Bargaining model of war

In international relations theory, the bargaining model of war is a means to represent the potential gains and losses and ultimate outcome of war between two actors as a bargaining interaction.[1]

History

Carl von Clausewitz was the first to define war as a bargaining interaction. He wrote that war has no value itself, thus no one pursues war without having a larger goal.[2] During the 1950s, the limited conflicts of the Cold War furthered the bargaining theory. Because wars were limited, it was determined that war usually ends with a bargain rather than a total military victory. In the 1960s, Thomas Schelling claimed that most conflicts was a bargaining interaction and defined the end of World War II in bargaining rather than military terms. Formal BMoWs were introduced in the 1980s. The formal models focused on the causes of war as well as the ends, and defined them as bargaining interactions as well.[2]

Description

The bargaining model of war is a means of describing war as a political rather than economic or social action. The bargaining model of war (BMoW) describes war, its causes and consequences, as a bargaining disagreement over the allocation of resources.[2] Bargaining is defined as an interaction where no one actor can benefit without another suffering a loss, which is opposite of cooperative interaction, where all involved actors enjoy a benefit. Because war is defined as a bargaining interaction it is always costly and all actors involved suffer a cost of war, outside of the fighting. Therefore, the model assumes that war is the undesired outcome for both actors, and only under the correct conditions will war occur. This is different than economic or other political models of war which propose that war can have a positive net utility, or provide benefits to the victor that are greater than the losses of the defeated. The model makes several assumptions about war. Ultimately, it defines the cause of wars as a lack of information and a high level of uncertainty between actors, the process of fighting a war as a means to reveal information, and the consequence of war as revealed information, allowing for involved actors to adjust behaviors and motivations.[2]

Structure

The model is linear with two actors, A and B, on the left and right ends of the line, respectively. The line represents a good that A and B are willing to fight over. Point p represents the perceived potential division of the good that will result from a war. Actor A wants p to be as far right as possible, because it receives a greater division of the good, while actor B p to be as far left as possible. Points ca and cb represent the costs of war for A and B respectively. These costs are usually blood and treasure, the financial and manpower losses that result from a war. Points p-ca and p-cb represent the ultimate division of a good for A and B when the costs of war are calculated into the outcome. Both actors are willing to accept any deal that divides the good anywhere between points ca and cb. This is because a point in that range provides a better division than a war. A is willing to accept a point to the left of p because although the division is not in its favor, it is still better than if it were divided based on the costs of war. A is willing to accept a point to the right of p because this is a better division of the good than it predicted. The same reasoning stands for actor B, only in the opposite direction.

  • A = actor A
  • B = actor B
  • p = predicted division of a good as a result of a war
  • ca = the cost of fighting war for actor A
  • cb = the cost of fighting war for actor B
  • p-ca = actor A's division of the good after the costs of war are calculated
  • p-cb = actor B's division of the good after the costs of war are calculated

Causes of war based on the model

According to James D. Fearon, there are three conditions where war is possible under the bargaining model:

  1. Uncertainty: An actor can overestimate his own abilities or the resolve of his opponent and start a war. This under- or overestimation is common throughout history. Hitler's march on Russia in 1941 was motivated by the correct assumption that the Russian forces were significantly weaker and worse organized than the German ones.[2]
  2. Commitment Problems: an actor has a difficulty to commit to not use military strength in the future. A first-strike advantage may force an actor to begin a preemptive war, or the threat of being attacked may cause an actor to start a preventive war.
  3. Indivisibility of a good: if actors believe that a certain good could not be divided but only controlled in its entirety they may go to war.

Outcomes of war based on the model

Because the model assumes that war is fought because of and in order to gain information, the consequence of war is the revealing of new information and thus a reformation of an actors' goods and motivations to better suit the new conditions.[2]

Contradictions

There are three sets of ideas that disagree with the bargaining model of war:

  1. Cognitive Psychological: actors do not change their beliefs or behaviors even if new information allows them to do so
  2. Domestic Politics: leaders prefer to fight to solidify their position in domestic politics
  3. Constructivist: the identities of actors are realized through war[2]

References

  1. ↑ Coyne, C.J.; Mathers, R.L. (2011). The Handbook on the Political Economy of War. Elgar Original Reference Series. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. p. 19. ISBN 978-1-84980-832-3. Retrieved 11 July 2018.
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Reiter, Dan (6 June 1944). "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War – Perspectives on Politics". Perspectives on Politics. 1 (1): 27–43. doi:10.1017/S1537592703000033. ISSN 1541-0986. Retrieved 11 July 2018.
  • Filson, Darren; Werner, Suzanne (2002). "A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War". American Journal of Political Science. JSTOR. 46 (4): 819. doi:10.2307/3088436. ISSN 0092-5853.
  • Wagner, R. Harrison (2000). "Bargaining and War". American Journal of Political Science. JSTOR. 44 (3): 469. doi:10.2307/2669259. ISSN 0092-5853.
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