Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant

The first license application for the third unit was made in December 2000[50] and the date of the unit's entry into service was estimated to be 2010.[18] However, since the start of construction, several delays to the schedule have been announced. In July 2012 TVO announced that the unit would not go into service before 2015,[6][51] five years after the original estimate. In a statement, the operator said it was "not pleased with the situation" although solutions to various problems were being found and work was "progressing", and that it was waiting for a new launch date from Areva and Siemens.[7] At the end of 2013, TVO said that the Areva-Siemens consortium plans to reduce workers and subcontractors on the construction site and says that it expects the contractor to provide details about the expected impact on the project's schedule.[52] In February 2014, TVO said that it could not give an estimate of the plant's startup date because it was still waiting for the Areva-Siemens consortium to provide it with an updated overall schedule for the project."[53] Later the same month it was reported that Areva was shutting down construction due to the dispute over compensations and unfinished automation planning. According to Kauppalehti, the estimated opening was delayed until 2018–2020.[30] In July 2019 TVO announced that regular electricity generation is expected to start in July 2020. The delay was caused by slower than expected modification works.[48] In December 2019 TVO announced that regular electricity generation is delayed to March 2021 due to slow progress in system testing and delivery time of spare parts to replace faulty components.[1]

The delays have been due to various problems with planning, supervision, and workmanship,[6] and have been the subject of an inquiry by STUK, the Finnish nuclear safety regulator.[54] The first problems that surfaced were irregularities in the foundation concrete, and caused a delay of months. Later, it was found that subcontractors had provided heavy forgings that were not up to project standards and which had to be re-cast. An apparent problem constructing the reactor's unique double-containment structure also caused delays, as the welders had not been given proper instructions.[54]

In 2009, Petteri Tiippana, the director of STUK's nuclear power plant division, told the BBC that it was difficult to deliver nuclear power plant projects on schedule because builders were not used to working to the exacting standards required on nuclear construction sites, since so few new reactors had been built in recent years.[55]

In 2010, Jukka Laaksonen, Director General of STUK at that time, analyzed reasons for the delay:[56]

• Many nuclear power plants were constructed in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. After that there was a long break in the construction, and experienced experts retired.
• Areva did not have experience in construction of nuclear power plants. In all the earlier projects in which Areva supplied the reactor, Électricité de France was responsible for the construction management. Many experienced subcontractors had left the business, and Areva had to find new subcontractors and to coach them in nuclear manufacturing.
• The original schedule, four years from construction start to grid connection, was too ambitious for a first-of-a-kind plant that is larger than any earlier reactor.
• The project started very slowly because Areva was not adequately prepared. When the construction permit was given in 2005, parts of the detailed design were not yet available. Areva did not recognize how much additional work was needed to complete it. The construction started to proceed in a controlled manner two years later.
• Areva was not used to STUK’s regulatory approach with an early focus on the quality of structures and components. Manufacturing information and a quality control plan must be approved by both the licensee and STUK before manufacturing of the most important components is allowed to start. Inspections with hold points are made during the manufacturing.
• The large size of the reactor and the application of new technologies brought major challenges. Some manufacturing technologies had not been used before. For instance, new welding techniques were used in the reactor pressure vessel. Many large components, such as pressurizer forgings and some reactor internal parts, had to be re-manufactured once or twice to achieve the specified quality.
• TVO’s key persons did not have experience from management of a large construction project.

Construction of the turbine succeeded better under the responsibility of Siemens. Installations of the main turbine equipment were completed about one year behind the original schedule.[56]

After the construction of the unit started in 2005, Areva began constructing EPRs in Flamanville, France, and in Taishan, China. However, as of 2019, the construction of the EPR in France is ten years behind schedule.[57] Taishan 1 in China became the first EPR to start power generation on 29 June 2018,[44] and the second one (Taishan 2) came online in 2019.[58]

The main contractor, Areva, is building the unit for a fixed price of €3 billion, so in principle, any construction costs above that price fall on Areva. In July 2012, those overruns were estimated at more than €2 billion,[51] and in December 2012, Areva estimated that the full cost of building the reactor would be about €8.5 billion, well over the previous estimate of €6.4 billion.[3][4] Because of the delays, TVO and Areva are both seeking compensation from each other through the International Court of Arbitration.

In October 2013, TVO's demand for compensation from Areva had risen to €1.8 billion, and Areva's from TVO to €2.6 billion.[59] In December 2013, Areva increased its demand to €2.7 billion.[60] On March 10, 2018 French newspaper Le Monde announced that Areva and TVO have reached an agreement.[61] A day later, TVO confirmed that Areva would pay it €450 million in compensation over the delays and lost income.[41] The agreement would settle all legal actions between the two companies. With the settlement, TVO disclosed its total investment to be around € 5.5 billion. Areva had accumulated losses of € 5.5 billion. The total cost of the project, therefore, is estimated to be € 11 billion. [62]

In 2009, professor Stephen Thomas wrote, "Olkiluoto has become an example of all that can go wrong in economic terms with new reactors," and that Areva and the TVO "are in bitter dispute over who will bear the cost overruns and there is a real risk now that the utility will default."[63]

The project has also been criticized by STUK because "instructions have not been observed in the welding of pipes and the supervision of welding."[54] STUK has also noted that there have been delays in submitting proper paperwork.[64][65]

Olkiluoto 3 was supposed to be the first reactor of 3+ generation which would pave the way for a new wave of identical reactors across Europe, safe, affordable, and delivered on time. The delays and cost overruns have had knock-on effects in other countries.[55]

The construction workforce includes about 3,800 employees from 500 companies. 80% of the workers are foreigners, mostly from eastern European countries. In 2012 it was reported that one Bulgarian contracting firm is owned by the mafia, and that Bulgarian workers have been required to pay weekly protection fees to the mafia, wages have been unpaid, employees have been told not to join a union and that employers also reneged on social security payments.[66][67]