Iberia Airlines Flight 933

Iberia Airlines Flight 933
EC-CBN, the aircraft involved, at Madrid-Barajas Airport in June 1973.
Accident
Date December 17, 1973 (1973-12-17)
Summary Spatial disorientation resulted from pilot error
Site near Boston-Logan International Airport
Aircraft
Aircraft type McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30
Aircraft name Costa Brava
Operator Iberia Airlines
Registration EC-CBN
Flight origin Madrid Barajas International Airport, Madrid, Spain
Destination Boston-Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts
Passengers 154
Crew 14
Fatalities 0
Injuries 13 (3 serious)
Survivors 168 (all)

Iberia Airlines Flight 933 was an international flight from Madrid Barajas International Airport bound for its destination, Boston-Logan International Airport in Boston, that suffered an runway incident on December 17, 1973. As the McDonnell Douglas DC-10, the aircraft operating the flight, was approaching the airport, it collided with the ALS system 500 feet short from the runway threshold. This critically damaged the frontal gear, collapsing it. The aircraft came to a rest 3000 feet before the runway. Although all 168 onboard survived, the aircraft was written off. This accident is the first loss of the DC-10.

Aircraft And Crew

The aircraft operating was an McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30, manufactured in early 1973 by McDonnell Douglas at Long Beach Airport, California.[1] At the time of the accident, it was nine months old and flown a total of 2,016 flight hours. It was registered as N54627 during an certification test, but re-registered as EC-CBN when it was delivered to Iberia Airlines in August 1973.[2] Once, it was photographed previously for Iberia Airlines postcards and merchandise.[3][4]

Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigated into the cause of accident after its occurrence. According to the aircraft's flight data recorder, it explained that its descent rate was increasing rapidly during the approach, which was resulted previously by an wind shear encounter. It was discovered that the captain and the first officer failed to recognize the rate change until the aircraft collided with the ALS piers. It was also discovered that the changes in weather had directed their attention away from monitoring the descent rate. 11 months after the accident in 1974, the NTSB confirmed their probable cause of the crash.[5] In the accident report, in a statement, it claims "The captain did not recognize, and may have been unable to recognize, an increased rate of descent in time to arrest it before the aircraft struck the approach light piers. The increased rate of descent was induced by an encounter with a low-level wind shear at a critical point in the landing approach where he was transitioning from automatic flight control under instrument flight conditions to manual flight control with visual references. The captain's ability to detect and arrest the increased rate of descent was adversely affected by a lack of information as to the existence of the wind shear and the marginal visual cues available. The minimal DC-10 wheel clearance above the approach lights and the runway threshold afforded by the ILS glide slope made the response time critical and, under the circumstances, produced a situation wherein a pilot's ability to make a safe landing was greatly diminished."[6]

Aftermath

The NTSB issued seven safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration on September 6, 1974. All of them were closed and have acceptable action.

A-74-77: RELOCATE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ILS GLIDE SLOPE TRANSMITTER SITES IN ACCORDANCE WITH FAA ORDER 8260.24 TO PROVIDE A LARGER MARGIN OF SAFETY FOR WIDE-BODIED AIRCRAFT DURING CATEGORY I APPROACHES.

A-74-78: AS AN INTERIM MEASURE, INCREASE DH AND VISIBILITY MINIMUMS FOR THOSE APPROACHES WHERE THE COMBINATION OF THE GLIDE SLOPE TRANSMITTER ANTENNA INSTALLATION AND THE AIRCRAFT GLIDE SLOPE RECEIVER ANTENNA INSTALLATION PROVIDE A NOMINAL WHEEL CLEARANCE OF LESS THAN 20 FEET AT THE RUNWAY THRESHOLD

A-74-79: PENDING THE RELOCATION OF THE GLIDE SLOPE FACILITY TO COMPLY WITH FAA ORDER 8260.24, EXPEDITE THE MODIFICATIONS TO OFFICIAL U.S. INSTRUMENT APPROACH PROCEDURES SO THAT THEY DISPLAY GLIDE SLOPE RUNWAY THRESHOLD CROSSING HEIGHT FOR ALL APPROACHES HAVING A TCH OF LESS THAN 47 FEET.

A-74-80: ISSUE AN ADVISORY CIRCULAR WHICH DESCRIBES THE WIND SHEAR PHENOMENON, HIGHLIGHTS THE NECESSITY FOR PROMPT PILOT RECOGNITION AND PROPER PILOTING TECHNIQUES TO PREVENT SHORT OR LONG LANDINGS, AND EMPHASIZES THE NEED TO BE CONSTANTLY AWARE OF THE AIRCRAFT\'S RATE OF DESCENT, ATTITUDE AND THRUST DURING APPROACHES USING AUTOPILOT/AUTOTHROTTLE SYSTEMS.

A-74-81: MODIFY INITIAL AND RECURRENT PILOT TRAINING PROGRAMS AND TESTS TO INCLUDE A DEMONSTRATION OF THE APPLICANT\'S KNOWLEDGE OF WIND SHEAR AND ITS EFFECT ON AN AIRCRAFT\'S FLIGHT PROFILE, AND OF PROPER PILOTING TECHNIQUES NECESSARY TO COUNTER SUCH EFFECTS.

A-74-82: EXPEDITE THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND OPERATIONAL USE OF THE ACOUSTIC DOPPLER WIND MEASURING SYSTEM.

A-74-83: DEVELOP AN INTERIM SYSTEM WHEREBY WIND SHEAR INFORMATION DEVELOPED FROM METEOROLOGICAL MEASUREMENTS OR PILOT REPORTS WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE PILOTS OF ARRIVING AND DEPARTING AIRCRAFT.

EC-CBN was heavily damaged beyond repair and it was written off 2 months later. It was later scrapped in 1974.

See also

References

  1. ↑ "EC-CBN Iberia McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30". www.planespotters.net. Retrieved 2018-02-09.
  2. ↑ "Iberia EC-CBN (McDonnell Douglas DC-10 - MSN 46925) | Airfleets aviation". www.airfleets.net. Retrieved 2018-02-09.
  3. ↑ "EC-CBN: El breve "Costa Brava" *". Retrieved 2018-02-09.
  4. ↑ "Iberia McDonnell Douglas DC-10 (postcard)". Flickr. Retrieved 2018-02-09.
  5. ↑ "Event Details". www.fss.aero. Retrieved 2018-02-09.
  6. ↑ "MC DONNELL - DOUGLAS DC - 10 - Accident of EC-CBN (46925/87)". www.taxiways.de. Retrieved 2018-02-09.
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