Ukrainian crisis

The Ukrainian crisis is collective name for the 2013–2014 Euromaidan protest movement, the subsequent February 2014 Ukrainian revolution, the unrest that followed the revolution and the ensuing Russo-Ukrainian War.[1]

The crisis began on 21 November 2013, when the then-president of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych suspended preparations for the implementation of an association agreement with the European Union.The decision sparked mass protests from proponents of the agreement. The protests, in turn, precipitated a revolution that led to Yanukovych's ousting in February 2014. After the ousting, unrest enveloped in some largely Russophone eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, from where Yanukovych had drawn most of his support. Subsequently, an ensuing political crisis developed after Russia invaded said regions (from February 2014) and annexed the then-autonomous Ukrainian region of Crimea in March 2014. As Russia's invasion emboldened the Russophone Ukrainians already in upheaval, the unrest in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts devolved into a war (April 2014 onwards) against the post-revolutionary Ukrainian government. As that conflict progressed, the Russophone Ukrainian opposition turned into a pro-Russian insurgency, often supported and assisted by the Russian military and its special forces.[2][3]

Euromaidan and revolution

Despite being an independent country since 1991, Ukraine has been perceived by Russia as being part of its sphere of interest. Iulian Chifu and his co-authors claim that in regard to Ukraine, Russia pursues a modernized version of the Brezhnev Doctrine on "limited sovereignty", which dictates that the sovereignty of Ukraine cannot be larger than that of the Warsaw Pact prior to the demise of the Soviet sphere of influence.[4] This claim is based on statements of Russian leaders that possible integration of Ukraine into NATO would jeopardize Russia's national security.[4]

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, both nations retained very close ties. At the same time, there were several sticking points, most importantly Ukraine's significant nuclear arsenal, which Ukraine agreed to abandon in the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances on the condition that Russia (and the other signatories) would issue an assurance against threats or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine. In 1999, Russia was one of signatories of Charter for European Security, where it "reaffirmed the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve";[5] both would prove worthless in 2014.[6]

Ukraine became gripped by unrest when the Ukrainian government suspended preparations for signing the Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement with the European Union on 21 November 2013, to seek closer economic relations with Russia.[7] An organised political movement known as 'Euromaidan' demanded closer ties with the European Union, and the ousting of Yanukovych.[8] This movement was ultimately successful, culminating in the February 2014 revolution, which removed Yanukovych and his government.[9]

On 24 November 2013, clashes between protesters and police began. After a few days of demonstrations an increasing number of university students joined the protests.[10] The Euromaidan has been characterised as an event of major political symbolism for the European Union itself, particularly as "the largest ever pro-European rally in history."[11]

During 24 January 2014, various western Ukrainian cities such as Ivano-Frankivsk, and Chernivtsi had protesters seize regional government buildings in protest of president Viktor Yanukovych. In Ivano-Frankivsk, nearly 1,500 protesters occupied the regional government building and barricaded themselves inside the building. The city of Chernivtsi saw crowds of protesters storm the governors office while police officers protected the building. Uzhgorod also had regional offices blockaded, and in the western city of Lviv barricades were being erected just after previously seizing the governor's office.[12]

The protests continued despite heavy police presence,[13] regularly sub-freezing temperatures, and snow. Escalating violence from government forces in the early morning of 30 November caused the level of protests to rise, with 400,000–800,000 protesters, according to Russia's opposition politician Boris Nemtsov, demonstrating in Kyiv on the weekends of 1 December and 8 December.[14] In the preceding weeks, protest attendance had fluctuated from 50,000 to 200,000 during organised rallies.[15][16] Violent riots took place 1 December and 19 January through 25 January in response to police brutality and government repression.[17] Starting 23 January, several Western Ukrainian Oblast (province) Governor buildings and regional councils were occupied in a revolt by Euromaidan activists.[18] In the Russophone cities of Zaporizhzhya, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk, protesters also tried to take over their local government building, and were met with considerable force from both police and government supporters.[18]

Russo-Ukrainian War

2014 pro-Russian unrest

Following flight of President Yanukovych on 23 February 2014, protests by pro-Russian and anti-revolution activists began in the largely Russophone region of Crimea.[19] These were followed by demonstrations in cities across eastern and southern Ukraine, including Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Odessa.

Russian annexation of Crimea

Starting on 26 February 2014, pro-Russian armed men gradually began to take over the peninsula, provoking protests.[20] Russia initially said that these uniformed militants, termed "little green men" in Ukraine, were "local self-defence forces".[21] However, they later admitted that these were in fact Russian soldiers without insignias, confirming on-the-ground reports of a Russian incursion into Ukraine.[22][23][24][25][26][27][28] By 27 February, the Crimean parliament building had been seized by Russian forces. Russian flags were raised over these buildings, and a self-declared pro-Russian government said that it would hold a referendum on independence from Ukraine.[29] On 1 March 2014 the Federation Council of the Russian Federation unanimously adopted a resolution on petition of the President of Russia Vladimir Putin to use military force on territory of Ukraine.[30] The resolution was adopted several days later after the start of the Russian military operation on "Returning of Crimea". Following that internationally unrecognised referendum, which was held on 16 March 2014, Russia annexed Crimea on 18 March 2014.

War in Donbass

Damaged building in Lysychansk, 4 August 2014

From the beginning of March 2014, demonstrations by pro-Russian and anti-government groups took place in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine, together commonly called the "Donbass", in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution and the Euromaidan movement. These demonstrations, which followed the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, and which were part of a wider group of concurrent pro-Russian protests across southern and eastern Ukraine, escalated into an armed conflict between the separatist forces of the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DPR and LPR respectively), and the Ukrainian government.[31][32] Prior to a change of the top leadership in August 2014,[33] the separatists were largely led by Russian citizens.[34] Russian paramilitaries are reported to make up from 5% to 20% of the combatants.[34][35][36][37][38]

Between 22 and 25 August 2014, Russian artillery, personnel, and what Russia called a "humanitarian convoy" were reported to have crossed the border into Ukrainian territory without the permission of the Ukrainian government. Reportedly, crossings occurred both in areas under the control of pro-Russian forces and areas that were not under their control, such as the south-eastern part of Donetsk Oblast, near Novoazovsk. These events followed the reported shelling of Ukrainian positions from the Russian side of the border over the course of the preceding month.[39][40][41][42][43] Head of the Security Service of Ukraine Valentyn Nalyvaichenko said that the events of 22 August were a "direct invasion by Russia of Ukraine".[44] Western and Ukrainian officials described these events as a "stealth invasion" of Ukraine by Russia.[43] As a result, DPR and LPR insurgents regained much of the territory they had lost during the preceding government military on the offensive. On September 5, 2014, Russia and Ukraine signed a deal to establish a ceasefire, called the Minsk Protocol.[45] Yet, violations of the ceasefire were common. Amidst the solidification of the line between insurgent and Ukrainian territory during the ceasefire, warlords took control of swathes of land on the insurgent side, leading to further destabilisation.[46] The ceasefire completely collapsed in January 2015. Heavy fighting resumed across the conflict zone, including at Donetsk International Airport and Debaltseve.[47] A new ceasefire agreement, called Minsk II, was signed on 12 February 2015.[48]

Kerch Strait incident

An international incident occurred on 25 November 2018, when the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) coast guard fired upon and captured three Ukrainian Navy vessels attempting to pass from the Black Sea into the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait on their way to the port of Mariupol.[49][50] Under a 2003 treaty, the strait and the Azov Sea are intended to be the shared territorial waters of both countries, and freely accessible.[49][51][52] As the flotilla, which consisted of two gunboats and a tugboat, approached the Kerch Strait, the Russian coast guard said they repeatedly asked the Ukrainian vessels to leave what they referred to as "Russian territorial waters". They said that the vessels had not followed the formal procedure for passage through the strait, that the Ukrainian ships had been manoeuvring dangerously, and that they were not responding to radio communications.[49][53][54] Ukraine said that it had given advance notice to the Russians that the vessels would be moving through the strait, that the ships had made radio contact with the Russians, but received no response, and cited the 2003 treaty against the assertion that the ships had entered Russian territorial waters.[55][56][57] The Russians tried to halt the Ukrainian ships, but they continued moving in the direction of the bridge. As they neared the bridge, the Russians authorities placed a large cargo ship under it, blocking their passage into the Azov Sea. The Ukrainian ships remained moored in the strait for eight hours, before turning back to return to port in Odessa. The Russian coast guard pursued them as they left the area, and later fired upon and seized the vessels in international waters off the coast of Crimea.[53][58][49][59][60] Three Ukrainian crew members were injured in the clash, and all twenty-four Ukrainian sailors from the captured ships were detained by Russia.[49][61][62] The Ukrainian government characterised the incident as a potential precursor to a Russian invasion, and declared martial law along the border with Russia and in Black Sea coastal areas, which expired on 26 December 2018.[63][64] The Russian government called the incident a deliberate provocation by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko ahead of the 2019 Ukrainian presidential election.[65] The incident took place a few days before the 2018 G20 Buenos Aires summit.

Elections in Ukraine after Euromaidan

Since 2014, multiple elections were held across Ukraine. The first election held since the ousting of President Yanukovych was the 25 May presidential election, which resulted in the election of Petro Poroshenko as president of Ukraine. In the Donbass region, only 20% of polling stations were open due to threats of violence by pro-Russian separatist insurgents.[66] Of the 2,430 planned polling stations in the region, only 426 remained open for polling.[66]

As the war in Donbass continued, the first post-revolutionary parliamentary elections in Ukraine were held on 26 October 2014.[67] Once again, separatists stymied voting in the areas that they controlled. They held their own elections, internationally unrecognised and in violation of the Minsk Protocol peace process, on 2 November 2014.[68]

On 25 October 2015, local elections took place in Ukraine.[69] In the Donbass region the elections were held only throughout parts of the region, separatists stymied voting in the areas that they controlled. A second round of voting for the election of mayors in cities with more than 90,000 residents where no candidate gained more than 50% of the votes were held on 15 November 2015.[70][71]

Donbass general elections were held on 11 November 2018, by the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics.[72]

The 2019 Ukrainian presidential election was held on 31 March and 21 April in a two-round system. There were a total of 39 candidates for the election on the ballot. The 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia and the occupation of parts of Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast prevented around 12% of eligible voters from participating in the election. As no candidate received an absolute majority of the vote, a second round was held between the top two candidates, Volodymyr Zelensky, who played the role of Ukraine's president in a popular television comedy and the incumbent president, Petro Poroshenko, on 21 April 2019. According the Central Election Commission, Zelensky won the second round with 73.22% of the votes.[73][74]

Snap elections to the Ukrainian parliament were held on 21 July 2019. Originally scheduled to be held at the end of October, these elections were brought forward after newly inaugurated President Volodymyr Zelensky dissolved parliament on 21 May 2019, during his inauguration. The election result was the one-party majority, a novelty in Ukraine, for President Zelensky's Servant of the People party with 254 seats. Out of 225 constituencies, 26 were suspended due to the March 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia and the ongoing occupation of parts of Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast.

Effects of the crisis

The crisis has had many effects, both domestic and international.[75] According to an October 2014 estimate by the World Bank, the economy of Ukraine contracted by 8% during the year 2014 as a result of the crisis.[76] Economic sanctions imposed on Russia by western nations contributed to the collapse in value of the Russian rouble, and the resulting Russian financial crisis.[77]

The war in Donbass caused a coal shortage in Ukraine, as the Donbass region had been the chief source of coal for power stations across the country. Furthermore, Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Station was forced to close down one of its reactors after an accident. The combination of these two problems led to rolling blackouts across Ukraine during December 2014.[78]

Additionally, due to the Ukrainian crisis, a construction of a new pipeline in Turkey with an annual capacity around 63 billion cubic metres (bcm) was proposed, so as to carry natural gas to Europe while completely bypassing Ukraine as a traditional transit hub for Russian gas.[79]

Progress on implementing reforms in post-revolutionary Ukraine has been said to be slow. According to a BBC report in February 2016, Ukraine remained gripped by corruption, and little progress had been made in improving the economy. Low-level fighting continued in the Donbass. The report also said that there was talk of a "Third Maidan" to force the government to take action to remedy the crisis.[80]

An IMF four-year loan program worth about $17.5 billion was agreed in eight tranches over 2015 and 2016, subject to conditions regarding economic reforms.[81] Analysts disputed that the $17.5 billion represented a 'new' bailout, noting that the IMF's announcement amounted to making good on "old promises, rather than offering any new cash."[75] However, due to lack of progress on reforms, only two tranches worth $6.7 billion were paid in 2015. A third tranche of $1.7 billion may be paid in June 2016 subject to the bringing into law of 19 further reform measures.[82][83] In May 2016, the IMF mission chief for Ukraine stated that the reduction of corruption was a key test for continued international support.[83]

Since about 2015, there has been a growing number of Ukrainians working in the European Union, particularly Poland. Eurostat reported that 662,000 Ukrainians received EU residence permits in 2017, with 585,439 being to Poland. The head of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine has estimated that up to 9 million Ukrainians work abroad for some part of the year, and 3.2 million have regular full-time work abroad with most not planning to return. World Bank statistics show that money remittances back to Ukraine have roughly doubled from 2015 to 2018, worth about 4% of GDP.[84][85]

See also

References

  1. German, Tracey; Karagiannis, Emmanuel (2018). "Introduction". The Ukrainian Crisis: The Role of, and Implications for, Sub-State and Non-State Actors. Routledge. ISBN 9781351737920.
  2. Higgins, Andrew; Kramer, Andrew E. (18 April 2014). "Pro-Russian Insurgents Balk at Terms of Pact in Ukraine". The New York Times. Retrieved 7 April 2018. Doubts about the Kremlin's readiness to push pro-Russian militants to surrender their guns have been strengthened by its insistence that it has no hand in or control over the separatist unrest, which Washington and Kiev believe is the result of a covert Russian operation involving, in some places, the direct action of special forces.
  3. Tsvetkova, Maria (10 May 2015). "Special Report: Russian soldiers quit over Ukraine". Reuters. Retrieved 7 April 2018. Evidence for Russians fighting in Ukraine – Russian army equipment found in the country, testimony from soldiers' families and from Ukrainians who say they were captured by Russian paratroopers – is abundant.
  4. Iulian Chifu; Oazu Nantoi; Oleksandr Sushko (2009). "Russia–Georgia War of August 2008: Ukrainian Approach" (PDF). The Russian Georgian War: A trilateral cognitive institutional approach of the crisis decision-making process. Bucharest: Editura Curtea Veche. p. 181. ISBN 978-973-1983-19-6. Retrieved 21 February 2016.
  5. "Istanbul Document 1999". Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 19 November 1999. Retrieved 21 July 2015.
  6. nbc 18 March 2014 , ukrainesolidaritycampaign the oligarchic rebellion in the donbas
  7. "A Ukraine City Spins Beyond the Government's Reach". The New York Times. 15 February 2014.
  8. Balmforth, Richard (12 December 2013). "Kiev protesters gather, EU dangles aid promise". Reuters. Archived from the original on 20 April 2014. Retrieved 10 April 2014.
  9. "Ukraine Opposition Vows To Continue Struggle After Yanukovych Offer". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 25 January 2014. Retrieved 10 April 2014.
  10. Students in Ukraine threaten indefinite national strike, Euronews (26 November 2013)
  11. "Ukraine Offers Europe Economic Growth and More". The New York Times. 12 December 2013. Retrieved 21 January 2014.
  12. "BBC News - Ukraine unrest: Protesters storm regional offices".
  13. Protests continue in Kiev ahead of Vilnius EU summit, Euronews (27 November 2013)
  14. "Ukraine's capital Kiev gripped by huge pro-EU demonstration". BBC News. 8 December 2013. Retrieved 8 December 2013.
  15. Olzhas Auyezov and Jack Stubbs (22 December 2013). "Ukraine opposition urges more protests, forms political bloc". Reuters. Retrieved 24 January 2014.
  16. Ukraine pro-Europe protesters hold first big rally of 2014, Reuters (12 January 2014)
  17. "No Looting or Anarchy in this Euromaidan Revolution". Kyiv Post. Retrieved 24 January 2014.
  18. Ukraine protests 'spread' into Russia-influenced east, BBC News (26 January 2014)
  19. "Ukraine crisis fuels secession calls in pro-Russian south". The Guardian. 24 February 2014. Archived from the original on 1 December 2008.
  20. "Gunmen Seize Government Buildings in Crimea". The New York Times. 27 February 2014. Retrieved 1 March 2014. Masked men with guns seized government buildings in the capital of Ukraine's Crimea region on Thursday, barricading themselves inside and raising the Russian flag after mysterious overnight raids that appeared to be the work of militant Russian nationalists who want this volatile Black Sea region ruled from Moscow.
  21. "A Look Back At How The Ukraine Crisis Erupted And What To Expect In 2015". Forbes. 13 December 2014. Retrieved 13 December 2014.
  22. Karmanau, Yuras; Vladimir Isachenkov (17 April 2014). "Vladimir Putin admits for first time Russian troops took over Crimea, refuses to rule out intervention in Donetsk". National Post. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 19 April 2014. Retrieved 10 May 2014.
  23. "Warning shots end OSCE Crimea entry bid – Europe". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 11 March 2014.
  24. Jones, Sam (21 February 2014). "US scorns Russia's version of Crimean intervention". Financial Times.
  25. "OSCE team say Crimea roadblock gunmen threatened to shoot at them". Reuters. Archived from the original on 12 March 2014. Retrieved 14 March 2014.
  26. de Carbonnel, Alissa; Alessandra Prentice (28 February 2014). "Armed men seize two airports in Ukraine's Crimea, Yanukovich reappears". Reuters. Archived from the original on 28 February 2014.
  27. Kelly, Lidia; Pavel Polityuk (1 March 2014). "Putin ready to invade Ukraine; Kiev warns of war". Reuters. Archived from the original on 16 June 2014. Retrieved 8 September 2016.
  28. Finley, J. C. (28 February 2014). "Telecom services sabotaged in Ukraine's Crimea region". United Press International. Retrieved 8 September 2016.
  29. Loiko, Sergei L (1 March 2014). "New Crimea leaders move up referendum date". The Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on 1 March 2014. Retrieved 3 March 2014. Kiev, Ukraine – Crimea's new pro-Moscow premier, Sergei Aksenov, moved the date of the peninsula's status referendum to March 30. On Thursday, the Crimean parliament, which appointed Aksenov, had called for a referendum on May 25, the date also set for the urgent presidential election in Ukraine.
  30. The Federation Council gave approval on use of the Russian Armed Forces on territory of Ukraine (Совет Федерации дал согласие на использование Вооруженных Сил России на территории Украины). Federation Council. 1 March 2014
  31. Grytsenko, Oksana (12 April 2014). "Armed pro-Russian insurgents in Luhansk say they are ready for police raid". Kyiv Post. Archived from the original on 12 April 2014.
  32. Leonard, Peter (14 April 2014). "Ukraine to deploy troops to quash pro-Russian insurgency in the east". Yahoo News Canada. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 14 April 2014. Retrieved 26 October 2014.
  33. Strelkov/Girkin Demoted, Transnistrian Siloviki Strengthened in 'Donetsk People's Republic', Vladimir Socor, Jamestown Foundation, 15 August 2014
  34. "Pushing locals aside, Russians take top rebel posts in east Ukraine". Reuters. 27 July 2014. Archived from the original on 28 July 2014. Retrieved 27 July 2014.
  35. Представитель ДНР назвал процент российских добровольцев в местной армии [DPR representative revealed the percentage of Russian volunteers in the local army] (in Russian). rumedia.biz. 27 June 2014. Archived from the original on 15 October 2014.
  36. "Российский Наемник: "Половина Ополченцев - Из России. Мне Помогают Спонсоры. Мы Возьмем Львов"". M.censor.net.ua. 26 July 2014. Retrieved 26 August 2014.
  37. "Interview: I Was A Separatist Fighter In Ukraine". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Retrieved 29 August 2014.
  38. "Whisked Away for Tea With a Rebel in Ukraine". The New York Times. Retrieved 29 August 2014.
  39. Gordon, Michael R. (22 August 2014). "Russia Moves Artillery Units Into Ukraine, NATO Says". New York Times. Archived from the original on 15 October 2014.
  40. Nicks, Denver (22 August 2014). "NATO: Russia Artillery Fires on Ukraine Forces". Time. Retrieved 8 September 2016.
  41. Heintz, Jim (25 August 2014). "Ukraine: Russian Tank Column Enters Southeast". ABC News. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 25 August 2014. Retrieved 26 August 2014.
  42. "Ukraine crisis: 'Column from Russia' crosses border". BBC News. BBC. 25 August 2014. Retrieved 26 August 2014.
  43. "Ukraine Reports Russian Invasion on a New Front". The New York Times. 27 August 2014. Retrieved 27 August 2014.
  44. "Ukraine accuses Russia of invasion after aid convoy crosses border". Reuters. 22 August 2014. Archived from the original on 22 August 2014. Retrieved 22 August 2014.
  45. "Ukraine and pro-Russia rebels sign ceasefire deal". BBC News. 5 September 2014. Retrieved 5 September 2014.
  46. "Ukraine rebels a disunited front run by warlords". Associated Press. 10 November 2014. Retrieved 10 November 2014.
  47. "Ukraine peace talks collapse over ceasefire as fighting rages". The Australian. Agence France-Presse. 1 February 2015. Retrieved 10 February 2015.
  48. "Ukraine: A tentative ceasefire". The Economist. 12 February 2015. Retrieved 12 February 2015.
  49. "Tension escalates after Russia seizes Ukraine naval ships". BBC News. 26 November 2018. Retrieved 26 November 2018.
  50. Osborn, Andrew; Polityuk, Pavel (25 November 2018). "Russia seizes Ukrainian ships near annexed Crimea after firing on them". Reuters. Retrieved 26 November 2018.
  51. "Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Ukraine on cooperation in the use of the sea of Azov and the strait of Kerch". Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations Database. 24 December 2003.
  52. "Ukraine-Russia sea clash: Who controls the territorial waters around Crimea?". BBC News. 27 November 2018. Retrieved 19 January 2019.
  53. "О провокационных действиях кораблей ВМС Украины". fsb.ru (in Russian). Russian Federal Security Service. 26 November 2018. Retrieved 28 November 2018.
  54. "Russian forces fulfilled 'military duty' in stopping Ukraine ships: Putin". Agence France-Presse. 28 November 2018. Retrieved 19 January 2019 via New Straits Times.
  55. Bodner, Matthew (26 November 2018). "Russia fires on Ukrainian vessels in Black Sea; 2 wounded". Associated Press. Retrieved 26 November 2018.
  56. "Kyiv Says Russia Attacked Ukrainian Navy Ships, Seized Three In Black Sea". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 25 November 2018. Retrieved 2 December 2018.
  57. Larter, David B.; Bodner, Matthew (28 November 2018). "The Sea of Azov won't become the new South China Sea (and Russia knows it)". Defense News. Retrieved 2 December 2018.
  58. "Russia-Ukraine sea clash in 300 words". BBC News. 30 November 2018. Retrieved 12 December 2018.
  59. Osborn, Andrew; Polityuk, Pavel (25 November 2018). "Russia fires on and seizes Ukrainian ships near annexed Crimea". Reuters. Retrieved 19 January 2019.
  60. Esch, Christian (4 December 2018). "Russia Tries to Strangle Ukraine with New Maritime Strategy". Spiege Online. Retrieved 14 December 2018.
  61. "Ukraine-Russia sea clash: Captured sailors shown on Russia TV". BBC News. 27 November 2018. Retrieved 19 January 2019.
  62. Troianovski, Anton; Ferris-Rotman, Amie (27 November 2018). "Russia shrugs off Western pressure over Black Sea incident with Ukraine". The Washington Post. Retrieved 19 January 2019.
  63. "Ukraine-Russia clash: MPs back martial law". BBC News. 27 November 2018. Retrieved 27 November 2018.
  64. Hodge, Nathan; Berlinger, Josh (26 November 2018). "Ukrainian lawmakers approve martial law as tensions with Russia escalate". CNN. Retrieved 26 November 2018.
  65. "Ukraine-Russia sea clash staged, says Putin". BBC News. 28 November 2018. Retrieved 28 November 2018.
  66. "Poroshenko Declares Victory in Ukraine Presidential Election", The Wall Street Journal (25 May 2014)
  67. Ukraine President Poroshenko Calls Snap General Election, Bloomberg News (25 August 2014)
  68. "Russia calls for talks with Kiev after separatist elections". The Guardian. 3 November 2014. Archived from the original on 8 December 2014. Retrieved 3 November 2014.
  69. "Local elections on October 25 to be held in 73 unified communities – CEC". Interfax-Ukraine. 28 August 2015. Retrieved 5 July 2018.
  70. (in Ukrainian) In the CEC released official estimates of turnout, Ukrayinska Pravda (16 November 2015)
  71. Interfax-Ukraine (2 October 2015). "Local election runoff in Ukraine's major cities should be held no later than Nov. 15". Kyiv Post. Retrieved 5 July 2018.
  72. "Separatists win vote in Ukraine rebel regions by big margins". Washington Post. 12 November 2018. Retrieved 17 November 2018.
  73. "Comedian Volodymyr Zelenskiy has won 73% of the vote in Ukraine's election, an exit poll suggests". The Independent. 21 April 2019. Retrieved 22 April 2019.
  74. Karmanau, Yuras. "Comedian who plays president on TV headed for landslide victory in Ukraine's presidential election". chicagotribune.com. Retrieved 22 April 2019.
  75. Mamlyuk, Boris N. (6 July 2015). "The Ukraine Crisis, Cold War II, and International Law" (PDF). 16 (3). The German Law Journal. Retrieved 12 September 2016. Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  76. "Ukraine economy to contract by 8% in 2014: World Bank". Yahoo News. Agence France-Presse. 2 October 2014. Retrieved 13 January 2015.
  77. "'We are hardly surviving': As oil and the ruble drop, ordinary Russians face growing list of problems". Financial Post. Reuters. 1 January 2015. Archived from the original on 2 January 2015. Retrieved 13 January 2015.
  78. Ukraine turns off reactor at its most powerful nuclear plant after 'accident', The Independent (28 December 2014)
    https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/25/world/europe/ukraine-briefly-cuts-power-to-crimea-amid-dispute-with-russia-over-nato.html?_r=0 Ukraine Briefly Cuts Power to Crimea Amid Feud With Russia Over NATO], New York Times (24 December 2014)
    Coal import to help avoid rolling blackouts in Ukraine — energy minister Archived 8 January 2015 at the Wayback Machine, ITAR-TASS (31 December 2014)
    Rolling blackouts in Ukraine after nuclear plant accident, Mashable (3 December 2014)
    Ukraine to Import Coal From ‘Far Away’ as War Curtails Mines, Bloomberg News (31 December 2014)
  79. "Russia to Shift Ukraine Gas Transit to Turkey as EU Cries Foul". Bloomberg. 14 January 2015. Archived from the original on 15 January 2015. Retrieved 15 January 2015.
  80. David Stern (5 February 2016). "Ukraine teeters a few steps from chaos". BBC News. Retrieved 6 February 2016.
  81. "Ukraine may get USD 1.7 bln from IMF by mid-year - Moody's". Ukraine Today. 13 May 2016. Retrieved 20 May 2016.
  82. "What Ukraine must do to get another $1.7 billion IMF loan". Kyiv Post. 14 May 2016. Retrieved 20 May 2016.
  83. Alessandra Prentice (18 May 2016). "Ukraine, IMF agree terms to resume financial support - IMF". Reuters. Retrieved 20 May 2016.
  84. Bershidsky, Leonid (20 February 2019). "Eastern Europe Feeds on a Shrinking Ukraine". Bloomberg. Retrieved 24 June 2019.
  85. Kiryukhin, Denys (14 May 2019). "Losing Brains and Brawn: Outmigration from Ukraine". Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Retrieved 24 June 2019.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.