Daniel Ortega

Daniel Ortega
58th and 62nd President of Nicaragua
Assumed office
January 10, 2007
Vice President Jaime Morales Carazo (2007-2012)
Moisés Omar Halleslevens (2012-2017)
Rosario Murillo (2017-present)
Preceded by Enrique Bolaños
In office
January 10, 1985  April 25, 1990
Vice President Sergio Ramírez Mercado (1985-1990)
Preceded by Himself (Coordinator of the Junta of National Reconstruction)
Succeeded by Violeta Chamorro
Coordinator of the Junta of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua
In office
July 18, 1979  January 10, 1985
Preceded by Francisco Urcuyo (Acting President)
Succeeded by Himself (President)
Personal details
Born José Daniel Ortega Saavedra
(1945-11-11) November 11, 1945
La Libertad, Nicaragua
Political party FSLN
Spouse(s) Rosario Murillo (2005–present)
Children 8

José Daniel Ortega Saavedra (Spanish pronunciation: [daˈnjel oɾˈteɣa]; born November 11, 1945) is a Nicaraguan politician serving as President of Nicaragua since 2007; previously he was leader of Nicaragua from 1979 to 1990, first as Coordinator of the Junta of National Reconstruction (1979–1985) and then as President (1985–1990). A leader in the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, FSLN), his policies in government have seen the implementation of leftist reforms across Nicaragua.

Born into a working-class family, from an early age Ortega opposed ruling President Anastasio Somoza Debayle, widely recognized as a dictator, and became involved in the underground movement against his regime. Joining the Sandinistas as a student in 1963, Ortega’s urban resistance activities led to his arrest in 1967.[1] After his release in 1974, he also travelled to Cuba to receive training in guerilla warfare from Fidel Castro's Marxist–Leninist government. He played a crucial role in forming the Insurrectionist faction, which united the FSLN and sparked the mass uprisings of 1978-1979.[2] After the Nicaraguan Revolution resulted in the overthrow and exile of Somoza's government, Ortega became leader of the ruling multipartisan Junta of National Reconstruction. In 1984, Ortega, the FSLN candidate, won Nicaragua's free presidential election with over 60 percent of the vote.[1] A Marxist–Leninist, his first period in office was characterized by a controversial program of nationalization, land reform, wealth redistribution and literacy programs.

Ortega's relationship with the United States was never very cordial, due to U.S. support for Somoza prior to the revolution.[3][4] Although the U.S. supplied post-revolution Nicaragua with tens of millions of dollars in economic aid,[5] relations broke down when the Sandinistas supplied weapons to leftist Salvadoran rebels (something which Ortega later admitted occurred).[6] His government was opposed by the Contras in a vicious civil war; the Contras were funded by the Reagan administration of the United States. A joint peace proposal by the Democratic Speaker of the House Jim Wright and Ronald Reagan helped precipitate a peace agreement at a meeting of five Central American chiefs of state in July 1987, which won Costa Rican President Óscar Arias the Nobel Peace Prize. This led to free elections in which Ortega was defeated by Violeta Chamorro in the 1990 presidential election, but he remained an important figure in Nicaraguan opposition politics, gradually moderating in his political position from Marxism–Leninism to democratic socialism. Also, he restored relations with the Catholic Church, with adoption of anti-abortion policies.

Ortega was an unsuccessful candidate for president in 1996 and 2001, before winning the 2006 presidential election.[7] In office, he made alliances with fellow Latin American socialists, such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, and under his leadership, Nicaragua joined the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas.

As of April 19, 2018, Amnesty International and the IACHR of the Organization of American States stated that Ortega has engaged in a violent oppression campaign against protesters,[8][9] while government officials and government-owned media have denied such actions.

Early life

Ortega was born in La Libertad, department of Chontales, Nicaragua. His parents, Daniel Ortega Cerda and Lidia Saavedra, were opposed to the regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle. His mother was imprisoned by Somoza's National Guard for being in possession of "love letters" which the police stated were coded political missives. Ortega and his two brothers, Humberto Ortega, former general, military leader, and published writer, and Camilo Ortega, grew to become revolutionaries. He also had a sister named Germania who is also deceased.[10][11]

The search for stable employment took the family from La Libertad to the provincial capital of Juigalpa, and then on to a working-class neighborhood in Managua.[12] Daniel Ortega Cedra detested U.S. military intervention in Nicaragua and Washington's support for the Somoza dictatorship, and he imparted the anti-American sentiment to his sons.[12]

Ortega was arrested for political activities at the age of 15,[13] and quickly joined the then-underground Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN).[14] In 1964, Ortega travelled to Guatemala, where the police arrested him and turned him over to the Nicaraguan National Guard.[15] After his release from detainment, Ortega arranged the assassination of his torturer, Guardsman Gonzalo Lacayo, in August 1967.[15] He was imprisoned in 1967 for taking part in robbing a branch of the Bank of America while brandishing a machine gun, telling collaborators that they should be killed if they did not partake in the robbery.[11][16] Ortega was released in late 1974 along with other Sandinista prisoners in exchange for Somocista hostages. While he was imprisoned at the El Modelo jail, just outside Managua, he wrote poems, one of which he titled "I Never Saw Managua When Miniskirts Were in Fashion".[16] During his imprisonment, Ortega was severely tortured.[17] While at El Modelo, his mother helped stage protests and hunger strikes for political prisoners, which improved the treatment of incarcerated Sandinistas.[18] After his release, Ortega was exiled to Cuba, where he received several months of guerrilla training. He later returned to Nicaragua secretly.[19]

In the late 1970s, divisions over the FSLN's campaign against Somoza led Daniel and Humberto Ortega to form the Insurrectionist, or Tercerista (Third Way) faction.[2] The Terceristas sought to combine the distinct guerrilla war strategies of the two other factions, Tomas Borge's Guerra Prolongada Popular (GPP or Prolonged People's War), and Jaime Wheelock's Proletarians.[20] The Ortega brothers forged alliances with a wide array of anti-Somoza forces, including Catholic and Protestant activists and other non-Marxist civil society groups.[21] The Terceristas became the most effective faction in wielding political and military strength, and their push for FSLN solidarity received the support of reputable revolutionary leaders like Fidel Castro.[20]

Ortega married Rosario Murillo in 1979 in a secret ceremony.[22] and moved to Costa Rica with her three children from a previous marriage.[23] Ortega remarried Murillo in 2005 to have the marriage recognized by the Roman Catholic Church. The couple has eight children,[24] three of them together.[13] She is currently the government's spokeswoman and a government minister, among other positions.[25][26] Ortega adopted stepdaughter Zoilamérica Narváez in 1986, through a court case.[27]

Sandinista revolution (1979–1990)

When Somoza was overthrown by the FSLN in July 1979, Ortega became a member of the five-person Junta of National Reconstruction, which also included Sandinista militant Moisés Hassan, novelist Sergio Ramírez, businessman Alfonso Robelo, and Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, the widow of a murdered journalist. In September 1979, United States President Carter hosted Ortega at the White House, and warned him against arming other Central American leftist guerrilla movements.[28] At the time, Ortega spoke truthfully by denying Sandinista involvement in neighboring countries.[28] When Ortega questioned the Americans about C.I.A. support for anti-Sandinista groups, Carter and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher called the reports false.[28] After the meeting, Carter asked Congress for $75 million in aid to Nicaragua, contingent on the Sandinista government’s promise not to aid other guerrillas.[29]

The FSLN came to dominate the junta, Robelo and Chamorro resigned, and in 1981 Ortega became the coordinator of the Junta.[30] As the only member of the FSLN National Directorate in the Junta, he was the effective leader of the country. The FSLN embarked upon an ambitious programme of social reform upon attaining power. 5 million acres of land were redistributed to about 100,000 families, a literacy drive was launched, and health improvements were carried out which got rid of polio and reduced other diseases.[31] The Sandinista nationalization efforts mostly affected banks and industries owned by the Somoza family.[32] More than half of all farms, businesses, and industries remained in private hands, as the revolutionary government still wanted to preserve a mixed economy and support private sector investment.[32] The Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP) opposed the Sandinistas’ economic reform.[33] The main organization of Nicaraguan big business was composed of prosperous families from the Pacific coast cities, who dominated commerce and banking.[34] Ortega took a very hard line against opposition to his policies: On February 21, 1981, the Sandinista army killed 7 Miskito Indians and wounded 17.[35] Forced displacement has also been documented to have occurred with the native population: 10,000 individuals had been moved by 1982.[35] Thousands of Indians took refuge in Honduras and 14,000 were imprisoned in Nicaragua. Anthropologist Gilles Bataillon termed this "politics of ethnocide" in Nicaragua.[36] The Indians formed two rebel groups – the Misura and Misurasata. They were joined in the north by Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) and in the south by former Sandinistas and peasantry who under the leadership of Edén Pastora were resisting forced collectivization.[35]

In 1980 the Sandinista government launched the massive Nicaraguan Literacy Campaign, and claimed the illiteracy rate fell from 50% to 13% in the span of five months; these figures are disputed, as many "unteachable" illiterates were omitted from the statistics, and because many people declared literate turned out to be unable to read or write a simple sentence. The UNESCO rewarded Nicaragua the Nadezhda K. Krupskaya prize in recognition of its efforts.[37] The FSLN also focused on improving the Nicaraguan health system, particularly through vaccination campaigns and the construction of public hospitals, and halved child mortality[38] to 40 deaths per thousand.[39] By 1982, the World Health Organization deemed Nicaragua a model for primary health care.[33]

In 1981, United States President Ronald Reagan accused the FSLN of joining with Soviet-backed Cuba in supporting Marxist revolutionary movements in other Latin American countries such as El Salvador. People within the Reagan administration authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to begin financing, arming and training rebels, some of whom were former officers from Somoza's National Guard, as anti-Sandinista guerrillas. These were known collectively as the Contras. This also led to one of the largest political scandals in US history, (the Iran–Contra affair), when Oliver North and several members of the Reagan administration defied the Boland Amendment, selling arms to Iran and then using the proceeds to fund the Contras. The Contra war would claim 30,000 lives.[40] The tactics used by the Sandinista government to fight the Contras have been criticized by some historians for their suppression of civil rights. On March 15, 1982, the Junta declared a state of siege, which allowed it to close independent radio stations, suspend the right of association and limit the freedom of trade unions. Nicaragua's Permanent Commission on Human Rights condemned Sandinista human rights violations, accusing them of killing and disappearing thousands in the first few years of the war.[41][42] However, some historians accuse the Contras of having a far poorer Human Rights Record during the same period, with documented cases of murder, rape and torture used to terrorize the rural population. The Contras engaged in destruction of schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure, in order to disrupt the social reform programs of the Sandinistas.[43][44]

At the 1984 general election Ortega won the presidency with 67% of the vote and took office on January 10, 1985. In the early phases of the campaign, Ortega enjoyed many institutional advantages, and used the full power of the press, police, and Supreme Electoral Council against the fractured opposition.[45] In the weeks before the November election, Ortega gave a U.N. speech denouncing talks held in Rio de Janeiro on electoral reform.[46] But by October 22, the Sandinistas signed an accord with opposition parties to reform electoral and campaign laws, making the process more fair and transparent.[47] While campaigning, Ortega promoted the Sandinistas’ achievements, and at a rally claimed that “Democracy is literacy, democracy is land reform, democracy is education and public health.”[48] International observers judged the election to be the first free election held in the country in more than half a century. A report by an Irish governmentary delegation stated: "The electoral process was carried out with total integrity. The seven parties participating in the elections represented a broad spectrum of political ideologies." The general counsel of New York's Human Rights Commission described the election as "free, fair and hotly contested." A study by the US Latin American Studies Association (LASA) concluded that the FSLN (Sandinista Front) "did little more to take advantage of its incumbency than incumbent parties everywhere (including the U.S.) routinely do." However some people described the election as "rigged". According to a detailed study, since the 1984 election was for posts subordinate to the Sandinista Directorate, the elections were no more subject to approval by vote than the Central Committee of the Communist Party is in countries of the East Bloc.[49]

Thirty-three percent of the Nicaraguan voters cast ballots for one of six opposition parties—three to the right of the Sandinistas, three to the left—which had campaigned with the aid of government funds and free TV and radio time. Two conservative parties captured a combined 23 percent of the vote. They held rallies across the country (a few of which were disrupted by FSLN supporters) and blasted the Sandinistas in harsh terms. Most foreign and independent observers noted this pluralism in debunking the Reagan administration charge—ubiquitous in the US media—that it was a "Soviet-style sham" election.[50] Some opposition parties boycotted the election, allegedly under pressure from US embassy officials, and so it was denounced as being unfair by the Reagan administration.[51][52] Reagan thus maintained that he was justified to continue supporting what he referred to as the Contras' "democratic resistance".[53]

In opposition (1990–2007)

In the 1990 presidential election, Ortega lost his reelection bid to Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, his former colleague in the junta. Chamorro was supported by the US and a 14-party anti-Sandinista alliance known as the National Opposition Union (Unión Nacional Oppositora, UNO), an alliance that ranged from conservatives and liberals to communists. Ortega campaigned on the slogan, "Everything Will Be Better," and promised that, with the Contra war over, he could focus on the nation's recovery.[54] Contrary to what most observers expected,[55] Chamorro shocked Ortega and won the election. Chamorro's UNO coalition garnered 54 percent of the vote, and won 51 of the 92 seats in the National Assembly.[56] Immediately after the loss, the Sandinistas tried to maintain unity around their revolutionary posture.[57] In Ortega's concession speech the following day he vowed to keep "ruling from below" a reference to the power that the FSLN still wielded in various sectors. He also stressed his belief that the Sandinistas had the goal of bringing "dignity" to Latin America, and not necessarily to hold on to government posts. In 1991, Ortega claimed elections were “an instrument to reaffirm” the FSLN’s “political and ideological positions,” and also “confront capitalism.”[57] However, the electoral loss led to pronounced divisions in the FSLN. Some members adopted more pragmatic positions, and sought to transform the FSLN into a modern social democratic party engaged in national reconciliation and class cooperation.[20] Ortega and other party insiders found common ground with the radicals, who still promoted anti-imperialism and class conflict to achieve social change.[20]

Possible explanations for his loss include that the Nicaraguan people were disenchanted with the Ortega government as well as the fact that already in November 1989, the White House had announced that the economic embargo against Nicaragua would continue unless Violeta Chamorro won.[58] Also, there had been reports of intimidation from the side of the contras,[59] with a Canadian observer mission claiming that 42 people were killed by the contras in "election violence" in October 1989.[60] This led many commentators to assume that Nicaraguans voted against the Sandinistas out of fear of a continuation of the contra war and economic deprivation.

From July 19–21, 1991, the FSLN held a National Congress to mend the rifts between members and form a new overarching political program.[61] The effort failed to unite the party, and intense debates over the internal governance of the FSLN continued. The pragmatists, led by the former vice president Sergio Ramirez, formed the basis of a "renovating" faction, and supported collaboration with other political forces to preserve the rule of law in Nicaragua.[61] Under the leadership of Ortega and Tomas Borge, the radicals regrouped into the "principled" faction, and branded themselves the Izquierda Democratica (ID), or Democratic Left (DL).[61] The DL fought the Chamorro government with disruptive labor strikes and demonstrations, and renewed calls for the revolutionary reconstruction of Nicaraguan society.[62] During the May 20–23, 1994, extraordinary congress, Ortega ran against a fellow National Directorate member, Henry Ruiz, for the position of party secretary-general.[63] Ortega was elected with 287 to Ruiz's 147 votes, and the DL secured the most dominant role in the FSLN.[63]

On September 9, 1994, Ortega gained more power after taking over Sergio Ramirez’s seat in the Asemblea Sandinista (Sandinista Assembly).[61] Ramirez had served as chief of the FSLN’s parliamentary caucus since 1990, but Ortega came to oppose his actions in the National Assembly, setting the stage for Ramirez’s removal.[63] Historic leaders, such as Ernesto Cardenal, a former minister of culture in the Sandinista government, rejected Ortega’s consolidation of power: “My resignation from the FSLN has been caused by the kidnapping of the party carried out by Daniel Ortega and the group he heads.”[63] The party formally split on January 8, 1995, when Ramirez and a number of prominent Sandinista officials quit.[61]

Ortega ran for election again, in October 1996 and November 2001, but lost on both occasions to Arnoldo Alemán and Enrique Bolaños, respectively. In these elections, a key issue was the allegation of corruption. In Ortega's last days as president, through a series of legislative acts known as "The Piñata", estates that had been seized by the Sandinista government (some valued at millions and even billions of US dollars) became the private property of various FSLN officials, including Ortega himself.[64]

In the 1996 campaign, Ortega faced the Liberal Alliance (Alianza Liberal), headed by Arnoldo Aleman Lacayo, a former mayor of Managua.[65] The Sandinistas softened their anti-imperialist rhetoric, with Ortega calling the U.S. “our great neighbor,” and vowing to cooperate “within a framework of respect, equality, and justice.”[65] The image change failed, as Aleman’s Liberal Alliance came first with 51.03 percent of the vote, while Ortega’s FSLN secured 37.75 percent.[66]

Ortega's policies became more moderate during his time in opposition, and he gradually changed much of his former Marxist stance in favor of an agenda of democratic socialism. His Roman Catholic faith has become more public in recent years as well, leading Ortega to embrace a variety of socially conservative policies; in 2006 the FSLN endorsed a strict law banning all abortions in Nicaragua.[67] In the run-up to the 2006 elections, Ortega displayed his ties to the Catholic Church by renewing his marriage vows before Cardinal Miguel Obanda y Bravo.[68]

Ortega was instrumental in creating the controversial strategic pact between the FSLN and the Constitutional Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Constitucionalista, PLC). The controversial alliance of Nicaragua's two major parties is aimed at distributing power between the PLC and FSLN, and preventing other parties from rising. After sealing the agreement in January 2000, the two parties controlled the three key institutions of the state: the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Electoral Council.[61] "El Pacto," as it is known in Nicaragua, is said to have personally benefited former presidents Ortega and Alemán greatly, while constraining then-president Bolaños. One of the key accords of the pact was to lower the percentage necessary to win a presidential election in the first round from 45% to 35%, a change in electoral law that would become decisive in Ortega's favor in the 2006 elections.

At the Fourth Ordinary Congress of the FSLN, held March 17–18, 2002, Ortega eliminated the National Directorate (DN).[61] Once the main collective leadership body of the party, with nine members, the DN no longer met routinely, and only three historic members remained.[61] Instead, the body just supported decisions already made by the secretary-general.[61] Ortega sidelined party officials and other members while empowering his own informal circle, known as the ring of iron.[61]

2001 presidential election

Under Ortega’s direction, the FSLN formed the broad National Convergence (Convergencia Nacional) coalition to defeat the PLC in the 2001 elections.[69] Ortega abandoned the revolutionary tone of the past, and infused his campaign with religious imagery. In speeches, he gave thanks to “God and the Revolution” for the post-1990 democracy, and claimed a Sandinista victory would enable the Nicaraguan people to “pass through the sea and reach the Promised Land.”[70] The U.S. opposed Ortega’s candidacy from the beginning. The U.S. ambassador even made an appearance with the PLC’s Enrique Bolanos while distributing food aid.[71] The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks doomed Ortega’s chances, as the threat of a U.S. invasion became an issue. Bolanos convinced many Nicaraguans that the renewed U.S. hostility towards terrorism would endanger their country if the openly anti-U.S. Ortega prevailed.[72] Bolanos ended up with 56.3 percent of the vote, and Ortega won 42.3 percent.[73]

2006 presidential election

In 2006, Daniel Ortega was elected president with 38% of the vote. This occurred despite the fact that the breakaway Sandinista Renovation Movement continued to oppose the FSLN, running former Mayor of Managua Herty Lewites as its candidate for president. Ortega personally attacked Lewites’ Jewish background, compared him to Judas, and warned he “could end up hanged.”[74] However, Lewites died several months before the elections.

Ortega emphasized peace and reconciliation in his campaign, and selected a former Contra leader, Jaime Morales Corazo, as his running mate.[75] The FSLN also won 38 seats in the congressional elections, becoming the party with the largest representation in parliament. The split in the Constitutionalist Liberal Party helped allow the FSLN to become the largest party in Congress; however, the Sandinista vote had a minuscule split between the FSLN and MRS, and that the liberal party combined is larger than the Frente Faction. In 2010, several liberal congressmen raised accusations about the FSLN presumably attempting to buy votes to pass constitutional reforms that would allow Ortega to run for office for the 6th time since 1984.[76]

Second presidency (2007–present)

Presidential styles of
Daniel Ortega
Reference style Daniel Ortega, Presidente de la República de Nicaragua Daniel Ortega, President of the Republic of Nicaragua
Spoken style Presidente Ortega President Ortega
Alternative style Señor Presidente Mister President

Soon after his inauguration, Ortega paid an official visit to Iran and met Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Ortega told the press that the "revolutions of Iran and Nicaragua are almost twin revolutions...since both revolutions are about justice, liberty, self-determination, and the struggle against imperialism."[77] Since the start of his second presidency, various measures have been introduced to combat hunger and to improve access to healthcare, education,[78] credit,[79] and social security.[80] In addition, other reforms have been carried out, including an enhancement of labour rights,[81] the introduction of low-interest loans and training for female micro-entrepreneurs in rural areas,[82] and the distribution of transport subsidies, scholarships, medicine, land titles, and housing materials throughout the population.[78] Altogether, these policies have helped to reduce high levels of poverty and inequality in Nicaragua.[83][84][85][86][87][88][89] Ortega placed the first lady, Rosario Murillo, in charge of the Citizens’ Power Councils (CPCs), designed to implement his anti-poverty social policies.[61] The CPCs also undermined municipal autonomy, as they effectively functioned as local governments by determining the distribution of public goods and services.[90]

In June 2008 the Nicaraguan Supreme Court disqualified the MRS and the Conservative Party from participation in municipal elections.[91] In November 2008, the Supreme Electoral Council received national and international criticism following irregularities in municipal elections, but agreed to review results for Managua only, while the opposition demanded a nationwide review.[92] For the first time since 1990, the Council decided not to allow national or international observers to witness the election.[93][94] Instances of intimidation, violence, and harassment of opposition political party members and NGO representatives have been recorded.[95] Official results show Sandinista candidates winning 94 of the 146 municipal mayoralties, compared to 46 for the main opposition Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC).[96] The opposition claimed that marked ballots were dumped and destroyed, that party members were refused access to some of the vote counts and that tallies from many polling places were altered.[97] As a result of the fraud allegations, the European Union suspended $70m of aid, and the US $64m.[98]

With the late-2000s recession, Ortega in 2011 characterised capitalism as in its "death throes" and portrayed the Bolivarian Alternative for the People of Our America (ALBA) is the most advanced, most Christian and fairest project.[99] He also said God was punishing the United States with the financial crisis for trying to impose its economic principles on poor countries. "It's incredible that in the most powerful country in the world, which spends billions of dollars on brutal wars ... people do not have enough money to stay in their homes."[100]

Before the National Sandinista Council held in September 2009, Lenin Cerna, the secretary of the party organization, called for diversifying its political strategies.[61] He declared the FSLN’s future depended on implementing new plans, “so that the party can advance via new routes and in new ways, always under Ortega’s leadership.”[61] Ortega gained power over the selection of candidates, allowing him to personally choose all candidates for public office.[61]

During an interview with David Frost for the Al Jazeera English programme Frost Over The World in March 2009, Ortega suggested that he would like to change the constitution to allow him to run again for president.[101] In Judicial Decision 504, issued on October 19, 2009, the Supreme Court of Justice of Nicaragua declared portions of Articles 147 and 178 of the Constitution of Nicaragua inapplicable; these provisions concerned the eligibility of candidates for president, vice-president, mayor, and vice-mayor—a decision that had the effect of allowing Ortega to run for reelection in 2011.[102]

For this decision, the Sandinista magistrates formed the required quorum by excluding the opposition magistrates and replacing them with Sandinista substitutes, violating the Nicaraguan constitution.[103] Opposing parties, the church and human rights groups in Nicaragua denounced the decision.[104][105][106] Throughout 2010, court rulings gave Ortega greater power over judicial and civil service appointments.[90]

While supporting abortion rights during his presidency during the 1980s, Ortega has since embraced the Catholic Church's position of strong opposition.[107] While non-emergency abortions have long been illegal in Nicaragua, recently even abortions "in the case where the pregnancy endangers the mother's life", otherwise known as therapeutic abortions have been made illegal in the days before the 2006 election, with a six-year prison term in such cases, too—a move supported by Ortega.[108]

Ortega and his supporters celebrating his victory in the 2011 elections.

Ortega himself denies that the abortion legislation outlaws medical procedures necessary to save the woman's life if they result in the termination of pregnancy. "The medical Procedural Code, he says, is not affected by the law, and requires doctors to do what is necessary to save a woman's life if it is threatened by conditions related to her pregnancy." He claims that the accusations that the abortion laws outlaw medical procedures necessary to save the life of the mother are part of "a media war".[109]

Ortega was re-elected president with a vote on November 6 and confirmation on November 16, 2011.[110] During the election, the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) blocked both domestic and international poll observers from multiple polling stations.[90] According to the Supreme Electoral Council, Ortega defeated Fabio Gadea, with 63 percent of the vote.[90]

Daniel Ortega in 2013.

In January 2014 the National Assembly, dominated by the FSLN, approved constitutional amendments that abolished term limits for the presidency and allowed a president to run for an unlimited number of five-year terms. Although billed as a measure to ensure stability, critics charged that the amendments threatened Nicaraguan democracy.[111] The constitutional reforms also gave Ortega the sole power to appoint military and police commanders.[90]

As of 2016, Ortega's family owns three of the nine free-to-air television channels in Nicaragua, and controls a fourth (the public Channel 6). Four of the remaining five are controlled by Mexican mogul Ángel González, and are generally considered to be aligned with Ortega's ruling FSLN party. There are no government restrictions on Internet use; the Ortega administration attempted to gain complete control over online media in 2015, but failed due to opposition from civil society, political parties, and private organizations.[112]

In June 2016, the Nicaraguan supreme court ruled to oust Eduardo Montealegre, the leader of the main opposition party, leaving the main opposition coalition with no means of contesting the November 2016 national elections.[113] In August 2016, Ortega chose his wife, Rosario Murillo, as his vice-presidential running-mate for re-election.[114]

According to the Washington Post, figures announced on November 7, 2016 put Daniel Ortega in line for his third consecutive term as President, also being his fourth term overall. The Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) reported Ortega and Murillo won 72.4 percent of the vote, with 68 percent turnout.[115] The opposition coalition had called the election a "farce" and had called for the boycott of the election. International observers were not allowed to observe the vote. Nevertheless, according to the BBC, the autocratic Ortega was the most popular candidate by far, possibly due to Nicaragua's stable economic growth and lack of violence compared to its neighbours El Salvador and Honduras in recent years.[116]

In April 2018, student protests over a nature reserve fire expanded to cover an unpopular social security decree. The protesters were violently set upon by the state sponsored Sandinista Youth.[117] Despite attempts by Ortega's government to hide the incident through censorship off all private-owned news outlets, photos and videos of the violence made their way to social media where they sparked outrage and urged more Nicaraguans to join in on the protests.[118][119][120] Tensions escalated quickly, as police began using mustard gas canisters and rubber bullets, and eventually live ammunition on unarmed protesters.[121] Authorities were also seen arming Sandinista Youth members with weapons to serve as paramilitary forces.[121] Dozens of student protesters were subsequently killed. Despite the withdrawal of the unpopular decree, the protests continue, with most protesters demanding Ortega's and his cabinet's resignations. As the protests continue, support for the Ortega-Murillo regime dwindles.[122]

On May 30, Nicaragua’s Mother’s Day, a march attended by over 300,000 people took place. It was held to honor the mothers of students killed in the recent protests. The demonstration was peaceful, attended by children, mothers and retirees. Yet Ortega's regime ordered sharpshooters, perched at the National Stadium to shoot indiscriminately at the marchers, resulting in the deaths of 15 civilians, one of them in the hands of his own mother. This event has been dubbed by Nicaraguans as the "Mother's Day Massacre".[123][124][125][126]

As of July 3, 2018, the Death Toll has reached 309 people. With no peaceful solution in sight, Ortega clings to power despite the growing unrest.[127]

Foreign policy

Ortega with Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in Russia on December 18, 2008.

On March 6, 2008, following the 2008 Andean diplomatic crisis, Ortega announced that Nicaragua was breaking diplomatic ties with Colombia "in solidarity with the Ecuadorian people".[128] Ortega also stated, "We are not breaking relations with the Colombian people. We are breaking relations with the terrorist policy practiced by Álvaro Uribe's government".[129] The relations were restored with the resolution at a Rio Group summit held in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, on March 7, 2008. At the summit Colombia's Álvaro Uribe, Ecuador's Rafael Correa, Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and Ortega publicly shook hands in a show of good-will. The handshakes, broadcast live throughout Latin America, appeared to signal that a week of military buildups and diplomatic repercussions was over. After the handshakes, Ortega said he would re-establish diplomatic ties with Colombia. Uribe then quipped that he would send him the bill for his ambassador's plane fare.[130][131]

On May 25, 2008, Ortega, upon learning of the death of FARC guerrilla leader Manuel Marulanda in Colombia, expressed condolences to the family of Marulanda and solidarity with the FARC and called Marulanda an extraordinary fighter who battled against profound inequalities in Colombia.[132][133] The declarations were protested by the Colombian government and criticized in the major Colombian media outlets.

On September 2, 2008, during ceremonies for the 29th anniversary of the founding of the Nicaraguan army, Ortega announced that "Nicaragua recognizes the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and fully supports the Russian government's position". Ortega's decision made Nicaragua the second country (after Russia) to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia.[134] A day after Venezuela recognised the two Republics, Nicaragua established diplomatic relations with Abkhazia, and followed this by establishing diplomatic links with South Ossetia. Embassies have been mooted, but as of 2013 these had not opened.[135]

When seeking office, Ortega threatened to cut ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan) in order to restore relations with the People's Republic of China (as in the period from 1985 to 1990). But he did not do so. In 2007 Ortega stated that Nicaragua did not accept the One China Policy of the PRC government and that Nicaragua reserved the right to maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan. He reassured President Chen Shui Bian in 2007 that Nicaragua would not break diplomatic relations with Taiwan. He explained that during the Reagan administration the United States imposed sanctions on Nicaragua. But cutting ties with Taiwan was a sad and painful decision because of the friendship between Nicaragua and Taiwan's people and government. Ortega met with Taiwan's President Ma Ying-jeou in 2009 and both agreed to improve the diplomatic ties between both countries.[136] However, with a trade show from China in Managua in 2010, he is attempting a two-track policy to get benefits from both sides. In 2016 Nicaragua and Taiwan signed an air services agreement and Ortega stated that Nicaragua's free trade deal with Taiwan had benefited both nations. Taiwan increased its investment in Nicaragua. In 2017 Ortega reaffirmed Nicaragua's diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[137]

In September 2010, after a US report listed Nicaragua as a "major" drug-trafficking centre, with Costa Rica and Honduras, Ortega urged the US Congress and Obama administration to allocate more resources to assist the fight against drug trafficking.[138][139]

During the Libyan Civil War, Ortega was among the very few leaders who spoke out in clear defense of the embattled Muammar Gaddafi.[140] During a telephone conversation between the two, Ortega told Gaddafi that he was "waging a great battle to defend his nation"[141] and stated that "it's at difficult times that loyalty and resolve are put to the test."[142]

Ortega has said that Assad's victory in the 2014 election is an important step to "attain peace in Syria and a clear cut evidence that the Syrian people trust their president as a national leader and support his policies which aim at maintaining Syria's sovereignty and unity".[143]

Environmental policy

In 2016, Daniel Ortega did not sign the Paris Agreement because he felt the deal did not do enough to protect the climate, although he later changed his mind. Moreover, Nicaragua rejected projects of mining of the Canadian group B2 Gold which could represent a threat to the environment.[144] According to government estimates, Nicaragua has passed from 25 percent renewable energy to 52 percent between 2007 and 2016.[145]

Electoral history of Daniel Ortega

1984 elections
Candidate Party/Alliance Votes %
José Daniel Ortega Saavedra Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) 735,967 66.97%
Clemente Guido Chavez Democratic Conservative Party of Nicaragua (PCDN) 154,327 14.04%
Virgilio Godoy Reyes Independent Liberal Party (PLI) 105,560 9.60%
Mauricio Díaz Dávila Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC) 61,199 5.56%
Allan Zambrana Salmerón Communist Party of Nicaragua (PC de N) 16,034 1.45%
Domingo Sánchez Salgado Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) 14,494 1.31%
Isidro Téllez Toruño Marxist-Leninist Popular Action Movement (MAP ML) 11,352 1.03%
Total valid votes 1,098,933 100%
Spoilt and invalid votes 71,209 6.09%
Total votes/Turnout 1,170,142 75.42%
Registered voters 1,551,597
Population 3,165,000
1990 elections
Candidate Party/Alliance % Votes
Violeta Barrios de Chamorro National Opposition Union (UNO) = National Conservative Party (PNC) / Popular Conservative Alliance (APC) / National Conservative Action (ACN) / Democratic Party of National Confidence (PDCN) / Independent Liberal Party (PLI) / Neoliberal Party (PALI) / Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC) / National Action Party (PAN) / Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) / Communist Party of Nicaragua (PC de N) / Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC) / Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN) / Social Democratic Party (PSD) / Central American Integrationist Party (PIAC) 54.74% 777,552
José Daniel Ortega Saavedra Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) 40.82% 579,886
Erick Ramírez Beneventes Social Christian Party (PCS) 1.18% 16,751
Moisés Hassán Revolutionary Unity Movement (MUR) 0.78% 11,136
Bonifacio Miranda Bengoechea Workers' Revolutionary Party (PRT) 0.60% 8,590
Isidro Téllez Toruño Marxist-Leninist Popular Action Movement (MAP ML) 0.57% 8,115
Fernando Agüero Rocha Social Conservative Party (PSC) 0.41% 5,798
Blanca Rojas Echaverry Central American Unionist Party (PUCA) 0.36% 5,065
Eduardo Molina Palacios Democratic Conservative Party of Nicaragua (PCDN) 0.32% 4,500
Rodolfo Robelo Herrera Independent Liberal Party for National Unity (PLIUN) 0.22% 3,151
Total valid votes 100% 1,420,544
Spoilt and invalid votes 5.97% 90,249
Total votes/Turnout 86.23% 1,510,838
Registered voters 1,752,088
Population 3,800,000
1996 elections
Candidate Party/Alliance Votes %
José Arnoldo Alemán Lacayo Liberal Alliance (AL) = Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC) / Independent Liberal Party for National Unity (PLIUN) / Nationalist Liberal Party (PLN) / Neoliberal Party (PALI) 896,207 50.99%
José Daniel Ortega Saavedra Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) 664,909 37.83%
Guillermo Osorno Nicaraguan Party of the Christian Path (PCCN) 71,908 4.09%
Noel Vidaurre Conservative Party of Nicaragua (PCN) 39,983 2.27%
Benjamin Ramón Lanzas Selva National Project (PRONAL) 9,265 0.53%
Sergio Ramírez Mercado Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) 7,665 0.44%
Francisco José Mayorga Balladares Bread and Strength Alliance (Pan y Fuerza) = National Action Party (PAN) / Republican Strength 96 Alliance (ASR) 7,102 0.40%
Francisco José Duarte Tapia National Conservative Action (ACN) 6,178 0.35%
Edgar Enrique Quiñónez Tuckler Nicaraguan Resistance Party (PRN) 5,813 0.33%
Andrés Abelino Robles Pérez Nicaraguan Workers, Peasants and Professionals Unity Party (PUNOCP) 5,789 0.33%
Virgilio Godoy Independent Liberal Party (PLI) 5,692 0.32%
Jorge Alberto Díaz Cruz National Justice Party (PJN) 5,582 0.32%
Alejandro Serrano Caldera Unity Alliance (AU) = Social Christian Party (PCS) / Revolutionary Unity Movement (MUR) / Social Democratic Party (PSD) 4,873 0.28%
Elí Altamirano Pérez Communist Party of Nicaragua (PC de N) 4,802 0.27%
Miriam Auxiliadora Argüello Morales Popular Conservative Alliance (APC) 4,632 0.26%
Ausberto Narváez Argüello Liberal Unity Party (PUL) 3,887 0.22%
Alfredo César Aguirre National Opposition Union 96(UNO 96) = National Democratic Party (PND) / Conservative Action Movement (MAC) / Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN) 3,664 0.21%
Allan Antonio Tefel Alba National Renovation Movement (MORENA) 2,641 0.15%
James Odnith Webster Pitts Democratic Action Party (PAD) 1,895 0.11%
Sergio Abilio Mendieta Castillo Central American Integrationist Party (PIAC) 1,653 0.09%
Moises Hassán Morales Renovating Action Movement (MAR) 1,393 0.08%
Gustavo Ernesto Tablada Zelaya Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) 1,352 0.08%
Roberto Urcuyo Muñoz Nicaraguan Democratic Party (PADENIC) 890 0.05%
Total valid votes 1,757,775 100%
Spoilt and invalid votes 91,587 4.95%
Total votes/Turnout 1,849,362 76.39%
Registered voters 2,421,067
Population 4,706,000
2001 elections
Candidate Party/Alliance Votes %
Enrique Bolaños Geyer Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC) 1,228,412 56.31%
José Daniel Ortega Saavedra Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) 922,436 42.28%
Alberto Saborío Conservative Party of Nicaragua (PC) 30,670 1.41%
Total valid votes 2,181,518 100%
2006 elections
 Summary of the 5 November 2006 Nicaragua presidential election results
Candidates - Parties Votes %
José Daniel Ortega Saavedra - Sandinista National Liberation Front 854,316 38.07
Eduardo Montealegre - Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance 650,879 29.00
José Rizo Castellón - Constitutionalist Liberal Party 588,304 26.21
Edmundo Jarquín Calderón - Sandinista Renovation Movement 144,596 6.44
Edén Atanacio Pastora Gómez - Alternative for Change 6,120 0.27
Total 2,244,215 100.0
The source is Consejo Supremo Electoral
2011 elections
  Summary of the 6 November 2011 Nicaraguan presidential election results
Candidates – Parties Votes %
José Daniel Ortega SaavedraSandinista National Liberation Front 1,569,287 62.46
Fabio Gadea MantillaIndependent Liberal Party 778,889 31.00
José Arnoldo Alemán LacayoConstitutionalist Liberal Party 148,507 5.91
Édgar Enrique Quiñónez Tuckler – Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance 10,003 0.40
Róger Antonio Guevara Mena – Alliance for the Republic 5,898 0.23
Total votes 2,512,584 100.00
Source: CSE
2016 elections
Candidate Party Votes %
José Daniel Ortega SaavedraSandinista National Liberation Front1,806,65172.44
Maximino Rodríguez MartínezConstitutionalist Liberal Party374,89815.03
José del Carmen AlvaradoIndependent Liberal Party112,5624.51
Saturnino Mirando Cerrato HogdsonNicaraguan Liberal Alliance107,3924.31
Erick Antonio Cabezas GranadosConservative Party57,4372.30
Carlos José CanalesAlliance for the Republic35,0021.40
Invalid/blank votes
Total2,493,942100
Registered voters/turnout
Source: CSE

Controversy

In Nicaragua, reviews of Ortega's presidency have not always been glowing, with many considering him a dictator. Many Nicaraguans, and prominent former sandinistas leaders, including Daniel Ortega's brother Humberto Ortega, have accused him of forgetting where he came from and catering to his own capitalist interests; calling his government monopolistic and authoritarian and denouncing him as a "Bloody Dictator".[146] The 2018 protests are symbolic of these tensions [147][148] with nearly 70% of Nicaraguans thinking Ortega should resign.[149]

Sexual abuse allegations

In 1998, Daniel Ortega's adopted stepdaughter Zoilamérica Narváez released a 48-page report[150] describing how, she alleged, Ortega had systematically sexually abused her from 1979, when she was 9, until 1990.[151][152] Ortega and his wife Murillo denied the allegations.[153] The case could not proceed in Nicaraguan courts, which have been consistently allied with Ortega,[154] because Ortega had immunity from prosecution as a member of parliament[155], and the five-year statute of limitations for sexual abuse and rape charges was judged to have been exceeded.[156] Narváez took a complaint to the Inter American Human Rights Commission, which was ruled admissible on October 15, 2001.[157] On March 4, 2002 the Nicaraguan government accepted the Commission's recommendation of a friendly settlement.[27]

Ortega continued to deny the allegations and Narváez withdrew the accusations in 2008, though she later renewed her complaints shortly after.[154][153] Following the 2016 election, Narváez continued to make the accusations saying that she had become an outcast of her family.[151]

References

  1. 1 2 Helicon, ed. (2016). Ortega Saavedra, Daniel. The Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia with Atlas and Weather Guide. Abington: Helicon.
  2. 1 2 Motyl, Alexander, ed. (2000). Ortega, Daniel. Encyclopedia of Nationalism: Leaders, Movements, and Concepts. Oxford: Elsevier Science & Technology.
  3. McClintock, Michael (1987). The American Connection.
  4. Chomsky, Noam (1985). Turning the Tide. Boston, Massachusetts: South End Press.
  5. "U.S. halts economic aid to Nicaragua", The New York Times, April 2, 1981.
  6. "Salvador Rebels: Where Do They Get the Arms", The New York Times, November 24, 1988,
  7. "Ortega wins Nicaraguan election", BBC News, November 8, 2006.
  8. "Document". www.amnesty.org. Retrieved 2018-06-14.
  9. "Document". www.oas.org. Retrieved 2018-06-14.
  10. "La Jornada – Jueves, 5 de Mayo de 2005". lajornadanet.com.
  11. 1 2 "Meet Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua's Rising Dictator". PanAm Post. August 16, 2016. Retrieved November 4, 2017.
  12. 1 2 Kinzer, Stephen (1991). Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 186.
  13. 1 2 "Five facts about Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega". Reuters. Retrieved 2008-01-15.
  14. "Daniel Ortega Saavedra, candidato presidencial del FSLN". La Prensa (in Spanish). 2007-05-10. Archived from the original on 2007-05-20. Retrieved 2007-05-11.
  15. 1 2 Kinzer, Stephen (1991). Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 187.
  16. 1 2 Vulliamy, Ed. "Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega; In the Lions' Den Again". Archived from the original on 2007-12-23. Retrieved 2008-01-15.
  17. Bernard Diederich, Somoza and the Legacy of U.S. Involvement in Central America, p. 85.
  18. Kinzer, Stephen (1991). Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 188.
  19. "Hispanic Heritage in the Americas: Ortega, Daniel". Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 2007-05-11.
  20. 1 2 3 4 Perez, Andres (1992). "The FSLN after the Debacle: The Struggle for the Definition of Sandinismo". Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. 34: 111–139. JSTOR 40925837.
  21. DeFronzo, James (2011). Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements (4th ed.). Boulder: Westview Press. p. 258.
  22. Reuters, November 1, 2006, FACTBOX-Five facts about Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega
  23. Vulliamy, Ed (September 2, 2001). "Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega; In the Lions' Den Again". London: The Observer. Retrieved 2008-01-15.
  24. "Cardenal Obando caso a Daniel Ortega y poetisa Rosario Murillo". Cardinal Rating. September 28, 2005. Archived from the original on March 28, 2007. Retrieved May 11, 2007.
  25. "Iran and Nicaragua in barter deal". BBC News. London. August 5, 2007. Retrieved 2007-10-05.
  26. "Nicaragua-Venezuela Talk Cooperation". Prensa Latina. Archived from the original on 2008-01-17. Retrieved 2008-01-15. ... Government minister and first lady, Rosario Murillo.
  27. 1 2 Envio, March 2002, No 248 Case 12,230: Zoilamérica Narváez vs. the Nicaraguan State
  28. 1 2 3 Kinzer, Stephen (1991). Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 80.
  29. Kinzer, Stephen (1991). Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 81.
  30. "Daniel Ortega", Encyclopædia Britannica (15th ed.), 1993
  31. Mastering Modern World History by Norman Lowe, second edition
  32. 1 2 DeFronzo, James (2011). Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements (4th ed.). Boulder: Westview Press. p. 263.
  33. 1 2 DeFronzo, James (2011). Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements (4th ed.). Boulder: Westview Press. p. 264.
  34. Baumeister, Eduardo (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley, eds. The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 250.
  35. 1 2 3 "ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTROVERSY", Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Retrieved October 14, 2014.
  36. "3 – Le Nicaragua (French)", Gilles Bataillon. Retrieved October 14, 2014.
  37. Dr. Ulrike Hanemann, Nicaragua’s literacy campaign, UNESCO Institute for Education, March 2005
  38. Times, Stephen Kinzer and Special To the New York. "CASUALTIES IN NICARAGUA: SCHOOLS AND HEALTH CARE".
  39. http://www.lecourrier.ch/141179/la_sante_c_est_d_abord_un_choix_politique_et_gouvernemental
  40. Thomas Walker, Nicaragua: Living in the Shadow of the Eagle, 4th Ed. (Westview Press, 2003)
  41. John Norton Moore, The Secret War in Central America (University Publications of America, 1987), p. 143
  42. Roger Miranda and William Ratliff, The Civil War in Nicaragua (Transaction, 1993), p.193.
  43. Chomsky, Noam (1985). Turning the Tide. Boston, MA: South End Press.
  44. Grandin & Joseph, Greg & Gilbert (2010). A Century of Revolution. Duke University Press.
  45. Kinzer, Stephen (1991). Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 242.
  46. Kinzer, Stephen (1991). Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 244.
  47. McConnell, Shelley (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley, eds. The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 127.
  48. Kinzer, Stephen (1991). Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 246.
  49. Martin Kriele, “Power and Human Rights in Nicaragua,” German Comments, April 1986, pp. 56–7, 63–7, a chapter excerpted from his Nicaragua: Das blutende Herz Amerikas (Piper, 1986). See also Robert S. Leiken, "The Nicaraguan Tangle", The New York Review of Books, December 5, 1985 and "The Nicaraguan Tangle: Another Exchange", The New York Review of Books, June 26, 1986; Alfred G. Cuzan, Letter, Commentary, December 1985 and "The Latin American Studies Association vs. the United States", Academic Questions, Summer 1994.
  50. 'The Sandinistas won't submit to free elections' Article from "Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting". November 1987
  51. Ronald Reagan. Remarks Following Discussions With President Jose Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador. May 16, 1984
  52. Neikirk, Bill; Coffey, Raymond (May 2, 1985). "Reagan Puts Embargo On Nicaragua To `Mend Their Ways`". Chicago, Illinois: Chicago Tribune. Retrieved August 31, 2015.
  53. "Aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance". U.S. Department of State Bulletin. October 1987. Archived from the original on 2009-06-28. Retrieved 2006-12-14.
  54. Kinzer, Stephen (1991). Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 389.
  55. Alma Guillermoprieto, The Heart That Bleeds: Latin America Now, pp. 23–25
  56. Marti i Puig, Salvador (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley, eds. The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 30.
  57. 1 2 Baltodano, Andres Perez (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley, eds. The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 70.
  58. "Bush Vows to End Embargo if Chamorro Wins", The Washington Post, November 9, 1989
  59. "The policy of keeping the contras alive ... also has placed in jeopardy the holding of elections by encouraging contra attacks on the electoral process. Thus, while the Bush administration proclaims its support for human rights and free and fair elections in Nicaragua, it persists in sabotaging both." As seen at: "Nicaragua" Human Rights Watch, 1990
  60. "U.S. trying to disrupt election in Nicaragua, Canadians report" The Toronto Star, October 27, 1989
  61. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Marti i Puig, Salvador; Wright, Claire (2010). "The Adaptation of the FSLN: Daniel Ortega's Leadership and Democracy in Nicaragua". Latin American Politics and Society. 52: 79–106. JSTOR 40925837.
  62. DeFronzo, James (2011). Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements (4th ed.). Boulder: Westview Press. p. 276.
  63. 1 2 3 4 Marti i Puig, Salvador (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley, eds. The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 35.
  64. Shirley Christian. "Managua Journal; Victor's Lament: To the Losers Belong the Spoils – New York Times". Nicaragua: Nytimes.com. Retrieved 2014-08-18.
  65. 1 2 Baltodano, Andres Perez (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley, eds. The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 72.
  66. Baltodano, Andres Perez (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley, eds. The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 73.
  67. "Nicaragua Eliminates Last Exception to Strict Anti-Abortion Law". The New York Times. November 20, 2006. Retrieved August 5, 2016.
  68. Baltodano, Andres Perez (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley, eds. The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,. p. 81.
  69. Baltodano, Andres Perez (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley, eds. The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 76.
  70. Baltodano, Andres Perez (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley, eds. The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 77.
  71. McConnell, Shelley (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley, eds. The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 142.
  72. DeFronzo, James (2011). Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements (4th ed.). Boulder: Westview Press. p. 280.
  73. McConnell, Shelley (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley, eds. The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 143.
  74. Baltodano, Andres Perez (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley, eds. The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 83.
  75. DeFronzo, James (2011). Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements (4th ed.). Boulder: Westview Press. p. 281.
  76. News Paper Article: La Prensa "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2013-10-19. Retrieved 2013-09-14.
  77. Nicaragua e Iran, "Unión Invencible" Hauser, Karim BBC Mundo, June 2007
  78. 1 2 "Latin American Program". Wilson Center. Retrieved 2014-08-18.
  79. Carroll, Eva (November 3, 2011). "Daniel Ortega set for Nicaragua election victory but heroic sheen wearing off". The Guardian. London.
  80. "may_briefing_eng". Tortillaconsal.com. Retrieved 2014-08-18.
  81. Archived August 1, 2016, at the Wayback Machine.
  82. Richard Feinberg (2011-11-02). "Daniel Ortega and Nicaragua's Soft Authoritarianism". Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 2014-08-18.
  83. "Nicaragua Under Daniel Ortega's Second Presidency: Daniel-Style Politics as Usual?". Coha.org. 2011-04-15. Retrieved 2014-08-18.
  84. Archived May 23, 2013, at the Wayback Machine.
  85. "Inter Press Service - News and Views from the Global South". Archived from the original on September 7, 2010. Retrieved August 5, 2016.
  86. Carroll, Rory (January 11, 2009). "Second Coming of the Sandinistas turns sour". The Guardian. London.
  87. Amplifier, Scoop (2011-04-05). "Nicaragua: FSLN victory in November will permit change | Scoop News". Scoop.co.nz. Retrieved 2014-08-18.
  88. "Re-election for Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, continent's poorest nation — MercoPress". En.mercopress.com. 2011-11-08. Retrieved 2014-08-18.
  89. "Nicaragua: 21st century Sandinismo – or losing the revolution?". Red Pepper. Retrieved 2014-08-18.
  90. 1 2 3 4 5 Thaler, Kai (2017). "Nicaragua: A Return to Caudillismo". Journal of Democracy. 28: 157–169 via Project MUSE.
  91. Robert Burbach, CounterPunch, February 27, 2009, Et Tu, Daniel? The Betrayal of the Sandinista Revolution Archived 2009-03-04 at the Wayback Machine.
  92. "Review follows election fraud allegations in Nicaragua". CNN. 2008-11-12. Retrieved 2008-11-14.
  93. "How to steal an election". The Economist. 2008-11-13. Retrieved 2008-11-14.
  94. "Conozca como Daniel Ortega preparo el fraude electoral". Retrieved 2009-03-03.
  95. Wood, Robert. "Irregularities in Nicaraguan Municipal Elections". US Department of State. Archived from the original on November 13, 2008. Retrieved 2008-11-14.
  96. Aleman, Filadelfo. "Nicaraguan opposition demands election review". Miami Herald.
  97. LA Times, November 20, 2008, Voter fraud allegations directed at Nicaragua's Sandinistas
  98. Daily Times (Pakistan), February 20, 2009, COMMENT: The Mugabe of Latin America  —Carlos R Chamorro Archived January 12, 2012, at the Wayback Machine.
  99. "Ortega Says Capitalism In Its Death Throes". 2008-01-11. Retrieved April 25, 2015. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega stated that the capitalism is in its death throes and the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) as the most advanced, Christian and fairest project.
  100. "Nicaragua's Ortega says crisis is God punishing U.S". Reuters. October 10, 2008.
  101. "Daniel Ortega". Retrieved April 25, 2015.
  102. "Global Legal Information Network". Archived from the original on July 8, 2012. Retrieved August 5, 2016.
  103. PH, Editor. "Presidente de la CSJ de Nicaragua tilda de "ilegal" reelección de Ortega". Retrieved October 30, 2011.
  104. Jarquin, Leyla. "Oposición toca a rebato". Retrieved October 30, 2011.
  105. San Martin, Nieves. "NICARAGUA: LA IGLESIA, CONTRA LA REELECCIÓN "ILEGAL" DE ORTEGA". Archived from the original on February 21, 2011. Retrieved October 30, 2011.
  106. EFE, International. "Núñez: "Reelección ilegal de Ortega aumenta persecución contra sociedad civil"". Retrieved October 30, 2011.
  107. Nicaragua brings in abortion ban: Nicaraguan President Enrique Bolaños has signed into law a ban on all abortions, even in cases when a woman's life is judged to be at risk November 18, 2006
  108. Abortion Outlawed in Nicaragua Ten Days Before Controversial Elections October 27, 2006
  109. "Nicaraguan President Denounces International Media for Campaign Against Country's Anti-Abortion Laws". Archived from the original on November 9, 2008. Retrieved August 5, 2009.
  110. "Nicaragua electoral body confirms Ortega win – Americas". Al Jazeera English. Retrieved 2014-08-18.
  111. "Nicaragua: Ortega allowed to run for third successive term". BBC News. Retrieved April 25, 2015.
  112. "Nicaragua Country report/Freedom of the Press/2016". freedomhouse.org. Retrieved August 4, 2016.
  113. Lakhani, Nina (June 26, 2016). "Nicaragua suppresses opposition to ensure one-party election, critics say". The Guardian. Retrieved August 4, 2016.
  114. "Nicaragua's President Picks Wife as Running Mate". NBC News. August 3, 2016. Retrieved August 4, 2016.
  115. Thaler, Kai (2017). "Nicaragua: A Return to Caudillismo". Journal of Democracy. 28: 157–169 via Project MUSE.
  116. "Nicaragua's Ortega re-elected president". BBC News. November 7, 2016. Retrieved November 29, 2017.
  117. "Peaceful Protests against Nicaraguan Social Security Reforms Violently Repressed". the Havana Times. April 19, 2018.
  118. "Nicaragua Roiled by Protests Over Social Security Benefits". The New York Times. April 20, 2018.
  119. "Facing censorship, Nicaraguan journalists and citizens turn to social media". ijnet. May 3, 2018.
  120. "Amidst unrest, Nicaraguan journalists use digital innovation to share information". ijnet. July 24, 2018.
  121. 1 2 "In Nicaragua, the political battle is moving from the streets to the negotiating table". the Miami Herald. May 2, 2018.
  122. "As Nicaragua Death Toll Grows, Support for Ortega Slips". The New York Times. May 4, 2018. Retrieved May 7, 2018.
  123. "Nicaragua Protests Grow Increasingly Violent, 100 Killed Since April". The New York Times. May 31, 2018. Retrieved May 31, 2018.
  124. "Protests on Nicaragua's Mother's Day turn deadly". CNN. June 1, 2018. Retrieved May 31, 2018.
  125. "Nicaragua: Violent attack on mass Mother's Day march in Managua". CNN. May 30, 2018. Retrieved May 30, 2018.
  126. "Estados Unidos condena masacre del Día de las Madres y pide una investigación inmediata". La Prensa. May 31, 2018. Retrieved June 23, 2018.
  127. "Nicaragua government agrees to international probe into deadly protests". CNN. June 18, 2018. Retrieved June 23, 2018.
  128. "Nicaragua breaks diplomatic relations with Colombia" March 6, 2008 CNN
  129. Mu, Xuequan. "Nicaragua breaks off relations with Colombian gov't". Xinhua News. Retrieved 2008-03-06.
  130. "Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela Agree to End Border Crisis". VOA. 2008-03-07. Archived from the original on 2008-03-09. Retrieved 2008-03-08.
  131. "Leaders say Colombia crisis over". London: BBC News. 2008-03-08. Retrieved 2008-03-08.
  132. Bridges, Tyler (2008-05-25). "Colombian rebels' loss of leader ends an era". Miami Herald.
  133. "Ortega expresa condolencias a FARC por muerte líder" (in Spanish). Reuters. 2008-05-25. Archived from the original on 2008-05-27.
  134. "Nicaragua recognizes South Ossetia and Abkhazia". rian.ru.
  135. "Abkhazia, S. Ossetia may soon open embassies in Nicaragua". rian.ru.
  136. "Ma Ying-jeou shouldn't meet Daniel Ortega". Retrieved August 5, 2016.
  137. Tim Rogers (January 14, 2011), Nicaragua seeks economic relations with China, archived from the original on 2011-07-21
  138. "U.S. adds three nations to drug-traffic-hub list – Americas – MiamiHerald.com".
  139. "transshipment point for cocaine destined for the US and transshipment point for arms-for-drugs dealing" Field Listing :: Illicit drugs, CIA, retrieved 2011-04-21
  140. "Live Blog – Libya Feb 22". Al Jazeera Blogs.
  141. Al Jazeera (February 24, 2011). Latin America divided over Gaddafi on YouTube.
  142. "Washington Post article".
  143. "syriatimes.sy - Nicaragua's Ortega Congratulates President Al-Assad on Winning Elections". syriatimes.sy.
  144. "Le Salvador devient le premier pays au monde à interdire les mines de métaux". Le Monde.fr.
  145. "Nicaragua Didn't Sign the Paris Agreement Because It Didn't Go Far Enough". Time.
  146. Press, Associated (May 5, 2018). "Ortega's repressive regime cannot survive — even his younger brother, a former Sandinista leader, says so". the Miami Herald.
  147. Press, Associated (April 23, 2018). "Nicaragua abandons social security changes after dozens killed in riots". the Guardian.
  148. "Nicaragua: Shoot to kill: Nicaragua's strategy to repress protest".
  149. "Nicaragua's unlikely opposition faces rocky road to defeat Ortega".
  150. (in Spanish) Zoilamerica Narvaez 48-page testimony about sexual abuse Archived 2014-10-26 at the Wayback Machine.; Zoilamerica Narvaez 48-page testimony about sexual abuse (in English)
  151. 1 2 Watts, Jonathan (November 4, 2016). "As Nicaragua's first couple consolidates power, a daughter fears for her country". The Guardian. Retrieved November 4, 2017.
  152. Time, March 23, 1998, An Ugly Family Affair: Charges of sexual abuse leveled against Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega swirl atop a power struggle
  153. 1 2 The Guardian, November 7, 2006, From comandante to caudillo
  154. 1 2 Margolis, Mac (May 20, 2013). "Nicaragua's President Accused of Sex Abuse by His Stepdaughter". The Daily Beast. Retrieved November 4, 2017.
  155. "Ortega faces sex abuse case from his stepdaughter". The Independent. Retrieved 2018-08-30.
  156. Picq, Manuela. "Ignoring sexual violence in Nicaragua". www.aljazeera.com. Retrieved 2018-08-30.
  157. "Nicaragua 12.230 - Admissible". Retrieved August 5, 2016.
Political offices
Preceded by
Francisco Urcuyo
as Acting President of Nicaragua
Coordinator of the Junta of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua
1979–1985
Succeeded by
Himself
as President of Nicaragua
Preceded by
Himself
as Coordinator of the Junta of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua
President of Nicaragua
1985–1990
Succeeded by
Violeta Chamorro
Preceded by
Enrique Bolaños
President of Nicaragua
2007–present
Incumbent
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.