Nuclear Freeze campaign

The Nuclear Freeze campaign was a mass movement in the United States during the 1980s intended to place political pressure on the United States and the Soviet Union to mutually freeze the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons.[1][2][3] The movement is based on a memorandum titled "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race," and it quickly gained grassroots support.[4] The movement went on to have limited national success despite criticism from many, including President Ronald Reagan, but ultimately lost momentum due to various proposals put forth by Reagan.[4]

Background of the Nuclear Freeze Movement

Various freeze proposals occurred throughout the Cold War, with the first suggestion being a freeze on fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons in the mid-1950s, as found in letters between Eisenhower and Bulganin.[4] Concrete policy proposals began in the 1960s, with a formal proposal from the United States to the Soviet Union for a partial freeze on the number of both offensive and defensive nuclear vehicles.[4] However, this was rejected by the Soviet Union due to fears that it would freeze the Soviet Union into strategic inferiority.[4] In 1970, the US Senate passed a non-binding resolution calling for both superpowers to suspend further development of nuclear strategic weapons systems, both offensive and defensive, during the SALT I negotiations.[4]

The first agreements, known as SALT I and SALT II, were signed by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1972 and 1979, respectively, and were intended to restrain the arms race in strategic (long-range or intercontinental) ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons.[5] These negotiations were first suggested by Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967. Of the resulting complex of agreements (SALT I), the most important were the Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Systems and the Interim Agreement and Protocol on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons. Both were signed by President Richard M. Nixon for the United States and Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, for the U.S.S.R. on May 26, 1972, at a summit meeting in Moscow.[5] These limitations prevented either party from defending more than a small fraction of its entire territory, and thus kept both sides subject to the deterrent effect of the other’s strategic forces.[6] The Interim Agreement was seen essentially as a holding action, designed to complement the ABM Treaty by limiting competition in offensive strategic arms and to provide time for further negotiations. The agreement essentially freezes at existing levels the number of Strategic ballistic missile launchers, operational or under construction, on each side, and permits an increase in Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) launchers up to an agreed level for each party only with the dismantling or destruction of a corresponding number of older Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) or SLBM launchers.[7] This agreements helped improve relations between the United States and the USSR and led to further agreements such as SALT II. The SALT II Treaty curtailed manufacturing, put a reduction on strategic forces, and banned new missile programs.[5] But renewed tensions between the superpowers prompted Carter to remove the treaty from Senate consideration in January 1980, after the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan.[5]

Throughout this period, other arms proposals suggested would also qualify as partial freezes.[4] Concerns over nuclear weapons continued to grow through the late 1970s, but the movement remained fragmented.[8] While figures like Rev. Theodore Hesburgh and Rev. Billy Graham had discussed the dangers of nuclear war, the combination of a conservative and nationalist tone in the country and the fractured nature and goals of activist groups resulted in little progress towards concrete action.[8]

Nuclear Freeze Movement in the United States

Fears over nuclear war rose in the late 70s and early 80s, peaking in the US between 1981 and 1983 with 50% of Americans estimating that nuclear war was "very likely" or "fairly likely" in the next ten years.[9] Additionally, while 43% of Americans rated their chance of survival in nuclear war as "poor" in 1961, by 1984, the number had risen to 77%.[9] With an increase in anxiety over nuclear war, there was an increased desire for activism.

Randall Forsberg and "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race"

The origin of the nuclear freeze movement is broadly credited to Randall Forsberg, who was the executive director of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament studies, which was a think tank she founded in 1980 with the aim of reducing the risk of war and minimizing the burden of U.S. military spending.[10] She used her background to become the author of a 1980 public memorandum "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race."[4] This arms-control proposal called for both the United States and Soviet Union to stop the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons as a first step towards lowering nuclear tensions.[8] The memorandum built on the work of groups such as the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), Mobilization for Survival, Clergy and Laity Concerned (CALC), the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), and personal experience while working for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and reading about failed agreements between the US and USSR.[11]

The accessible goal set forth in the memorandum became a widely accepted rallying point. The memorandum was moderate and simple in order to appeal to both peace activists and ordinary people concerned about the threat of the arms race but unwilling to risk national defense.[8] Forsberg framed a nuclear freeze as a logical choice, claiming that the two countries owned more than 50,000 nuclear weapons with plans to build 20,000 more.[11] The memorandum also argued against the more widely accepted idea of deterrence, arguing that adding more nuclear weapons to the world would only increase the chance of nuclear war.[11] Additionally, Forsberg argued that a nuclear weapons freeze would result in a large amount of fiscal savings, going on to detail the social and economic benefits of various alternative domestic spending options.[11]

After "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race" was published, it was endorsed by various leaders, intellectuals, and activists. Political figures, such as George Ball, Clark Clifford, William Colby, Averell Harriman, and George Kennan, came forward to support the idea. Scientists also supported the proposal, including Linus Pauling, Jerome Wiesner, Bernard Feld, Jonas Salk, and Carl Sagan.[11]

Public anxieties from the late 1970s to mid 1980s stimulated a boom in anti-nuclear literature and media. Anti-nuclear literature, which had previously commanded a modest market became abundant as authors worked to galvanize the Nuclear Freeze Campaign and were inspired by it in turn.[12] Jonathan Schell wrote a series of essays, “The Fate of the Earth,” which became a cornerstone of the Nuclear Freeze Campaign and was actively promoted by the campaign founder Randall Forsberg. Schell’s essays asserted in plain, direct language that nuclear war was more an extinction event than a proper war. He rejected the notion of nuclear survivalism with his visceral depictions of aftermath.[12] Ground Zero founder Roger Molander wrote a novel called, “Nuclear War: What's in it For You?”. It follows a fictional family in the aftermath of a hypothetical, yet possible, nuclear war scenario and explores the history of contemporary concerns regarding nuclear war.[12] Both books were intentionally published to be available at a low prices to illuminate their true activist purposes.[12] While Roger Molander's efforts did not directly endorse the Nuclear Freeze Campaign they undoubtedly supported its message. In fact proponents of the campaign, Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) and Mark Hatfield co-opted Ground Zero Week to publish “Freeze! How you Can Help Prevent Nuclear War.” This book was markedly political in its nature and provides tools for readers to directly impact public policy and elections. Despite some harsh criticism, the book helped catalyze the New York City Freeze rally of June 12, 1982.[12] At the end of 1982, the nuclear book boom was largely calmed by Reagan administration START propaganda efforts from March to November of 1982.[12]

Despite Reagan administration efforts to subdue the campaign, popular media continued to bolster the sentiments of the movement beyond the book boom. Notably, Carl Sagan and colleagues controversially published and promoted work on nuclear winter. The idea of nuclear winter was utilized aggressively by Sagan and nuclear freeze activists to once again dispel the notion of survivalism in a manner similar to Jonathan Schell with “The Fate of the Earth.”[12] In 1983 the film, "The Day After" deeply moved and captivated American audiences. The film followed the citizens of Kansas City and its rural outskirts, a typical Midwestern college city, during and after a hypothetical nuclear war scenario. It portrayed the instant death of many citizens as well as their struggle to cope with radiation poisoning and nuclear winter as a result of fallout. This film deeply impacted the psyche of Reagan, who personally believed in the abolition of all nuclear weapons. He held a screening event for the film, yet it was scarcely attended.[13]

The campaign pulled on notable works from outside the U.S. for support. These works include “Unforgettable Fire,” a Japanese collection of illustrations of the Hiroshima bombing aftermath created by survivors. This project began in 1976 as an initiative from the Japanese public-broadcasting network NHK to collect illustrated accounts from bombing survivors. Six years later the collection was published and toured in the U.S. to great success and became powerful evidence often cited by the Nuclear Freeze Campaign.[12]

Grassroots Support

Despite the proliferation of nuclear weapons being an international issue, initial efforts to advance the movement focused on alerting and educating at a local level. Activists distributed vast quantities of literature about the nuclear arms race and brought freeze resolutions before affiliated organizations while securing signatures on freeze petitions and placing freeze referendum on town, city and state ballots nationwide.[14] "Think globally, act locally" served as a motto of the campaign.[15] One difference between the nuclear freeze campaign and previous activist movements was the strong emphasis on education, expanding the number of people interested in the campaign. For example, on Veteran's Day in 1981, the Union for Concerned Scientists held teach-ins in 150 schools, and in April 1981, Ground Zero mobilized one million Americans in high schools and colleges to circulate petitions, listen to debates, or watch films.[16]

After obtaining various peace groups' endorsements, a freeze resolution was first placed on the November 1980 election ballot in towns of western Massachusetts. With the leadership of Randy Kehler, Frances Crowe, and other local activists, the resolution passed in 59 out of the 62 towns.[3] In March 1981, the first national conference of the freeze movement convened at the Center for Peace Studies at Georgetown University. In general, freeze activism was stronger in Northern and Western states than in the more conservative South. Nevertheless, by mid-1982 it had taken root in three-quarters of the nation’s Congressional districts.[1] In March 1982, 88 percent of the 180 Vermont town meetings voted to support a bilateral nuclear weapons freeze between the United States and the Soviet Union.[15] Furthermore, by November 1983, the freeze had been endorsed by more than 370 city councils, 71 county councils, and by one or both houses of 23 state legislatures.[1]

When the freeze campaign delivered its petitions to the U.S. and Soviet missions to the United Nations in 1982, they contained the signatures of more than 2,300,000 Americans. Moreover, that fall, when freeze referendum appeared on the ballot in 10 states, the District of Columbia, and 37 cities and counties around the nation, voters delivered a victory to the freeze campaign in nine of the states and in all but three localities. Covering about one-third of the U.S. electorate, this was the largest referendum on a single issue in U.S. history.[14]

National Impact

Results from public opinion polls taken in 1982 and 1983 were virtually identical showing an average of 72 percent support and 20 percent opposition to the nuclear weapons freeze campaign.[14] On June 12, 1982, the largest peace rally in United States' history was held concurrently with the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament with approximately one million participants.[14][15] Many major United States religious bodies, such as the National Council of Churches, the Roman Catholic Church, the United Presbyterian Church, the United Methodist Church, the Episcopalians, the Lutherans, and the Synagogue Council of America endorsed the campaign.[1] Hundreds of national organizations, many of which had never before taken a stand on national defense issues—came out in favor of the freeze. They included the American Association of School Administrators, the American Association of University Women, the American Nurses Association, the American Pediatric Society, the American Public Health Association, Friends of the Earth, the National Council of La Raza, the National Education Association, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and the Young Women’s Christian Association.[14]

In March 1982, a plan to introduce a freeze resolution in Congress was announced by United States' Democratic Sens. Edward Kennedy and Mark Hatfield.[14] The freeze campaign contributed to Democrats adding 26 seats during the 1982 midterm elections.[17] Additionally, freeze resolutions passed in eight of the nine states where it was on the ballot in the 1982 election.[16] In 1984 it became part of the Democratic Party’s presidential campaign platform.[17]

However, national success was limited. The freeze legislation passed in the House of Representatives was drafted by opponents of the movement, leading it to be called a "phony freeze" by activists.[11][12] The legislation was debated for more than 42 hours with large numbers of amendments and counter-amendments, but the legislation ultimately led to a substantially weakened resolution. The resolution was passed by the House with a vote of 278 to 149 on May 4, 1983, but five months later, a similar measure was rejected by the Senate with a vote of 58 to 40.[16]

Parallels in Global Activism

Anti-nuclear activism was common in Europe during this time, and Europe was a likely choice for any nuclear conflict.[11] Europeans were even more concerned about the prospects for nuclear war, given the 1979 decision between the United States and its NATO allies to deploy nearly six hundred nuclear missiles across Western Europe.[17] Unease grew in 1979 with the stationing of Pershing II missiles in five European countries, and anxieties increased with Reagan's more confrontational rhetoric.[11] In response to the growing threats, demonstrations were held in 1981 and 1982 in cities such as Bonn, London, Paris, Rome, and Amsterdam, with hundreds of thousands of participants.[11] The US freeze movement maintained close contact with European Nuclear Disarmament (END) and other groups more focused on European missiles, with speakers going between the groups and rallies coordinated whenever possible.[11]

While the European and American movements in support of a nuclear moratorium mostly overlapped in their methods, aims, and anxieties on account of the prospect of a potentially endless arms race, European activists more generally supported bolder, more generally unilateral political moves in the direction of peace as opposed to the Americans' more measured approach of intensive, tortuous negotiations.[18]

Collaboration between transnational organizations was a necessity in order for the nuclear weapons freeze campaign to be successful. When Randall Forsberg officially launched the campaign, an International Task Force was formed to serve as representation of the campaign outside the United States. The International Task Force first focused on lobbying the freeze resolution to the United Nations.[15] Two resolutions went before the United Nation's General Assembly, the closest resolution to the United States was sponsored by Mexico and Sweden. Calling for a multilateral freeze, the second resolution was sponsored by India.[15] Despite opposition by the United States, both resolutions were passed by the United Nation's General Assembly by significant margins. Results from the vote showed the majority of the world supported a moratorium on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The United Nations vote contributed to the mounting political pressure on the United States and Soviet Union to halt the nuclear arms race. Despite the initial success at the global level, the International Task Force was disbanded to focus on advancing the movement at a local level.[15] Abandoning the initial success at the global level proved to be a missed opportunity to advance the movement and influence global policy.[15]

Criticism

A key argument against the nuclear freeze movement was an action that would leave the Soviet Union in a state of superiority.[11] While a 1980 New York Times/CBS poll showed that 72 percent of Americans would support a nuclear freeze, roughly the same number of Americans opposed the idea if it would allow for a Soviet weapons advantage.[11] William Buckley painted freeze supporters as Communist dupes, with other critics and commentators arguing that activists were simply naive.[11] Polling data showed that about 66 percent of Americans believed the Soviet Union to be stronger militarily, with a majority opposing cuts to military spending.[12]

While traditionally right-wing organizations were an obvious source of contentiousness, the pragmatic nature of a campaign merely to limit nuclear proliferation was a cause for much disagreement among the diversity of interests advocating for various degrees of demilitarization and nuclear non-proliferation. Concerning this central dilemma of strategically balancing mass-appeal with left-wing sincerity, Forsberg noted prophetically (before Reagan's unexpected advocacy of nuclear non-proliferation) that the movement's success relied on more than those with a "pacifist-vegetarian anti-corporate value system."[19]

The grassroots nature of the movement also led to controversy. Some critics argued that matters of national security and national policy should be left to experts and federal policymakers, especially in forums dedicated to local matters.[11]

Ronald Reagan

Ronald Reagan's administration was initially a staunch opponent of the movement.[14] According to Reagan's administration, the campaign was a danger to national security and was initiated by "foreign agents".[14][20] Reagan's extreme military and nuclear policies were often used by Democrats as a rallying point.[20] In 1982, the administration tried to prevent freeze referenda at state and local levels. They succeeded in defeating a freeze resolution in the Senate in 1983. The Reagan administration failed to defeat a resolution that passed the House of Representatives in 1983 but succeeded in weakening the resolution with various amendments.[20]

Despite these initial efforts to defeat the campaign, Reagan later began publicly declaring his opposition to nuclear war and began to reevaluate his nuclear policies.[14] By December 1982, the anti-nuclear movement had continued to grow, and public support for increasing military spending had dropped 60 percent in the span of two years.[8] In an attempt to decrease public fear of a nuclear war, Reagan launched his Strategic Defense Initiative.[21] Reagan's administration disapproved of his switch of rhetoric and his Strategic Defense Initiative, however, Reagan remained persistent.

Facing even further public support for a nuclear freeze the Reagan administration undertook a propaganda effort to co-opt the language of and defuse the Nuclear Freeze Campaign.[22] The Reagan administration expressed its support for the sentiment of the Nuclear Freeze Campaign, but asserted that a unilateral domestic freeze would be dangerous and unrealistic without any verifiable cooperation from the Soviet Union.[12] START was proposed as a formula for the cooperative winding down of nuclear armament development between the USSR the U.S. At the time of proposal START served as a fairly insincere demonstration of the administration's willingness to negotiate with the USSR on a winding-down of nuclear armaments. Its desired effect, to slow down the Nuclear Freeze Campaign, while maintaining a steady build in nuclear weapons capacity, was largely achieved.[22] This is shown in the Senate failure of a freeze resolution in 1983, and a marked decline of the nuclear book boom beginning after November 1982. Previously prolific anti-nuclear literature then met only modest sales.[12] The initiative, perhaps ironically, spawned a legacy of initiatives when it was signed as treaty on July 31, 1991, which included the briefly lived START II treaty and New START treaty.[12]

Legacy

1984 United States Presidential Election

Prior to the 1984 election, the Democratic strategy was to ensure the party and the Democratic nominee endorsed the nuclear weapons freeze campaign to gain support from freeze advocates.[21] Even though she declined, Democratic candidate Reverend Jesse Jackson went as far as asking Randall Forsberg to serve as an official adviser. All Democratic candidates excluding Ruben Askew publicly supported the campaign.[21] Democratic candidate Walter Mondale won the bid for the Democratic nominee. Mondale's opponent was incumbent President Ronald Reagan. Because of Reagan's shift in rhetoric and Walter Mondale's lack of distinction in policy, Reagan eventually went on to win reelection in a landslide.[21] Reagan won the 1984 election with 512 more Electoral votes and 16,878,000 more popular votes.[23]

Fragmented Growth

While the movement appeared to have peaked in 1982, the component organizations of the movement continued to grow. Various groups found it increasingly different to agree upon goals and strategies, especially after the 1984 election.[24] Even as early as 1983, freeze supporters tended to disagree on the specifics of what a freeze would entail, such as when it would begin and what weapons would be included.[16] As it lost momentum, the divided movement also returned to tactics more characteristic of activism prior to the nuclear freeze movement, such as civil disobedience, direct action, symbolic demonstrations, and electoral campaigns. The activity was generally viewed as separate from one another rather than unified under the nuclear freeze proposal.[24] The return to more traditional protest methods and legislative action meant decreased visibility in the media, as a significant portion of attention given to the movement was due to its large amount of mobilization. This lack of media coverage also led to decreased mobilization and fracturing of the movement.[24]

See also

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 Wittner, Lawrence S. (December 5, 2010). "The Nuclear Freeze and Its Impact". Arms Control Association.
  2. ↑ "The Nuclear Freeze campaign prevented an apocalypse, so can the climate movement". Waging Nonviolence. Retrieved 2018-04-04.
  3. 1 2 Lanham, Andrew (2017-03-14). "Lessons from the Nuclear Freeze". Boston Review. Retrieved 2018-04-04.
  4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Committee on International Security and Arms Control (1985). Nuclear Arms Control: Background and Issues. The National Academies Press. p. 81. doi:10.17226/11.
  5. 1 2 3 4 "Strategic Arms Limitation Talks". Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved 2018-04-17.
  6. ↑ "Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty | international treaty". Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved 2018-04-17.
  7. ↑ "Interim Agreement". U.S. Department of State. Retrieved 2018-04-17.
  8. 1 2 3 4 5 FitzGerald, Frances (2000). Way out there in the blue : Reagan, Star Wars, and the end of the Cold War. New York: Simon & Schuster. pp. 145–209. ISBN 0684844168. OCLC 42935776.
  9. 1 2 Schatz, Robert T.; Fiske, Susan T. (1992). "International Reactions to the Threat of Nuclear War: The Rise and Fall of Concern in the Eighties". Political Psychology. 13 (1): 1–29. doi:10.2307/3791421. JSTOR 3791421.
  10. ↑ "War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Missile Experimental; Interview with Randall Forsberg, 1987". openvault.wgbh.org. Retrieved 2018-04-17.
  11. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Martin, Bradford (2011). The other eighties : a secret history of America in the age of Reagan (1st ed.). New York: Hill and Wang. pp. 3–24. ISBN 9780809074617. OCLC 640132143.
  12. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 M.,, Knoblauch, William. Nuclear Freeze in a Cold War : the Reagan Administration, Cultural Activism, and the End of the Arms Race. Amherst. ISBN 9781625342744. OCLC 966256565.
  13. ↑ Emanuel), Hoffman, David E. (David (2010). The dead hand : the untold story of the Cold War arms race and its dangerous legacy (1st Anchor books ed.). New York: Anchor Books. ISBN 9780307387844. OCLC 503042133.
  14. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Wittner, Lawrence S. (December 5, 2010). "The Nuclear Freeze and Its Impact". Arms Control Association. Retrieved April 4, 2018.
  15. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Smith, Jackie; Chatfield, Charles; Pagnucco, Ron (1997). Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press. p. 159.
  16. 1 2 3 4 Hayes, Michael T. (1987). "Incrementalism as Dramaturgy: The Case of the Nuclear Freeze". Polity. 19 (3): 443–463. doi:10.2307/3234798. JSTOR 3234798.
  17. 1 2 3 "Nuclear Freeze Movement - Dictionary definition of Nuclear Freeze Movement | Encyclopedia.com: FREE online dictionary". www.encyclopedia.com. Retrieved 2018-04-17.
  18. ↑ The Nuclear weapons freeze and arms control. Miller, Steven E., American Academy of Arts and Sciences., John F. Kennedy School of Government. Center for Science and International Affairs. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger. 1984. ISBN 0887300103. OCLC 10559114.
  19. ↑ 1953-, Hogan, J. Michael, (1994). The nuclear freeze campaign : rhetoric and foreign policy in the telepolitical age. East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press. ISBN 0870133675. OCLC 44958389.
  20. 1 2 3 Lanham, Andrew (March 14, 2017). "Lessons From the Nuclear Freeze". The Boston Review. Retrieved April 5, 2018.
  21. 1 2 3 4 Meyer, David S. (1990). A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics. New York, NY: Praeger Publishers. pp. 247–260. ISBN 0-275-93305-9.
  22. 1 2 McGovern, George (1988-06-01). "Congress and the Nuclear Freeze: An Inside Look at the Politics of a Mass Movement. By Douglas C. Waller. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987. xxi + 346 pp. Cloth, $30.00; paper, $12.95.)". Journal of American History. 75 (1): 315–316. doi:10.2307/1889787. ISSN 0021-8723.
  23. ↑ "Presidential Election of 1984". Retrieved 2018-04-17.
  24. 1 2 3 Meyer, David S. (1993). "Institutionalizing Dissent: The United States Structure of Political Opportunity and the End of the Nuclear Freeze Movement". Sociological Forum. 8 (2): 157–179. JSTOR 684633.

M., Knoblauch, William. Nuclear Freeze in a Cold War : the Reagan Administration, Cultural Activism, and the End of the Arms Race. Amherst. ISBN 9781625342744. OCLC 966256565.

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