Indian National Army in Singapore

The Indian National Army (INA) was an Indian military wing in Southeast Asia, particularly active in Singapore,[1] that was officially formed in April 1942 and disbanded in August 1945.[2][1][3] It was formed with the help of the Japanese forces and was made up of roughly about 45 000 Indian POWs, who were captured after the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942.[1] It was initially headed by Mohan Singh till April 1942. Following disagreements between Mohan Singh and other leaders of the INA, the responsibility of leadership fell to Subhas Chandra Bose in 1943.[2][4][1]

Between 1942 and 1945, the INA was involved in various military operations fighting alongside the Japanese forces and against the British and Allied forces. They are notable for their contributions to the battle fought in Burma, Imphal and Kohima.[2]

Following the defeat of the Japanese, the INA was dissolved in August 1945. However, its effects continued to be felt in the Indian Independence Movement. Some scholars believe that the INA acted as a catalyst for the Indian Independence movement.[5] During the INA trials in 1945 and 1946, the nationalistic sentiments aroused by the INA led to the various mutinies in the Royal Indian Navy and Royal Indian Air Force. Similarly, political parties such as the Indian National Congress have been said to have appropriated the legacy of the INA in order to gain political favour with the general population.[6]

Background and Context

Independence movements in India 1920s and 1930s

There were a number of Independence movements occurring in India during the 1920s and 1930s which played a huge role in shaping the ideology behind the formation of the INA.

Gandhi’s Non-Cooperation Movement

One of the more significant independent movements which brought together hundreds of thousands of Indians was Mohandas Gandhi’s Non-Cooperation Movement between 1920 and 1922 which aimed to reject British rule through non-violent means such as boycotting British products and consuming only local products.[7] This movement also strengthened nationalistic feelings amongst the Indian population both in India as well as other parts of the world. As a result of this movement Gandhi was arrested and he spent two years in jail.[7] However, the effects of this movement were far reaching as it spurred the emergence of a newer generation of Indians from the Congress Party such as, Jawaharlal Nehru, C. Rajagopalachari and Subhas Chandra Bose (who would eventually become the leader of the INA) who would later on actively advocate for India’s independence.[8]

Pre-1942 Conditions in Singapore and Malaya

In 1941, with the impending arrival of the Japanese troops to the Malay Peninsula, the British government had begun sending a large number of Indian troops to the Malay Peninsular and Singapore.[1] It was estimated that were some 37 000 Indian troops stationed in these areas, making up roughly about the 40 percent of the total military strength of the British forces.[1] However, the British-Indian troops stationed begun to experience various problems.

Firstly, the British military was beginning to be spread too thinly and they were unable to allocate much of their resources to the military set up in the Malay Peninsula and Singapore.[1] Secondly, although it appears that the number British-Indian troops swelled from 200 000 to 900 000 between 1939 and 1941, it was made up of very young boys (as a result of the open recruitment policy of the British) who had very little or no combat training and experience, leading to anxiety amongst the British-Indian forces.[9][1]

Thirdly, the British had already begun to suspect that not all of their Indian Army personnel were loyal to them. This was largely because, towards the end of 1942, the British government had to resort to indiscriminate recruitment in order to maintain the numbers for its army, meaning that it was no longer carefully curating its selection for the armed forces and consequently the British Indian Army was no longer filled with single minded individuals fighting for the same cause. The antagonistic feeling towards the British amongst the Indian soldiers were due to inferior treatment meted out to them. By 1941, British abuse, both verbal and physical of the Indian soldiers was rampant.[1]

As such, due to a combination of the above-mentioned factors and conditions, by 1941, the morale of the Indian Army troops was very low and this set up the stage for many soldiers to switch loyalties to the Japanese in 1942.[2][9]

The Role of the Japanese in the formation of the INA

The circumstances leading up to the formation of the INA have been contested. While some scholars have gone down the nationalistic road, newer scholars have instead challenged these claims and with the aid of new sources been able to shed a different light on the same event. Early accounts trace the founding of the INA to the spontaneous uprising of nationalism among Indian troops in Malaya.[5] More recent accounts, however, suggest the Japanese played a central role in its formation and development.[1][4][2]

Plans by the Japanese forces to influence the British-Indian soldiers in Singapore and Malaya had begun as early September 1941.[1][9] Major Iwaichi Fujiwara was the officer assigned by the Japanese government to head to Bangkok to undertake efforts to “engage in intelligence operations intended to cultivate...Japanese Indian cooperation”. As the first step in his efforts, Major Fujiwara sought out the highly popular but controversial Indian Nationalist, Pritam Singh who had fled from India to avoid arrest by the British government. Pritam Singh was also the General Secretary of the Indian Independence League (IIL) in Thailand, as part of a larger anti-British political organization which operated in various parts of Southeast Asia.

Fujiwara and Pritam held a series of secret discussions during the months of October and November 1941. During these meetings, Pritam managed to convince Fujiwara that the loyalties of the British Indian soldiers could only be attained if the Japanese authorities would promise the future prisoners of war the sparring of their lives .[1] Additionally, Pritam also persuaded Fujiwara to assure the British-Indian soldiers that the Japanese forces would assist in the liberation of Indian nation from the clutches of the British. Major Fujiwara guaranteed Pritam Singh that they did not harbour any “political, economic, cultural or religious” [9] intentions in India and they would respect the “property and freedom of Indians in territory that came under the sway of the Japanese”.[9]

Following that, Pritam Singh and Major Fujiwara followed the movement of the Japanese troops during their journey from Southern Thailand to Malaya.[3] As they advanced towards Northern Malaya in December 1941, the Japanese forces were able to capture British-Indian soldiers from the 1/14 Punjab regiment and their leader Mohan Singh who would go on to lead the INA later. Mohan Singh was tasked by Fujiwara to “manage the POWs and to maintain law and order in the area”.[9] During this period, Fujiwara was greatly convinced by Mohan Singh’s leadership abilities and as such sought Mohan Singh’s compliance to aid the Japanese efforts. He also offered Mohan Singh the opportunity to captain this new Indian army .[4]

Although, initially conflicted as he had heard horrific stories about the torture tactics employed by the Japanese forces, Mohan Singh believed that the proposed new Indian armed forces and cooperation with the Japanese forces, would act as a defence mechanism for “Indian soldiers and to protect Indian civilians and property from Japanese exploitation”.[4] As such, Mohan Singh was inclined to agree to Fujiwara’s proposal, on the strict condition that Fujiwara agreed to five conditions dictated by Singh. These conditions were:

1. Full assistance and collaboration would be extended by the Japanese army in the formation of liberation army for India.

2. The present IIL and INA should not be conflated with each other and be allowed to exist separately.

3. The POWs should come solely under the purview of Mohan Singh.

4. Indian POWs should be offered a choice about whether they wanted to join the INA and POWs who refuse should not be subjected to any form of torture by the Japanese forces.

5. The soon to be formed INA should be treated as an ‘allied army’ by the Japanese forces.[9]

Fujiwara acceded to Singh’s request.[9] Consequently, Mohan Singh was told to immediately head a propaganda movement in order to convince British-Indian soldiers to join the newly formed INA. By January 1942, this propaganda movement led by Mohan Singh was in full force.

Establishing the INA

The Farrer Park Meeting

it was during the Farrer Park Meeting on 17 February 1942, that Fujiwara and Mohan Singh first addressed the 45 000 strong British-Indian POWs. Major Fujiwara assured the POWs that they would be treated as comrades as opposed to POWs. He also repeatedly assured the POWs that if they complied with the Japanese forces, they would be provided with the support and resources to fight against the British forces and clinch independence for India.[9][1] Fujiwara had hoped that appealing to the nationalistic consciousness and patriotic feelings of these soldiers would enable him to win their support. Despite Fujiwara’s impassioned plea, many of the POWs remained unconvinced.[4][1] It was only when the charismatic Mohan Singh addressed them next, urging them to “seize the opportunity and rise for the motherland” [10] that the POWs begun to seriously consider the proposal to join the INA.

Although the POWs were not coerced into making an immediate decision with regard to joining the INA, the general consensus was that many of the POWs with the exceptions of the higher ranking British officials and the Gurkha contingent were sufficiently convinced.[11][1]

Treatment of the Indians under the Early Japanese Rule

It would not be until 9 May 1942 that the INA would come into full effect. However, following the events of 17 February 1942 Farrer Park meeting, the Indians in Singapore begun to enjoy special privileges during the Japanese ‘pacification’ of Singapore .[1] This was clearly seen in the vastly different ways in which the Japanese treated the Indians and Chinese. During these early months, it was reported that roughly 50 000 Chinese in Singapore and the Malayan Peninsula were brutally killed in what is now known as the ‘Sook Ching Massacre’ .[12] In contrast, the Indians received far more lenient treatment.[13] However, this is not to say that the Indians felt no fear at all. In fact, the attitudes of the Japanese forces towards the Chinese population did instil some fear in the general Indian civilian population as well as leaders such as Pritam Singh. This was significant or the Indian leaders, during the Farrer Park meeting who had expressed reservations about collaborating with the Japanese as these incidents further cemented their initial beliefs about the cruel nature of the Japanese and would further affirm their decision to not join the INA in May 1942.[1]

Pledging Allegiance to the INA

In the months following the Farrer Park meeting and the eventual formation of the INA in May 1942, Indian and Japanese leaders held various meetings with the most notable one held in Tokyo between 28 March 1942 and 30 March 1942.[14] It was during this meeting that Indian leaders carefully negotiated the terms of the INA with the Japanese officials. It was during these series of meetings that Mohan Singh was officially appointed as Commander in Chief for the INA.[1]

The ‘Bidadari Resolutions’ negotiated between Mohan and other senior Indian officials was formalized on 27 April 1942.[14] These resolutions mandated that the official recruitment for the INA could begin on 8 May 1942 .[15][1] Mohan Singh continued his attempts to convince the Indian POWs to join the INA. He was rather successful as by September 1942, he was able to recruit more than 40 000 soldiers.[15] Even though it was initially largely believed that many POWs joined the INA because of a burst of nationalistic consciousness, in recent years, it has been uncovered through the reading of other court documents and previously classified government documents[2] that there were other compelling reasons such as anger towards the British officials, the perceived sense of security offered by the Japanese in exchange for the loyalty of the POWs and also the promise of escape from malnutrition and starvation .[2][1]

The vast difference in treatments provided to those who joined the INA and those who refused further prompted those who initially did not wish to join to change their minds. The Indian POWs who aligned themselves with the INA were often well fed and given simpler, less taxing duties to perform. They were given great amounts of freedom in these camps (termed as volunteer camps) and were entitled to various forms of entertainment such as “patriotic theatrical and song nights that were also used as instruments to get POWs to join the INA”.[16] In a blatant violation of the conditions set by Mohan Singh prior to the formation of the INA, which would later serve as a source of conflict between Singh and the Japanese forces, the POWs who chose to not join the INA were subject to great physical and mental torture as they were sent to ‘concentration camps’, where they were deprived of food, medical aid and other basic rights.[17] An excerpt from Bryon Farewell details some of the methods and techniques that the Japanese used to coerce the Indian POWs into join the INA.

“When none of the Singapore prisoners of 2/2nd or the 2/9th Gurkhas signed up for the I.N.A., their Gurkha officers and N.C.O.s were taken away to Skeleton Camp for intensive coercion.… Twenty-six were selected for brutal treatment, then returned to camp ‘to think again’… [Gurkha officers] were made to work at heavy tasks, clubbed with rifle butts, brutally beaten with poles, and sand was mixed with their food.… Subadar- Major Chethabahadur of the 2/9th was put in a small cage, starved, left for long periods in solitary confinement and beaten…. Subadar-Major Harisung Bohra of the 2/2nd was blinded and repeatedly beaten with bamboo poles; he died of internal hemorrhages.”.[11]

To further complicate matters, it was not just the Japanese who were engaged in torturing the Indian POWs. There have been various reports suggesting that the INA formed its own version of the much feared Japanese Kempeitai which employed various torturous measures in order to coerce the POWs to join the INA.[1]

Leaders of the INA

Scholars have generally agreed that both Mohan Singh and Subhas Chandra Bose were influential figures.[18][1] However, earlier scholars, who were writing at a time when the Indian government had begun to portray Bose as a nationalistic hero, tended to accord much of the success of the INA to Bose.[19][3][14][20][21] However, scholars from newer non-nationalistic historical traditions, supported by access to newer historical sources, argue that both Singh and Bose were major players in the formation and maintenance of the INA.[1][19][20][21]

Captain Mohan Singh in a meeting with Japanese Major Iwaichi Fujiwara

Mohan Singh

Captain Mohan Singh was a soldier of the 1/14th Punjab regiment and a member of the British-Indian forces. He and his troops were capture by the Japanese forces in the Northern part of Malaya in December 1941. Singh believed that the British were exploiting the Indians. His desire to free India from British rule was one of the main reasons that he agreed to captain the INA and formed an alliance with the Japanese forces albeit with some conditions set to protect the Indians. Singh was instrumental in recruiting many of the British-Indian POWs to become members of the INA and also actively partook in their training.

However, towards the end of 1942, Mohan Singh begun to have disagreements with the Japanese authorities. He felt that the Japanese authorities had not kept their promises of treating the Indians as equals largely because they Indian troops were not provided with the latest military equipment and many of them were asked to do laborer jobs. Singh became increasingly disillusioned with the Japanese forces and surmised that the “Japanese ‘wanted the army [INA] and the organization to be just a show piece and a convenient puppet, but not a strong and powerful reality which may become a problem for them later on, thwart their secret designs on India”.[22]

As the Japanese forces felt that Singh was increasingly uncooperative, they feared that he would influence the rest of the INA to rebel against the Japanese as well. As such, Mohan Singh was dismissed from his position as captain and was arrested by the Japanese military police on 29 December 1942.[18]

After the defeat of the Japanese forces, Singh was sent to India face trial for his role in the INA. However, due to the overwhelming support he received from the Indian population, he was dismissed from the Army and faced no other form of punishment. He eventually pursued a career as a politician.[22]

Young Subhash Chandra Bose

Subhas Chandra Bose (Netaji)

After the capture of Mohan Singh, the Japanese forces enlisted the help of Subhas Chandra Bose to revive and lead the INA. Bose was already very well known amongst the Indian Diaspora communities for his efforts to fight for India’s independence and his disagreements with Gandhi’s ideologies about fighting for independence. As such, Bose was able to rally the INA forces together .[23] He was also able to convince many of the Indian civilians to contribute to the cause of the INA.[24] Bose also encouraged women to partake in activities of the INA, setting up the first women’s unit, the Rani of Jhansi Regiment in October 1943.[25] Bose was also more successful in negotiations with the Japanese to provide support for the Indian troops. This was largely because Bose was more successful than Singh in the military operations that he organized. The success of the troops also forced the Japanese to take the INA more seriously.[9]

However towards the end of the Japanese occupation, even Bose could not salvage the falling morale in the INA despite his best efforts.[1] In the midst of quelling various mutinies that had emerged in various INA camps during August 1945, Bose received information that the Japanese were surrendering.[1] On 15 August 1945, Bose declared the end of the INA through a radio broadcast made in Singapore.[1] Three days later, he perished in an airplane crash.[1]

Decline of the INA

While earlier academics have often attributed the fall of the INA to prevailing socio-economic conditions during the war or the inefficiency of the Japanese forces, more recent literature which have focused on perspectives from the soldiers themselves, suggests that a multitude of factors contributed to the decline of the INA.[1][2]

Loss of motivation

Towards the end of the Japanese occupation around December 1943, the prevailing socioeconomic conditions for the Indians were quickly going downhill. There was a severe food shortage due to the Japanese losing their footing and influence in many parts of the Southeast Asian region .[1]

The poor economic conditions faced by the Indians contributed to the low morale in the ranks of the INA. To further complicate matters, news of the 1944 Imphal disaster had made its rounds amongst the INA troops as well, contributing to their sense of hopelessness. Many of the INA soldiers had also begun to believes that the Japanese would soon be defeated by the allied forces. As such, they were reluctant to obey instructions to serve the Japanese forces.[3] During this period, the number of civilians who volunteered to be part of the INA declined greatly as well. In December 1944, only a mere 560 civilians became part of the INA. At that point “there were already 2000 deserters at large in Malaya, and 200 men were disappearing from training camps every month”.[3]

The existing INA troops’ unhappiness was further compounded by the news that the 3rd Division of the INA was not going to be allowed to go to Burma to fight for India’s independence. Instead, they were tasked to protect the Japanese bases in Singapore and Malaya.[1] In particular the Japanese forces wanted to use the 3rd division to quell the uprising from the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), formed in 1944 and was made up of local Chinese and members of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP).[26] Many INA soldiers chose to defect from the INA as they did not wish to fight the locals for the Japanese forces who had broken their promises of aiding them to fight for the freedom of India from the British. Some of those who defected, quickly aligned themselves and forged alliances with MPAJA, as they now felt that there was “no hope of liberating India, the alternative of liberating Malaya begun to seem far more attractive”.[27]

Bose visiting the INA memorial during June 1945.

Simultaneously, there was a more rapid dissolution of the INA occurring in Burma. By the middle of June 1945, when Subash Chandra Bose returned to Singapore, he focused on revitalizing the disintegrating INA movement. He engaged in various propaganda measures, most notably, he called for the construction of a memorial in remembrance of the Indian soldiers who died for the INA’s cause.[1] However, despite his best efforts, it would appear that there was very little left of the INA to salvage. By that time, many of the INA soldiers were deeply influenced by communist ideologies and were contributing aid and rations to the guerilla forces.[1] This decline in morale and the rise of dissatisfaction amongst the INA soldiers reached its peak in early August, when a riot erupted in one of the INA training camps. This was later believed to have been because the senior “Indian army officers [in that camp] had rebelled in the hopes that they would be better placed when the British forces arrived”.[1]

Acceptance of Defeat

In August 1945, Bose was informed of the Japanese’s decision to surrender. This marked the end of the INA and its activities. On 15 August 1945, Bose partook in a final radio broadcast in Singapore. He praised and thanked the Indians in East Asia for their huge scarifies. In his speech, he asserted that:

“A glorious chapter in the History of India’s struggle for Freedom has come to a close and, in that chapter, the sons and daughters of India in East Asia will have an undying place.…You sent an unending stream of your sons and daughters to the camps to be trained as soldiers of the Azad Hind Fauj and of the Rani of Jhansi Regiment. Money and materials, you poured lavishly…. Posterity will bless your name, and will talk with pride about your offerings at the altar of India’s freedom.…Do not be depressed at our temporary failure.… There is no power on earth that can keep India enslaved. India shall be free and before long.” [22]

Aftermath of the Japanese Occupation in Singapore

Following the end of the Japanese occupation, the INA were viewed with great pride and reverence in India as stories of their struggle for India’s independence spread quickly.[1] However, the same could not be said for the former INA members in diasporic Singapore.[1] In Singapore, Indians particularly the ones who were associated with the INA were treated with disdain as they were “stigmatized as fascists and Japanese collaborators”.[27] However, many of the members of the British re-occupation forces were made up of Indian soldiers and this at the very least offered some amount of physical protection for many of the Indians living in Singapore.[27]

Many of the ex-INA soldiers had by then switched loyalties back towards the British. When the British arrived on 5 September 1945 Shinozaki notes that that the Gurkhas … [upon seeing] the INA’s memorial tower … began to knock it down. Many Indians nearby … clapped their hands at this. I thought to myself, these same people were before in the INA’.[28] With the return of the British, many Indians were afraid that they would be oppressed or hounded because of their connections to the INA and IIL. Largely due to the poor fortunes that they had experienced towards the end of the British regime, many of the educated Indians desired to gain employment within the British administration. As such they pledged (correctly or incorrectly) that they had stayed loyal to the British during the Japanese occupation and had only joined the INA when left with no choice. Some others chose to turn other members of the INA and IIL over to the British force in order to gain favour with the British administration.[1]

Long-Term Significance of the Indian National Army

Despite being dissolved in August 1945, the INA and its legacy continued to have far reaching consequences in India such as influencing the new Indian Army, altering British policy towards the Indian forces and also playing a major role in shaping the political outcome following India’s independence.

Effects on the Indian Army (Post 1945)

The INA had left deep impressions on many of the existing British-Indian soldiers, many of them who had been recruited during the war. Their encounters with members of the INA and the secret circulation of past INA propaganda had a lasting impression of the British-Indian soldiers. In fact, one British officer observed: "In the eleven months which had ... elapsed since the first contacts of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force with the mass of the I.N.A. in Rangoon, there had been widespread fraternization. Its result was political consciousness which the Indian Servicemen had never before possessed." This new consciousness led them to react more sharply not only to the existing grievances in the Service but to the pressing political issues of the post-war years.[5]

Coupled with the glorification of the INA by various political parties, the morale of the members of the British-Indian troops begun to decline and signs of rebellion begun to emerge.[5] During the first INA trial, in November 1945, the Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF) went on a strike to protest against the trials and in February 1946, the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) also joined the mutiny with some areas where the RIN was stationed, experiencing bursts of violence. It was evident by the middle of 1946 that the much of the Indian Armed Forces were INA sympathizers.[5]

Changes by the British Colonial Administration

The British administration was able to gather some important lessons from the revolt of the British-Indian officers to form the INA. Prior to World War II, the British had been certain that certain “martial races” would be forever loyal to the British.[5] However, this confidence was shaken after the events of World War II. During the INA trials which occurred shortly after the surrender of the Japanese, the British forces uncovered that this “martial races” had felt discriminated by the British forces in terms “pay, allowance and promotions”.[5] This was said to be one of the biggest motivations for the revolt. This “was a lesson for the colonial powers”.[5] In fact, some authors have argued that these realizations greatly shaped the policy of the British towards the Indian forces in the next few years before India achieved independence in 1947. The British resorted to treating the Indian soldiers with more suspicion but ensured greater equality to prevent such an occurrence again.[5]

Contributions to the Indian Nationalist Movements

Some academics believe that the INA acted as a catalyst for the India independence movement as it sped up the end of British rule in India.[29][30][19][15] The INA and its legacy continued to aid the Indian Nationalist movements and brought together various groups of people who were previously in conflict with each other. This was especially so after the trials of some of the INA officers between 1945 and 1946.[5] The trials were said to have “created a widespread revolutionary anti-British sentiment in India. A consensus of opinion arose among almost all the political parties in India which condemned the Government's policy of trying certain I.N.A. officers by court martial.”.[5] The Muslim League, Hindu religious groups such as the Mahasabha and Akali Dal, and the Socialist leaders all came together to lend their support to the INA soldiers. In fact, the Indian National Congress was able to gain popularity amongst the general Indian population by choosing to side with the INA officers despite their varying religious faiths, thus establishing itself as a secular political party which could represent the interest of all groups of Indians.[5] This would eventually play an important role in the Indian National Congress winning the first general elections in 1947, following the departure of the British .[6]

Memory of the INA in Singapore History

Indian National Army Monument at Esplanade Park

Many scholars have claimed the INA’s story, is an integral part of the history of Indians in Singapore.[1][2] In 1995, the Singapore government erected an Indian National Army Monument at the Esplanade Park to commemorate the 50th anniversary of World War II. It was one of the 11 monuments constructed as part of this initiative.[31] However, there has been little focus on the INA in the post-independence historical narrative of Singapore.[1][4][32] The INA is only very briefly mentioned as an anti-colonial force in much of Singapore’s post-independence historical narrative. The Singapore government often chooses not to allow war commemorations to be along ethnic lines.[33] These accounts often omit the information of the INA soldiers fighting for the Japanese forces, under whom the Chinese population had endured great hardship.[12] One explanation is that In the early formation years of Singapore, the government “found themselves in a state without a nation” [12] and at that moment they took advantage of the common suffering that the people had endured during the Japanese occupation and attempted to turn it into one of the cornerstones of nation building in Singapore.[31] As such, in order to play up the suffering as a common thread and collective memory, the Singapore government had left out the part of history where the Indians in Singapore had joined hands with the Japanese. Instead, they proceeded to highlight that people living in Singapore from all walks of life had suffered extensively at the hands of the Japanese. Consequently, that feeling of mutual suffering contributed to them being and feeling Singaporean. This exclusion about details of the INA from the historical narrative helped to create a sense of identity and unity in a rather fragmented society at that time.[31][12]

References

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  13. ↑ Turnbull, Constance Mary (1989). A History of Singapore, 1819-1988. Oxford University Press.
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  16. ↑ Durrani, M. (1955). The Sixth Column" The Heroic Personal Story of Lt Col Mahmood Khan Durrani. Cassell.
  17. ↑ Ghosh, Kalyan Kumar (1969). The Indian National Army: Second Front of the Indian Independence Movement. Meenakshi Prakashan.
  18. 1 2 Green, L. C. (1948-01-01). "The Indian National Army Trials". The Modern Law Review. 11 (1): 47–69. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2230.1948.tb00071.x. ISSN 1468-2230.
  19. 1 2 3 Cohen, S (2001). The Indian Army: Its contribution to the development of a nation. Oxford University Press.
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  24. ↑ Pande, Amba (2016-07-03). "Bose, beyond the 'Mystery'". Strategic Analysis. 40 (4): 234–238. doi:10.1080/09700161.2016.1184795. ISSN 0970-0161.
  25. ↑ Rettig, Tobias (2013-12-01). "Recruiting the All-Female Rani of Jhansi Regiment: Subhas Chandra Bose and Dr Lakshmi Swaminadhan". South East Asia Research. 21 (4): 627–638. doi:10.5367/sear.2013.0178. ISSN 0967-828X.
  26. ↑ Mahajani, U. (1960). The Role of Indian Minorities in Burma and Malaya. Vora.
  27. 1 2 3 Stenson, M. (1980). Class, Race and Colonialism in West Malaysia. University of Queensland Press.
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  29. ↑ Chaudhuri , N. (1953). Subhas Chandra Bose-His Legacy and Legend. Pacific Affairs, 26(4), 349-357.
  30. ↑ Sarkar, S. (1989). Modern India 1885–1947. Springer
  31. 1 2 3 Henderson, J. (2007). Remembering the Second World War in Singapore: Wartime Heritage as a Visitor Attraction. Journal of Heritage Tourism, 2(1), 36-52.
  32. ↑ Wong, D. (2001). Memory suppression and memory production: the Japanese Occupation of Singapore. In J. Fujitani, G. White, & L. Yoneyama, Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s) (pp. 218-238). Perilous memories: the Asia-Pacific wars
  33. ↑ Salleh, B. (2012). War Memory and the Making of Modern Malaysia and Singapore (Review). Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 122-124
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