Battle of Csorna

The Battle of Csorna, fought on 13 June 1849, was one of the battles which took place in the Summer Campaign of the Hungarian War of Independence from 1848 to 1849, fought between the Habsburg Empire and the Hungarian Revolutionary Army. The Hungarian army was led by Colonel[3] György Kmety, and the imperial army by Major General Franz Wyss. After liberation of the Hungarian capitals from the siege of Buda, the Hungarian commanders elaborated a plan to continue the Hungarian advance towards the Habsburg capital Vienna, before the arrival of the 200,000-strong army, sent by the Russian Empire to help the 170,000-strong Habsburg troops to crush the Hungarian revolution and freedom. But before the real fighting started between the two main armies, the commander of the 15th division of the VII Hungarian army corps, Colonel György Kmety, attacked the imperial half brigade led by Franz Wyss by surprise, and in heavy fighting forced them to flee. During the retreat the imperial commander also received a fatal wound, dying on the battlefield. At the same time two other Hungarian detachments from the VII corps also won victories against Austrian troops, chasing them away from Öttevény and Kóny.

Battle of Csorna
Part of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848
Date13 June 1849
Location
around and in Csorna, Kingdom of Hungary
47.6167°N 17.2500°E / 47.6167; 17.2500
Result Hungarian victory
Belligerents
 Hungarian Revolutionary Army  Austrian Empire
Commanders and leaders
 György Kmety  Franz Wyss 
Strength
5002
17 cannons
2690 men
8 cannons
Did not participate
2026 men
3 cannons[1]
Casualties and losses
Total: 271/215 men
-51/31 dead
-218/184 wounded
Total: 258 men
-55 dead
-78 wounded
-125 missing and prisoner[2]

Background

Thanks to the victories of the Spring Campaign, the Hungarian Revolutionary Army liberated much of Hungary from the occupation of the numerically and technologically superior Habsburg armies and their Serbian, Romanian and Croatian allies.[4] The Hungarian army of Transylvania, led by Lieutenant General Józef Bem even managed to chase the first Russian intervention troops (7000 soldiers) out of the province, which had entered in the winter of 1849.[5] From the end of March the Austrian politicians and military leaders understood that the Habsburg Empire was incapable of crushing their revolution relying on their own strength.[6] So, based on the Münchengrätz Agreements of 1833, according to which the Habsburg and Russian Empires and Prussia agreed to help each other if their sovereignty was threatened by a revolt or revolution, Austria decided to ask for Russian help against the Hungarian Revolution, although initially they were reluctant to do that, because they knew that it would lose them much prestige.[7] But the Hungarian victories of the Spring Campaign made the Habsburg government take this unwanted step, and on 21 April, they officially requested help from Russia, followed by a letter from emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria to Tsar Nicholas I of Russia.[8] So the Tsar decided to send 200,000 Russian soldiers to Hungary, putting another 80,000 in reserve, to enter Hungary if their presence would be needed.[9] The Hungarian Government led by Bertalan Szemere and Governor President Lajos Kossuth believed that the European nations would not allow Russia to intervene in Hungary, but England and other European states agreed with a Russian intervention in order to crush the Hungarian revolution. Thus Lord Palmerston replied to the question of the Russian ambassador about the reaction of England to a Russian intervention in Hungary, saying: Finish them quickly!, demanding that after they fulfilled their task they return in Russia immediately.[10] Although England worried about a Russian intervention in Hungary, its first concern was that the Russian Empire not advance in the Balkans, and an important condition for this was a strong Habsburg Empire.[11] So, an independent Hungary could have been an impediment for England's world domination policy.

Meanwhile, after the capture of Buda General György Klapka, as the deputy ministry of war, elaborated the plan for Hungarian military actions for summer, later called the Summer Campaign. His plan was based on the inactivity of the main Hungarian army corps, stationed around the fortress of Komárom. In case of retreat, he planned that the Hungarian capitals (Buda and Pest) and Miskolc would be the concentration point for Hungarian troops which were facing the main imperial forces under the command of Lieutenant Field Marshal Julius Jacob von Haynau, while the Hungarian troops from Transylvania and Southern Hungary had to accomplish heavy tasks that could be achieved only after relentless military actions in two months. In Klapka's plan, the Russian military intervention was only faintly mentioned without taking any measure against it.[12] This plan was rejected by many of the Hungarian commanders (Józef Bem, Lieutenant General Henryk Dembiński), who said that they would not obey it.[13] The Hungarian commander-in-chief and War Minister General Artúr Görgei also protested against this plan, underlining that Komárom should be the concentration point of the Hungarian troops instead of Miskolc, and because of the imminent threat of the Russian intervention, he saw that the only way open to the Hungarian army was to deal a decisive blow to the main imperial army before the slowly moving Russian forces arrived. This would have forced Austria to enter talks, and offer some kind of settlement, with the Hungarians.[14] So Görgei planned to attack the Austrian troops on the western border of Hungary as quickly as possible with the I, II, III and parts of the VIII corps on the left bank of the Danube, while the remainder of his troops had to protect the defensive line based on the Rába and Marcal rivers. Before the attack he hoped for the 12,000 soldiers led by Józef Bem, coming from the southern front and Transylvania, promised by Kossuth to arrive to join his forces (unfortunately Bem refused to come, saying that this would leave Transylvania defenseless against the imminent Russian invasion).[15] The Hungarian armies in the beginning of the Summer Campaign consisted of 150,000 soldiers, 464 field and 393 defensive (castle) cannons.[16]

On the other hand, the Austro-Russian coalition prepared to attack Hungary with 358,000 soldiers and 1354 cannons (165,000 Austrians with 770 cannons and 193,000 Russians with 584 cannons).[17] While Russian and Austrian army groups, led by General Alexander von Lüders and General Eduard Clam-Gallas, prepared their attacks on Transylvania from Bucovina, Wallachia and Moldavia, (53,000 soldiers and 133 cannons against 39,000 Hungarians, who were mainly fresh recruits, and 107 cannons), the main Russian army under the lead of Field Marshal Ivan Paskevich had to advance from the north (135,000 Russian soldiers and 448 cannons against 16,500 Hungarians with 49 cannons), and the Austro-Croatian-Serbian troops led by Feldzeugmeister Josip Jelačić operated in Southern Hungary (53,000 soldiers with 401 cannons against 34,000 Hungarians and 249 cannons).[18] The numerical disadvantage of the Hungarian armies was also augmented because 13% of the Hungarian troops in Transylvania and Eastern Hungary were used in the sieges of different fortifications in imperial hands (Arad, Temesvár, Gyulafehérvár, Titel) (around 12,000 men), while others (8000 men) were garrisons in different fortifications, so they could not be used as moving forces against the invading Austro-Russian armies.[19]

From the west the imperial troops which were preparing to attack Hungary led by Lieutenant Field Marshal Haynau, the commander-in-chief of all the Habsburg forces outside Italy, were about 83,000 soldiers (71,000 Austrians and a 12,000-strong Russian army corps led by Lieutenant General Feodor Sergeyevich Panyutyin) and 336 cannons, against 51,000 Hungarian soldiers (including also the garrison of the fortress of Komárom) with 196 field and 244 defensive cannons used only in the fortifications, led by General Görgei.[20]

Prelude

So Görgei planned to attack towards Pozsony and Vienna quickly, before the main Russian army started its attack on the eastern and northern front against Hungary. To this end he and his chief of the general staff, Lieutenant-Colonel József Bayer, organized the Central Operational Bureau (Központi Hadműveleti Iroda) at the end of May, in order to coordinate the movements of the different units of the Hungarian main army corps gathered in the western front.[21] Besides the troops which the Central Operational Bureau disposed (I, II, III and parts of the VIII corps), on the western front was another army grouping to which the VII corps from the Rába line, led by Ernő Poeltenberg (from 6 May Colonel, and from 7 June General),[22] and the garrison of Komárom (the VIII corps) belonged, and this was led by Major General György Klapka, commander of the garrison of Komárom. Klapka refused to submit to the orders of chief of the general staff József Bayer, acting independently.[23]

Brocky Károly: Kmety György
Franz Wyss

On 11 June the division led by Colonel György Kmety arrived at Pápa in order to secure the right wing of the VII corps. This division was not under the command of Klapka.[24] From a spy Kmety heard that an imperial half brigade led by Major General Franz Wyss was stationed in the city of Csorna, and decided to make a surprise attack on it. The city was at 40 km distance from Pápa, requiring 16 hours or marching, an exhausting task for the Hungarian Honvéd troops, but he set his troops on the march.[25] In order to make sure that nobody could inform the enemy, Kmety did not reveal his plan to his officers, saying that they were heading towards Győr. Only when they arrived at Marcaltő, at 12 June at night, did he send an envoy to inform Klapka and Colonel[26] Lajos Zámbelly, the chief of the VII corps general staff about his plans.[27] The imperial commander, Wyss, who came to Kapuvár on the 7th, and a day later with the majority of his troops to Csorna, suspected for some days that he would be attacked, but the Austrian commander did not send troops to his aid.[28] Some other signs too made a Hungarian attack likely to happen. When Colonel Zessner, the commander of the 4th imperial lancer regiment headed to Kapuvár on his carriage without escort, to take the command of the troops stationed here, he was attacked in the neighborhood of Bogyoszló by Hungarian Hussars, who according to some accounts killed him when he defended himself, while the others say he surrendered, but was killed later when he tried to escape.[29] Because of this, Wyss lost one of his best officers, alongside with the plan of the location and strength of his units. Despite knowing about this, Wyss did not change anything in the positions of his troops.[30]

Kmety planned to attack Csorna from the south and west, after crossing the Rába river. He said that the two bridges on the road through the Hanság mire were destroyed, so if his attack against Csorna would be successful, the imperials would have two options: to retreat towards the east, right where the Hungarian VII corps were stationed, or flee towards the north, entering the marshes of the Hanság, and both of these options would have forced them to surrender.[31] This plan was not without risk because the other imperial half brigade, stationed at Kapuvár, could come to Wyss's rescue in 5 hours, while the Collery brigade could come from Szerdahely in 8–9 hours.[32]

In Csorna, Franz Wyss had at his disposition three and a half companies from the Hess infantry regiment, six companies from the Landwehr battalion of the Baden regiment, two companies of the 14th Kaiserjägers battalion, three companies of the 4th lancers regiment (11 platoons), two cavalry cannons and two rockets. A half infantry company was at Csorna's exit towards Pásztori and a company was at the exit towards Kóny. Both units were from the Hess regiment. Another two companies were installed at the exit towards Szilsárkány, and the Kaiserjägers were south-east in a street towards Pásztori.[33] The 1st company of the Baden infantry stood on the road towards Kapuvár, the 2nd and 4th in the municipality, and the 3rd and 5th were defending the cannons, while the 6th was at the exit towards Szilsárkány. Later the 2nd and 4th companies also went there. The cavalry was placed as follows: five platoons of the 2nd major class of the lancers were at the western end, while the five platoons of the 1st major class of the lancers were in the middle of the municipality. Two cavalry cannons were placed to the southern exit towards Szilsárkány, while the other two cannons with the rockets went to the western exit of Csorna, towards Farád.[34] On the southwestern end of Csorna was a cemetery, surrounded by a stone wall; it even had a trench very suitable for a defensive line, and from the right some banks, making the cemetery a very good place for an efficient defense. The region behind the graveyard and the marketplace in connection with it was very suitable for placing the reserves. In the background was a grange surrounded by walls and buildings with ditches on the left, and from the front a poplar park, which made a second defense line.[35]

Battle

Kmety departed from Pápa on 12 June, and after his troops arrived at the destination, crossing the Rába river at Malomsok,[36] they started the attack on 13 June at dawn.[37] He had his sappers make two bridges in order to secure his troops' retreat if needed, and left a hussar company in Marcaltő.[38] The Hungarian troops at Szilsárkány, which prepared to attack from the south, stumbled on an imperial patrol made of lancer cavalry (Uhlans) and captured one of them, but the others rode away. So it was a real danger, that Wyss and the Austrian troops around Csorna would be informed about the coming Hungarian attack. Kmety sent the cavalry of the Hungarian column which he wanted to send to Farád to cut the way of the imperials and their envoys towards Kapuvár.[39] At Szilsárkány, Kmety divided his troops for the attack. He sent the Lieutenant-Colonels Emil Üchritz and László Pongrácz to lead the 10th, 12th, and 33rd Honvéd battalions with five companies of Wilhelm Hussars and the 9th cavalry battery to the enemy's rear, on the route: Bogyoszló — Jobbaháza — Farád. He himself, with the 45th and 2nd Honvéd battalions, two jaeger companies, two companies of Nádor Hussars, an infantry battery and two rockets, marched from the front to Csorna, while a part of his troops went in the same direction through Pásztori.[40] So his troops attacked Csorna from three directions.[41] When Emil Üchritz's troops were passing through Jobbaháza, the Lieutenant-Colonel learned that 15 Hungarian soldiers had been taken prisoners by a patrolling Uhlan platoon. These cavalry troops, together with an infantry company and two cavalry batteries, were stationed on an embankment between Kóny and Csorna. At Bősárkány a half infantry company with an Uhlan platoon were also stationed. These troops had the mission of observing the region to learn about Hungarian movements, and to keep the connection with the I imperial Army Corps.[42] The Uhlan patrols' commander, lieutenant Chamot, after taking the Hungarian prisoners at Jobbaháza, heard the first roar of the cannons from Csorna, signalling the start of the battle, and in order to prevent his soldiers from being cut off by the enemy, decided to retreat towards Kapuvár. But right at this moment the Hungarian Vilmos-Hussars attacked, so the Uhlans retreated in haste, letting the prisoner soldiers loose, who thus could return to their comrades.[43]

Wyss received news from its Uhlan patrol about the 400 Hungarian troops at Szilsárkány, but he did not get concerned, thinking that they were only an isolated scout unit, so at 4:30 o'clock in the morning he commanded his troops to march out from Csorna in order to capture them. He also sent envoys to his outposts from Bágyog, Kóny, and to the half brigade from Kapuvár to advance towards Csorna. But none of the envoys arrived at their destinations.[44]

Shortly after that, at 4:45 o'clock, Wyss received news that some troops were advancing from the southeast, but he explained that they were the imperial battalions from the 29th infantry regiment, for which he was waiting. He sent a patrol to meet them, who only then sent him the messages that these were Hungarian soldiers.[45] Hearing this, Wyss took a platoon of the Uhlans and went towards the part of Csorna in the direction of Szilsárkány. The advance of the Hungarians was so quick that they started to fire on Csorna from three directions, long before the imperials installed their cannons.[46] The surprised imperials responded well, installing their cannons and troops in a hurry, in the heavy attack and fire of the Hungarians.[47] The attack occurred at 5 o'clock, according to Kmety and 5:30 or 6 o'clock, according to the Austrians, and although they were expecting this to happen, its extraordinary quickness took them by surprise.[48]

The column led by Lieutenant-Colonels Emil Üchritz and László Pongrácz advanced on and along the road from Farád to Csorna, as follows: North from the road, the two companies of the Vilmos-hussars; on the road the 9th cavalry battery advanced; south from the road the 23rd and leftwards from it the 10th battalion, both having a line of skirmishers at their front lines. The 33rd battalion followed them as reserve troops.[49]

Wyss sent his baggage from Csorna to Bősárkány, guarded by two platoons of uhlans. To clear their way, Üchritz sent two companies of the Vilmos-hussars together with the 9th cavalry battery. The hussars, led by Captain Wladyslaw Dzwonkowski, advanced slowly and when they observed the uhlans, who were north-east of the cemetery, attacked them, but because of the deep and wide trench, they could hurdle with their horses only one by one, so the uhlans waited them on the other side of the trenches and stabbed many of them to death with their lances. Then the uhlans attacked the Hussars, chasing them away, while another three platoons were sent to the uhlans' aid. In the skirmish also Captain Wladyslaw Dzwonkowski was killed.[50] Three new uhlan platoons arrived, and attacked the Hungarian hussars from the sides, who just before were strengthened by a company of the Vilmos-hussars, and led by this started a counterattack. As a result of this, the Hussars were forced to retreat again, both sides suffering great losses, augmented by the Hungarian cavalry battery which, during this time, shot permanently the uhlans. Then another 6 uhlan platoons arrived, with two cannons and two rockets, together with the Baden infantry.[51]

In the meantime a company of the Baden-infantry entered the wood west from Csorna and chased the Hungarian infantry out, but when the Hungarian artillery opened fire, and the Hungarians counterattacked with reinforcements, the Austrians had to retreat to the town.[52] The 3rd and 5th companies of the Baden infantry, with two cannons, positioned themselves on the road towards Kapuvár and in the cemetery, while the 2nd, 4th, and half of the 6th companies defended the western exit towards Szilsárkány, while the other half of the 6th company had the mission of maintaining the connection with the infantry from the Hess regiment.[53]

The 10th and 23d Hungarian Honvéd battalions started an attack on the cemetery, while the imperials tried to stop them with rocket-shots, but with little success. On the narrow road towards the cemetery, the soldiers from the Hungarian lines intermingled and lost their coordination, and the officers lost control of them. Many of them pressed to the stone wall of the cemetery, so the 1st, 3d and 5th companies of the Baden could easily repulse them and counterattack. The enemy fire also did its job mainly to the 5th Hungarian company, which was face to face with the imperial cannons.[54]

At this moment two companies of the Nádor-hussars arrived on the scene (north-east from the cemetery) of the place where the cavalries fought with each other, and the uhlans were ready to retreat with Wyss's baggage towards Bősárkány. The Nádor hussars were formerly at the southern end of the town, but it seems that after the unsuccessful actions of the Vilmos-hussars, they came and started an attack against the uhlans, then withdrew in a feigned retreat, and at a proper moment counterattacked, taking the uhlans by surprise, and pushed them on the Hungarian infantry lines, inflicting heavy losses. However, the hussars too had great losses, and in the end the remaining uhlans managed to secure the retreat of the baggage towards Bősárkány.[55]

In the meanwhile the Hungarians attacking Csorna from the direction of Szilsárkány faced the 2nd and 4th companies of the Baden-infantry, supported by two cavalry batteries which unleashed grapeshot, causing them to disperse, but when the Hungarian artillery started to fire on the imperial battery, they too retreated. Wyss saw the danger and tried to convince the battery to reenter the battle, but with no success. Using this opportunity, the Hungarian infantry regrouped and entered into Csorna at that place. They advanced to the building of the tavern, but the counterattack of the 2nd infantry company, strengthened with units from the Hess infantry, caused them to retreat. In the attack the commander of the Austrian infantry, Major Weiss was wounded twice, and his place was taken by Captain Hörnes, who led the troops north.[56] The 2nd and 4th companies and half of the 6th company retreated towards the main square of the city, followed by the Hungarians. The imperial artillery fired grapeshot, but after they regrouped they started to advance again.[57] Wyss ordered his Uhlan cavalry to attack the Hungarian infantry, in order to enable to his infantry to attack. The Hungarians retreated from the attack of the uhlans, but some of them went into the houses and behind the fences, while others regrouped in the end of the street in a mass, and unleashed a fusillade against the imperial cavalry, who therefore started to retreat. But on their way back they were caught in the fire of the Hungarians who hid behind fences and in houses, inflicting heavy losses, forcing them to retreat further.[58] The battle lasted another half hour, when the Honvéds advanced to the main square of the city, where two companies of imperial Kaiserjägers tried to stop them, but the fusillade of the Hungarians made them retreat. With this the Hungarians cut the imperial troops in two: the right wing which were in the exit of Csorna towards Kapuvár, and the left wing which was on the exit towards Kóny.[59]

From the south direct from the direction of Szilsárkány, the battalion led by Major Mikovényi attacked, helped by the cavalry battery. They were received by a company of the Hess infantry, while another company was in reserve; half of them were sent to help the 2nd, 4th and 6th companies of the Baden-infantry, pushed back by the Hungarians, as shown before.[60] Left from them were two companies of the 14th Kaiserjaeger battalion. The Hungarian advance led by Mikovényi stopped after the Major was wounded on his knee.[61]

From the direction of Pásztori the 45th Honvéd battalion, two companies of Jägers, and two companies of the Nádor-hussars advanced. Two companies of the Hess-infantry and half of the 14th Kaiserjaeger battalion opposed them. Captain Weiss, their commander made a skirmish line out of the half battalion of Kaiserjaegers and positioned them in the trenches; he also put two platoons in the background to left and right, and made a barricade from carriages, beams, and boards, and put the remaining company soldiers behind them.[62] After repulsing the first attack of the Nádor-hussars, Captain Weiss ordered a continuously fighting retreat of his troops, because he knew that the Baden-infantry which fought right from his troops, was retreating, so he did not want to be encircled. The Hungarian 45th battalion was advancing on the street, together with the two Jäger companies and hussars, putting the imperials at risk of being cut in half, but Wyss arrived just in time with reinforcements, sending the Hess-infantry against them, who together with the Kaiserjaegers pushed the Hungarians back to the entrance of Csorna.[63] But here the Hungarians got a foothold in the houses east of the street, enabling a cavalry battery to join the battle and shoot grapeshot at the Kaiserjaegers, and also pushing two cannons forward, against which the Kaiserjaegers made an attack. But when a Hungarian Hussar platoon arrived, they retreated to their positions. At the same time, the Hungarian soldiers from east of the entrance to Csorna, entered through the gardens and houses in Csorna, cutting the path of retreat towards Kóny.[64] When the companies of the Hess-infantry arrived just outside of Csorna and started to gather, they were attacked by a Hungarian battalion with cannons, which was cutting their way towards Kóny, To their right was another Hungarian battalion, with some hussars and two cannons, which started to fire on them. At that moment two imperial Kaiserjaegers companies also joined the Hess-infantry, and together they managed to retreat towards Bősárkány through Barbacs and Markota, covered by the skirmish-line of the Kaiserjaegers.[65]

Between 8 and 9 o'clock, Wyss sent Lieutenant Bujanovics with the order that his troops fighting throughout Csorna must retreat towards the exit of the city leading to Bősárkány, in order to retreat together in an organized way, [66] The troops in the most cases were already retreating because of the pressure of the Hungarians.[67] Many of these troops however did not follow Wyss's order, and retreated in haste towards the villages nearest to them, which shows that at that time the Hungarian troops had cut the majority of the roads on which they could fulfill their commander's order.

At this moment the 23rd and a part of the 10th Hungarian battalion, getting around the cemetery and the trenches from the right, entered into the streets. Lieutenant-Colonel László Pongrácz led the charge taking the flag of the 10th battalion, with the help of the 2nd battalion, pushing the 1st, 3rd and 5th companies of the Baden-infantry from the cemetery.[68] These together with five platoons of uhlans were the first units to reach Bősárkány, then retreated towards Szentpéter.[69] While these followed a straight road towards Bősárkány, the other imperial columns used roundabout roads in their retreat, showing signs of disorder and panic, because they feared that the Hungarians closed their retreat way.[70]

In the meantime the half company of the Hess-infantry which was in the entrance towards Pásztori, also started to retreat, followed a little later by the imperial troops at the entrance towards Szilsárkány, who retreated not through the street, but through the gardens, fearing an ambush. The retreating one and a half Hess-infantry, half of the 6th company of the Baden-infantry, and two cannons met at the exit of the city towards Kóny; then Wyss commanded them to retreat towards Bősárkány on the Barbacs-Markota road. Wyss did not follow them, but retreated to Csorna, although Captain Zerboni said to him that there were no imperial units left there, and that they were the last Austrians to leave the town.[71]

Location of the Battle of Csorna
Fleeing Austrian dragoons, chased by Hungarian Hussars, August von Pettenkofen

The battle hardened Austrian Uhlan cavalry (Uhlans), newly arrived from the Italian front, inflicted heavy losses on the Hungarian Hussars, and despite suffering heavy losses themselves, secured the retreat of the Austrians towards the north, to Bősárkány.[72] During the retreat, Wyss received a fatal wound, dying on the battlefield.[73]

The Hungarians, after they occupied Csorna, pushed the imperials towards the marshes of Hanság. The imperials were lucky, because some days before the Austrian sappers had restored the bridges, so they could retreat over them, or they could have easily fallen into the Hungarian trap, and be forced to surrender. Thanks to the bridges, they reached Bősárkány with heavy losses.[74] At the same time two other Hungarian detachments from the VII corps also won victories against Austrian troops, chasing them away from Öttevény and Kóny.[75]

Aftermath

After this success Kmety retreated with the bulk of his troops on the right bank of the Rába, leaving only a weak advance guard in Csorna.[76]

Kmety's attack could have had very positive results for the planned general Hungarian attack, making Haynau send troops to the right banks of the Danube, thus easing the job of the Hungarian main armies, who wanted to attack in the region of the Vág river, which was on the left bank. Haynau indeed started to group his troops on the right bank, but not for defensive reasons, but because he himself wanted to attack.[77] So, Kmety's action resulted in a great Hungarian tactical success, but did not have more important results. Haynau penalized the imperial officers from Wyss's half brigade, whom he found to be guilty of the defeat, continuing at the same time to prepare for his attack.[78]

The Austrians and Russians still enjoyed numerical and technical superiority. The Hungarian army corps changed leaders by bringing new Hungarian commanders, inexperienced or unsuited for their heavy tasks, in the places of the talented and experienced generals like János Damjanich, András Gáspár, and Lajos Aulich, who because of different causes had to retire, or were moved into other positions. The Governor, President Lajos Kossuth had conflicts with the commander in chief of the army and at the same time with Minister of War General Artúr Görgei. Last but not least, the news of hugely superior Russian armies entering different parts of Hungarian soil had a demoralizing effect on Hungarian soldiers. So for all those reasons, the attack of Haynau's main imperial troops over the following days and weeks started to defeat the Hungarian armies more and more, eventually forcing them to start to retreat towards Komárom.[79]

Notes

  1. Hermann 2004, p. 276.
  2. Hermann 2004, p. 276.
  3. Bóna 1987, p. 203.
  4. Hermann 2001, p. 314.
  5. Hermann 2001, p. 257.
  6. Hermann 2001, p. 315.
  7. Hermann 2001, p. 315.
  8. Hermann 2001, p. 315.
  9. Hermann 2001, pp. 315–316.
  10. Hermann 2001, p. 316.
  11. Hermann 2001, p. 316.
  12. Hermann 2001, p. 316.
  13. Hermann 2001, p. 316.
  14. Hermann 2001, p. 317.
  15. Hermann 2001, pp. 316–317.
  16. Hermann 2001, p. 318.
  17. Hermann 2001, p. 318.
  18. Hermann 2001, p. 318.
  19. Hermann 2001, pp. 318–319.
  20. Hermann 2001, p. 318.
  21. Hermann 2001, p. 322.
  22. Bóna 1987, p. 268.
  23. Hermann 2004, p. 272.
  24. Hermann 2004, p. 272.
  25. Hermann 2004, p. 272.
  26. Bóna 1987, p. 340.
  27. Hermann 2004, p. 272.
  28. Hermann 2004, p. 272.
  29. Hermann 2004, p. 272.
  30. Hermann 2004, p. 272.
  31. Hermann 2004, pp. 272–273.
  32. Hermann 2004, p. 273.
  33. Hermann 1999, p. 26.
  34. Hermann 1999, p. 26.
  35. Hermann 1999, p. 26.
  36. Hermann 1999, p. 25.
  37. Hermann 2004, p. 273.
  38. Hermann 1999, p. 25.
  39. Hermann 1999, p. 26.
  40. Hermann 1999, p. 26.
  41. Hermann 2004, p. 273.
  42. Hermann 1999, p. 26.
  43. Hermann 1999, p. 26.
  44. Hermann 1999, p. 26.
  45. Hermann 1999, pp. 26–27.
  46. Hermann 1999, p. 27.
  47. Hermann 2004, p. 273.
  48. Hermann 1999, p. 27.
  49. Hermann 1999, p. 29.
  50. Hermann 1999, p. 29.
  51. Hermann 1999, p. 29.
  52. Hermann 1999, pp. 29–30.
  53. Hermann 1999, p. 30.
  54. Hermann 1999, p. 30.
  55. Hermann 1999, p. 30.
  56. Hermann 1999, p. 31.
  57. Hermann 1999, p. 31.
  58. Hermann 2004, p. 273.
  59. Hermann 2004, p. 273.
  60. Hermann 1999, p. 31.
  61. Hermann 1999, p. 31.
  62. Hermann 1999, pp. 31–32.
  63. Hermann 1999, p. 32.
  64. Hermann 1999, p. 32.
  65. Hermann 1999, pp. 32–33.
  66. Hermann 1999, p. 33.
  67. Hermann 2004, p. 273.
  68. Hermann 1999, p. 33.
  69. Hermann 1999, p. 33.
  70. Hermann 1999, p. 33.
  71. Hermann 1999, p. 32.
  72. Hermann 2004, p. 273.
  73. Hermann 2004, p. 273.
  74. Hermann 2004, p. 273.
  75. Hermann 2004, p. 273.
  76. Pusztaszeri 1984, p. 446.
  77. Hermann 2004, p. 273.
  78. Hermann 2004, p. 273.
  79. Hermann 2001, pp. 316–319, 325–327.

Sources

  • Bóna, Gábor (1987). Tábornokok és törzstisztek a szabadságharcban 1848–49 ("Generals and Staff Officers in the War of Freedom 1848–1849") (in Hungarian). Budapest: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó. p. 430. ISBN 963-326-343-3.
  • Hermann (ed), Róbert (1999). A csornai ütközet története és okmánytára ("The history of the Battle of Csorna and its documents) (in Hungarian). Győr: The Archives of Győr-Moson-Sopron County. p. 310. ISBN 963-8218-20-7.CS1 maint: extra text: authors list (link)
  • Hermann (ed), Róbert (1996). Az 1848–1849 évi forradalom és szabadságharc története ("The history of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–1849) (in Hungarian). Budapest: Videopont. p. 464. ISBN 963-8327-15-4.CS1 maint: extra text: authors list (link)
  • Hermann, Róbert (2004). Az 1848–1849-es szabadságharc nagy csatái ("Great battles of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848–1849") (in Hungarian). Budapest: Zrínyi. p. 408. ISBN 963-327-367-6.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Hermann, Róbert (2001). Az 1848–1849-es szabadságharc hadtörténete ("Military History of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848–1849") (in Hungarian). Budapest: Korona Kiadó. p. 424. ISBN 963-9376-21-3.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)
  • Pusztaszeri, László (1984). Görgey Artúr a szabadságharcban ("Artúr Görgey in the War of Independence") (in Hungarian). Budapest: Magvető Könyvkiadó. p. 784. ISBN 963-14-0194-4.CS1 maint: ref=harv (link)

This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.