Meroni doctrine
In European Union (EU) law, the Meroni doctrine, which arose from cases C-9/56 and C-10/56 (Meroni v High Authority [1957/1958] ECR 133), relates to the extent to which EU institutions may delegate their tasks to regulatory agencies.[1] The doctrine is controversial,[1] notably because it would be anachronistic in view of the growing complexity of EU competences.[2]
References
- Lelieveldt, Herman; Princen, Sebastiaan (2011). The Politics of the European Union. Cambridge University Press. p. 271. ISBN 1139498398.
- Hatzopoulos, Vassilis (2012). Regulating Services in the European Union. Oxford University Press. p. 325. ISBN 0199572666.
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