Birchfield v. North Dakota
| Birchfield v. North Dakota | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued April 20, 2016 Decided June 23, 2016 | |
| Full case name | Danny Birchfield, Petitioner v. North Dakota |
| Docket nos. | 14–1468 |
| Citations |
579 U.S. ___ (more) 136 S. Ct. 2160 |
| Argument | Oral argument |
| Opinion announcement | Opinion announcement |
| Prior history | On writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of North Dakota |
| Holding | |
|
1. The Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving but not warrantless blood tests. 2. Motorists who refuse to submit to a blood test may face civil but not criminal penalties. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Alito, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer, Kagan |
| Concur/dissent | Sotomayor, joined by Ginsburg |
| Concur/dissent | Thomas |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. amend. IV | |
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___ (2016), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the search incident to arrest doctrine permits law enforcement to conduct warrantless breath tests but not blood tests on suspected drunk drivers.[1]
Background
Birchfield was a consolidation of three cases: Birchfield v. North Dakota, Bernard v. Minnesota, and Beylund v. Levi. Birchfield was charged with violation of a North Dakota statute for refusing submission to a blood alcohol content testing; Bernard was charged with a violation of a Minnesota statute for refusing submission to a breath alcohol testing; Beylund underwent a blood alcohol test consistent with North Dakota's implied consent law and challenged the constitutionality of that law after an administrative hearing based on the test results led to the revocation of his license.
Issue
In Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013), the Court held "the natural dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream does not always constitute an exigency justifying the warrantless taking of a blood sample" but the court "did not address any potential justification for warrantless testing of drunk driving suspects, except for the exception 'at issue in the case,' namely, the exception for exigent circumstances".[2]
The issue before court was how the "search-incident-to-arrest doctrine applies to breath and blood tests". Is warrantless alcohol testing incident to drunk driving arrests to determine blood alcohol content a violation of the Fourth Amendment?
Decision
The Court held that both breath tests and blood tests constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court then proceeded to analyze both types of tests under the search incident to arrest doctrine, weighing on the one hand "the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy" and on the other hand "the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Applied to breath tests, the Court concluded that breath tests do not implicate significant privacy concerns. Blood tests, on the other hand, are significantly more intrusive. Turning to the government's interest in the tests, the Court concluded that serves the very important function of providing an incentive to cooperate in alcohol testing. Weighing these interests, the Court concluded that requiring breath tests is constitutional; however, requiring blood tests is not, as the goal of traffic safety can be obtained by less invasive means (such as breath tests).
In the majority opinion, in addressing the limits of implied consent laws, the court stated that while their "prior opinions have referred approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws" that "there must be a limit to the consequences to which motorists may be deemed to have consented by virtue of a decision to drive on public roads" and "that motorists could be deemed to have consented to only those conditions that are 'reasonable' in that they have a 'nexus' to the privilege of driving".
The Court ruled in favor of Birchfield who was prosecuted for refusing a warrantless blood draw and ruled against Bernard who refused a warrantless breath test. Beylund, on the other hand consented to a blood test after police advised him that he was required to do. The court therefore remanded Beylund's case back to the state court "to reevaluate Beylund's consent given the partial inaccuracy of the officer's advisory." The Supreme Court of North Dakota court subsequently avoided the issue by holding that, even assuming the consent was involuntary, the Exclusionary Rule does not apply in the administrative hearing context and thus affirmed suspension of his license for testing over the prohibited level set forth in the implied consent / administrative license suspension statute.[3]
See also
References
- ↑ Birchfield v. North Dakota, No. 14–1468, 579 U.S. ___, slip op. at 1, 32 (2016).
- ↑ "Birchfield v. North Dakota, Opinion of the Court" (PDF). pp. 15–16 (20–21 of pdf). Retrieved 2 September 2017.
- ↑ "Beylund v. Levi, Wojan v. Levi, 2017 ND 30, 889 N.W.2d 907".