Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness (1989)

• The mind's ability to attend to its own representing activity is a distinct ability, logically presupposed as a condition of experience. (We couldn't be representing objects unless, in all cases of such representing, we could also become conscious of our representing.) ... All consciousness ... is a species of self-consciousness, representing objects is at the same time attending to the mind's activities.
  • p. 20

• In any remembering, thinking or imagining, although the object of my intending is some state of affairs or other, I am also potentially aware as I intend that what I am doing is an act of remembering, thinking, or imagining. My asserting that S is P is not an assertion of mine unless I am implicitly aware as I assert that I am asserting, not entertaining the possibility that, S is P.
  • p. 21