Factual relativism

Aletheic relativism argues that truth itself is relative. This form of relativism has its own particular problem, regardless of whether one is talking about truth being relative to the individual, the position or purpose of the individual, or the conceptual scheme within which the truth was revealed. This problem centers on what Mandelbaum (1962) termed the "self-excepting fallacy." Largely because of the self-excepting fallacy, few authors in the philosophy of science currently accept aletheic cognitive relativism[1]. Factual relativism (also called epistemic relativism, epistemological relativism, alethic relativism or cognitive relativism) is a way to reason where facts used to justify any claims are understood to be relative and subjective to the perspective of those proving or falsifying the proposition.[2]

Viewpoints

One school of thought compares scientific knowledge to the mythology of other cultures, arguing that it is merely our society's set of myths based on societal assumptions. For support, Paul Feyerabend's comments in Against Method that "The similarities between science and myth are indeed astonishing" and "First-world science is one science among many" (from the introduction to the Chinese edition)[3] are sometimes cited, although it is not clear if Feyerabend meant them to be taken entirely seriously.

The strong program in the sociology of science is (in the words of founder David Bloor) "impartial with respect to truth and falsity".[4] Elsewhere, Bloor and Barry Barnes have said "For the relativist [such as us] there is no sense attached to the idea that some standards or beliefs are really rational as distinct from merely locally accepted as such."[5] In France, Bruno Latour has claimed that "Since the settlement of a controversy is the cause of Nature's representation, not the consequence, we can never use the outcome – Nature – to explain how and why a controversy has been settled."[6]

Yves Winkin, a Belgian professor of communications, responded to a popular trial in which two witnesses gave contradicting testimony by telling the newspaper Le Soir that "There is no transcendent truth. [...] It is not surprising that these two people, representing two very different professional universes, should each set forth a different truth. Having said that, I think that, in this context of public responsibility, the commission can only proceed as it does."[7]

The philosopher of science Gérard Fourez wrote in that "What one generally calls a fact is an interpretation of a situation that no one, at least for the moment, wants to call into question."[8]

British archaeologist Roger Anyon told the New York Times that "science is just one of many ways of knowing the world... The Zuni's world view is just as valid as the archeological viewpoint of what prehistory is about." [9]

Criticism

Cognitive relativism is unfalsifiable and has been criticized by both analytic philosophers and scientists.

Cosmologist Stephen Hawking in The Grand Design has advocated model-dependent realism, which bears close resemblance to a relativist position, as a means of reconciling apparent inconsistencies between different iterations of M-Theory.

Larry Laudan's book Science and Relativism[10] outlines the various philosophical points of view on the subject in the form of a dialogue.

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ Muncy, James A.; Fisk, Raymond P. (1987). "Cognitive Relativism and the Practice of Marketing Science". Journal of Marketing. 51 (1): 20–33. doi:10.2307/1251141.
  2. ↑ Iris Einheuser, "Varieties of Relativism: Indexical, Propositional and Factual", from the Logos conference on RELATIVIZING UTTERANCE TRUTH, Barcelona, 2005.
  3. ↑ Feyerabend, Paul (1992). Against method (Repr ed.). London [u.a.]: Verso. p. 3. ISBN 9780860916468.
  4. ↑ "PhilosophyScience2". Retrieved August 11, 2012.
  5. ↑ Hollis, Martin; Lukes, Stephen, eds. (1982). Rationality and relativism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT press. pp. 27–28. ISBN 9780262580618.
  6. ↑ Latour, Bruno (1987). Science in action : how to follow scientists and engineers through society. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. p. 99. ISBN 9780674792913.
  7. ↑ Sokal, Alan; Bricmont, Jean (1998). Fashionable nonsense : postmodern intellectuals' abuse of science. New York: Picador. p. 100. ISBN 9781466862401.
  8. ↑ Fourez, Gérard (1992). La Construction des sciences, 2eme edition revue. Brussels:De Boeck Université.
  9. ↑ Johnson, George. Indian Tribes' Creationists Thwart Archeologists, New York Times, October 22, 1996
  10. ↑ Science and Relativism: Dialogues on the Philosophy of Science, ISBN 978-0-226-46949-2

References

  • Maria Baghramian, Relativism, London: Routledge, 2004, ISBN 0-415-16150-9
  • Ernest Gellner, Relativism and the Social Sciences, Cambridge University Press, 1985, ISBN 0-521-33798-4
  • Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978, ISBN 0915144522, Paperback ISBN 0915144514
  • Martin Hollis, Steven Lukes, Rationality and Relativism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982, ISBN 0-631-12773-9
  • Jack W. Meiland, Michael Krausz, Relativism, Cognitive and Moral, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982, ISBN 0-268-01611-9
  • Diederick Raven, Lieteke van Vucht Tijssen, Jan de Wolf, Cognitive Relativism and Social Science, 1992, ISBN 0-88738-425-0
  • Markus Seidel, Epistemic Relativism: A Constructive Critique, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, ISBN 978-1-137-37788-3
  • Factual relativism at PhilPapers
  • Epistemic relativism at PhilPapers
  • "Epistemology and Relativism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Westacott, E. Cognitive Relativism, 2006, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  • Westacott, E. Relativism, 2005, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.