Reverse post-material thesis

The reverse post-material thesis argues that the far-right have increased in support as a result of mainstream parties embracing issues such as LGBT rights (pictured) rather than traditional class interests.

The reverse post-material thesis or reverse post-materialism thesis[1] is an academic theory used to explain support for far-right political parties and populist political parties. The thesis is modelled on the post-material thesis from sociology that has been used to explain the shift in Western societies from traditional economic interests towards issues such as environmentalism and feminism.[2]

Core premise

The thesis begins from the premise that, during the 1970s and 1980s, mainstream political parties embraced a post-material agenda, with less concern for traditional class and economic interests and greater concern for issues such as feminism, environmentalism, liberal internationalist values, and LGBT rights and other sexual freedoms.

The reverse post-material thesis argues that individuals support such parties because they reject the post-material positions adopted by mainstream political parties, particularly centre-left and progressive political parties. According to this thesis, this post-material agenda, while more likely to appeal to the young and the more educated voters, is seen as irrelevant to material concerns, particularly of working-class unskilled males.[3] Merkel and Weinberg state that the material concerns of these voters will, if anything, have increased against a backdrop of globalisation.

Criticism

Roger Eatwell argues that the reverse post-material thesis is insufficient to explain local variations in support for extreme-right parties — for instance, to explain why the British National Party did well in Oldham at the 2001 General Election but relatively poorly in neighbouring Blackburn.[4]

They also argue that, in Europe, post-material values are strongest in Germany, Scandinavia, and the Netherlands, but as the extreme-right is generally weaker in these countries, the post-material thesis is insufficient on its own as an explanation for far-right support.[5]

Pisoiu and Ahmed argue tht the French National Front and Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang) in fact have an anti-materialist philosophy that prioritises political issues over economic concerns. [6]

References

  1. ↑ Carrolll, W. (2014) Far Right Parties and Movements in Europe, Japan, and the Tea Party in the U.S.: A Comparative Analysis, Journal of Power, Politics & Governance, June 2014, Vol. 2, No. 2, p 220
  2. ↑ Pisoiu, D. and Ahmed, R. (2016), 'Capitalising on Fear: The Rise of Right-Wing Populist Movements in Western Europe', OSCE Yearbook 2015, Baden-Baden 2016, p. 172
  3. ↑ Merkel, P. and Weinberg, L. (2004) Right-wing Extremism in the Twenty-first Century, Frank Cass Publishers: London, pp 52-53
  4. ↑ See Eatwell, R. (2017) 'Ten Theories of the Extreme Right' in 'The Populist Radical Right: A Reader', Mudde, C. (ed), Routledge: Abingdon, pp. 409-410
  5. ↑ Merkel, P. and Weinberg, L. (2004) Right-wing Extremism in the Twenty-first Century, Frank Cass Publishers: London, pp 53
  6. ↑ Pisoiu, D. and Ahmed, R. (2016), 'Capitalising on Fear: The Rise of Right-Wing Populist Movements in Western Europe', OSCE Yearbook 2015, Baden-Baden 2016, p. 173
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