Ian Hamilton (British Army officer)

Second Boer War

Jean, Wife of Colonel Ian Hamilton, John Singer Sargent, 1896

Amidst mounting tensions between the United Kingdom and the Boer republics in South Africa Lieutenant General White was dispatched to take command in Natal in September 1899, with Hamilton accompanying him as Chief Staff Officer (Assistant Adjutant General). The Second Boer War broke out shortly after their arrival and Hamilton commanded the infantry at the Battle of Elandslaagte. At the Battle of Ladysmith Hamilton continued to lead his brigade sized column, but played no role in the fighting. Defeated in the field, White's Natal Field Force was besieged in Ladysmith from the beginning of November. Hamilton was given command of the southern sector of the towns defences and successfully fought off the only major assault on the garrison at the Battle of Wagon Hill in January. For his part in the siege he was frequently mentioned in dispatches.

After the relief of Ladysmith in February Hamilton took command of a brigade of Mounted Infantry, and from April the Mounted Infantry Division. He was promoted to major general, and knighted as a Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath (KCB)^[5]. The war correspondent Winston Churchill told of his campaign from Bloemfontein to Pretoria in Ian Hamilton's March (London, 1900, reprinted as the second half of The Boer War), having first met Hamilton in 1897 when they sailed on the same ship. Hamilton travelled 400 miles from Bloemfontein to Pretoria fighting 10 major battles with Boer forces (including the battle of Rooiwal) and fourteen minor ones, and was recommended twice for the Victoria Cross (which was considered inappropriate because of his rank).

In May 1901 Hamilton was appointed Military Secretary at the War Office,^[6] but the following November he was again asked to return to South Africa as Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Kitchener.^[7] He arrived in South Africa in late November 1901, and received the local rank of Lieutenant-general.^[8] In April 1902 he took command of the military columns operating in the Western Transvaal.^[9] Following the end of hostilities in June 1902, he returned to the UK together with Lord Kitchener on board the SS Orotava,^[10] which arrived in Southampton on 12 July. They received an enthusiastic welcome on their arrival to London, with thousands of people lining the streets to watch their procession.^[11]

In a despatch dated 23 June 1902, Lord Kitchener wrote the following about his work in South Africa:

At much personal convenience, Lord Roberts lent me his Military Secretary, Sir Ian Hamilton, as my Chief of Staff. His high soldierly qualities are already well known, and his reputation does not require to be established now. I am much indebted to him for his able and constant support to me as Chief of Staff, also for the marked skill and self-reliance he showed later, when directing operations in the Western Transvaal.^[12]

In September 1902, Hamilton accompanied Lord Roberts, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces, and St John Brodrick, Secretary of State for War, on a visit to Germany to attend the German army maneuvers as guest of the Emperor Wilhelm.^[13] He returned to his post at the War Office, and from 1903 to 1904 he was Quartermaster-General to the Forces.^[14]

Service in Japan

Western military attachés and war correspondents with the Japanese forces after the Battle of Shaho (1904): 1. Robert Collins; 2. David Fraser; 3. Capt. Francois Dhani; 4. Capt. James Jardine; 5. Frederick McKenzie; 6. Edward Knight; 7. Charles Victor-Thomas; 8. Oscar Davis; 9. William Maxwell; 10. Robert MacHugh; 11. William Dinwiddie; 12. Frederick Palmer; 13. Capt. Berkeley Vincent; 14. John Bass; 15. Martin Donohoe; 16. Capt. ____;　17. Capt. Carl von Hoffman; 18. ____; 19. ____; 20. ____; 21. Gen. Sir Ian Hamilton; 22. ____; 23. ____; 24. ____; 25. ____.

From 1904 to 1905, Hamilton was the military attaché of the British Indian Army serving with the Japanese army in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War. Amongst the several military attachés from Western countries, he was the first to arrive in Japan after the start of the war.^[15] He published A Staff Officer's Scrap-Book during the Russo–Japanese War on his experiences and observations during that conflict.^[16]

Gen. Sir Ian Hamilton (facing front) with Japanese General Kuroki Tamemoto after the Japanese victory in Battle of Shaho (1904).

This military confrontation between a well-known European army and a less-familiar Asian army was the first time that the tactics of entrenched positions for infantry were defended with machine guns and artillery. This was the first twentieth-century war in which the technology of warfare became increasingly important, factors which came to dominate the evolution of warfare during the First World War. Hamilton wrote that cavalry was obsolete in such a conflict, regarding their role as better accomplished by mounted infantry. He became a supporter of non-traditional tactics such as night attacks and the use of aircraft. Conversely the successful Japanese infantry assaults convinced him that superior morale would allow an attacker to overcome prepared defensive positions.

Hamilton went on to serve as General Officer Commanding Southern Command between 1905 and 1909 and as Adjutant-General to the Forces between 1909 and 1910.^[17]

The Dardanelles

In March 1915 Herbert Kitchener appointed Hamilton to command the Allied Mediterranean Expeditionary Force to gain control of the Dardanelles straits from Turkey and to capture Constantinople.^[18] Hamilton, aged 62, had been in charge of land defences for England. Whilst a senior and respected officer, perhaps more experienced in different campaigns than most, he was considered too unconventional, too intellectual and too friendly with politicians to be given a command on the Western Front.^[19] Hamilton was not given a chance to take part in planning the campaign. Intelligence reports were poor— they grossly underestimated the strength of defending forces and their willingness to fight. While leaders of the Greek Army informed Kitchener that he would need 150,000 men to take Gallipoli, Kitchener concluded that a force of 70,000 men would be adequate to rapidly overpower the defenders.^[20]

The plan to take control of the Dardanelles and open a new front in the war had been considered in various forms in 1914. In November that year, British ships shelled the outer forts, causing the magazine at Seddülbahir castle to explode. In December a British submarine entered the channel and sank the Turkish ironclad Mesudiye at Çanakkale. Both these events raised British hopes of an easy victory, but as a consequence the Turks set about laying mines through the channels to prevent ships approaching and strengthened the fortifications. On 3 January 1915 the British First Sea Lord, Admiral Fisher, presented a plan to the War Council for a joint naval and military attack, using 75,000 troops, but only if the attack could be launched immediately. By 21 January Fisher wrote privately to Admiral Jellicoe that he could not approve the plan unless 200,000 men were available. Churchill himself, as First Lord of the Admiralty, had initially suggested in September 1914 that the operation would need the support of 50,000 men.

Starting on 19 February, Allied ships attempted to take the strait using naval power alone. For the large ships to approach and shell the forts, the mines had to be cleared. The mines could not be cleared because of inadequate minesweepers, and because of ongoing shell-fire from the forts. The plan had been conceived with the idea of only sending second-rate ships which were considered expendable. On 18 March the British and a squadron of French ships mounted a more determined attack, with the result that three were sunk and three disabled by undiscovered mines. There was little effect on the defenders, except to cause them to expend the majority of their ammunition. Churchill ordered Admiral John de Robeck to continue the operation, but de Robeck, replacing the intended commander of the fleet, Admiral Sackville Carden (who had become ill), saw no sense in losing further ships, and withdrew. It was then decided that an invasion by troops would be required. Had the bombardment continued it is likely the defending guns would have ceased firing for lack of shells, the minesweepers could have worked effectively and the British ships could have moved in to their objectives.^[21]

General Hamilton in a formal pose (1910).

Hamilton became responsible for organising armed landings. He had no specialised landing craft, the disparate troops he had been given had no training, and supplies for the army had been packed in ways which made them difficult to access for landings. Hamilton believed that the navy would make further attacks during his landings. The navy, realising likely losses and fundamentally opposing the idea that tactical losses of ships was acceptable, declined to mount another attack. The Turks had had two months warning from the first serious navy attack to prepare ground defences before the follow-up ground landings took place, and they used the time effectively.^[22]

With the Dardanelles expedition stalled, Hamilton was recalled to London on 16 October 1915, effectively ending his military career.

Decorations

Colonel Ian Hamilton, John Singer Sargent, 1898

• DSO : Distinguished Service Order – 1891

Most Honourable Order of the Bath

• CB : Companion – 1896 – Chitral relief force
• KCB : Knight Commander – 29 November 1900 – in recognition of services in connection with the Campaign in South Africa 1899–1900^[5]
• GCB : Knight Grand Cross – 1910

Most Distinguished Order of St Michael and St George

• GCMG : Knight Grand Cross – 1919