Åklagaren v Fransson

19 The Court's settled case-law indeed states, in essence, that the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by European Union law, but not outside such situations. In this respect the Court has already observed that it has no power to examine the compatibility with the Charter of national legislation lying outside the scope of European Union law. On the other hand, if such legislation falls within the scope of European Union law, the Court, when requested to give a preliminary ruling, must provide all the guidance as to interpretation needed in order for the national court to determine whether that legislation is compatible with the fundamental rights the observance of which the Court ensures (see inter alia, to this effect, Case C‑260/89 ERT [1991] I‑2925, paragraph 42; Case C‑299/95 Kremzow [1997] ECR I‑2629, paragraph 15; Case C‑309/96 Annibaldi [2007] ECR I‑7493, paragraph 13; Case C‑94/00 Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I‑9011, paragraph 25; Case C‑349/07 Sopropé [2008] ECR I‑10369, paragraph 34; Case C‑256/11 Dereci and Others [2011] ECR I‑11315, paragraph 72; and Case C‑27/11 Vinkov [2012] ECR, paragraph 58).

20 That definition of the field of application of the fundamental rights of the European Union is borne out by the explanations relating to Article 51 of the Charter, which, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter, have to be taken into consideration for the purpose of interpreting it (see, to this effect, Case C‑279/09 DEB [2010] ECR I‑13849, paragraph 32). According to those explanations, 'the requirement to respect fundamental rights defined in the context of the Union is only binding on the Member States when they act in the scope of Union law'.

21 Since the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must therefore be complied with where national legislation falls within the scope of European Union law, situations cannot exist which are covered in that way by European Union law without those fundamental rights being applicable. The applicability of European Union law entails applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.

22 Where, on the other hand, a legal situation does not come within the scope of European Union law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on it and any provisions of the Charter relied upon cannot, of themselves, form the basis for such jurisdiction (see, to this effect, the order in Case C‑466/11 Currà and Others [2012] ECR, paragraph 26).

23 These considerations correspond to those underlying Article 6(1) TEU, according to which the provisions of the Charter are not to extend in any way the competences of the European Union as defined in the Treaties. Likewise, the Charter, pursuant to Article 51(2) thereof, does not extend the field of application of European Union law beyond the powers of the European Union or establish any new power or task for the European Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties (see Dereci and Others, paragraph 71).

24 in the case in point, it is to be noted at the outset that the tax penalties and criminal proceedings to which Mr Åkerberg Fransson has been or is subject are connected in part to breaches of his obligations to declare VAT.

25 in relation to VAT, it follows, first, from Articles 2, 250(1) and 273 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1), which reproduce inter alia the provisions of Article 2 of the Sixth Directive and of Article 22(4) and (8) of that directive in the version resulting from Article 28h thereof, and second, from Article 4(3) TEU that every Member State is under an obligation to take all legislative and administrative measures appropriate for ensuring collection of all the VAT due on its territory and for preventing evasion (see Case C‑132/06 Commission v Italy [2008] ECR I‑5457, paragraphs 37 and 46).