of life being a group of refugees in Okinawa, invariably proven to be a group more interested in obtaining their own goals than in truly assisting the United States.[4]

Eventually, the CIA declassified its records and admitted the failures of the Third Force strategy.[5] The list illuminated a quick study on insurgency failures. According to the documents, the CIA began dropping small guerilla units into China, the first Third Force team having been deployed in April, 1952. All four members of the team were never heard from again. The second Third Force team was made up of five ethnic Chinese agents, and dropped into the Jilin region of Manchuria in mid-July 1952. The team eventually reported contact with local rebel leaders. The team was, unbeknownst to the CIA, captured and turned by the Chinese, setting up the ensuing trap. The CIA responded by sending in a rescue unit, only to have its planes shot down and its principal agents assigned to the mission, Jack Downey and Dick Fecteau, arrested. Both men were subsequently sentenced to prison sentences in China. Beijing later boasted of the insurgency failures of their United States counterparts. At that point, the CIA had dropped 212 agents into China, resulting in 101 agents killed and 111 captured.[5][6][7] Michael D. Coe, who had been recruited by the CIA and worked within the agency during the Third Force events, stated that the CIA "had been sold a bill of goods by the Nationalists - that there was a huge force of resistance inside of China. We were barking up the wrong tree. The whole operation was a waste of time." [8]

1959

The CIA provided the Tibetan Chushi Gangdrug Tenshung Danglang Mak group with material assistance and aid, including arms and ammunition, as well as training to members of Chushi Gangdruk and other Tibetan guerrilla groups at Camp Hale.

1989

The CIA assisted in a secret operation to transport Chinese dissidents who participated in the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 overseas in order to escape arrest by the PRC government.

2010

According to an investigation by the New York Times, the government of the PRC was able to either kill or imprison 18 to 20 C.I.A sources from 2010 to 2012; an article in Foreign Policy cited a higher number, putting the number of sources killed at at least 30.[9][10] A joint CIA and FBI counterintelligence operation set up to investigate the intelligence failure advanced three different theories[10][11] as to why the spy network was dismantled: (1) there was a mole within the C.I.A., (2) "sloppy tradecraft" and (3) PRC intelligence agents had hacked the covert system the C.I.A. used to communicate with its foreign sources. The New York Times said that the debate over the cause remained unsolved while the a former American intelligence official cited by Foreign Policy said investigators concluded that it was caused by a "confluence and combination of events."[9] In January 2018, a former CIA officer named Jerry Chun Shing Lee was arrested and would eventually plead guilty[12][13] on suspicion of helping dismantle the network[11] while the Foreign Policy article ascribed, notwithstanding the arrest, the failure to the ability of the PRC intelligence agencies to penetrate the CIA's communication system.[9]

2018

Sun Bo, a general manager of the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, supplied classified information to the CIA, including technical specifications of the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning.[14]

See also

References
  1. Peter R. Moody (1977). Opposition and dissent in contemporary China. Hoover Press. p. 302. ISBN 978-0-8179-6771-0. Retrieved 2010-11-30.
  2. Jay Taylor (2000). The Generalissimo's son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the revolutions in China and Taiwan. Harvard University Press. p. 195. ISBN 978-0-674-00287-6. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
  3. Nançy Bernkopf Tucker (1983). Patterns in the dust: Chinese-American relations and the recognition controversy, 1949-1950. Columbia University Press. p. 181. ISBN 978-0-231-05362-4. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
  4. Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Anchor Books, 2007), 66-68.
  5. "Two CIA Prisoners in China, 1952–73", Apr 05, 2007, CIA
  6. "Extraordinary Fidelity", Apr 05, 2007, CIA
  7. "Extraordinary Fidelity" , Jun 05, 2013, (transcript), CIA
  8. Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Anchor Books, 2007), 66-68, 645.
  9. DORFMAN, ZACH (15 August 2018). "Botched CIA Communications System Helped Blow Cover of Chinese Agents". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 16 August 2018.
  10. Mazzetti, Mark; Goldman, Adam; Schmidt, Michael S.; Apuzzo, Matthew (May 20, 2017). "Killing C.I.A. Informants, China Crippled U.S. Spying Operations". The New York Times. Archived from the original on May 20, 2017. Retrieved May 20, 2017.
  11. Goldman, Adam (January 16, 2018). "Ex-C.I.A. Officer Suspected of Compromising Chinese Informants Is Arrested". The New York Times. Retrieved January 16, 2018.
  12. Hannon, Elliot (May 1, 2019). "Former CIA Agent Pleads Guilty to Spying for China". Slate.
  13. "Former CIA Officer Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Commit Espionage". www.justice.gov. 2019-05-01. Retrieved 2019-05-07.
  14. Strong, Matthew (June 22, 2018). "China shipyard manager might have leaked Liaoning secrets to CIA". Taiwan News. While initial suspicion focused on graft and corruption, later reports suggested that Sun might have handed over key details of the Liaoning project to CIA agents.
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