Taif Agreement

The Taif Agreement (Arabic: اتفاقية الطائف‎ / ittifāqiyat al-Ṭā’if) (also the National Reconciliation Accord or Document of National Accord) was an agreement reached to provide "the basis for the ending of the civil war and the return to political normalcy in Lebanon".[1] Negotiated in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, it was designed to end the decades-long Lebanese Civil War, reassert Lebanese authority in Southern Lebanon (then controlled by South Lebanon Army and supported by Israeli troops). Though the agreement set a time frame for Syrian military withdrawal, stipulating that the Syrians withdraw within two years, the actual withdrawal did not take place until 2005. It was signed on 22 October 1989 and ratified by the Lebanese parliament on 5 November 1989.[2]

Overview

The treaty was fathered by the Speaker of the Parliament Hussein El-Husseini and negotiated in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, by the surviving members of Lebanon's 1972 parliament.[3] The agreement came into effect with the active mediation of Saudi Arabia, discreet participation by the United States, and behind-the-scenes influence from Syria.[4]

The agreement covered political reform, the ending of the Lebanese Civil War, the establishment of special relations between Lebanon and Syria, and a framework for the beginning of complete Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Since Rafik Hariri was a former Saudi diplomatic representative, he played a significant role in constructing the Taif Agreement.[3] It is also argued that the Taif Accord reoriented Lebanon toward the Arab world, especially Syria.[5] In other words, the Taif Accord positioned Lebanon as a country with "an Arab identity and belonging."[6] The agreement was finalized and confirmed only after the development of an anti-Saddam Hussein international alliance.[7] The alliance included Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, France, Iran and the United States.[7]

The agreement formed the principle of "mutual coexistence" (Arabic: العيش المشترك) between Lebanon's different sects and their "proper political representation" (Arabic: صحة التمثيل السياسي) as the main objective of post-civil war parliamentary electoral laws.[6] It also restructured the National Pact political system in Lebanon by transferring some of the power away from the Maronite Christian community, which had been given a privileged status in Lebanon under the period of French rule. Prior to the agreement, the Sunni Muslim Prime Minister was appointed by and responsible to the Maronite President. After the Taif agreement the Prime Minister was responsible to the legislature, as in a traditional parliamentary system. Therefore, the agreement changed the power-sharing formula that had favoured the Christians to a 50:50 ratio and enhanced the powers of the Sunni Prime Minister over those of the Christian president.[8] Prior to the Taif negotiations, a Maronite Christian, General Michel Aoun, had been appointed Prime Minister by President Amine Gemayel on 22 September 1988. This had caused a serious political crisis of a split premiership, as the post was reserved for a Sunni Muslim due to the National Pact of 1943, and Omar Karami held this office.The Taif agreement helped to overcome this crisis by preparing the election of a new president.

The agreement also provided for the disarmament of all national and non national militias. Hezbollah was allowed to stay armed in its capacity as a "resistance force" rather than a militia, fighting Israel in the south, a privilege obtained – according to the Swedish academic Magnus Ranstorp – in part by using its leverage as holder of a number of Western hostages.[9]

Although the Taif Agreement identified the abolition of political sectarianism as a national priority, it provided no timeframe for doing so. The Chamber of Deputies was increased in size to 128 members, shared equally between Christians and Muslims, rather than elected by universal suffrage that would have provided a Muslim majority (excluding the expatriate community, a majority of which is Christian). A cabinet was established similarly divided equally between Christians and Muslims.

According to As'ad AbuKhalil and many Lebanese Christians, the agreement greatly diminished the power of the President to the benefit of the Council of Ministers, although there is ongoing debate about whether this power has shifted to the Council as a whole or the Prime Minister. The president, having had significant executive power prior to the agreement, was reduced to a figurehead with no real and/or considerable power, as in most parliamentary republics. He also noted that the agreement extended the term of the Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament from one year to four years, although the position "remains largely without meaningful authority".[10]

The agreement was ratified on 5 November 1989. The Parliament met on the same day at the Kleyate air base in North Lebanon and elected President René Moawad,[2] 409 days after Amine Gemayel vacated this position upon the expiration of his term in 1988. Moawad was unable to occupy the Presidential Palace which was still in use by General Michel Aoun. Moawad was assassinated seventeen days later in a car bombing in Beirut on 22 November 1989 as his motorcade returned from Lebanese Independence Day ceremonies.[11] He was succeeded by Elias Hrawi, who remained in office until 1998.

See also

References
  1. Krayem, Hassan. "The Lebanese civil war and the Taif agreement". American University of Beirut. Retrieved 10 June 2012.
  2. Laura Etheredge (15 January 2011). Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. The Rosen Publishing Group. p. 151. ISBN 978-1-61530-329-8. Retrieved 19 March 2013.
  3. Neal, Mark W.; Richard Tansey (2010). "The dynamics of effective corrupt leadership: Lessons from Rafik Hariri's political career in Lebanon" (PDF). The Leadership Quarterly. 21: 33–49. doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2009.10.003. Retrieved 10 June 2012.
  4. Hudson, Michael C. (1997). "Trying Again: Power-Sharing in Post-Civil War Lebanon". International Negotiation. 2: 103–122. doi:10.1163/15718069720847889.
  5. AbuKhalil, Asad (29 May 2001). "Lebanon One Year After the Israeli Withdrawal". Middle East Research and Information Project. Retrieved 7 July 2012.
  6. F. Salloukh, Bassel (September 2006). "The Limits of Electoral Engineering in Divided Societies: Elections in Postwar Lebanon". Canadian Journal of Political Science. 39 (3): 635–655. doi:10.1017/s0008423906060185. JSTOR 25165996.
  7. Salamey, Imad (Autumn–Winter 2009). "Failing Consociationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options" (PDF). International Journal of Peace Studies. 14 (2): 83–105. Retrieved 21 October 2012.
  8. Somasundram, Premarani (2 August 2006). "Lebanon: Return to the dark ages" (PDF). IDSS Commentaries. Archived from the original (PDF) on 21 February 2007. Retrieved 2 July 2012.
  9. Ranstorp, Magnus, Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis, New York, St. Martins Press, 1997, p. 105
  10. AbuKhalil, As'ad (15 June 2018). "The Meaning of the Recent Lebanese Election (and How Hariri Suffered a Stinging Defeat)". consortiumnews.com. Retrieved 16 June 2018.
  11. Murphy, Kim (25 November 1989). "Lebanon Picks New President; Aoun Defiant". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 19 March 2013.
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