Soviet Middle Eastern foreign policy during the Cold War

The Soviet Union used its relationship with Europe to gain economic cooperation with the Arab world during the Cold War and its influence in the Middle East by inciting proxy conflicts between the Arab states and their Jewish neighbors. The superpowers interacted with proxy combatants, which factored into the Soviet Union's omission from the Camp David Accords. The policy exposed Soviet dualism; while aiming to reduce their military budget and improve their image on the world stage, they pursued an anti-Israel policy in the Arabian Peninsula.

Background

The Middle East went from an afterthought of the United Nations Security Council to its main focus, despite the Arab nations lacking a lobby and only having the regional Arab League to mediate disputes. The Soviets could enter the region by appealing to the working class, most of the region's population.[1]

Petroleum, nationalism, and religion

The interconnection of religion, nationalism and petroleum played a part in the growing divide between the Arabs and the Soviets. As Arab nationalism gained in popularity, Islam moved to the forefront as a unifier against Israel and the West. All three were the basis for the creation of OPEC and the modern Arab world, which led to a growing Arab distrust of outside influence.[2] Religion was a binding factor of the Arabs and their states, as Christianity joins the West in times of social and political unrest. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the Arabs were uncertain of Soviet intentions since the Soviets invaded to bolster the Afghan Communist Party (whose attempted coup was failing). Oil affects world politics; the creation of OPEC led to Arab stability, moving them beyond the communist or capitalist spheres. This fence-sitting allowed the Arabs to gain economic power over the West and the Soviets, while losing nothing.[3]

Soviet foreign policy

The relationship between the USSR and the Middle East focused on its rivalry with the Turks, mistrust of the Persians, and the Afghan conflict. Under Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviets were inconsistent in their Middle Eastern policies and mistrusted by the Arabs. The Arabs viewed the Soviets as anti-imperialistic (since the Russian Revolution overthrew the Russian monarchy) and, after Arab setbacks following the Arab-Israeli wars, as bureaucrats concerned solely with Soviet interests.[4] Soviet inconsistency and their weapon inferiority to the West were the main reasons for the Arabs distancing themselves from Moscow and returning to the West.[5] The Soviets tried to slow (if not halt) the flow of Arab petroleum to the West.[6] After the Six-Day War, the Soviet Union became a major player in the Middle East as its proxy countries dragged it deeper into Mideast political intrigue. The Soviets provided continued support to their Arab allies in their struggle with Israel.[7] Moscow's policy changed after the Yom Kippur War as it used its client states to act out aggression toward the West in the Iran–Iraq War. The Soviets were a strongman in the Middle East, interceding to maintain tensions as a distraction to the West.[8] Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East emphasized the Arab nations and their interaction with the West. Moscow had little use for the region except to distract Washington from Berlin early in the Cold War.[9] John S. Badeau wrote about the background of Soviet-American relations with the Arabs after World War II in Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science.[10]

Soviet-Arab relations

The Soviet policy of favoring one Arab group often drove the others towards the West. Increased Soviet favoritism towards Iraq and Syria pushed Egypt and Saudi Arabia (former Soviet allies) back towards the West. The Soviets used a stick-and-carrot approach to persuade the Arabs into joining their sphere of influence, although the Arab League maintained closer ties with religion. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan severely reduced their popularity and credibility in the Arab world.[11] Although Moscow initially reaped rewards from its involvement in the Arab world, it lost diplomatic trust through its missteps and lackluster policies. In addition to their invasion of Afghanistan, their most notable mistake was to initially support both Iran and Iraq during their early-1980s war before only supporting Iran. This cost Iran the diplomatic respect of the Arab nations, pushing it further towards the West.

Tensions in the Middle East

The Arab world dealt with social tensions through conflict, which the Soviets used to drive wedges between the Arabs and the West. The Middle East (the birthplace of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity) is a key supplyier of petroleum.[12] Arab nationalism affected relations between Iran and the rest of the Arab world; unlike the other Arab countries, it was not colonized by the Western powers (who viewed it as a buffer state with the Soviet Union) after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire following World War I and saw itself as equal to the Europeans.[13] The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created further tension with its support of fledgling Communist regimes while attacking an Islamic nation.

Shuttle diplomacy

Shuttle diplomacy was instrumental in brokering a Middle Eastern peace. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger spent considerable time at Middle Eastern peace talks as a neutral party. He explained the reasons behind the need to pull out of Vietnam, which complicated the Middle Eastern talks and the nascent nuclear-nonproliferation-treaty talks. President Richard Nixon used the Sino-Soviet split to begin ending the Cold War by breaking down political and economic barriers between the U.S. and China, further isolated the Soviets.[14] Kissinger spoke about his roles in brokering peace between the Arabs and Israelis and ending the nuclear-arms race.[15] Nixon also became a key player in Middle East peace talks, ignoring Dwight D. Eisenhower's non-interventionism and hoping that his reputation for ending the Vietnam War, brokering the first nuclear-arms treaty and opening China to American trade would overshadow the Watergate scandal.[16]

Camp David Accords and aftermath

The Arab-Israeli peace process was complex during the Soviet era. Although the Soviets were reluctant to join the American-backed peace movement (since they wanted a divided West), the cost of the arms race was beginning to bankrupt the Soviet Union.[11] Strained relations among the parties stalled the initial negotiations, exacerbated by American-North Vietnamese peace negotiations.[17] Moscow was limited in the peace talks because it did not recognize Israel diplomatically, which enabled the United States to talk to both sides.[8]

The U.S. responded to Soviet influence in the Middle East after the Camp David Accords by using economic sanctions to influence the Arab world.[18] Geopolitics transitioned from post-Cold War polarization to 21st-century regional conflicts. The lack of two superpowers destabilized the Middle East as pressure-relieving, limited proxy conflicts grew into greater conflicts which spawned genocide.[19]

References

  1. ↑ Hurewitz, J. C. "The Un and Disimperialism in the Middle East". International Organization. 19 (3): 749–763. JSTOR 2705880.
  2. ↑ Lingyu, Lu; Thies, Cameron. "War, Rivalry, and State Building in the Middle East". Political Research Quarterly. 66 (2): 239–53. JSTOR 23563141.
  3. ↑ Issawi, Charles (1973). "Oil and Middle East politics". Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science. 31 (2): 111–122. doi:10.2307/1173574. JSTOR 1173574.
  4. ↑ "Soviet Policy in the Middle East". Journal of Palestine Studies. 9 (1): 161–164. 1979. doi:10.2307/2536332. JSTOR 2536332.
  5. ↑ Wheeler, G. E. (1959). "Russia and the Middle East". International Affairs. 35 (3): 295–304. doi:10.2307/2612281. JSTOR 2612281.
  6. ↑ Reedman, Robert O. "Patterns of Soviet Policy towards the Middle East". The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 482: 40–64. JSTOR 1046382.
  7. ↑ "Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence". Journal of Palestine Studies. 5 (3/4): 241–247. 1976. doi:10.2307/2536039. JSTOR 2536039.
  8. 1 2 Freedman, Robert O. "Patterns of Soviet policy towards the Middle East". The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 482: 40–64. JSTOR 1046382.
  9. ↑ Smolansky, Oles M. (1974). The Soviet Union and the Arab East Under Khrushchev. Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Press.
  10. ↑ Badeau, John S. "Internal Contest in the Middle East". Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science. 29: 3. JSTOR 1173196.
  11. 1 2 Smolansky, O. M. (1978). "The United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East". Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science. 33 (1): 99. doi:10.2307/1173976. JSTOR 1173976.
  12. ↑ Lengyel, Emil. "Social Tension in the Middle East". The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 276: 28–34. JSTOR 1027657.
  13. ↑ Grady, Henry Francis (1952). "Tensions in the Middle East with Particular reference to Iran". Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science. 24 (4): 114–121. doi:10.2307/1173511. JSTOR 1173511.
  14. ↑ Kissinger, Henry (1979). The White House Years. Boston: Brown And Company. pp. 340–631, 1258–1300.
  15. ↑ Kissinger, Henry (1982). Years of Upheaval. Boston: Brown and Company.
  16. ↑ Nixon, Richard M. (1978). The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset and Dunlap. pp. 297–1015.
  17. ↑ Hunter, Henry (1971). "In the Middle in the Middle East". Foreign Policy. 5 (5): 137–150. doi:10.2307/1147724. JSTOR 1147724.
  18. ↑ Lawson, Fred (1984). "The Reagan Administration in the Middle East". MERIP Reports. 128 (128): 27. doi:10.2307/3011188. JSTOR 3011188.
  19. ↑ Lieven, Dominic. "Western Scholarship on the Rise and Fall of the Soviet Regime: the View from 1993". Journal of Contemporary History. 29 (2): 195–227. JSTOR 260888.
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