Battle of Trapani

The War of Saint Sabas between the rival Italian maritime republics of Venice and Genoa broke out over access to and control of the ports and markets of the Eastern Mediterranean. In the Battle of Acre in 1258 and again in the Battle of Settepozzi in 1263, the Venetian navy had demonstrated its superiority over its Genoese counterpart. Consequently the Genoese avoided direct confrontations with the Venetian battle fleet and engaged in commerce raiding against the Venetian merchant convoys, a type of warfare exemplified by the Battle of Saseno in August 1264.[1][2]

For the 1266 raiding campaign, Genoa prepared a fleet comprising eighteen galleys and a large nave,[lower-alpha 1] under Lanfranco Borbonino. As the fleet departed for Corsica in late April, news arrived of increased Venetian naval strength, and nine more galleys were ordered into action; they joined the rest of the fleet at Bonifacio later in May.[4]

In reality, the Venetian fleet only counted 14 galleys—according to the Venetian chronicler Martino da Canal, who lists four galleys from Venice itself, four from Crete, three from Zara, and three galleys and a galleot from Negroponte—or, according to the Annali Genovesi, only ten galleys. Jacopo Dondulo (often erroneously called Dandolo), an experienced sailor who was said to "know the harbours and holes where the Genoese lay in hiding", was appointed as its commander.[4][5][6]

Dondulo led his fleet to Tunis, where they captured a Genoese ship in a night attack, removed its crew and cargo, and burned it. The next day, a small merchant vessel from Savona was likewise captured, while on the way back to Messina, the Venetians encountered and defeated a pirate squadron of two galleys and a saetta[lower-alpha 2] from Porto Venere, capturing one of the galleys with most of its crew.[4]

The Venetians may have hoped to encounter the Genoese battle fleet at or near the Straits of Messina, but the Genoese remained at Bonifacio, and the Venetians, after unloading their booty at Messina, set sail for Venice. In the meantime, however, news had reached Venice of the large Genoese fleet, and a further ten galleys under Marco Gradenigo had been dispatched to join with Dondulo's fleet. The two squadrons met at Ragusa, and their commanders decided to return to Sicily to search for the Genoese fleet.[4] Faced with the apparent inactivity of the Genoese fleet, many of the Venetian patricians serving with the fleet were growing anxious to leave so that they could participate in the summer trade convoy (the muda) which would soon depart for the Levant, so the Venetian fleet had to stop at Apulia—likely at Gallipoli—and allow them to disembark and make their way to Venice over land.[8]

19th-century image of a 13th-century Venetian galley

A Genoese nave, by Quinto Cenni

In the meantime, Borbonino received reports that the Venetians had assembled thirty galleys or even more, whereas in reality he had a slight numerical advantage. As a result, he decided to abandon the nave, and distribute its crew to the other vessels to enhance their combat strength. Finally, in early June Borbonino led his fleet out of Bonifacio to confront the Venetians.[9] On 22 June, the Genoese were at Trapani, when they received intelligence that the Venetian fleet was at Marsala nearby, and that it was smaller than Borbonino had feared. Borbonino convened a council of war with his three councillors and the galley captains. The Genoese captains did not trust their crews, many of whom, according to the sources, were Lombards and other foreigners hired as substitutes by Genoese citizens eager to avoid the hardships and dangers of rowing in a war galley. As a result, the council resolved to attack the Venetians from the open sea, so that the crews would not be tempted to abandon their posts and swim for the shore.[9][10]

However, soon Borbonino decided otherwise. Possibly influenced by previous Venetian victories in open combat, he decided to adopt a purely defensive position, chaining his ships together, with their sterns turned to the safety of the shore, and their prows directed seaward. This tactic offered many advantages to the defender, especially, according to historian John Dotson, "in the face of a more skillful, aggressive opponent": it ensured that his fleet would not be flanked or split apart, and that reinforcements could be quickly moved to any threatened ship. On the other hand, it presupposed that the defenders would possess discipline and steadfastness.[9][11]

Borbonino's order was carried out during the night, and when, next day, the Venetian fleet arrived at Trapani, they found the Genoese galleys bound and chained together. Taking this as a sign of poor morale among their opponents, and despite the contrary wind, the Venetians eagerly advanced upon them Genoese, raising loud shouts to further discourage them.[12][5] Twice the Venetian attempts to break the Genoese line failed, but on the third attempt they succeeded in detaching three Genoese galleys from the main body. The Genoese had tried to counter the Venetian attacks by setting a burning raft adrift against their enemy's ships, but when they saw the Venetian success, panic began to spread among the Genoese crews.[13] Already disheartened by their commander's apparent lack of confidence, the Genoese began to abandon their ships and swim ashore to safety, so that in the end the Venetians were able to capture all 27 Genoese galleys, as well as some of the crews who remained behind. 24 of them were towed away, while three were burned on the spot. Some 1,200 Genoese drowned, many were killed, and 600 were taken captive.[13][14]

Borbonino and his officers were able to escape, but on their return to Genoa they were tried and, except for five, were found guilty of cowardice and incompetence. Their possessions were confiscated and large fines were imposed on them.[14] Dondulo was acclaimed a hero on his return to Venice in July, towing the captured ships, and was duly elected as Captain-General of the Sea. He soon fell out with Doge Reniero Zeno, however: the Doge insisted that the fleet restrict itself to escorting the merchant convoys, whereas Dondulo strongly supported the idea that the fleet should, rather than return to Venice once the convoys were safely under way, remain at sea seeking to attack Genoese shipping. As a result of this disagreement, Dondulo resigned and was replaced by his lieutenant, Marco Zeno.[6]

The Venetian triumph at Trapani did not immediately impact the course of the war.[11] Marco Zeno's cautious leadership left the seas open to the Genoese raiders, who preyed on unescorted Venetian shipping, so that in spring 1267, Dondulo was recalled to command. This time he carried out his chosen strategy, keeping the fleet at sea and attacking the Genoese fleet that was blockading Acre in August. This time, the Genoese tried to escape, so that the Venetians only captured five ships; and when the two fleets met again at Tyre, the Genoese again refused to offer battle and escaped.[6]

The stalemate between the two powers continued, until in 1269 King Louis IX of France, keen to use the Venetian and Genoese fleets in his planned Eighth Crusade, coerced both to sign a five-year-truce in the Treaty of Cremona.[11][15] This truce would hold and be renewed a number of times, until the heightening of Genoese–Venetian antagonism in the wake of the conquest of the last Western outposts in the Levant by the Mamluks of Egypt led both powers to the War of Curzola in 1294.[16]

• Dotson, John E. (1999). "Fleet Operations in the First Genoese-Venetian War, 1264-1266". Viator. Medieval and Renaissance Studies. 30: 165–180. doi:10.1484/J.VIATOR.2.300833. ISSN 0083-5897.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
• Dotson, John E. (2006). "Ship Types and Fleet Composition at Genoa and Venice in the Early Thirteenth Century". In Pryor, John (ed.). Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades: Proceedings of a Workshop Held at the Centre for Medieval Studies, University of Sydney, 30 September to 4 October 2002. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. pp. 63–76. ISBN 978-0-7546-5197-0.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
• Pozza, Marco (1992). "DONDULO, Giacomo". Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Volume 41: Donaggio–Dugnani (in Italian). Rome: Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
• Stanton, Charles D. (2015). Medieval Maritime Warfare. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword. ISBN 978-1-4738-5643-1.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
• Wiel, Alethea (1910). The Navy of Venice. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. OCLC 4198755.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)