Carmine Guerriero

Born in Avellino, Italy, Guerriero obtained his BA in economics from Bocconi University in 2002, his MA in Economics from the University of Chicago in 2004, his MSc in Economics from LSE in 2005, and his PhD in Economics from the University of Cambridge in 2010.

From 2009 to 2015 he has been Assistant Professor of law and economics and Program Director at the ACLE[2] (University of Amsterdam) and is now "Rita Levi-Montalcini" Assistant Professor of Economics (RTDb) at the University of Bologna. Between 2009 and 2017, he has visited Bocconi, EIEF, LUISS, and Collegio Carlo Alberto.

Guerriero is associate editor of the International Review of Law and Economics (from 2012 on) and Co-Primary Investigator of the Nomography Project (from 2014 on). Furthermore, he has received the EARIE Paul Geroski award in 2007 and the Hans-Jurgen-Ewer prize in 2011 and the Rita Levi-Montalcini prize in 2016.

He has published in renowned journals as Economica, the Journal of Comparative Economics, the Journal of Law and Economics, and the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. Guerriero is most known for his work on:

• market design: This literature stresses the importance of identifying the technological determinants of reforms to properly assess the impact of different market designs on economic outcomes.[3]
• legal traditions: This strand of research constitutes a criticism to the legal origins literature based on the fact that legal systems evolve due to forces also affecting the economic outcomes that economists want to explain through legal variation and suggests that the reforms supported by the World Bank and based on the legal origins literature had detrimental effects.[4][5]
• property rights: This literature constitutes a criticism to the economics analysis of property rights and is based on the idea, widely discussed in law, that incomplete property rights can be efficient when transaction costs deliver large ex post misallocation by impeding the exchange of assets and inputs.[6][7]
• the determinants and effects of a culture of cooperation and inclusive political institutions. Building on the institutional revolution that shook Europe during the Middle Ages, this strand of research identifies the geographic determinants of the two institutional arrangements showing that the former is more important than the latter for the long-run economic growth.[8]
• extractive policies with a special focus to the unitary origins of the present-day North-South of Italy divide. This gap was mainly induced by the region-specific policies selected by the Piedmontese elite, who dominated the first post-unitary governments, and that penalized more the regions farther away from the ruler's fiercer enemies.[9]

• "Accountability in Government and Regulatory Policies: Theory and Evidence.'' Journal of Comparative Economics, 39 (2011): 453-469.
• “The Political Economy of Incentive Regulation: Theory and Evidence from US States.”Journal of Comparative Economics, 41 (2013): 91-107.
• “Law and Culture: A Theory of Comparative Variation in Bona Fide Purchase Rules” (with: Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, University of Amsterdam). Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 35 (2015): 543-574.
• "Endogenous Legal Traditions.'' International Review of Law and Economics, 46 (2016): 49-69.
• "Endogenous Legal Traditions and Economic Outcomes.'' Journal of Comparative Economics, 44 (2016): 416-433.
• "Endogenous Property Rights.'' Journal of Law and Economics, 59 (2016): 313-358.
• “Extractive States: The Case of the Italian Unification” (with: Guilherme de Oliveira, Columbia Law School). International Review of Law and Economics, 56 (2018): 142-159.
• "Endogenous (In)Formal Institutions.” (with: Serra Boranbay, Carnegie Mellon University). Forthcoming, Journal of Comparative Economics.
• “Endogenous Institutions and Economic Outcomes.” Forthcoming, Economica.